Trade unions and corporatism in South Africa¶
Johann Maree (1993). Trade unions and corporatism in South Africa. Transformation 21.
| Type | journal article |
| Scope | Economics and economic history of apartheid |
| Method | synthesis review |
| Period studied | 1980–1993 |
| Regions | South Africa, Sweden, West Germany, Australia, advanced industrial countries (comparative) |
| Themes | unions strikes, business and state, transition post apartheid, labour markets wages, inequality poverty unemployment, comparative theory, manufacturing industrial policy |
| Citation key | maree1993a |
Argument¶
Maree argues that South Africa's major actors (labour, capital, state) are already drifting into corporatist arrangements, and that the black union movement, especially COSATU, should learn from international experience of societal corporatism. He grounds the need for it in economic stagnation, rising unemployment and poor productivity in the 1980s-90s. He reviews Taylor's five-country study, the Swedish, West German and Australian cases, and Cameron's 18-country study. From these he draws lessons: all powerful actors must be included, leaders must stay accountable to the rank and file, and unions face a trade-off between militancy and employment. He rebuts the left's five objections to social contracts but concedes that the dualism between organised and unemployed workers is the most serious challenge, and that corporatism alone cannot solve unemployment.
Evidence and method¶
Secondary international literature (Taylor 1989, Cameron 1984, Cawson 1986, Schmitter 1979, Lansbury and Davis 1987), SA official statistics and economic surveys (Reserve Bank, CSS, NPI productivity data, Sanlam survey), press reports and union documents (Labour Bulletin, Weekly Mail, Business Day, SACTWU News), COSATU shop-steward survey (Pityana and Orkin 1992), and union interviews (Naidoo, Shilowa).
Place in the debates¶
- Should unions enter social contracts or accords? (labour and left debate) (see Black trade unions: growth, wage effects, Wiehahn and strategy). Maree is cautiously in favour. He treats participation as a question of 'how' rather than 'whether'. He rebuts Callinicos and Vally-critics' claims of incorporation and bureaucratisation, while acknowledging risks.
- Do corporatist arrangements subordinate labour to capital (Marxist vs corporatist theory)? (see Black trade unions: growth, wage effects, Wiehahn and strategy). Maree follows Cawson in treating union power as variable and open-ended. He cites Cameron and the Australian Accord against Taylor's finding of union subordination, and holds that outcomes depend on class struggle.
- Militancy versus employment: do quiescent unions gain or lose? (see Black trade unions: growth, wage effects, Wiehahn and strategy). Following Cameron, he holds that wage restraint under centralised unions is traded for employment and a higher social wage, without lowering labour's income share. He concedes this is hard to apply where workers earn poverty wages.
- State corporatism vs societal corporatism (see Black trade unions: growth, wage effects, Wiehahn and strategy). He adopts Schmitter's distinction and restricts the analysis to societal corporatism, arguing that union autonomy and mobilisation survive within it.
Findings¶
-
GDP growth collapsed from the 1960s peak to near stagnation in the 1980s. (p. 5)
From a peak of 5.8% per annum in the 1960s the growth rate slumped to a mere 0.7% per annum in the 1980s as the table below demonstrates.
-
Per capita income fell in the 1980s because population growth outpaced GDP growth. (p. 5)
Between 1981 and 1987 the average annual growth rate was only 0.7% whereas South Africa's population growth was 2.5% per annum thereby giving rise to an annual decline of 1.8% in the per capita income
-
Formal-sector job losses began with the 1989 recession. (p. 6)
there has been a reduction of employment of more than 250 000 in the formal sectors of the economy outside agriculture over approximately three years commencing September 1989
-
Employment growth lagged far behind labour-force growth, deepening unemployment. (p. 6)
During the 1980s the annual average increase in employment declined to only 1.1% whereas the annual average growth rate of the economically active population amounted to 2.5%
-
Multifactor productivity in the private non-agricultural economy declined 1970-87. (p. 7)
multifactor productivity of this large sector of the South African economy has declined gradually from 1970 to 1987 at an average annual rate of 0.1% per annum.
