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Marashea on the Mines: Economic, Social and Criminal Networks on the South African Gold Fields, 1947-1999

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Gary Kynoch (2000). Marashea on the Mines: Economic, Social and Criminal Networks on the South African Gold Fields, 1947-1999. Journal of Southern African Studies, 26(1). Taylor & Francis.

Type journal article
Scope Wider apartheid literature
Method mixed
Period studied 1947–1999
Regions Witwatersrand/East Rand, Free State goldfields (Welkom, Virginia), Western Transvaal (Carletonville, Klerksdorp), Rustenburg platinum belt, Lesotho
Themes mining migrant labour, unions strikes, resistance social movements, demography urbanisation, bantustans removals influx, labour markets wages
Citation key kynoch2000

Argument

The Basotho Marashea ('Russians') gangs survived and flourished for fifty years because of their ties to gold mineworkers, not because of urban settlement. After the 1963 legislation confined Basotho to mining and farm work, and with the opening of the Free State mines, the gangs' centre of gravity moved to mining areas. The gangs split into employed mineworkers and unemployed 'loafers' in nearby shack settlements. The two sections formed a symbiotic network: miners' wages funded the loafers, and the loafers supplied women, liquor, dagga, protection and security. The gangs mostly avoided conflict with management, joined ethnic faction fights as Basotho, and clashed with the NUM when unionism threatened their patron-client networks. The author concedes there is no documented proof that management hired them as union-busters. The argument rests on oral interviews combined with archival and commission records.

Evidence and method

Roughly 40 oral interviews with Marashea members and veterans, mine security staff, hostel managers, TEBA officials and a police inspector (Lesotho, Soweto, Virginia, Klerksdorp, Welkom, 1998-99). Archival files from the Central Archives Depot (Native Affairs, SAP, Justice), the Free State Archives and the TEBA/NRC archives. Commission reports (Goldstone 1992, Bregman 1986, Bafokeng North 1992, Satchwell 1995). Press reports (The World, Golden City Post, Rand Daily Mail, Weekly Mail). A 1988 survey of mineworkers and secondary literature (Bonner, Moodie, McNamara, Steinberg and Seidman).

Place in the debates

  • Origins and sustaining basis of the Russians: Bonner's migrant-to-immigrant urbanisation thesis vs. a mine-centred explanation (see Worker consciousness, strikes and conflict on the mines and shop floor). Kynoch builds on Bonner but argues that the 1950s Rand era of Russians working in secondary industry was an aberration. The 'shift from migrant to immigrant status' was never completed, and the mineworker-loafer relationship explains the gangs' survival.
  • Were Russian gangs hired by mine management and police to break the NUM and foment faction fights? (see Worker consciousness, strikes and conflict on the mines and shop floor). Agnostic and sceptical. Management and security approval is plausible, but no documented proof exists. The Bregman Report and Goldstone found no substantiation, and Russians mostly acted to defend their own networks and Basotho solidarity. Some NUM claims appear to have used the Russians as convenient scapegoats.
  • Causes of ethnic faction fighting on the mines (see Worker consciousness, strikes and conflict on the mines and shop floor). Treats Russian involvement as ethnically motivated (as Basotho) and economically motivated (protecting customers and income). Their participation hardened ethnic boundaries in the compounds.

Findings

  • The gangs rest on a symbiosis between unemployed members in the settlements and employed mineworkers. (p. 9)

    The 'loafer' and mineworker factions have a symbiotic relationship: the unemployed rely on the miners for financial support while the miners depend on the 'full-time' Russians for access to and control over women.

  • The 1963 Aliens Control Act pushed Basotho into mine and farm work and out of urban employment, tying the gangs to the mines. (p. 7)

    After 1963, when the Aliens Control Act restricted Basotho migrants to agricultural and mining labour, the number of Russians employed in urban areas other than as mineworkers decreased accordingly.

  • Bonner's 1950s Rand picture of industrial workers is treated as exceptional; mineworkers remained the bulk of gang membership. (p. 6)

    Bonner's period, during which large numbers of Russians worked in secondary industry, was an aberration.

  • Rising real mine wages from the mid-1970s increased the income pool the gangs could tap. (p. 7)

    The real average wage of black mineworkers nearly tripled between 1974 and 1987.

  • Mineworkers are the gangs' main market for liquor, dagga and protection. (p. 11)

    The miners are our market. We sell beer and dagga and they are the ones who buy these things.

  • The 1975 deferred-pay riots are reinterpreted as Russians defending their economic interests, not acting for the exiled BCP as officials alleged. (p. 15)

    It is more likely that the Russians were acting to protect their economic interests as the imposition of deferred pay substantially reduced mineworkers' ability to financially support the gangs.

  • The 1991 President Steyn stay-away dispute produced large-scale ethnic violence in which Russians took part. (p. 17)

    This led to a series of clashes involving thousands of armed mineworkers, which lasted throughout the night and resulted in 15 deaths and 55 injuries.

