| Abedian (1982) |
Tomlinson Commission estimates of Bantu regions' domestic production |
1950-51 |
Mentioned as the pioneering estimates but judged unusable because they excluded white-populated areas. |
| Abel (2014a) |
Tomlinson Commission report (1954) |
1954 |
Cited for estimate that homelands could sustain 1.8 million people and for its view that homeland fragmentation produced incoherence. |
| Abel (2014b) |
Tomlinson Commission report (1954) |
1954 |
Cited for the claim that homeland population exceeded what the areas could sustain. |
| Bell (1973) |
Tomlinson Commission Report (Summary), U.G. 61/1955, and White Paper W.P. F/1956 |
1951-6 |
Baseline 1951 population, income, migration, carrying capacity and the border versus Bantu areas industrialisation dispute. |
| Bell (1986) |
Tomlinson Commission Report, U.G. 61/1955 |
1955/56 |
Frames the original political aims of industrial decentralisation, including the recommendation on white investment in the homelands. |
| Best (1971) |
Government Decisions on the Recommendations of the Tomlinson Commission, White Paper F-1956 |
1956 |
Documents the government's rejection of internal industrialization and adoption of industry at White border towns. |
| Best (1971) |
Tomlinson Commission, Summary of the Report of the Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas Within the Union of South Africa (U.G. 61, 1955) |
1955 |
Sets out the recommended homeland industrialization alternative that the government rejected in favour of border industries. |
| Bromberger (1978) |
Tomlinson Commission income norm (as used by Simkins) |
1950s |
Used by Simkins as the income norm dividing homeland agricultural output value to derive full-time job equivalents. |
| Carter (1958) |
Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas (Tomlinson Commission), Summary of the Report, U.G. 61/1955, and Government White Paper (1956) |
1955-1957 |
Used for the carrying capacity of the Reserves and the Government's rejection of a ten-year development programme. |
| Christopher (1982) |
Summary of the Report of the Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas (Tomlinson Commission, 1955) |
1955 |
Establishes the commission's role in changing the terms of debate on the black areas and its proposal to consolidate the reserves in seven blocks. |
| Clynick (1990) |
LNC (SC Becker) returns to the Tomlinson Commission, 1954 (KLI N2/11/3 Settlement and Rehabilitation) |
1954 |
Estimate of how many more families the Trust could hold, and contrast with overstocked Reserves. |
| Cornell (1960) |
Tomlinson Commission Report (Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas), 1956, summary U.G. 61/1955 |
1951-1956 (estimates to end of 1958) |
Establishes the blueprint for separate development, its proposed expenditure, carrying capacity and the share of Union land held by Bantu areas. |
| Davenport (1969) |
Tomlinson Commission Summary Report, UG 61-1965 |
1955 (summary published 1965) |
Population projections of urban Bantu-speakers and the need for 50,000 jobs a year in Bantu areas, used to assess Verwoerdian policy. |
| Delius and Schirmer (2000) |
Tomlinson Commission report, Social-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas |
c.1955 |
Used to show the commission endorsed technicians' view that part-time farming could not succeed, and recommended a full-time farmer class. |
| Evans (1997) |
Report of the Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas (Tomlinson Commission) and its Record of Evidence (UNISA copy) |
1950–1955 |
Used to assess Verwoerd's rejection of economic development of reserves and the 'Commissioner complex'; the unpublished evidence record was obtained from Alan Jeeves. |
| Giliomee and Schlemmer (1985) |
Tomlinson Commission Report (1955; government White Paper 1956) |
1955-1956 |
Cited as the origin of the strategy for developing the reserves and later industrial decentralisation. |
| Harvey (1974) |
Tomlinson Commission report (as cited) |
1950s |
Estimate that reserve population was twice carrying capacity, used to refute subsistence-farming claims. |
| Hindson (1978) |
Tomlinson Commission Report (1955), Reserve output and minimum income assumption |
1955 |
Used to set the minimum income/output level for full-time agricultural employment so that Reserve output can be converted into full-time employment equivalents. |
| Horrell et al. (1972) |
Tomlinson Commission report (U.G. 61/1955) |
1949-50 data |
Used to compare maize and kaffircorn yields on white farms and in Bantu areas. |
| Jeeves and Crush (1992) |
Tomlinson Commission Record of Evidence vol. XII, 20 May 1952 (Busschau, Gemmill) |
1952 |
Source for Chamber's testimony that about 12 percent of the workforce could be stabilized. |
| Katzen (1974) |
Tomlinson Commission Report, 1956 |
1956 |
Establishes the policy background: it favoured industrial development in the reserves to raise carrying capacity and stem African flow to white areas, which the government rejected in favour of border industries. |
| Knight (1976a) |
Tomlinson Commission, Summary of the Report of the Commission for the Socio-economic Development of the Bantu Areas (1955) |
1950-1955 |
Source for Homeland incomes, livestock numbers, carrying capacity and the 357,000 farming families used to size productive Homeland agricultural employment. |
| Knight (1976b) |
Summary of the Report of the Commission for the Socio-economic Development of the Bantu Areas (Tomlinson Commission), 1955 |
1930-1955 |
Estimates of reserve income, livestock, carrying capacity and number of farming families; basis for productive labour in Homeland agriculture. |
| Legassick (1974) |
Tomlinson Commission Report (March 1956), Viljoen Commission (UG 36-1958), Riekert and Geyser Commissions; Fact Papers (UG Fact Paper 17, 36, 50) |
1956-1972 |
Used to show later policy on border industries, rich peasant farmers, modernization and decentralization. |