-
The 1991 Labour Relations Amendment Act was the first product of trilateral negotiation involving black unions. (p. 8)
the first Act in parliament that was the product of trilateral negotiations between the state, capital and black trade unions
-
The anti-VAT general strike was the leverage behind the creation of the National Economic Forum. (p. 10)
On 5 and 6 November 1991 81% of workers round the country stayed away from work on the first day and 68% on the second day of the campaign
-
Mining retrenchments prompted the NUM-initiated Mining Summit, a meso-level corporatist forum. (p. 11)
100 000 mine workers had been laid off and up to 200 000 more could possibly face retrenchments
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Taylor finds that unions, even when integrated into policy-making, remain subordinate to capital. (p. 16)
they all find their interests subordinate to that of capital
-
Cameron finds that centralised, organisationally powerful labour movements coincide with low militancy, low inflation and high employment. (p. 21)
countries where the trade union movement possessed a high level of centralised organisational power experienced a relatively quiescent labour force and had small levels of price and wage increases as well as high levels of employment.
-
Neither quiescence nor militancy changes labour's long-run income share. (p. 21)
neither quiescence nor militancy has a great deal of impact on the distribution of income between capital and labour over the long term
-
Corporatism risks deepening the divide between organised and unemployed workers. (p. 28)
By their nature corporatist agreements can only be entered into by the organised section of the working class.
Evidence ledger¶
Sources used¶
| Source | Kind | Period | How used |
|---|---|---|---|
| South African Statistics 1992 (price/inflation series) | official statistical series | 1975-1991 | Shows inflation eroding real incomes: a consumer item costing 14 cents in 1975 would cost R1.15 in 1991. |
| Real GDP growth rates by decade (Moll 1990; SA Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletins March 1988 and March 1991) | national accounts macro | 1950-1990 | Table of ten-year GDP growth rates documenting the slowdown from 5.8% in the 1960s to 0.7% in the 1980s. |
| Cape Times reports of GDP growth in 1990-92 and of CSS employment figures | newspapers periodicals | 1989-1992 | Supplies negative GDP growth for 1990-92 and the loss of over 250,000 formal non-agricultural jobs since September 1989. |
| National Productivity Institute, Productivity Focus 1989 | official statistical series | 1970-1987 | Establishes the fall in per capita income in 1981-87, declining multifactor productivity, and wages outstripping labour productivity in manufacturing. |
| South African Reserve Bank, Annual Economic Report 1990 | official statistical series | 1980s | Gives employment growth of 1.1% a year against 2.5% growth of the economically active population in the 1980s. |
| President's Council unemployment estimate (via Archer et al 1990) and Wilson and Ramphele 1989 | secondary literature compilation | 1980 | Gives estimated unemployment rates of 30% nationally and about 50% in depressed areas. |
| Sanlam Economic Survey, May 1991 (reported in Sunday Times Business Times) | newspapers periodicals | 1991 | Shows that only one in ten new labour market entrants was assured a formal-sector job. |
| Laboria Minute, September 1990 | legislation gazette | September 1990 | Documents the first corporatist agreement, on consultation over labour legislation, leading to the 1991 Labour Relations Amendment Act. |
| COSATU-Minister of Manpower accord, November 1992, and South African Labour News 4(11) and Special Document 23 November 1992 | union or movement records | November 1992 | Documents the accord extending labour rights to farm and domestic workers and the SAAU's angry reaction. |
| Media Statement, Ministry of Manpower, 05.02.93 | commission or official report | 1992-1993 | Documents the August 1992 restructuring and composition of the National Manpower Commission. |
| Schreiner 1991, Bird 1992b, CALS 1991a/b, Liebenberg 1991 (labour movement accounts of NMC, NTB and labour legislation) | union or movement records | 1991-1992 | Establish COSATU's objectives and participation in the NMC, the National Training Board and the 1991 Act. |
| Weekly Mail 08-14.11.91 (anti-VAT strike stayaway figures) | newspapers periodicals | November 1991 | Gives stayaway rates showing the union movement's mobilising power behind the demand for the NEF. |
| Interviews with COSATU leaders Naidoo (1991) and Shilowa (1992) in SA Labour Bulletin; Business Day 09.10.91 and 30.10.92 | interviews oral history | 1991-1992 | Show COSATU's stance on a macro-economic forum, restraints on strikes, and the NEF launch participants and agenda. |
| Labour Bulletin Correspondent 1991 and Bilateralism Review 1992 on the Mining Summit | newspapers periodicals | 1991-1992 | Describes the NUM-initiated Mining Summit, its proposals, and the slow progress of its working groups. |
| Board of Trade and Industry (1988) Report No. 2646 and BTI (1991); National Clothing Federation reports; Sactwu News 27.01.92 | commission or official report | 1988-1992 | Documents the Structural Adjustment Programme, job losses in clothing and textiles, and the Hatty Committee working group. |
