The Role of Non-Violent Action in the Downfall of Apartheid

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Stephen Zunes (1999). The Role of Non-Violent Action in the Downfall of Apartheid. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 37(1). Cambridge University Press.

Type	journal article
Scope	Wider apartheid literature
Method	synthesis review
Period studied	1912–1990
Regions	South Africa, Natal/Durban, Western Cape, Transvaal townships (Vaal, Alexandra, Soweto), Southern Africa neighbours
Themes	resistance social movements, unions strikes, politics ideology elections, sanctions divestment, transition post apartheid, bantustans removals influx, comparative theory
Citation key	zunes1999

Argument

Zunes argues that non-violent action, not armed struggle, was the major factor in apartheid's downfall. The armed struggle faced overwhelming military, geographic and regional obstacles, whereas the regime's dependence on black labour and on Western economic support made it vulnerable to strikes, boycotts, alternative institutions and international sanctions. The ANC itself came to treat armed action as 'armed propaganda' supporting mass resistance. Non-violence also built white and international dissent, which fed sanctions and the economic crisis that pushed elites toward negotiation. The case is made through a narrative history of resistance, supported by secondary literature and activist accounts.

Evidence and method

Secondary literature (Sharp, Price, Karis, Frederikse, Lodge, Luthuli, Benson, Kuper), activist compilations (Smuts & Westcott 1991, Wink 1987), press reports and some official documents (Riekert Commission). No archives, survey data or original quantitative analysis.

Place in the debates

• Armed struggle vs non-violent action as the decisive force in ending apartheid (see Why apartheid ended: reform, transition and elite bargaining). Argues non-violent mass action was decisive; armed struggle was marginal and at times counterproductive, though the threat of it may have helped force compromise.
• Sanctions effectiveness and the role of foreign pressure (see Sanctions, disinvestment and the anti-apartheid movement). Credits sanctions, combined with strikes and rising security costs, with producing an economic crisis that forced elites to seek change. Sanctions are attributed to anti-apartheid solidarity movements responding to non-violent resistance and repression.
• Liberal view that growth and foreign investment would liberalise apartheid (see Liberal vs revisionist: was apartheid functional or dysfunctional for capitalist growth?). Dismisses it in a note as an unrealistic scenario pushed by Western analysts.
• Role of black labour militancy and the 1973 strikes in the regime's crisis (see Resistance and liberation movements). Treats labour militancy since 1973 as the most important trend toward successful non-violent action, moving from economic to political strikes.

Findings

• Non-violent resistance drew its power from the regime's combined strength and vulnerability, including dependence on the black majority. (p. 3)

  It was this paradoxical situation, of being both extraordinarily powerful and highly vulnerable, that gave non-violent resistance its power.

• ANC military strength was small and its armed struggle never threatened the regime. (p. 10)

  Estimates of ANC military personnel in the early i980s were never higher than I4,000

• The ANC treated armed action as subordinate to mass resistance and aimed at ungovernability rather than physical overthrow. (p. 13)

  it was the ungovernability of the country by the apartheid regime, and not its physical overthrow, which would end apartheid.

• Strikes escalated in the late 1980s despite the state of emergency and media bans. (p. 20)

  in i987, over 20,ooo railway workers struck for over two months, and 340,000 mineworkers struck the Chamber of Mines for three weeks

• The rent boycott spread widely and forced the township authorities to negotiate. (p. 21)

  By September i986, an estimated 6o per cent of the black population was not paying rent.

• Strikes, sanctions, disinvestment, bank credit refusal and security costs together produced an economic crisis that pushed elites toward change. (p. 26)

  This, combined with the strikes and other forms of economic resistance by the black majority and the increasing costs of internal security

• The Western economic ties, including trade, investment and loans, that sustained apartheid were quantified for the pre-sanctions period. (p. 30)

  there was over $I 3 billion worth of annual trade between South Africa and the West, which combined with $30 billion in foreign investment

• Soweto youths became effective only after allying with workers. (p. 31)

  the rioting Soweto youths only began to seriously challenge the white authorities when they stopped rioting, built alliances with workers in the townships, and organised a non-violent movement.