  • Russian-NUM conflict is explained as a struggle over established patron-client networks. (p. 19)

    it was simply a power struggle between a resident force with an established patron-client network that was threatened by the encroachment of militant unionism.

  • There is no documented proof that management hired Russians against the union, despite NUM allegations. (p. 22)

    Despite some compelling evidence there is, to my knowledge, no documented proof that Marashea gangs were hired to attack union supporters.

  • The single-sex hostel system sustained the gangs; retrenchment since 1987 now threatens or reshapes them. (p. 25)

    the mining industry with its single-sex hostel system of accommodation, has sustained an association of migrant gangs with a penchant for violence over the past fifty years

  • Basotho mine employment fell sharply after 1987, with consequences for the gangs' income base. (p. 25)

    Basotho have experienced a 48 per cent decline in jobs on gold, coal, platinum and copper mines, so that in 1999, they numbered approximately 60,600 on the South African mines.

Evidence ledger

Sources used

Source Kind Period How used
Central Archives Depot (Pretoria) files: NTS, SAP, KKD, JUS, BAO, WRAD series on Russian gangs, faction fights, arrests and unrest, 1910s-1972 state archives 1913-1972 Documents Russian gang activity, arrests, occupations and police observations on the Rand, and later mine-area faction fights.
Free State Archives (Bloemfontein): CO 620 file 2385/1 and PNV 1/2, PNV 1/3 (FS 1302) police files state archives 1910-1962 Shows Basotho faction fights in 1910 and Russian gangs in Free State mining areas from the mid-1950s.
TEBA (The Employment Bureau of Africa) archives, NRC files A.9 Pad 1 chamber of mines or recruiting records 1951-1952 Official reports on Russian intimidation and extortion of Basotho mineworkers and requests to restrict weekend visits to townships.
TEBA Liaison Division (TEBALD) reports: 'Lesotho "Russian" Gangs, March 1980'; Notes on Visit to Elandsrand Mine 1979; Disturbances Involving Basotho Mine Labour from 26 December 1978 (1981) chamber of mines or recruiting records 1978-1981 Evidence that Russians infiltrate compounds for food and housing and that management suspected links to the BCP.
Chamber of Mines Research Organization, A Human Resources Audit of Elandsrand Gold Mine following the April 1979 Disturbances (Project GH2CO6, Internal Report No. 5) company records or reports 1979 Internal report noting workers' genuine grievances against management's blaming of Russians for the 1979 riot.
Mine and mining-house disturbance reports: Vaal Reefs No.3 compound 1972 (CAD KKD 2/1/8); K325 files on 1975 deferred pay disturbances; Elandsrand Note for the Record 1979; Gencor Manpower Division report on Bracken and Leslie 1987 company records or reports 1972-1987 Management accounts of Russian involvement in compound fights, the 1975 deferred pay riots and the 1979 strike.
Goldstone Commission, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Violence During November 1991 at the President Steyn Gold Mine, Welkom (1992) commission or official report 1991-1992 Principal documentation of Russian participation in the November 1991 killings of Xhosa workers and the commission's finding on security-force involvement.
Bregman Report, vol. 4, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Violence at Vaal Reefs Mine, No. 1 Shaft Hostel During 1986 commission or official report 1986 Finds no evidence that Russians were hired by management against the NUM.
Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Events at the Bafokeng North Mine During March 1992 commission or official report 1992 Used to show Russian-Basotho conflict with NUM and ANC-affiliated marshals at Bafokeng North.
Satchwell Commission of Enquiry into Violence at No. 8 Shaft Vaal Reefs Mine, January 1995 commission or official report 1995 Source for the January 1995 Vaal Maseru bus dispute clashes involving Russians and NUM members.
Intercontinental Marketing Services Africa, Survey Report of a Study of the Labour Situation on Certain Gold Mines Prepared for General Mining Corporation (March 1988), Tables 56-57 household or labour survey microdata 1988 Survey of hundreds of miners showing universal awareness of Russians and many identifying them as professional killers.
Author's oral history interviews (c. 1998-1999) with Marashea members, mineworkers, mine security, TEBA and SAPS officials, NUM organizer, in Lesotho, Soweto, Virginia, Klerksdorp, Welkom, Potchefstroom, Maseru interviews oral history 1998-1999 Main evidence for gang structure, recruitment, the mineworker-loafer symbiosis, women's role, faction fights and NUM conflict.
Newspapers: The World, Golden City Post, Rand Daily Mail, Weekly Mail (1956-1990) newspapers periodicals 1956-1990 Documents Russian raids from mines on townships, spread to Free State, and NUM allegations of management hiring Russians.
J.K. McNamara, 'Black Worker Conflicts on South African Gold Mines, 1973-1982' (PhD, Wits, 1985) and 'Inter-Group Violence' (1989) secondary literature compilation 1973-1986 Supplies figures on Basotho mine employment (over 100,000 by mid-1970s) and accounts of deferred pay disputes and fights.
Steinberg with Seidman, Gold Mining's Labour Markets (Wits Labour Studies Research Report 6, 1995) secondary literature compilation 1974-1990s Source for tripling of real black mine wages 1974-1987 and the survey of prostitutes in a mining town.
Standing, Sender and Weeks, Restructuring the Labour Market (1996) and TEBA personal communication (Hechter, 1999) secondary literature compilation 1987-1999 Figures on Basotho mine employment decline (16,345 in 1987 cited, about 60,600 in 1999).
Bonner, 'The Russians on the Reef 1947-1957' (Basotho employment figures on the Rand) secondary literature compilation 1946-1948 Figures on Basotho mineworkers and secondary industry workers, against which the author contests the Russians' industrial composition.
NUM documents: Motlatsi 1995 paper 'The History of Violence in the Mining Industry'; 'Reaping the Whirlwind' NUM/Anglo American Gold Division joint study (1986) union or movement records 1986-1995 Presents the NUM claim that management paid Russians to attack union supporters, which the author weighs against other evidence.
Carletonville HIV survey (Williams, Campbell, MacPhail 1999) secondary literature compilation 1999 Supports the claim that HIV poses a risk to mine-adjacent settlement dwellers.
Legislation: 1963 Aliens Control Act restricting Basotho to agricultural and mining labour legislation gazette 1963 Used as the structural cause shifting Basotho employment and Russian strength to the mines.

