Trade Unions and Corporatism in South Africa¶
Johann Maree (1993). Trade Unions and Corporatism in South Africa. Transformation 21.
| Type | journal article |
| Scope | Economics and economic history of apartheid |
| Method | synthesis review |
| Period studied | 1990–1993 |
| Regions | South Africa, Sweden, West Germany, Australia |
| Themes | unions strikes, business and state, transition post apartheid, labour markets wages, inequality poverty unemployment, comparative theory |
| Citation key | maree1993 |
Argument¶
Maree argues that South Africa's stagnant economy, rising unemployment and poor productivity create a need for societal corporatism, and that the black union movement has already entered corporatist arrangements with the state and capital since 1990. Drawing on Taylor's five-country study, the Swedish, German and Australian cases and Cameron's 18-country comparison, he draws lessons for COSATU. He concludes that corporatism need not subordinate unions, that it trades labour quiescence for employment and a better social wage, and that the optimal conditions (a united union movement, a single employers' body, a left-leaning governing party) are unlikely in South Africa. He answers left critics of social contracts, but accepts that the dualism between organised workers and the unemployed is the most serious challenge.
Evidence and method¶
Secondary international literature on corporatism (Schmitter, Cawson, Grant, Taylor, Cameron, Lansbury and Davis), plus South African press reports, union documents and interviews, labour bulletins, NPI and Reserve Bank statistics, and a COSATU shop steward survey (Pityana and Orkin).
Place in the debates¶
- Whether social contracts or corporatist accords benefit or harm the labour movement (COSATU/left debate) (see Black trade unions: growth, wage effects, Wiehahn and strategy). Maree argues unions should participate and rejects Callinicos's view that social contracts weaken socialism and workers; he accepts the risks of bureaucratisation and dualism and says they must be guarded against.
- Corporatism: Marxist vs corporatist theory on capital's dominance (see Black trade unions: growth, wage effects, Wiehahn and strategy). Follows Cawson that corporatist theory is open-ended: unions need not be junior partners, contrary to Taylor's finding of union subordination in advanced countries.
- Wage militancy, unemployment and the insider-outsider trade-off (see Black trade unions: growth, wage effects, Wiehahn and strategy). Drawing on Cameron, he sees a trade-off between militancy and employment, and stresses that corporatism cannot alone solve mass unemployment.
Findings¶
-
GDP growth collapsed from the 1960s peak to near stagnation in the 1980s and contraction in the early 1990s. (p. 5)
From a peak of 5.8% per annum in the 1960s the growth rate slumped to a mere 0.7% per annum in the 1980s
-
Per capita income fell in the 1980s because population growth outpaced GDP growth. (p. 5)
Between 1981 and 1987 the average annual growth rate was only 0.7% whereas South Africa's population growth was 2.5% per annum thereby giving rise to an annual decline of 1.8%
-
Formal job creation lagged far behind labour force growth in the 1980s. (p. 6)
During the 1980s the annual average increase in employment declined to only 1.1% whereas the annual average growth rate of the economically active population amounted to 2.5%
-
Manufacturing wages outran productivity, raising unit labour costs relative to competitors. (p. 7)
the increase in wage earnings between 1975 and 1987 has far outstripped the rise in labour productivity
-
The Laboria Minute of 1990 opened the way to trilateral labour law-making, producing the 1991 Labour Relations Amendment Act. (p. 8)
the first Act in parliament that was the product of trilateral negotiations between the state, capital and black trade unions
-
The anti-VAT general strike was used to win a seat for labour in macro-economic policy-making, leading to the National Economic Forum. (p. 10)
On 5 and 6 November 1991 81% of workers round the country stayed away from work on the first day and 68% on the second day of the campaign
-
Drive towards corporatism in South Africa came from union initiative, reflecting the rise of strategic unionism. (p. 13)
in almost all cases the drive towards corporatism and centralisation of bargaining has come from union initiative and pressure on the government and employers
-
Taylor found unions subordinate to capital in all five countries, and that perception of international vulnerability mattered more than corporatist structure. (p. 16)
Although unions have access to governmental decision-makers and some are even integrated into the policy process, they all find their interests subordinate to that of capital
-
Cameron found centralised labour power associated with quiescence, lower unemployment and inflation, with employment the quid pro quo for restraint. (p. 21)
The essential quid for the quo of labour quiescence is full employment over an extended period
