'An Historical and Persistent Interest': Britain and South Africa¶
James Barber (1991). 'An Historical and Persistent Interest': Britain and South Africa. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 67, No. 4. Blackwell Publishing for the Royal Institute of International Affairs.
| Type | journal article |
| Scope | Wider apartheid literature |
| Method | policy analysis |
| Period studied | 1940s–1991 |
| Regions | Britain, South Africa, Southern Africa |
| Themes | sanctions divestment, business and state, transition post apartheid, politics ideology elections, macro fiscal finance debt, inequality poverty unemployment |
| Citation key | barber1991 |
Argument¶
Barber surveys Britain's interests in South Africa (citizenship and right of abode, political, regional and economic) as apartheid ends after de Klerk's 1990 reforms. He argues that Britain's 'constructive engagement' under Thatcher gave it contacts and a claim to influence, although this cannot be proved or disproved. British economic stakes are real but modest, and a 'post-apartheid dividend' is easily exaggerated given political instability, a weak economy and limited access to capital markets. He sets out three options (step back, wait and see, push on) and endorses 'push on' with modest, practical help for the new South Africa. The argument draws on parliamentary evidence, business reports and commentators such as Coker and Leape.
Evidence and method¶
House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee evidence (Feb. 1991), statements by Douglas Hurd and Lynda Chalker, UKSATA and Overseas Trade Board material, SA Dialogue, Leape's Chatham House study (1991), Coker's World Today article, and a GNP table drawing on Strauss (SAIIA 1990).
Place in the debates¶
- Sanctions effectiveness vs constructive engagement (see Sanctions, disinvestment and the anti-apartheid movement). Notes the British government's claim that engagement and contacts helped bring reform, but says it cannot be proved or disproved. Treats the sanctions dispute as a clash of convictions, not a testable question.
- Will lifting sanctions bring a post-apartheid investment boom? (see Sanctions, disinvestment and the anti-apartheid movement). Sceptical. Argues the dividend can be exaggerated: investors need stability and profit prospects, and international capital markets are now less hospitable.
- Britain's future role in southern Africa (Coker vs obligation view). Rejects Coker's view that Britain will be marginal. Favours a continuing active role, 'push on', on grounds of interest and obligation.
Findings¶
-
British economic interests contracted under sanctions, but Britain remained a leading economic partner and the main foreign investor. (p. 8)
Britain is the main external investor in South Africa (both direct and indirect), with about half the total foreign stake; the real value, however, is difficult to determine
-
In 1990 Britain was South Africa's second largest trading partner, with roughly balanced two-way trade. (p. 8)
In 1990 it was the second largest, with a two-way flow totalling £2.2 billion, roughly in balance
-
The South African economy was in decline and formal-sector job creation had collapsed. (p. 10)
There has beena fall of 12.8 per cent in real GDP per capita since 1982, and while in the early 1970s more than 70 per cent of new entrants
-
The share of new labour-market entrants finding formal-sector work fell from over 70 per cent to 12.5 per cent by 1989. (p. 10)
by 1989 the proportion had dropped to only 12.5 per cent.
-
Barber describes a three-part economy (First, Second and Third World); the Second World of state control flourished under apartheid through job reservation, influx control and forced removals. (p. 9)
The Second World—of tight state control in pursuit of ideological aims—flourished with apartheid through such policies as job reservation, influx
-
The cost of racial parity in social services would be enormous. (p. 10)
it would cost £9 billion to create racial parity in education, housing and health by the year 2000.
-
Gold remained the largest export, but its price stayed low and access to foreign capital was limited. (p. 11)
is still clearly South Africa's largest export: 30 per cent of total exports in 1990
-
Leape expects a harsher international capital environment than the one South Africa left in 1985. (p. 11)
when South Africa finally regains full access to the international capital markets, it will find an environment much less hospitable than the one it left in 1985.
-
Barber says the claims for constructive engagement cannot be tested. (p. 3)
There is no way of proving or disproving these claims.