| Mariotti (2012a) |
Tomlinson Commission Report 1955 (Summary, UG 61/1955) |
c.1951-1955 (data around 1953) |
Provides baseline farm incomes, livestock holdings, land carrying capacity and erosion to show pre-shock poverty. |
| Mariotti (2012b) |
Tomlinson Commission report (Summary of the Report of the Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas, UG 61/1955) |
c. 1951-1955 |
Provides baseline farm incomes, cattle holdings, erosion and carrying capacity in the homelands to show pre-shock poverty and the size of the income increase. |
| Mariotti (2012c) |
Tomlinson Commission, Summary of the Report of the Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas, UG 61/1955 |
c.1953-1955 |
Provides baseline farm incomes, livestock holdings, erosion and carrying capacity showing pre-shock poverty and overcrowding. |
| Massey (1983) |
Tomlinson Commission report (Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of South Africa), 1955 |
1955 |
Quoted to show the South African state recognised the role of foreign migrant labor in keeping wages low. |
| Massie (1997) |
Tomlinson Commission report (appointed 1952, published 1956) |
1952-1956 |
Shows that the homelands needed massive capital inflows and that Verwoerd set aside less than two percent of the recommended funding. |
| McCarthy (1982) |
Tomlinson Commission estimate of annual industrial job requirement |
1950s |
Benchmark of 20,000 industrial jobs per year against which achieved job creation is compared (cited via Van der Berg note). |
| Milburn and Cole (1957) |
Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas (Tomlinson Commission), Summary of the Report, U.G. 61/1955 |
1955 |
Cited as a government report whose approach to native affairs corresponds in part to Nationalist Party views; it is listed, not analysed. |
| Nattrass (1976a) |
Tomlinson Commission Report UG 61/1955 (cited as 1961) |
1950s |
Evidence that African rural areas could not support their populations by the early 1950s, so resettled people were unlikely to make a viable living. |
| Nattrass (1977) |
Report of the Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas (Tomlinson Commission), U.G. 61/1955; Keiskammahoek Rural Survey Vol. II |
1950s |
Cited to show the heavy dependence of rural areas on remittances (46,5% and 50% of incomes). |
| Pankhurst (1996) |
Tomlinson Commission Report (South Africa, 1955) |
1955 |
Compared with Rhodesia's Godlonton Commission and Namibia's Odendaal Report as a state blueprint for African rural development, and for what the government accepted or rejected. |
| Posel (1990a) |
Tomlinson Commission (Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Native Areas) report, as summarised by Houghton, incl. submissions by AHI, FCI, ASSOCOM |
1950s (data to 1951-52) |
Supplies estimates of foreign African workers by sector, the share of unskilled in wholesale/retail trade, and the contradictory evidence on migrant versus settled worker stability. |
| Posel (2011) |
Tomlinson Commission Summary Report (UG 61/1955) |
1951 (report 1955) |
Establishes the extreme poverty and income concentration in the reserves (13% of population earning 46% of income). |
| Rex (1975) |
Tomlinson Commission findings |
1950s |
Cited as substantiating the earlier recorded reserve crisis. |
| Roth (1995a) |
Chamber of Mines report submitted to the Tomlinson Commission |
1950s (implied by the Tomlinson Commission; not dated in the review) |
Shows that housing a family unit on the mines would cost far more than a single migrant in a compound, so ending migrancy was not economically viable. |
| Roth (1995b) |
Chamber of Mines report for the Tomlinson Commission (costing of family housing versus single-migrant compounds) |
1950s (not stated in the review) |
Cited as confirming that housing family units on the mines would cost far more than compounds for single migrants, so ending migrancy would not have been economically viable. |
| Sabbagh (1968) |
Government White Paper F (1956), Memorandum of Government Decisions on the Recommendations of the Tomlinson Commission |
1956 |
Documents the government's reduction of investment funds and its rejection of white capital and freehold tenure. |
| Sabbagh (1968) |
Tomlinson Report: Summary of the Report of the Commission for the Socio-economic Development of the Bantu Areas (1955) |
1955 (data to 1954) |
Source of the population projections A and B, absenteeism estimates, economic farm unit and cost estimates, the Reserve boundary map, and the program that Separate Development builds on. |
| Schirmer (1994) |
Tomlinson Commission evidence (CAD NK No. 2 Vol. 65; K No. 20 Vol. 54, Chief Maserumule), c1952 |
c1952 |
Documents regional land shortage (families vs land) and African views on need for land. |
| Simkins (1981) |
Tomlinson Commission Report (Chapter 9 Appendix 1 production estimates; Chapter 19 cattle distribution) |
1937-1951 |
Alternative production valuations for comparison with Simkins's series, and cattle-ownership distribution data. |
| Simons (1956) |
Tomlinson Commission projection of urban African employment |
c.1955 |
Used to show four million Africans will still work in White urban areas by century's end. |
| Sources of Growth in the... (1990) |
Tomlinson Commission report (1954) |
1954 |
Cited as showing awareness of reserve economy neglect and recommending restructuring. |
| Tomlinson and Addleson (1986) |
Tomlinson Commission Report (UG 55/1955) |
1955 |
Benchmark target of 50 000 jobs per annum against which decentralization achievement is judged. |
| Williams (1996) |
Union of South Africa, Summary of the Report of the Commission for the Socio-economic Development of the Bantu Areas (Tomlinson Report, 1955) |
1955 |
Comparator for the Bank's proposals: its 'economic farm units' and creation of a Bantu farming class are likened to the Bank's plan. |