| Draft SACCOLA/COSATU Charter, South African Labour Bulletin 16(7) | union or movement records | August 1992 | Shows the bilateral Charter on mass action and a one-day plant closure. |
| Taylor (1989) Trade Unions and Politics, five-country study | secondary literature compilation | post-WWII | Supplies the comparative classification of union-state relations and conclusions on subordination and economic vulnerability. |
| Cameron (1984) 18-country study of corporatism and economic performance | secondary literature compilation | 1965-1982 | Statistical findings linking union organisational power to low strikes, inflation and unemployment, used as the main empirical basis for lessons for South Africa. |
| Australian Accord sources: Lansbury and Davis 1987; ACTU 1990; TUTA 1983 and 1988; Bird 1992a; Business Day 25.02.92 | union or movement records | 1983-1992 | Documents the Accord's content and outcomes, such as manufacturing growth, jobs, falling real wages and declining union density. |
| Rivlin 1984/1987 and The Economist 1990 (Swedish unemployment and inflation data) | secondary literature compilation | 1960-1982 | Gives Swedish unemployment and inflation rates compared with the European average. |
| COSATU shop steward survey (Pityana and Orkin 1992, Beyond the Factory Floor) | household or labour survey microdata | c.1991-1992 | Shows the strength of shop steward structures, supporting the claim that COSATU can maintain democratic practice under corporatism. |
| Bird and Schreiner (1992) 'COSATU at the crossroads' on principles of engagement | union or movement records | 1989-1992 | Supports the claim that COSATU has developed principles to safeguard democracy and link negotiation to mass action. |
Inference¶
Quantification: Illustrative figures.
Argumentative synthesis built on theory. It uses descriptive macro indicators and newspaper-reported events to establish a South African need for corporatism, then reasons by analogy from other scholars' comparative and country studies (Taylor, Cameron, Australian and Swedish cases) to draw lessons for South Africa.
Key claims¶
| Claim | Basis | Strength |
|---|---|---|
| The South African economy stagnated in the 1980s and early 1990s, with falling per capita income, job losses and rising unemployment, creating a need for corporatist accords. (p. 28) | Decadal GDP growth table (Moll/Reserve Bank), NPI, CSS employment, President's Council unemployment estimate, and Sanlam survey, used descriptively. | Partial data |
| Productivity performance is poor, with wages outstripping productivity and unit labour costs rising faster than in major industrial countries. (p. 30) | NPI (1989) multifactor productivity analysis, reported briefly with no comparative data shown. | Partial data |
| From 1990 the black trade union movement entered corporatist arrangements with state and capital at macro and meso levels, largely on union initiative. (p. 36) | Laboria Minute, 1991 Act, the Manpower accord, NMC and NTB restructuring, NEF, Mining Summit and textile working group, from labour press, union documents and newspapers. | Partial data |
| Cross-national evidence shows centralised union organisational power is associated with low strike activity, low inflation and unemployment, and no loss of wage share, so corporatism does not come at workers' expense. (p. 44) | Cameron's 18-country, 1965-82 correlational study, reported at second hand. | Partial data |
| Swedish and German experience show that corporatist accords collapse if a powerful group is excluded or leaders cannot deliver rank-and-file compliance. (p. 46) | Taylor (1989) and secondary accounts, plus the Mercedes Benz strike literature for South Africa. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| The Australian Accord delivered material gains and industrial policy achievements but suffered where employers were excluded and from drift to enterprise bargaining. (p. 41) | Lansbury and Davis, ACTU and TUTA documents, Bird presentation, and Business Day. | Partial data |
| COSATU has strong shop steward structures and engagement principles that mitigate corporatism's threat to union democracy. (p. 49) | Pityana and Orkin shop steward survey and Bird and Schreiner principles of engagement. | Partial data |
| Corporatism risks worsening the dualism between organised and unorganised or unemployed workers, and no organisations exist to represent the latter. (p. 51) | Argument with citation to Friedman 1991 and Bird and Schreiner; no data on the unemployed's representation. | Asserted |
The author's caveats¶
Notes that estimates of unemployment vary immensely. Acknowledges that the Australian Charter was never signed or implemented, and that Taylor's findings may not generalise to all countries.
Gaps in the evidence¶
The article gives no South African data on wages, strikes, union membership or bargaining coverage to test whether the Cameron-type relationships could hold here. It relies on secondary summaries of comparative studies instead of the underlying cross-national data (OECD or ILO series), and on newspaper and journal accounts of South African negotiations rather than archival or minuted records of the NEF, NMC and the summits. Union surveys, strike statistics and bargaining council records existed at the time and could test the claims about militancy and employment.
Replicability: Data poorly documented.