Sanctions Against South Africa¶
Charles S. Miller (2003). Sanctions Against South Africa.
| Type | other |
| Scope | Economics and economic history of apartheid |
| Method | synthesis review |
| Period studied | 1652–1993 |
| Regions | South Africa, United States, Southern Africa |
| Themes | sanctions divestment, macro fiscal finance debt, resistance social movements, origins segregation, business and state |
| Citation key | miller2003 |
Argument¶
The paper asks how far external economic pressure (disinvestment, investment sanctions, the Sullivan Principles, bank loan withdrawals, embargoes) explains the South African government's decision to end apartheid. It reviews the history of apartheid, the forms of sanction, and the obstacles to their effectiveness (regional dependence, circumvention through third countries, weak government-ordered measures). It concludes that sanctions had some effect, with the 1985 bank loan withdrawals the most powerful, and that financial and public pressure mattered more than government-ordered trade measures. It nonetheless judges internal resistance (boycotts, strikes, protests) the most significant force, and says the exact influence of sanctions cannot be determined. The argument rests on a literature review of secondary sources and press items, not on original analysis.
Evidence and method¶
Secondary literature and press sources only: Becker (1987), Kaempfer et al. (1987), Levy (1999), Rodman (1994), Mangaliso (1997), Thompson (2001), plus magazine and newspaper articles (Industry Week, U.S. News & World Report, Washington Post) and an encyclopedia entry. No archives, original data or interviews.
Place in the debates¶
- Sanctions effectiveness (see Sanctions, disinvestment and the anti-apartheid movement). Sanctions had some effect, with bank loan withdrawals and public or private pressure stronger than government-ordered trade sanctions. The author gives internal resistance greater weight and calls the exact effect unmeasurable.
- Constructive engagement vs. sanctions/disinvestment (see Sanctions, disinvestment and the anti-apartheid movement). Treats the Sullivan Principles and constructive engagement as insufficient because they dealt only with workplace treatment. Sees Sullivan's 1987 call for full withdrawal as a sign of their failure.
- Internal resistance vs. external pressure as cause of apartheid's end (see Why apartheid ended: reform, transition and elite bargaining). Concludes that internal struggle played the more significant role, with external pressure supporting it.
Findings¶
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The author's overall verdict puts internal resistance above sanctions. (p. 8)
after reviewing my sources, I believe the internal events, such as the boycotts, strikes, demonstrations and violence played a more significant role then sanctions did.
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The author doubts the sanctions' influence can be measured. (p. 9)
to determine an exact level of influence the sanctions had on ending apartheid does not appear to be possible.
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The withdrawal of loans by multinational banks in 1985 is cited (via Rodman) as the most powerful external weapon. (p. 8)
He believes the most powerful weapon was the multinational banks calling in their loans in 1985, causing chaos in the South African economy
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Apartheid-era profit rates drew foreign investors, tied to repressed, non-unionised labour. (p. 4)
Manufacturing companies in South Africa were making 18% profits on their investment in 1983, while in other countries they averaged only 12%.
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The GNP cost of trade sanctions is reported (via Levy) as small. (p. 7)
Statistically the loss of GNP, as a result of the trade sanctions, was only 0.5 percent (Levy 418).
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Government-ordered sanctions were easily evaded through subsidiaries and re-exporters. (p. 7)
The U.S. sanctions had no international authority, making them easy for companies to bypass, by using their subsidiaries in independent countries
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Regional dependence on the South African economy limited the appeal of sanctions. (p. 6)
South Africa had the most stable economy in the region, causing the surrounding nations to be dependent on them.
