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The Control of Migratory Labour on the South African Gold Mines in the Era of Kruger and Milner

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Alan Jeeves (1975). The Control of Migratory Labour on the South African Gold Mines in the Era of Kruger and Milner. Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1. Taylor & Francis.
Type journal article
Scope Economics and economic history of apartheid
Method archival narrative
Period studied 1890–1908
Regions Witwatersrand, Transvaal, Mozambique, Cape Colony, Basutoland, British Central Africa
Themes origins segregation, mining migrant labour, labour markets wages, business and state
Citation key jeeves1975a

Argument

Jeeves argues that the gold mines depended on the state, under both Kruger and Milner, to organise a cheap migrant labour supply. This was not simple domination of the state by capital, nor of the mines by Milner. He traces the dependence to the early commitment to low-grade ore mining, which made working costs, especially black wages, the critical variable. He also traces it to the mining houses' inability to control competition among themselves. Pass laws, wage-reduction agreements, the Rand Native Labour Association and its successor WNLA, and the Native Affairs Department all served to police the industry's own members as well as African workers. The 1906 crisis, when WNLA's monopsony nearly collapsed, shows a divided industry that needed the state. Government policy protected the mines from the consequences of their wasteful, callous use of labour.

Evidence and method

Chamber of Mines annual reports; the Industrial Commission of Inquiry (1897), Transvaal Labour Commission (1903), SANAC and Mining Industry Commission (1907-8) evidence; Transvaal Archives Depot files (Secretary of Native Affairs, Governor, High Commissioner archives); Colonial Office confidential prints; Rand Mines and Fitzpatrick private papers; contemporary books and newspapers.

Place in the debates

Findings

  • The mining industry's main need from the state was administrative and legislative organisation of black labour, not cash subsidy. (p. 2)

    what it did require throughout its history was an enormous legislative and administrative effort to organize the black labour supply-a crucial element in mining costs.

  • As early as 1890 the Chamber of Mines asked the state to take responsibility for labour supply because private effort had failed. (p. 9)

    The task must be undertaken by the public authorities

  • The 1895-6 pass law was designed partly to stop mines poaching each other's labour, not only to control Africans. (p. 10)

    The new pass law was designed specifically to eliminate 'thefts' of labour from one mine by another.

  • The pass law, wage cuts and monopsonistic recruiting formed a package in 1896-7, with wages cut by 30 per cent. (p. 10)

    cutting African wages by thirty per cent and providing for a system of inspection of company wage sheets to enforce compliance

  • Native Affairs Department inspectors, nominal protectors of Africans, in practice enforced mine discipline. (p. 14)

    investigated thirteen cases of alleged assault upon black mine workers by their white overseers and twenty-eight complaints concerning alleged wage irregularities

  • Compound conditions before and just after the war were appalling, with very high estimated mortality. (p. 16)

    the death rate was probably between eighty and one hundred per thousand per annum.

  • The African mine labour force fell sharply in 1905-6, alarming the Chamber and WNLA. (p. 20)

    The low point was reached in July 1906 when only 90,420 Africans were employed.

  • The 1902 compromise on wages restored the 1897 scale, with a maximum average of fifty shillings per thirty shifts. (p. 20)

    prescribing a 'maximum average' wage of fifty shillings per thirty shifts and allowing for limited incentives through piece work rates.

  • By 1906 WNLA had lost control of recruiting, supplying only about a tenth of available labour in the northern Transvaal. (p. 26)

    Between 1 January and 30 October, 1906, WNLA managed to recruit scarcely more than ten per cent of the available supply in the northern Transvaal

  • The mines were dependent on the state because they were divided and unable to control competition. (p. 27)

    For the Randlords, the relationship was rather one of dependence than of domination.

  • Policy was made for the poorest mines, so labour was cheap and wastefully used across the industry. (p. 28)

    Thus labour and other policies were formulated in relation to the presumed needs of a minority of the mines, the poorest among them.

