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"They should have destroyed more": The Destruction of Public Records by the South African State in the Final Years of Apartheid, 1990-1994

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Verne Harris (2000). "They should have destroyed more": The Destruction of Public Records by the South African State in the Final Years of Apartheid, 1990-1994. National Archives of South Africa.
Type conference paper
Scope Comparative and methods
Method archival narrative
Period studied 1960–1996
Regions South Africa, Namibia, Homelands (Transkei, Bophutatswana, Venda, Ciskei, KwaZulu)
Themes methods data sources, politics ideology elections, business and state, transition post apartheid
Citation key harris2000

Argument

Harris argues that the apartheid state routinely destroyed classified records outside the Archives Act before 1990. Between 1990 and 1994 this became a systematic, Cabinet-sanctioned sanitisation of state memory, concentrated in the security establishment, to keep records from a future democratic government. The state's legal justification (opinions that 'sensitive' records were not 'archives') was weak and in any case beside the point. The State Archives Service and the liberation movements failed to stop it. The paper draws on the TRC investigation and Harris's own part in it, and closes with lessons about transparency, archival law and the 'official secret'.

Evidence and method

The TRC investigation into records destruction (TRC Report vol. 1 ch. 8 and vol. 5 ch. 8), National Archives documentation on records destruction up to 1994, state legal opinions, the 1993 Currin Supreme Court settlement, destruction guidelines, and the author's own experience as a State Archives Service archivist and TRC team member.

Findings

  • Classified records were routinely destroyed outside the Archives Act, under government-wide guidelines in place by 1978. (p. 4)

    it was certainly in place by 1978. In that year all government departments received guidelines for the protection of classified information, signed by the Prime Minister and empowering department heads to authorise destruction outside the ambit of the Archives Act.

  • The National Intelligence Service destroyed a very large volume of records in 1993 alone. (p. 7)

    In a 6-8 month period in 1993, N1S headquarters alone destroyed approximately 44 tons of paper-based and microfilm records, utilising the Pretoria Iscor furnace and another facility outside Johannesburg

  • In 1992 the Security Police ordered destruction of all operational records, including records confiscated from individuals and organisations. (p. 7)

    In March of that year an instruction emanating from their head office ordered the destruction of all operational records, including non-public records confiscated from individuals and organisations.

  • A July 1993 circular, approved by Cabinet, triggered government-wide purging of classified records. (p. 7)

    The impact of this circular was immediate and severe. Across the country government officials began purging the classified records series under their care.

  • The Currin settlement of September 1993 did not stop the destruction; the state continued to exploit the loophole. (p. 8)

    Hopes that the loophole in the Archives Act had been removed proved vain. The settlement had not incorporated Currin's broader arguments, and the state exploited this to continue its "legal" destruction of records

  • Cabinet itself approved destruction guidelines for 'state sensitive' documentation in June 1993, unknown to Currin or the Archives Service. (p. 8)

    on 2 June 1993, a month before the July Security Secretariat circular, Cabinet had approved a new set of guidelines for the disposal of "state sensitive" documentation.

  • Some records survived, including those of the Department of Prison Services and the Justice Department's Security Legislation Directorate. (p. 10)

    the Department of Prison Services, despite routinely destroying classified records in the pre-1990 period and acting on all the 1993 government-wide guidelines, preserved intact two significant file series

  • The Archives Service was ineffective in the face of the purge. (p. 12)

    In the 1990-1994 period of mass destruction, intervention by the Service achieved nothing.

  • The liberation movements did not press for a moratorium during the negotiations; the blanket moratorium came only in November 1995. (p. 13)

    On 29 November 1995 Cabinet decided on a moratorium which applied to all records of the state, irrespective of their age and irrespective of whether or not the Director of Archives had authorised their destruction.

  • The destruction undermined the TRC's work and removed a rich record of resistance. (p. 14)

    "the destruction of state documentation probably did more to undermine the investigative work of the Commission than any other single factor."