-
Potential white flight to Britain is a key British concern. (p. 6)
Up to one million white South Africans may have the right of abode in Britain
-
Barber identifies aid to the region as part of constructive engagement. (p. 8)
during the 1980s worth £1 billion, or 43 per cent of total British aid to sub-Saharan Africa
Evidence ledger¶
Sources used¶
| Source | Kind | Period | How used |
|---|---|---|---|
| House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 'UK policy towards South Africa and other states of the region', 14 Feb. 1991, vol. 2 (evidence and testimony of Hurd, Chalker, others) | parliamentary debates | 1991 | Supplies ministerial statements (Hurd, Chalker) on British policy, aims, aid, and economic interests, plus the Spies cost estimate and Montgomery's remark. |
| Conrad Strauss, 'South Africa in a Southern African context', SAIIA Occasional Paper, Aug. 1990 (data for Table 1) | secondary literature compilation | 1987 | Provides the GNP, per capita GNP and population figures in Table 1 showing South Africa as a regional giant but international dwarf. |
| Jonathan Leape, 'South Africa: the role and prospect for new inflows of foreign capital in the 1990s', Chatham House Study Group, May 1991 | secondary literature compilation | 1990-1991 | Supplies the evidence on gold price, export share, Eskom's borrowing shortfall and the limited prospects for foreign capital inflows. |
| SA Dialogue (Johannesburg) 3:6 (June 1991) | newspapers periodicals | June 1991 | Cited for Makotho's comment on South Africa's inclusion in Africa, Hornby's trade-mission statement, and Montgomery's remark that the economy equals Maryland's. |
| Interlink (UKSATA newsletter, London), no. 1 (Spring 1991) | employer association records | Spring 1991 | Reports the UKSATA delegation's mixed impressions of South African business prospects in March 1991. |
| Christopher Coker, 'What future for Southern Africa?', The World Today 47:7 (July 1991) | newspapers periodicals | 1991 | Source for the EC per capita aid comparison ($28 Eastern Europe vs $16 Third World) and the claim that Southern Africa is marginal to Britain. |
| Peter Hadfield, 'The private sector investigator', Shell selected papers (April 1991) | company records or reports | April 1991 | Cited for the conditions private investors want in a stable environment. |
| Market South East (London) 5:1B (Jan. 1991) | newspapers periodicals | January 1991 | Supports the claim that by 1989 nearly one-third of British companies previously active in Africa had left. |
| Jesmond Blumenfeld, 'South Africa's post-apartheid dividend', The World Today 47:1 (Jan. 1991) | newspapers periodicals | January 1991 | Cited for the argument that the post-apartheid dividend can be exaggerated. |
| Focus on South Africa (Cape Town), July 1991 | newspapers periodicals | July 1991 | Source of Yusuf Saloojee's remark on ANC relations with Renwick. |
| Unspecified surveys of BBC World Service listenership in South Africa | household or labour survey microdata | c.1990-1991 | Establishes that only 2.4% of whites and 0.5% of blacks are regular BBC listeners. |
| Unattributed official statistics on British-South African trade, investment, tourism and GDP/employment (1990) | official statistical series | 1982-1990 | Provides trade totals (£2.2bn in 1990), tourism figures, the fall in real GDP per capita, and formal-sector job entry rates. |
Inference¶
Quantification: Illustrative figures.
Policy-analytic essay: assertion and argument from ministerial testimony to the Commons committee, press and think-tank reports, with one table of comparative GNP; scenarios (step back, wait and see, push on) are reasoned from stated interests rather than tested.
Key claims¶
| Claim | Basis | Strength |
|---|---|---|
| Up to one million white South Africans may have the right of abode in Britain, which makes a flight of whites a major British concern. (p. 727) | Unsourced registration and passport estimates; no source cited. | Asserted |
| Britain remains South Africa's most important economic partner and holds about half the foreign stake, though the real value is hard to determine. (p. 729) | Unattributed trade and investment totals; the author concedes secrecy and shifting asset prices. | Partial data |
| South Africa's economy is a regional giant but an international dwarf, and it has performed badly, with real GDP per capita falling 12.8% since 1982. (p. 731) | Table 1 from Strauss (SAIIA 1990) plus unattributed macro figures and the Montgomery comparison. | Partial data |
| Prospects for new foreign private investment in South Africa are poor, so lifting sanctions will not itself bring capital flows. (p. 732) | Leape's Chatham House study, the Eskom borrowing shortfall, the Hadfield and Market South East pieces, and the UKSATA delegation report. | Partial data |
| The British government's claim that constructive engagement contributed to reform cannot be proved or disproved. (p. 724) | Authorial judgement, with reference to ministerial claims. | Asserted |
| Thatcher's fall shifts policy from a personality-driven approach to a Foreign Office bureaucracy, with less attention to South Africa. (p. 733) | Hurd's statements to the Commons committee and press quotations; otherwise authorial interpretation. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| British aid to the region under constructive engagement was worth £1 billion in the 1980s, 43% of British aid to sub-Saharan Africa. (p. 729) | Unattributed aid figures, probably from government evidence. | Asserted |
The author's caveats¶
The author notes that the real value of British investment is hard to determine because of secrecy and shifting asset prices, and that sanctions claims cannot be objectively tested.
Gaps in the evidence¶
The essay lacks systematic series on British trade, investment and disinvestment, which Board of Trade, Bank of England and South African Reserve Bank statistics could supply. The policy influence claims need diplomatic and cabinet records, which were not yet open in 1991 but are now in the UK National Archives. The citizenship and abode estimate needs Home Office or passport data.
Replicability: Data poorly documented.