Evidence ledger

Sources used

Source Kind Period How used
Chamber of Mines Annual Reports (CMAR), 1890-1906, incl. 'A Descriptive and Statistical Statement of the Gold Mining Industry of the Witwatersrand' annexure to Thirteenth Report for 1902 chamber of mines or recruiting records 1890-1906 Documents Chamber requests for state help, pass laws, wage-reduction agreements, WNLA letters, low-grade mine dividend data, and 1906 correspondence with Elgin.
Evidence and Report of the Industrial Commission of Inquiry, Johannesburg 1897 (ICI) commission or official report 1897 Testimony of mining engineers, managers and officials on labour costs, low-grade difficulties, labour theft, and bribery of native commissioners.
Report of the Transvaal Labour Commission, 1903 (TLC) and Secretary of the Transvaal Labour Commission Archive (TAD) commission or official report 1903 Witness evidence on African unwillingness to work, compound conditions, mortality, labour touts, and WNLA recruiting.
South African Intercolonial Native Affairs Commission 1903-1905 (SANAC), Minutes of Evidence vols II and IV commission or official report 1903-1905 African and official testimony on awareness of Rand conditions and on mine owners' slowness to see self-interest in reducing mortality.
Mining Industry Commission 1907-1908, Report and evidence (Reyersbach) commission or official report 1907-1908 Evidence of low-grade ore reserves, average yields per ton in 1897 and 1906, and working costs in 1906, plus critique of the commission's reliance on industry data.
Transvaal Native Affairs Department correspondence files (SNA), Transvaal Archives Depot state archives 1901-1907 Principal archive for Lagden's relations with the Chamber and WNLA, inspector conduct, strikes, compound reform, and the 1906 Robinson/TMLC crisis.
Governor of the Transvaal and ORC Archive (GOV), High Commissioner Archive (HC), Colonial Secretary Archive (CS), British Agent's Collection, Leyds Argief, Union Native Affairs Dept Archive (TAD) state archives 1893-1907 Confidential despatches, employment statistics, inspector reports and Selborne-Elgin correspondence.
Colonial Office Confidential Print, Series African South (C.O. 879), microfilm in TAD state archives 1897-1907 Sources for Robinson's letters to Elgin, Selborne's despatches, and the Mozambique recruiting dispute.
Rand Mines Archive, Johannesburg (RMA) company records or reports 1892-1897 Private correspondence showing the group's consideration of closing mines, lobbying in Pretoria, and bribery.
J. P. Fitzpatrick Papers (private possession) and Rhodes House Charter Consolidated MS company records or reports 1897 Private letters evidencing the funding of 1897-98 republican election opposition by Robinson and Wernher, Beit/Eckstein and industry grievances.
Transvaal Administration Reports for 1902 and Transvaal Native Affairs Department Annual Reports for 1904 and 1905 official statistical series 1902-1905 Document pass department reorganization, compound improvements, mortality decline and the effect of Nyasaland recruits.
Native Affairs Department mortality and inspector statistics, incl. TLC 'Report on the Mortality of Natives' official statistical series 1902-1905 Shows high compound mortality and inspector case counts (13 assaults, 28 wage complaints, 3000+ disciplined).
Laws, Volksraad Resolutions, Proclamations and Government Notices Relating to Natives and Coolies in the Transvaal (Barber et al., transl.); Law 23 of 1895; Proclamation 38 of 1901; Coloured Labourers' Health Ordinance 1905; Report of the Superintendent of Natives of the ZAR 1897 legislation gazette 1895-1905 Establishes the pass laws, labour agent regulations, chiefs' bounties and compound health legislation enacted at the mines' behest.
Cape of Good Hope Dept of Native Affairs, Report of Native Delegates, G.4-1904 commission or official report 1904 Source on African awareness of Rand conditions and compound conditions interfering with recruiting.
Contemporary newspapers and periodicals (Economist, Standard and Diggers News, South African Mining Journal, Johannesburg Star, South African Mines, Commerce and Industries, Cape Times, The Times) newspapers periodicals 1897-1929 Supports mining company finances, wage-reduction agreements, Chamber statements, and Robinson's reputation.
Contemporary mining handbooks and Randlord publications (Hatch and Chalmers 1895; Goldmann 1895-96; Denny 1902; Mabson 1900; Frankel 1938) secondary literature compilation 1895-1938 Supplies labour cost share, capital requirements for deep levels, dividend records and investment return figures.

Inference

Quantification: Illustrative figures.

Archival narrative case study of the interplay of the Chamber, WNLA, Native Affairs Department and Imperial government, built from correspondence files, commission evidence and Chamber reports, with a few illustrative figures (wages, employment, recruiting shares, mortality estimate) and argument against the Denoon, Mawby and van der Horst interpretations.

Key claims

Claim Basis Strength
Mines depended on state support to control migrant labour, because competition among mining houses and low-grade mining made them unable to organize supply themselves; this was dependence more than domination. (p. 28) Chamber of Mines reports (CMAR) plus SNA and Colonial Office correspondence on the 1906 crisis, read interpretively. Partial data
Early commitment to low-grade mining drove the industry's concern with minimizing working costs and its lobbying for favourable state policy. (p. 5) Chamber's 1902 statistical statement (dividends of 79 companies), Reyersbach evidence on yields and costs, and commission testimony. Partial data
Pass laws, wage-reduction agreements and the RNLA monopsony of 1895-97 were designed partly to stop mines stealing each other's labour. (p. 10) CMAR for 1894-97, Volksraad law texts, and ICI/TLC testimony of pass officers and recruiters. Partial data
Native Affairs Department officials and inspectors were closely aligned with the Chamber and WNLA, acting to enforce industrial discipline, though the department did push compound reform. (p. 15) Native Affairs Department files (SNA), inspector reports and statistics on complaints and discipline. Partial data
Compound mortality before and after the war was very high, probably 80-100 per thousand per annum, and fell only after Native Affairs Department pressure. (p. 16) Author's estimate since statistics were unavailable; later NAD inspector reports and annual reports. Asserted
African employment on the Rand peaked at 107,756 in April 1905 and fell to 90,420 in July 1906, with Chinese labour compensating, producing the 1906 recruiting crisis. (p. 21) HC 17/86 employment statistics and CS 1085/3142/1905 influx and exodus figures. Systematic data
The 1906 Robinson/TMLC challenge, backed by the Liberal government, nearly broke WNLA's monopsony; the state under Botha helped restore it. (p. 27) Robinson-Elgin and Selborne-Elgin correspondence (C.O. 879), SNA 60/989/1906, UNAD 191/596, and CMAR 1906. Partial data

The author's caveats

Notes that mortality statistics are unavailable for the period, that hard evidence is lacking on whether mines worked richer ores, and that commissions had to rely on industry-controlled data. Also treats the Chamber's letters to Elgin as contrived rather than at face value.

Gaps in the evidence

The argument would be better tested with systematic mine-level data on costs, grades, wages, recruiting numbers and mortality by group and year, which exist partly in company and Chamber records. Reliance on selected correspondence leaves the extent of Chamber influence versus Milner's independence hard to weigh; comparable files from the Colonial Office and Milner's own papers could balance this. Much of the Chamber's internal record, WNLA board minutes and recruiting statistics could test the claims about monopsony breakdown more directly.

Replicability: Data described but not public.