Evidence ledger

Sources used

Source	Kind	Period	How used
Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Legislation Affecting the Utilisation of Manpower (Riekert Commission Report) and accompanying white paper, 1979	commission or official report	1979	Shows the state acknowledged a permanent black urban labour force and its own vulnerability to strikes and non-violent disruption.
Leonard, R. 1981, 'Mobilizing for total war', Southern Africa (military capacity figures)	newspapers periodicals	early 1980s	Provides figures on the South African Defence Force's troop strength, reserves, cadets and equipment, used to argue armed struggle was hopeless.
Karis, T. 1983-4, 'Revolution in the Making: Black Politics in South Africa', Foreign Affairs	newspapers periodicals	1983-84	Source for the estimate of ANC military personnel (no more than 14,000) and homeland cooperation with the military.
Smuts & Westcott (eds.) 1991, The Purple Shall Govern: a South African A to Z of Nonviolent Action	secondary literature compilation	1980s-1989	Main source on strikes, stayaways, rent boycotts, the 1989 Defiance Campaign, church action and hunger strikes.
Frederikse, J. 1987, South Africa: A Different Kind of War	secondary literature compilation	1980s	Source for strike counts, the 1984 stayaway, the 1984 tricameral election boycott, conscription resistance and student protests.
Price, R. M. 1991, The Apartheid State in Crisis: Political Transformation in South Africa, 1975-1990	secondary literature compilation	1975-1990	Used for the regional hegemony strategy, black township council turnout, the 1985 emergency and the conditions for negotiation.
Wink, W. 1987, Violence and Nonviolence in South Africa: Jesus' Third Way	secondary literature compilation	1980s	Source for squatter resistance, the Urban Institute estimate of 7 million illegal squatters, and the state of emergency restrictions.
Sharp, G. 1973, The Politics of Nonviolent Action (case accounts of the Defiance Campaign, Alexandra boycott and Nyanga)	secondary literature compilation	1950s-1960	Supplies narrative evidence on the 1952 riots ending the Defiance Campaign and on white reactions to police brutality.
Kuper, L. 1958, Passive Resistance in South Africa	secondary literature compilation	1952	Provides the monthly count of civil disobedience participants (2,354 in October to 280 in November 1952).
American Friends Service Committee 1982 study (1981)	secondary literature compilation	1981	Quoted to support the view that the state was ill-equipped to meet mass non-violent noncooperation.
Adam, H. 1971, Modernizing Racial Domination	secondary literature compilation	early 1970s	Source on the build-up of anti-terrorist military infrastructure and the effects of the 1960s bombing campaign.
Newspaper and broadcast items: Lelyveld, New York Times 12 Oct 1983; NPR 'All Things Considered' 3 June 1987; Weekly Argus editorial 1989	newspapers periodicals	1983-1989	Used for assessments of ANC military weakness, Alexandra's alternative government, and the decline of state authority.

Inference

Quantification: Illustrative figures.

Qualitative historical argument and counterfactual reasoning. It compares the military balance, the terrain and the Portuguese colonies and Rhodesia against South Africa, and narrates non-violent campaigns, strikes and boycotts, using quotations from secondary works and activists as support. No systematic data analysis or causal identification is attempted.

Key claims

Claim	Basis	Strength
Armed struggle faced overwhelming military, geographic and sanctuary obstacles and never threatened the regime's survival. (p. 145)	Leonard 1981 force figures, Karis estimate of 14,000 ANC personnel, Adam 1971 and Price 1991, supplemented by reasoning about terrain and neighbouring states.	Partial data
The early 1960s bombing campaign harmed the movement, and violence in 1952 crippled the Defiance Campaign. (p. 151)	Kuper's participation counts, Sharp and Luthuli quotations, and Adam.	Partial data
Rising black labour militancy, strikes and stayaways, from the 1973 Durban strikes to 1989, were the most important driver of change. (p. 153)	Strike statistics and descriptions drawn from Frederikse, Smuts & Westcott, Lodge, Johnson and Price.	Partial data
Rent boycotts, township non-cooperation and alternative institutions made townships ungovernable and forced the state toward negotiation. (p. 160)	Smuts & Westcott, Frederikse, Price and NPR, with Alexandra as an illustrative case.	Illustrative or anecdotal
Non-violence split white opinion and undermined police morale, whereas violence consolidated white resistance. (p. 163)	Anecdotes from Sharp, Frederikse and the End Conscription Campaign figures.	Illustrative or anecdotal
Non-violent resistance generated Western solidarity and sanctions, which together with strikes produced the economic crisis that pushed elites toward change. (p. 161)	Unreferenced trade and investment figures ($13 billion trade, $30 billion investment, $6.5 billion loans) and general assertions.	Asserted
Riots such as the Soweto uprising were not decisive; change came only when youths allied with workers in organised non-violent action. (p. 166)	Narrative reasoning with reference to Frederikse; no systematic comparison.	Illustrative or anecdotal

The author's caveats

Note 1 concedes that labelling resistance 'non-violent' is a misnomer given state violence. The author also acknowledges that the struggle was 'not as exclusively non-violent' as comparable struggles, and that the armed struggle and the threat of uprising may have influenced the regime.

Gaps in the evidence

The argument that non-violence outweighed armed action and sanctions is never tested against systematic evidence. Strike and stoppage series (Department of Manpower or Labour records), township boycott data, trade and investment series, and government and business archives would help, and these existed and are now accessible. Archival sources on the National Party, security establishment and business decision-making, together with oral histories from negotiators, would test the causal claim about why the regime negotiated. Nearly all evidence is second-hand, and the economic and sanctions channels are asserted without data.

Replicability: Data poorly documented.