The Extrusion of Foreign Labour from the South African Gold Mining Industry¶
Jonathan S. Crush (1986). The Extrusion of Foreign Labour from the South African Gold Mining Industry. Geoforum, Vol. 17, No. 2. Pergamon Journals Ltd.
| Type | journal article |
| Scope | Economics and economic history of apartheid |
| Method | descriptive quantitative |
| Period studied | 1886–1984 |
| Regions | South African gold mines, Malawi, Mozambique, Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Kwazulu |
| Themes | mining migrant labour, labour markets wages, bantustans removals influx, agriculture land, unions strikes, business and state, inequality poverty unemployment |
| Citation key | crush1986b |
Argument¶
Crush challenges the 'internalization thesis' (associated with Duncan Clarke), which holds that the gold mines deliberately and systematically replaced foreign with domestic black labour after 1974. He argues that the 1974-77 fall in the foreign share was mainly a supply-side shock, driven by Malawi's withdrawal in 1974 and the Mozambican drop in 1976, plus the differing capacity of supplier areas to respond to a generalized recruiting drive. Since 1977 the foreign share has been stable at about 40%, despite a large domestic labour surplus. He explains this stability by foreign workers' skills and experience, the political leverage they give the state over supplier states, divide-and-rule, and the industry's 'stabilization campaign'. The only real extrusion is a gradual attrition through novice allocations that favour domestic areas.
Evidence and method¶
Published Chamber of Mines/TEBA statistics on labour composition, recruits, novices, workstays and homestays (1968-84). Secondary literature and ILO working papers. Press and labour-bulletin accounts of the 1985 dismissals. One TEBA official interview (Pietermaritzburg, April 1984). Draws on a forthcoming book by Crush, Jeeves and Yudelman.
Place in the debates¶
- Internalization thesis: did the mines deliberately replace foreign labour with domestic labour in the 1970s-80s? (see The mine migrant labour system: origins, recruitment, foreign labour and stabilisation). Rejects it as oversimplified and resting on a changing foreign:domestic ratio. Sees the 1970s shift as a supply-side shock and the 1980s as stability around 40% foreign, with only gradual attrition via novice allocation.
- Mining capital's control over its labour supply (neo-Marxist accounts of an all-powerful mining capital) (see The mine migrant labour system: origins, recruitment, foreign labour and stabilisation). Argues that internalization accounts, like some neo-Marxist accounts, overstate the control of mining capital. The industry in the mid-1970s scrambled for labour region-wide.
- Why foreign labour persists amid a domestic surplus; the meaning and success of stabilization (see The mine migrant labour system: origins, recruitment, foreign labour and stabilisation). Persistence reflects skills, state political leverage, divide-and-rule and 'playing the mix'. Stabilization succeeded largely because of favourable structural conditions (a labour surplus), not just policy.
Findings¶
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The foreign share of the mine workforce and the number of foreign workers fell sharply in 1974-77, while South African black employment rose 250%. (p. 4)
The number of foreign workers in the mine labour force dropped from 336,000 in December 1973 to 208,000 at the end of 1977.
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Before the shock, black South African mine employment collapsed in the 1960s, leaving the industry strategically dependent on foreign labour. (p. 3)
The black South African mine complement fell precipitously from 175,000 in 1960 to less than 85,000 by 1971, while the proportion of foreign workers in the labour force climbed to almost 80%.
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The 1970s withdrawals were supplier-state actions, not mining-industry policy. (p. 4)
Neither of the major withdrawals of foreign labour in the 1970s were policy measures directed by the mining industry.
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Since 1977 there has been no secular trend of foreign extrusion; the foreign share has been stable at about 40%. (p. 8)
the foreign labour component has remained virtually static at around 40% for the past six years
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A large domestic labour surplus, produced by bantustan unemployment, farm mechanization, forced resettlement and agrarian collapse, means foreign withdrawal would now matter little. (p. 7)
TEBA recently estimated that it could generate an additional 300,000 domestic mineworkers with little difficulty.
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Forced resettlement is cited as a source of the reserve of uprooted labour that the mines tapped. (p. 6)
over three million 'surplus people' banished from white farms, urban areas and 'black spots' to the rural bantustans
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Domestic and foreign migrancy patterns are converging, with South African workers' workstays lengthening. (p. 7)
In 1977, for example, the average workstay for returning South African miners was 9.1 months and the average homestay 5.1 months. By 1983, the figures were 12.7 and 4.4 months
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Novice allocations favour domestic areas, implying a slow, long-term attrition of foreign labour rather than rapid extrusion. (p. 9)
Of 29,400 novices drawn into the industry in 1983, for example, only 16% were from outside South Africa.