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The Mercedes Benz strike of 1990 shows that restraining militant workers paid poverty wages is difficult. (p. 23)
the prospect of the trade union federations entering corporatist agreements that restrain workers from acting militantly in their immediate interest is indeed bleak
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The most serious challenge is that corporatism represents only organised workers, leaving the unemployed marginalised. (p. 28)
the concern that social contracts could exacerbate the dualism already present in the working class is probably the most serious challenge facing corporatism in South Africa
Evidence ledger¶
Sources used¶
| Source | Kind | Period | How used |
|---|---|---|---|
| Real GDP growth rates 1950-1990 table (Moll 1990 for 1950-80; SA Reserve Bank Quarterly Reports March 1988 and March 1991 for 1980-90) | national accounts macro | 1950-1990 | Shows GDP growth slumping from 5.8% in the 1960s to 0.7% in the 1980s, establishing economic stagnation. |
| Cape Times 12.02.93 (GDP growth 1990-92) | newspapers periodicals | 1990-1992 | Supplies the negative GDP growth rates for 1990, 1991 and 1992. |
| Central Statistical Services, South African Statistics 1992 | official statistical series | 1975-1991 | Documents consumer price inflation, with an item costing 14 cents in 1975 priced at R1.15 in 1991. |
| National Productivity Institute, Productivity Focus 1989 (also used for per capita income and multifactor productivity) | official statistical series | 1970-1987 | Supports claims of declining per capita GDP (1981-87), falling multifactor productivity, and wages outstripping labour productivity in manufacturing. |
| Central Statistical Services employment figures reported in Cape Times 02.11.92 | newspapers periodicals | Sept 1989-1992 | Shows job losses of more than 250,000, concentrated in mining, manufacturing and construction. |
| President's Council unemployment estimate (via Archer et al 1990) and Wilson and Ramphele 1989 | secondary literature compilation | 1980 | Provides unemployment estimates of 30% nationally and about 50% in depressed areas. |
| South African Reserve Bank, Annual Economic Report 1990 | official statistical series | 1980s | Supplies employment growth (1.1%) versus growth of the economically active population (2.5%) in the 1980s. |
| Sanlam Economic Survey May 1991 (reported in Sunday Times Business Times 19.05.91) | newspapers periodicals | 1991 | Shows that only one in ten new labour market entrants was assured of a formal sector job. |
| Laboria Minute (September 1990) and 1991 Labour Relations Amendment Act, via Schreiner 1991, CALS 1991a/b, Liebenberg 1991 | legislation gazette | 1988-1991 | Establishes the first trilateral labour legislation as evidence of union corporatist participation. |
| COSATU–Minister of Manpower accord of November 1992 and South African Labour News 1992 | newspapers periodicals | November 1992 | Documents the accord extending labour rights to farm and domestic workers, and SAAU opposition. |
| Media Statement, Ministry of Manpower, 05.02.93; Schreiner 1991 on the National Manpower Commission | commission or official report | 1991-1993 | Describes the restructured NMC composition (33 members, tripartite thirds) and COSATU's aims. |
| Bird 1992b, COSATU Congress 1991 resolution on training | union or movement records | 1991-1992 | Shows COSATU's decision to join the National Training Board. |
| Weekly Mail 08-14.11.91 (anti-VAT strike stayaway figures) | newspapers periodicals | 5-6 November 1991 | Documents the strike participation (81% and 68%) that underpinned COSATU's demand for an economic forum. |
| Interviews with Jay Naidoo and Sam Shilowa (Naidoo 1991; Shilowa 1992, SALB) and Business Day 09.10.91 | interviews oral history | 1991-1992 | Reports COSATU leaders' positions on a macro-economic forum and on limits to strikes in a social accord. |
| Business Day 30.10.92 on launch of National Economic Forum | newspapers periodicals | October 1992 | Describes NEF participants and agenda at launch. |
| Labour Bulletin Correspondent 1991 and Bilateralism Review 1992 (Mining Summit) | newspapers periodicals | 1991-1992 | Describes the Mining Summit, NUM proposals and slow progress of the Steering Committee. |
| Board of Trade and Industry Report No. 2646 (1988) and BTI 1991; National Clothing Industry data; National Clothing Federation 1992 Annual Report; Sactwu News 27.01.92 | commission or official report | 1988-1992 | Documents the Structural Adjustment Programme, employment losses and the Hatty Committee as meso-level corporatism. |
| Draft SACCOLA/COSATU Charter, South African Labour Bulletin 16(7) | union or movement records | August 1992 | Evidence of bilateral accord on mass action and plant closure. |
| Taylor (1989), Trade Unions and Politics: five-country comparative study | secondary literature compilation | post-WWII to 1980s | Supplies typology (integration, inclusion, marginalisation) and lessons on union subordination and economic vulnerability. |