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The Sullivan Principles dealt only with workplace treatment, not with political and economic rights. (p. 5)
they did not directly address the fact that blacks had no economic or political rights in South Africa; they only dealt with their workplace treatment
Evidence ledger¶
Sources used¶
| Source | Kind | Period | How used |
|---|---|---|---|
| Funk & Wagnalls New Encyclopedia (1979), entry 'South Africa' | other | 1979 edition; covers 17th c.-1960s | Supplies the definition of apartheid and the dates of the UN Security Council's first sanctions study (1964) and the discovery of diamonds and gold. |
| “Did Sanctions Work?” Industry Week, 4 Nov. 1991 | newspapers periodicals | 1985-1990 (article 1991) | Source for the figures on over 250 US companies withdrawing and $11 billion in investment withdrawn, and for trade sanctions being circumvented. |
| “Is There Life after Andy?” Washington Post, 16 Sept. 1979 | newspapers periodicals | 1979 | Cited for Trans-Africa's claim that US corporations profited from near-slave conditions in South Africa. |
| “No Color Bar in South Africa’s Trade,” U.S. News & World Report, 10 April 1978 | newspapers periodicals | 1978 | Source for migrant labour from neighbouring countries and South Africa's 40% share of Africa's manufacturing output. |
| Gergen, David, 'Apartheid’s Challenge', U.S. News & World Report, 15 June 1987 | newspapers periodicals | 1987 | Used for the count of companies voluntarily taking part in the Sullivan principles. |
| Manning, Robert A., 'Constructive Engagement; South Africa: Why Leon Sullivan gave up his Principles', U.S. News & World Report, 1987 | newspapers periodicals | 1987 | Supports the claim that Sullivan called for complete corporate withdrawal in 1987. |
| Levy, Phillip I., 'Sanctions on South Africa: What Did They Do?', AER 89.2 (1999) | secondary literature compilation | 1974-1990s | Source for the estimated GNP loss from trade sanctions, GNP decline from 1974 to 1987, Chase Manhattan's 1985 loan refusal, and Mandela's views. |
| Kaempfer, Lehman and Lowenberg, International Organization 41.3 (1987) | secondary literature compilation | 1980s | Source for British jobs dependent on South Africa, re-export circumvention via Southeast Asia, and the divestment mechanisms. |
| Mangaliso, Mzamo P., 'South Africa: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Sullivan Principles', J. of Black Studies 28.2 (1997) | secondary literature compilation | 1977-1983 | Source for the comparison of manufacturing profit rates (18% in South Africa against 12% elsewhere) in 1983 and for the content of the Sullivan principles. |
| Thompson, Leonard, A History of South Africa (Yale UP, 2001) | secondary literature compilation | 1652-1980s | Used for historical narrative, inflation figures for 1983-86, and the US and British investment dependence. |
| Rodman, Kenneth A., 'Public and Private Sanctions against South Africa', Political Science Quarterly 109.2 (1994) | secondary literature compilation | 1980s | Supports claims about the IMF stance, circumvention of US sanctions, and the effect of banks calling in loans in 1985. |
Inference¶
Quantification: Illustrative figures.
A short synthetic essay that draws on secondary literature and press articles to describe the types of external pressure, then reaches a qualitative judgment that internal resistance mattered more than sanctions. There is no systematic comparison, counterfactual or analysis of data.
Key claims¶
| Claim | Basis | Strength |
|---|---|---|
| Foreign investors were drawn by apartheid-enabled high profits on manufacturing investment in South Africa. (p. 4) | A single profit-rate comparison taken from Mangaliso. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| Divestment and withdrawal were large in scale between 1985 and 1990, with over 250 US companies leaving and $11 billion in investment withdrawn. (p. 6) | Industry Week article 'Did Sanctions Work?'; Levy on Chase Manhattan. | Partial data |
| Trade sanctions were easy to circumvent through subsidiaries and third-country re-exporters. (p. 7) | Rodman and Kaempfer; the Industry Week article. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| The measured macroeconomic cost of trade sanctions was small (0.5% of GNP). (p. 7) | Levy's estimate, contrasted with the GNP decline since 1974 and the inflation rise. | Partial data |
| Neighbouring countries' dependence on the South African economy limited the usefulness of sanctions. (p. 6-7) | Becker, the 'No Color' article and Kaempfer on jobs and manufacturing share. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| Internal resistance played a larger role than external sanctions in ending apartheid, though the precise influence of sanctions cannot be determined. (p. 8) | Author's judgment based on the reviewed secondary sources, with no causal test. | Asserted |
The author's caveats¶
The author states that the exact level of influence of sanctions cannot be determined and notes that the evidence on whether private stock sales alone cause withdrawal has not been proven.
Gaps in the evidence¶
The argument needs time-series data on capital flows, trade volumes, exchange rates and loan rollovers around 1985, together with evidence from South African government and business records showing how elites perceived sanctions. It would also need comparative or counterfactual analysis of the effects of internal unrest and sanctions. Such data existed (SARB, Treasury, Chamber of Mines, cabinet and NP archives) and is accessible now, but the essay uses none of it.
Replicability: Data poorly documented.