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The Extrusion of Foreign Labour from the South African Gold Mining Industry

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Jonathan S. Crush (1986). The Extrusion of Foreign Labour from the South African Gold Mining Industry. Geoforum, Vol. 17, No. 2. Pergamon Journals Ltd.
Type journal article
Scope Economics and economic history of apartheid
Method mixed
Period studied 1886–1984
Regions South Africa, Witwatersrand and Orange Free State goldfields, Malawi, Mozambique, Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, Transkei, Bophuthatswana, KwaZulu
Themes mining migrant labour, labour markets wages, bantustans removals influx, agriculture land, business and state, inequality poverty unemployment, unions strikes
Citation key crush1986a

Argument

Crush challenges the 'internalization thesis', which holds that the gold mines deliberately and systematically replaced foreign with domestic labour after 1974. He argues the 1974-77 fall in the foreign share resulted from supply-side withdrawals by Malawi (1974) and Mozambique (1976), not mining-industry policy. The mines scrambled for labour across the whole region, and a vastly expanded domestic reservoir let them fill the gap. Since 1977 the foreign share has been stable at about 40%, which he explains by foreign workers' continuing skills, political leverage over supplier states, divide-and-rule, and the industry's 'stabilization campaign'. The only real extrusion is a slow, gradual attrition in the allocation of novices.

Evidence and method

Published Chamber of Mines/TEBA statistics on labour composition, recruits, workstays, homestays and novice allocations (1968-84, shown in Figures 1-2), a TEBA official interview (April 1984), and a wide secondary literature (Clarke, First, Martin, Lacey, Jeeves, Yudelman and others). It also draws on the forthcoming book by Crush, Jeeves and Yudelman.

Place in the debates

Findings

  • Foreign labour was historically pivotal to mine accumulation, rarely falling below half the workforce before 1973. (p. 2)

    in the period between 1886 and 1973, the proportion of the mine workforce emanating from outside South Africa rarely fell below 50%.

  • By 1971 the black South African mine complement had collapsed and the industry was strategically dependent on foreign labour. (p. 3)

    The black South African mine complement fell precipitously from 175,000 in 1960 to less than 85,000 by 1971, while the proportion of foreign workers in the labour force climbed to almost 80%.

  • The 1974-77 convulsion reversed the foreign-domestic balance, with domestic black numbers rising 250%. (p. 4)

    The number of foreign workers in the mine labour force dropped from 336,000 in December 1973 to 208,000 at the end of 1977.

  • The withdrawals were supply-side events, not mining-industry policy, which refutes the policy premise of internalization. (p. 4)

    Neither of the major withdrawals of foreign labour in the 1970s were policy measures directed by the mining industry.

  • The domestic labour reservoir was expanded by structural forces including farm mechanization, forced removals and bantustan decline. (p. 6)

    the South African state's policy of forced re-settlement, which has seen over three million 'surplus people' banished from white farms, urban areas and 'black spots' to the rural bantustans

  • The domestic surplus of labour is so large that foreign labour could be replaced easily, yet the industry has not done so. (p. 7)

    TEBA recently estimated that it could generate an additional 300,000 domestic mineworkers with little difficulty.

  • Domestic and foreign migrancy have converged in workstays, as South African workers stay longer on the mines. (p. 7)

    In 1977, for example, the average workstay for returning South African miners was 9.1 months and the average homestay 5.1 months. By 1983, the figures were 12.7 and 4.4 months, respectively.

  • The foreign share stabilized at about 40% despite the loss of foreign labour's traditional advantages. (p. 8)

    the foreign labour component has remained virtually static at around 40% for the past six years

  • Stabilization sharply cut the novice share and the number of recruits needed. (p. 8)

    The proportion of novices in the total workforce dropped from a high of 30% in 1976 to a low of less than 12% by 1984.

  • Novice allocations favour domestic supplier areas, indicating only a slow, gradual withdrawal from foreign sources. (p. 9)

    Of 29,400 novices drawn into the industry in 1983, for example, only 16% were from outside South Africa. Malawi received less than 1% of the orders

  • The more stable workforce opens opportunities for worker organization by the NUM. (p. 9)

    The existence of a more stable, if still oscillatory, workforce undoubtedly provides the newly emergent National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) with unprecedented opportunities for worker organization