| Rivlin 1984 Table 1-1 and The Economist 1990 survey of Sweden (unemployment and inflation data) | secondary literature compilation | 1960-1982 | Quantifies Swedish unemployment and inflation performance under corporatism. |
| Cameron (1984) study of 18 advanced capitalist countries, 1965-82 | secondary literature compilation | 1965-1982 | The main empirical base for claims that corporatist/labour-organisational power is associated with low strikes, low unemployment and low inflation. |
| Australian Accord documents (TUTA 1983, TUTA 1988, ACTU 1990, Lansbury and Davis 1987, Bird 1992a, Business Day 25.02.92) | secondary literature compilation | 1983-1991 | Case study of the Accord's achievements and weaknesses for manufacturing output, jobs, real wages and union density. |
| Pityana and Orkin (eds) 1992, Beyond the Factory Floor: survey of COSATU shop stewards | household or labour survey microdata | c.1991-1992 | Supplies survey results on shop steward recognition and attendance, to argue union democracy is robust. |
| Bird and Schreiner (1992) 'COSATU at the crossroads' and Pillay and Webster (1991) | union or movement records | 1989-1992 | Documents COSATU principles of engagement and scenarios of state-union relations. |
Inference¶
Quantification: Illustrative figures.
Policy-oriented comparative argument: draws lessons for South African unions from secondary studies of corporatism in advanced countries (Taylor, Cameron, an Australian case study) and from a descriptive account of South African corporatist developments in 1990-93. It relies on theory (Schmitter, Cawson) and a few macro-economic indicators; there is no original data analysis.
Key claims¶
| Claim | Basis | Strength |
|---|---|---|
| The South African economy stagnated in the 1980s and contracted in the early 1990s, with falling per capita income, rising unemployment and poor productivity, creating a need for corporatist agreements. (p. 28) | Reserve Bank/Moll GDP series, NPI productivity and per capita data, CSS employment figures, President's Council unemployment estimate, press reports. | Partial data |
| Since 1990 the black trade union movement has entered fully-fledged corporatist arrangements (Laboria Minute, NMC, NTB, NEF, sectoral forums), largely on union initiative. (p. 30) | Accounts from SALB, Labour News, Business Day, ministry statement, Bilateralism Review, BTI reports and interviews with union leaders. | Partial data |
| Corporatism in advanced countries typically subordinates unions to capital, though not necessarily, and success depends on a shared perception of international vulnerability. (p. 39) | Taylor's five-country study, Swedish and West German episodes drawn from Taylor and Rivlin. | Partial data |
| Countries with strong, centralised labour organisation and corporatist institutions experienced lower strikes, unemployment and price increases, without a fall in labour's income share. (p. 44) | Cameron's 18-country, 1965-82 comparative statistical study, relayed second-hand. | Systematic data |
| The Australian Accord delivered material gains and industry policy successes but faced employer reluctance and rank-and-file dissatisfaction. (p. 42) | Lansbury and Davis, ACTU 1990 statistics, Bird 1992a, Business Day. | Partial data |
| Social contracts need not demobilise unions or reduce wages, and COSATU retains shop-steward democracy and safeguards; however, corporatism risks deepening the dualism between employed and unemployed workers. (p. 49) | Pityana and Orkin shop-steward survey, Bird and Schreiner on COSATU principles, Cameron, Friedman on unemployment. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| The most favourable corporatist outcome for South Africa is unlikely given union divisions, absence of a single employers' association, and workers' poverty wages. (p. 48) | Application of Cameron's and Taylor's findings to South African conditions; Mercedes Benz strike example from SALB. | Asserted |
The author's caveats¶
The author notes that unemployment estimates vary immensely, and that Cameron's findings show only a statistical tendency with several deviant countries (Japan, Switzerland, Denmark, Britain). He cautions that Taylor's findings may not be generalisable.
Gaps in the evidence¶
The argument transfers findings from advanced industrial countries to South Africa without testing them on South African data, such as union density, bargaining coverage, strike statistics and wage and employment series, which existed in official sources and union records at the time. The claims on union democracy rest on a single shop-steward survey and on COSATU's stated principles, with no records of actual mandating practice or interviews with rank-and-file members. Evidence on the accords' effects on workers' wages and employment could only come after implementation and is available in later datasets.
Replicability: Data described but not public.