Skip to content

National Development Plan 2030: Our Future – Make It Work

Literature › Works

National Planning Commission (South Africa) (2012). National Development Plan 2030: Our Future – Make It Work. The Presidency, Republic of South Africa (Sherino Printers).

Type report
Scope Post-1994 South African economy
Method policy analysis
Period studied 1994–2030
Regions South Africa, Southern Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa
Themes transition post apartheid, inequality poverty unemployment, labour markets wages, macro fiscal finance debt, manufacturing industrial policy, agriculture land, demography urbanisation, education human capital, business and state
Citation key africa2012

Argument

The Commission argues that the post-apartheid transition has been a political success but that poverty, inequality and unemployment persist because of apartheid's legacy and weak implementation. It proposes eliminating poverty and cutting inequality by 2030 through faster growth above 5 percent, 11 million more jobs, better education, infrastructure investment, and a capable developmental state. Diagnosis rests on a 'low-growth, middle-income trap' with uncompetitive markets, a poor skills base, low savings and a large number of work-seekers shut out of the labour market. The document is a forward-looking policy plan. It contains little historical analysis of apartheid, but it asserts links between apartheid-era spatial, ownership and labour-market distortions and present outcomes.

Evidence and method

Commission diagnostic report (2011), government statistics (Statistics South Africa, Treasury Budget Reviews), ASSA demographic scenarios, World Bank/McKinsey/IMF reports, SAPS murder-docket sample, commissioned papers (e.g. Bhorat on labour markets), employment scenario modelling, and a public consultation (NPC Jam, 160+ engagements). The middle of the document (roughly chapters 4-10) was omitted from the text provided.

Findings

  • The Plan sets headline poverty and inequality targets for 2030. (p. 37)

    Reduce the proportion of households with a monthly income below R419 per person (in 2009 prices) from 39 percent to zero.

  • Inequality and employment targets: Gini and job creation. (p. 37)

    The Gini coefficient should fall from 0.69 to 0.6.

  • The economy is diagnosed as stuck in a low-growth, middle-income trap with four mutually reinforcing features. (p. 114)

    South Africa is in a low growth, middle income trap.

  • Investment collapsed from the early 1980s, leaving a missed generation of infrastructure. (p. 47)

    Investment spending in South Africa fell from an average of almost 30 percent of GDP in the early 1980s to about 16 percent of GDP by the early 2000s.

  • Formal agricultural employment contracted sharply over the long run. (p. 148)

    In 1971, there were 1.8 million people employed. This dropped to 1.2 million in 1995, and, dramatically, to just over 600 000 today

  • Mining's weight in the economy and workforce fell steeply. (p. 150)

    The collective share of direct mining activities of South Africa's GDP has declined from 21 percent in 1970 to only 6 percent in 2010.

  • Mining jobs declined from 1970 and stabilised at a lower level. (p. 150)

    The number of people employed directly in mining (excluding upstream and downstream industries) fell from 660 000 in 1970 to about 440 000 in 2004 and stabilised at that level.

  • Apartheid is named as the root cause of income inequality via distorted education, skills and service provision. (p. 358)

    The root cause of income inequality is the socioeconomic distortion introduced by apartheid, which constrained the development of education and skills

  • The apartheid rural reserve system created a dualistic agrarian structure. (p. 47)

    The apartheid system forced much of the African population into barren rural reserves.

  • Land reform has fallen far short of its 1994 target. (p. 144)

    By 2011, only 4.1 percent of land had been redistributed, most of which was state land.

  • Exports show rising value but falling volumes, suggesting weak firm responsiveness cushioned by commodity prices. (p. 129)

    Fig.3.3 shows rising value of South African exports since 2002, but falling volumes since 1996.