Evidence ledger

Sources used

Source Kind Period How used
Chamber of Mines/TEBA data on mine labour force composition (foreign vs domestic employment at year-end), 1968-1984 (Figure 2) and 1973-1977 totals chamber of mines or recruiting records 1968-1984 Establishes the fall in foreign share from 79.6% to 49.3% in 1973-77 and its stabilization at around 40% thereafter.
TEBA regional office recruit numbers (recruits forwarded by TEBA regional offices, 1975-1983, Figure 1) chamber of mines or recruiting records 1975-1983 Shows that recruits from all domestic and foreign supplier areas rose sharply in 1974-77, undermining the claim of a deliberate policy of internalization.
Chamber of Mines/TEBA data on workstays, homestays and length of service of returning miners (1977 vs 1983) chamber of mines or recruiting records 1977-1983 Demonstrates convergence of domestic and foreign migrancy patterns, with lengthening workstays and shorter homestays.
Industry data on valid re-engagement guarantees (VRGs), novice proportions, recruits and workforce size, and experience profile, 1976-1984 chamber of mines or recruiting records 1976-1984 Documents the stabilization campaign: rising VRG coverage, falling novice share, falling recruits needed, growing experience.
Industry data on novice allocations by supplier area, 1983 chamber of mines or recruiting records 1983 Supports the claim that the mines favour domestic areas in allocating novice workers, implying gradual attrition of foreign labour.
Chamber of Mines historical labour force figures, 1951-1971 (total labour force, black South African complement, foreign share) chamber of mines or recruiting records 1951-1971 Establishes the rising dependence on foreign labour before 1974.
Interview with TEBA official, Pietermaritzburg, April 1984 interviews oral history April 1984 Quoted to show severe penalties for contract-breaking, given the plentiful supply of untried labour.
TEBA estimate of potential domestic recruits (additional 300,000) and TEBA recruiting office network chamber of mines or recruiting records early 1980s Supports the claim of a large domestic labour surplus that would permit replacement of all foreign workers.
TEBA recruiting documents (TEBA 458, 459, 460, 461 re-engagement certificates; TEBA 463 'blue letter') chamber of mines or recruiting records 1970s-1980s Describes the institutional instruments of stabilization and discipline.
Clarke's ILO working papers and published statistics/industry pronouncements (internalization thesis) secondary literature compilation 1976-1978 Target of critique: the thesis built on published statistics and public statements, said by the author to rest on flimsy statistical evidence.
Rob First, Black Gold (1983), labour ratio data and Mozambican miner material secondary literature compilation 1974-1979 Source of foreign-share figures (57% in 1976, 48% in 1977, 46% in 1979) quoted as typical of the internalization thesis, and of the Mozambican recruiting disruption.
Legislation: Bantu Laws Amendment Act and Aliens Control Act (1963) legislation gazette 1963 Cited as restricting non-contract labour from High Commission territories and thereby constraining foreign workers' options.
Labour press and periodicals on mine unrest and dismissals (Golding, South African Labour Bulletin 1985) newspapers periodicals 1985 Documents mass dismissals at Vaal Reefs in April 1985 and the industry response to NUM organization.
Moller and Schlemmer, 'Images of minework among non-mining migrants in Durban' (unpublished survey paper, 1977) household or labour survey microdata 1977 Cited as evidence of the industry's media campaign against perceptions of danger in mine work.
Eckert and Wykstra, South African Mine Wages in the Seventies (Lesotho Agricultural Sector Analysis Project, 1980) secondary literature compilation 1970s Cited for unprecedented wage increases for unskilled and semi-skilled mineworkers used to attract domestic labour.

Inference

Quantification: Descriptive tables.

Revisionist argument by comparison over time (pre-1974, 1974-77, post-1977) of aggregate Chamber/TEBA labour-supply statistics with a critique of the internalization thesis, combined with structural reasoning about the domestic labour surplus and the stabilization campaign, supplemented by one interview and secondary literature.

Key claims

Claim Basis Strength
The foreign share of the mine workforce fell sharply between 1973 and 1977 (79.6% to 49.3%) as South African black numbers rose 250%. (p. 4) Chamber of Mines/TEBA year-end workforce statistics (Figure 2) as reported in text. Systematic data
The 1974-77 fall in foreign labour was caused by supply-side withdrawals (Malawi 1974, Mozambique 1976) and a recruiting scramble across all areas, not a deliberate internalization policy. (p. 4) TEBA regional recruit numbers (Figure 1), plus narrative of Malawian withdrawal and FRELIMO's reorganization of WNLA. Partial data
Since about 1977 there has been no secular trend of extruding foreign workers; the foreign share has stabilized around 40%. (p. 8) Labour composition series in Figure 2; recruit numbers falling for both foreign and domestic sources. Systematic data
A large domestic labour surplus, generated by bantustan unemployment, farm mechanization and forced removals, enabled the mines to fill complements domestically and could replace all foreign workers. (p. 7) Secondary literature on unemployment, removals and farm labour, plus a TEBA estimate of 300,000 additional potential recruits. Partial data
The stabilization campaign (VRGs, longer contracts) has lengthened workstays, cut novice intake and converged foreign and domestic migrancy patterns. (p. 8) Industry statistics on workstays, homestays, VRG coverage, novice proportions and recruits needed. Systematic data
The mines are pursuing a gradual long-term withdrawal from foreign supplier states by favouring domestic areas in novice allocations. (p. 9) 1983 novice allocation figures by supplier area. Partial data
Foreign labour historically offered mining capital advantages (constrained choice, lower wages, stability), with foreign share rarely under 50% in 1886-1973. (p. 2) Secondary literature (Martin, First, Horner and Kooy) and general historical statements; limited figures. Illustrative or anecdotal

The author's caveats

Notes that earlier studies were written during the mid-1970s upheavals amid a 'paucity of primary information'; refers to a detailed interpretation in a forthcoming book. Acknowledges the category 'foreign labour' has been redefined by the state and uses a simple geographical definition.

Gaps in the evidence

The article presents aggregate figures without naming the Chamber of Mines/TEBA series, tables or years, so the claims cannot be checked against underlying data. Mine-level or mining-house labour sourcing data, wage series and Chamber internal policy documents (the 'three tiers of policy making') would better test whether internalization was deliberate; these existed in Chamber and TEBA archives and are partly accessible now. Worker-level survey or interview evidence on stabilization and on the effects on supplier states is also thin.

Replicability: Data poorly documented.