New data

Oral history interview corpus conducted 1998-1999 with Marashea members, retired mineworkers, mine security, TEBA officials and others in Lesotho and South African mining areas; number and sampling not stated.

Inference

Quantification: Illustrative figures.

Qualitative historical case study combining oral testimony with archival police, TEBA, Chamber and commission records and press reports; claims about continuity and mine dependence are argued by comparison across time (1950s Rand versus post-1963 Free State/Western Transvaal mines) and by triangulating interviews against official reports.

Key claims

Claim Basis Strength
Even in the 1950s mineworkers made up the bulk of most Russian groups on the Rand, contrary to Bonner's emphasis on secondary industry workers. (p. 83) Respondent estimates, arrest reports listing occupations, police/township official observations in CAD files. Partial data
After the 1963 legislation and the opening of the Free State mines, the locus of Russian strength shifted to the Western Transvaal and Free State mining areas. (p. 85) Police reports and press from the 1950s, interviews, McNamara's employment figures, Goldstone report. Partial data
Mineworkers and unemployed 'loafers' are in a symbiotic relationship in which miners' wages fund the gangs and the gangs give miners access to and control over women. (p. 86) Interview testimony from Marashea and mineworkers, 1951 NRC inspector report, 1972 Vaal Reefs report. Illustrative or anecdotal
The Russians historically avoided conflict with mine management, confined crime to areas outside the compounds, and were never subject to sustained management efforts to purge them. (p. 91) Interviews with mine security, TEBA and Russians; archival management reports; only two episodes (1975, 1979) of widespread management enmity. Partial data
Russians act as ethnic enforcers for Basotho in mine faction fights, uniting rival factions against outsiders, as in the 1991 President Steyn killings. (p. 94) Goldstone Commission report, interviews with Russians, TEBA investigator and SAPS inspector. Partial data
There is no documented proof that management or police hired Russians to attack the NUM; the NUM allegation is plausible but unsubstantiated, and Russians fought the union mainly when it threatened their patron-client networks or Basotho. (p. 99) NUM claims, a NUM organizer's testimony, Russian denials, Goldstone and Bregman findings, interviews. Partial data
Russian gangs have contributed to ethnic chauvinism on the mines, the control of migrant women and links between compound and township communities (tentative). (p. 101) Interviews, commission reports, inference from fight patterns; no systematic measure. Asserted

The author's caveats

The author notes that the Russians' share in the illegal gold and diamond trade is difficult to ascertain, that many respondents refused or were uncomfortable discussing BCP links given Lesotho's 1998 political climate, that informants disagree about some group boundaries, that evidence from the Harmony conflict is anecdotal, and that conclusions on impact are 'tentative'. Accounts of the number of jobs lost differ across studies.

Gaps in the evidence

The argument rests on a non-random set of interviews, with no count, sampling frame or demographic profile of Marashea membership, so the 'majority mineworkers' claim and the share of gang income from miners are not quantified. Mine-level records of hostel populations, Basotho employment by mine, wages and disciplinary or security files (some presumably in company and TEBA archives) could test the mine-dependence and infiltration claims, and cross-checked police docket data on gang arrests by occupation would help. Direct evidence on payments to Russians by management or police is absent and may never have existed in documentary form, leaving the NUM-collusion question unresolved.

Replicability: Data described but not public.