Sell-out, or the culminating moment? Trying to make sense of the transition¶
Jeremy Cronin (1994). Sell-out, or the culminating moment? Trying to make sense of the transition. Popular History Workshop, 'Democracy Popular', University of the Witwatersrand History Workshop, 13-15 July 1994. University of the Witwatersrand History Workshop.
| Type | conference paper |
| Scope | Wider apartheid literature |
| Method | theoretical or conceptual |
| Period studied | 1990–1994 |
| Regions | South Africa, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Eastern Transvaal, Namibia |
| Themes | transition post apartheid, politics ideology elections, resistance social movements, comparative theory |
| Citation key | cronin1994 |
Argument¶
Cronin, an SACP figure, argues that the 1994 elections were a decisive moment in a protracted transition but not its culmination. He criticises two paradigms. The neo-liberal 'transition to democracy' model is tied to shifting imperialist strategy and treats democracy as elite pacting that demobilises the populace. The national liberation and 'marxist-leninist' tradition is marked by teleology, vanguardism, substitutionism and the idea of a single 'all-in' moment. He argues that the ANC's relative success came from combining mass action with negotiation, illustrated by mid-1992, the response to Hani's assassination, the Eastern Transvaal boycott and Bophuthatswana. He concludes that the ANC must stay a mass-based movement allied to autonomous social movements, and that the RDP's aim of 'democratising power' should be extended to the social and economic spheres.
Evidence and method¶
Newspaper commentary (The Star, Business Day), speeches and documents of the ANC, SACP, COSATU and PAC, the RDP text, the Eastern Transvaal tripartite boycott report, activist testimony (Suttner on Bisho, Molaba), and secondary literature on democratic transitions (Huntington, O'Donnell et al., Slabbert, Adam & Moodley, Ottaway, Gills et al.).
Place in the debates¶
- Neo-liberal 'transition to democracy' paradigm vs mass-driven transformation (see Why apartheid ended: reform, transition and elite bargaining). Rejects elite pacting and 'low intensity democracy' as demobilising. Argues that mass action and negotiation reinforced each other and that the transition should be mass-driven.
- Negotiated transition vs insurrection/seizure of power within the ANC alliance (Slovo vs Jordan) (see Resistance and liberation movements). Sides with Slovo's tactical point on negotiated compromise but says he still hints at a 'culminating point'. Criticises Jordan for ruling out protracted revolutionary reform. Holds that insurrection was unrealistic, citing Bisho and Bophuthatswana.
- Can a liberation movement become a democratic government? (Ottaway) (see Resistance and liberation movements). Denies that teleology, vanguardism and substitutionism are defining features of liberation movements. Argues the ANC's practice contradicts Ottaway's pessimism and that it should not turn into a 'normal political party'.
Findings¶
-
The 1994 elections are framed as a decisive but not final moment in a protracted transition. (p. 2)
Since May 1990 the ANC-led liberation movement has been engaged in a protracted transition process in which April's elections were a decisive moment, but only a moment.
-
The neo-liberal model is characterised as managing change through elite pacting. (p. 8)
Essentially, the negotiated transition has to be managed as a process of elite pacting.
-
Democratisation is linked to the imposition of structural adjustment on Third World populations. (p. 6)
elected centrist (or even left) governments would have more legitimacy in imposing the bitter pill of structural adjustment programmes on their own third world populations.
-
De Klerk's reforms are attributed to changed circumstances, notably the collapse of eastern Europe, rather than conviction. (p. 6)
He was tacitly admitting that he was not a democrat by conviction, but by circumstance.
-
Mass mobilisation and negotiations together produced the September 1992 breakthrough. (p. 11)
But it was the combination of mass mobilisation and "elite" (and popular) negotiations that paved the way for the September 1992 breakthrough.
-
Liberation teleology produced strategic miscalculation about the armed struggle in the early 1960s. (p. 16)
Strategic thinking from our side greatly underestimated the resolve and capacity of the ruling bloc within our country
-
Even the Bophuthatswana uprising was not a seizure of power but a negotiated-and-mass hybrid. (p. 25)
A qualitative transformation was secured, but it was hardly, nor could it be, a seizure of power.
-
Turning the ANC into a 'normal party' would risk neo-colonial bureaucracy and structural adjustment. (p. 31)
Deprived of its liberation movement character, the ANC in government would quickly become, at worst a neo-colonial bureaucracy
-
Neo-liberal economic policy weakens the sovereignty of governments that come to power in transitions. (p. 32)
the accompanying neo-liberal economic programme is weakening the sovereignty and capacity of national governments - through privatisation
-
The paper concludes that the task is to democratise all power, in line with the RDP. (p. 35)
if we begin to think, as the RDP starts to think, of the main task as being about democratising power. All power.