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Stabilization succeeded because of labour-surplus conditions, which leave workers with no option but to accept re-engagement guarantees. (p. 8)
In market conditions of an overwhelming regional surplus of labour and very limited opportunities for securing alternative forms of employment, departing workers have no option but to accept VRGs
Evidence ledger¶
Sources used¶
| Source | Kind | Period | How used |
|---|---|---|---|
| Chamber of Mines/TEBA data on gold mine labour force composition (foreign vs domestic), 1968-1984, plotted in Figure 2 | chamber of mines or recruiting records | 1968-1984 | Establishes the fall in the foreign share of the workforce from 1974-77 and its stabilization at about 40% afterwards, which undercuts the internalization thesis. |
| TEBA regional office recruit numbers, 1975-1983 (Figure 1) | chamber of mines or recruiting records | 1975-1983 | Shows recruits rising from all domestic and foreign supplier areas in 1974-77, so the change was not a selective policy of displacing foreign labour. |
| Mine labour force figures for 1951-1961 and foreign worker numbers at December 1973 and end 1977 | chamber of mines or recruiting records | 1951-1977 | Documents the historical rise of foreign dependence (about 80% by 1971) and the 1973-77 drop in foreign numbers and share. |
| Novice allocation data by supplier area, 1983 | chamber of mines or recruiting records | 1983 | Shows novice orders favour domestic areas, indicating a gradual long-term withdrawal from foreign supplier states. |
| Interview with a TEBA official, Pietermaritzburg, April 1984 | interviews oral history | April 1984 | Supplies an official's statement that contract-breakers get no second chance because untried labour is plentiful. |
| TEBA re-engagement documents (VRG categories TEBA 458-461, TEBA 463 'blue letter') | chamber of mines or recruiting records | 1970s-1985 | Describes the VRG and stabilization system and how it disciplines workers and is being phased out. |
| Clarke's ILO/University of Natal working papers (published statistics and industry pronouncements) | secondary literature compilation | 1970-1978 | Serves as the origin of the 'internalization thesis', which the author reads as resting on flimsy statistics. |
| Crush, Jeeves and Yudelman, Labour Migrancy and the South African Gold Mines (forthcoming) | secondary literature compilation | 1970s-1980s | Referred to for the detailed interpretation and data on sourcing strategies, mining house policy and stabilization that the paper summarizes. |
| Golding, labour bulletin articles on mine struggles and mass dismissals (Vaal Reefs, April 1985) | newspapers periodicals | 1985 | Documents mass dismissals and industry responses to NUM-linked unrest, illustrating how replacement labour may be sourced. |
| TEBA statement on additional domestic mineworkers available and 120 recruiting offices | chamber of mines or recruiting records | c.1985 | Shows the domestic labour surplus, with TEBA estimating it could generate 300,000 more domestic mineworkers. |
| Legislation: Bantu Laws Amendment Act and Aliens Control Act (1963) | legislation gazette | 1963 | Cited as restricting non-contract labour from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland and thereby the choices of foreign workers. |
Inference¶
Quantification: Descriptive tables.
Revisionist argument built on time-series description of foreign and domestic labour numbers and ratios from industry sources, set against the internalization thesis. It is supported by the timing of the Malawian (1974) and Mozambican (1976) withdrawals, recruit-by-region trends, and structural interpretation of labour-market conditions drawn from secondary literature.
Key claims¶
| Claim | Basis | Strength |
|---|---|---|
| The foreign share of the mine workforce fell sharply between 1974 and 1977 (79.6% to 49.3%), mainly as a result of the Malawian and Mozambican withdrawals and not a deliberate industry policy of replacing foreign with domestic labour. (p. 164) | Chamber/TEBA labour-force statistics and recruit numbers by region (Figure 1), plus the sequence of the Malawian 1974 and Mozambican 1976 withdrawals. | Partial data |
| Since about 1977 there has been no secular trend toward extruding foreign labour; the foreign share has been stable at about 40%. (p. 165) | Figure 2 and workforce composition data, 1977-1984. | Systematic data |
| A large domestic labour surplus, produced by bantustan unemployment, farm displacement, forced removals and agrarian collapse, together with mine policy (wages, media, TEBA drives), allowed the mines to fill their complements from South African sources. (p. 166) | Mostly secondary literature, with a few figures (TEBA's 300,000 estimate); no original data. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| Stabilization has lengthened workstays, cut homestays and novice intake, and made the foreign and domestic components of the workforce converge in migrancy patterns. (p. 167) | Industry data on workstays, homestays, VRG coverage, novice share and recruits needed, 1977-1984. | Partial data |
| Foreign workers remain because of their skills, the political leverage they give over supplier states, the divide-and-rule benefits of a heterogeneous workforce and the 60:40 'mix' policy. (p. 168) | Author's inference; the 60:40 policy is stated in a footnote without a source and the rest rests on assertion. | Asserted |
| Novice allocations favour domestic areas, implying a gradual long-term withdrawal from foreign supplier states rather than rapid extrusion. (p. 169) | 1983 novice allocation percentages by supplier area. | Partial data |
The author's caveats¶
The author notes that earlier studies were written during the tumultuous mid-1970s, when there was a 'paucity of primary information'. He describes the internalization thesis as resting on 'flimsy statistical evidence' of a changing ratio. He gives no caveats about his own data and refers readers to a forthcoming book for the full evidence.
Gaps in the evidence¶
The argument depends on Chamber of Mines/TEBA aggregates presented in figures and footnotes without table sources, file references or series descriptions. Mine-by-mine and house-by-house recruitment and allocation records would test the claim that policy did not drive the ratio, and so would Chamber and mining house archival records and internal policy documents on the 60:40 mix. The causal claims about the surplus reservoir and political motives need direct evidence such as interviews and company minutes, which probably existed in the 1980s but are only referenced here as forthcoming.
Replicability: Data poorly documented.