Evidence ledger¶
Sources used¶
| Source | Kind | Period | How used |
|---|---|---|---|
| The Star newspaper columns and reports, 1992 and 1994 (Uys, Schlemmer, Van Zyl Slabbert, Boraine, Roberton, Maharaj report) | newspapers periodicals | July-August 1992; May 1994 | Quoted as evidence of liberal and neo-liberal commentators' hostility to mass action and preference for elite bargaining, and of their reading of the 1994 election. |
| Sunday Times (Ken Owen column, July 26 1992), Beeld (May 2 1994), Business Day (May 2 1994) editorials | newspapers periodicals | 1992; 1994 | Used to show press calls for elite pacting and to argue the neo-liberal agenda of turning the ANC into a centrist party. |
| Sowetan, 20 November 1989 (Zeph Mothopeng statement) and Indicator SA vol.7 no.3, 1990 (Benny Alexander) | newspapers periodicals | 1989-1990 | Quoted to illustrate the PAC's 'all-in moment' view that negotiation is a sell-out. |
| ANC/SACP/COSATU 1993, 'Lessons from E.Tvl Consumer Boycott', Tripartite report, Umsebenzi vol.9 no.2 | union or movement records | May-June 1993 | Extended quotation used as a case showing mass action and negotiations combining at the local and regional level. |
| Raymond Suttner 1992, 'The Bisho massacre: an assessment', The African Communist no.130 | union or movement records | September 1992 | Participant testimony used to show insurrectionist expectations and strategic confusion in the alliance before the Bisho march. |
| Theo Molaba, 'Letter of resignation', May 1993, in The African Communist no.135 | union or movement records | 1993 | Testimony that activists wanted insurrection at Chris Hani's funeral vigil. |
| Joe Slovo 1992, 'What room for compromise?'; Pallo Jordan 1992, 'Strategic debate in the ANC'; Blade Nzimande 1992 (African Communist nos.130-131) | union or movement records | 1992 | Treated as texts for discourse analysis of the national liberation paradigm and the 'culminating point' idea. |
| ANC 1994, The Reconstruction and Development Programme: A policy framework | commission or official report | 1994 | Quoted to show the RDP's commitment to people-driven development and democratisation. |
| SACP 1981, South African Communists Speak (1962 programme 'The Road to South African Freedom') | union or movement records | 1962 programme; published 1981 | Cited as evidence of teleological 'African Revolution' thinking in liberation theory. |
| Adam and Moodley 1993, The Negotiated Revolution (data on 43 informal Ramaphosa-Meyer meetings) | secondary literature compilation | mid-1992 | Their factual count of channel meetings is reinterpreted to show mass action and negotiation were complementary. |
| Other writers' texts quoted: Huntington 1993, Van Zyl Slabbert 1992, Steyn 1990, Ottaway 1991, Mulgan 1994, Frank 1993, Amin 1993, Gills et al. 1993 | secondary literature compilation | 1990-1994 | Quoted as the textual corpus of the 'transition to democracy' and liberation paradigms being critiqued. |
Inference¶
Quantification: None.
Theoretical and polemical argument by critical reading of texts (scholarly literature, press commentary, movement documents), illustrated by selected episodes from 1990-94 (1992 mass action, Hani boycott, Bisho, Bophuthatswana) and the author's participant-observer standpoint; no systematic data.
Key claims¶
| Claim | Basis | Strength |
|---|---|---|
| The neo-liberal 'transition to democracy' paradigm reflects shifting imperialist strategy and aims at elite pacting and demobilisation of the populace. (p. 8) | Quotations from Huntington, Slabbert, Steyn and press columns, plus secondary works on low-intensity warfare; argued interpretively. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| Mass mobilisation in 1991-94 drove the negotiations forward rather than obstructing them, contrary to the neo-liberal prediction. (p. 10) | Selected episodes (1991 stayaway, June-August 1992 mass action, post-Hani mobilisation, Bophuthatswana), asserted rather than documented. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| Mass action and elite negotiations were complementary; local campaigns generated thousands of negotiations and forums. (p. 11) | Adam and Moodley's count of meetings and the Eastern Transvaal tripartite report; author's assertion on 'thousands' of campaigns. | Partial data |
| Teleological, vanguardist and 'all-in moment' assumptions in the national liberation and marxist-leninist paradigms cause strategic miscalculation, e.g. the early 1960s armed struggle and insurrectionist expectations at Bisho. (p. 16) | Textual quotations from the SACP 1962 programme, Jordan, Slovo, Nzimande, Mothopeng, Suttner and Molaba; cites Barrell and Fine & Davis. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| The Bophuthatswana uprising of March 1994 was not an insurrection but a combination of strikes, student action, BDF collaboration and SADF entry at the request of the TEC. (p. 24) | Author's own account of events, no cited source. | Asserted |
| Transforming the ANC into a 'normal political party' would deprive it of its mass base and risk it implementing structural adjustment, so the ANC should remain linked to social movements. (p. 30) | Business Day editorial, Mulgan and Gills et al. quotations, and the analogy of Peru; argued rather than shown with data. | Asserted |
Gaps in the evidence¶
The paper is a theoretical and strategic polemic and rests on selective quotation and participant judgement. Its claims that mass action drove the transition and that thousands of local negotiations occurred need systematic evidence, such as protest and event datasets, minutes of the negotiating forums, and ANC and government archives, parts of which now exist. Comparative data on other transitions and polling of participants' attitudes would be needed to test the paradigm claims.
Replicability: Not applicable.