Soil Conservation in a Racially Ordered Society: South Africa 1930-1970¶
Peter Delius; Stefan Schirmer (2000). Soil Conservation in a Racially Ordered Society: South Africa 1930-1970. Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 26, No. 4, Special Issue: African Environments: Past and Present. Taylor & Francis.
| Type | journal article |
| Scope | Economics and economic history of apartheid |
| Method | archival narrative |
| Period studied | 1930–1970 |
| Regions | Transvaal, Northern Transvaal (Pietersburg, Soutpansberg, Sekhukhuneland), African reserves and South African Native Trust land, Ciskei, Transkei, white farming areas |
| Themes | agriculture land, bantustans removals influx, politics ideology elections, resistance social movements, origins segregation, business and state |
| Citation key | delius2000 |
Argument¶
State soil conservation policy in South Africa from 1930 to 1970 was shaped by racism and by the different political and economic standing of blacks and whites. Disenfranchised African farmers in the reserves and Trust lands faced coercive betterment and rehabilitation schemes that ignored their practices and perceptions and provoked bitter resistance. Enfranchised white farmers used their political influence to dilute the interventionist wartime reconstruction plans and to turn conservation into a channel for subsidies, which supported inefficient practices. The two tracks differed but had the same result: both failed conservationists' expectations. The authors conclude that both over-coercive and over-populist approaches fail, and that a balance between them is needed. The argument is built through a comparative archival narrative centred on the Transvaal.
Evidence and method¶
Official reports (Native Economic Commission 1932, Tomlinson Commission, Social and Economic Planning Council, Industrial and Agricultural Requirements Commission, Reconstruction of Agriculture 1944, Soil Conservation Board annual reports). Parliamentary Assembly Debates. Native Affairs Department and Department of Agriculture archival files (Transvaal Archives NTS files; CAD LDB and MLD files), including farmers' letters of complaint. Native Representative Council proceedings. Oral testimony (e.g. interviews at Mohlaletse, Nemutanzhela's collection). Unpublished theses (Bekker, Ritchken, Lazar). Secondary literature (Beinart, Hendricks, Lipton, Wickens, Delius).
Place in the debates¶
- Why the South African state moved from supportive to more coercive conservation policy for white farmers after 1939 (see Agricultural policy, productivity, farm size and land reform). Rejects the argument (Jones and Muller) that this stemmed mainly from the declining influence of farmers within the United Party. Stresses instead the psychological and social impact of the Second World War and the reconstruction ideal (following Marwick), while granting that farmers' influence remained important.
- Whether white farmers opposed the interventionist soil conservation legislation of the 1940s (see Agricultural policy, productivity, farm size and land reform). Argues that authors such as Jones and Muller mistakenly assume opposition. The South African Agricultural Union and most farmers' representatives supported conservation, seeing it as a route to more state assistance.
- Coercive versus populist/cooperative conservation policy (see Agricultural policy, productivity, farm size and land reform). Both extremes failed. Coercion in black areas bred resistance and ignored local adaptation, while accommodation of white farmers' interests rewarded inefficiency. The authors favour a balance between the two.
- Colonial and official narratives of reserve degradation (overstocking and 'primitive' subsistence) versus the history of conquest, land shortage and migrant labour (see Agricultural policy, productivity, farm size and land reform). Sides with critics of the Native Economic Commission's diagnosis. The authors stress inadequate land, the centrality of migrant labour, and thin scientific evidence of imminent catastrophe.
Findings¶
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State intervention took racially different forms but produced a common failure to meet conservationists' expectations. (p. 3)
But while policy took different forms and had diverse consequences, it did achieve an overall uniformity of outcome - it failed to live up to the expectations of conservationists.
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The Native Economic Commission's alarming predictions about reserve erosion rested on very weak evidence. (p. 4)
Part of what is striking about a report that placed the issue of soil erosion at the heart of its conclusions is the paucity of evidence on which its dire predictions were based.
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Trust land regulations capped arable plots, and the small plots reflected the policy of keeping a large rural population to sustain migrant labour. (p. 6)
should not exceed 5 morgen, which in the case of second or third wives (or widows) was reduced to 2.5 morgen.
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Officials' own estimates of how many people rehabilitation would have to remove from the land alarmed senior officials concerned with order and urbanisation, so villages were not pursued. (p. 11)
the estimates provided of the numbers that would have to be moved off the land ranged from 40 percent to 60 percent.
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Verwoerd's rejection of the core Tomlinson recommendations exposed a contradiction in apartheid policy between creating a full-time farmer class and preserving tribal unity. (p. 13)
One of the basic principles of planning in the Bantu areas is the creation of a true farmer class on economic agriculture units, but this principle may not clash with the other important principle of the maintenance of tribal unity.
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After the Sekhukhuneland revolt the state largely abandoned conservation in the reserves. Removals and influx control then drove population growth and destroyed the land-based economy. (p. 14)
In the 1960s and 1970s the remnants of a land-based economy in the reserves crumbled as, penned in by tightened influx control, the population soared as a result of forced removals and large scale movement of families to the reserves from white farms.
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White farmers received large financial transfers for conservation in the 1930s and early 1940s, with few coercive powers imposed on them. (p. 14)
Between 1934 and 1942, the Department of Agriculture transferred ?2.25 million to farmers who applied for these facilities.
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The wartime planners blamed high marketing-board prices for encouraging environmentally and economically inappropriate ploughing. (p. 16)
The high prices set by the marketing boards of the 1930s came under special criticism as these prices encouraged farmers to plough up land that was best suited for grazing.
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Racial assumptions rather than research drove the appropriation of conservation by white agricultural interests. (p. 18)
Racism rather than research was central to the way in which conservation was being appropriated.
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Substantial subsidies and loans were supplied to white farmers in the name of conservation, most of them for works that benefited farm capacity rather than conservation. (p. 20)
By 1961 the government had, in the name of soil conservation, supplied farmers with nearly R9 million in subsidies and rebates, and with over R6.5 million in loans.
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In the Highveld in 1965, spending on productive works dwarfed spending on direct soil conservation works. (p. 20)
The amount for direct soil conservation works such as contour banks and waterways, by contrast, was only R60,000.
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White farmers adopted farm plans, the real test of commitment, far more slowly than they applied for subsidies. (p. 21)
By 1961, the number of plans had increased to 20,621, which represented 19 percent of the 108,883 farming units in South Africa.
Evidence ledger¶
Sources used¶
| Source | Kind | Period | How used |
|---|---|---|---|
| Report of the Native Economic Commission 1930-1932 | commission or official report | 1930-1932 | Shows the official diagnosis of overstocking and erosion in the reserves, and is criticised for the thin evidence behind its predictions. |
| Native Economic Commission Evidence (Wits Historical Papers AD1438) | state archives | 1930-1932 | Cited for the testimony behind the Commission's erosion claims, including the Ciskei accounts. |
| D.L. Smit, Statement of Policy Under the Native Trust and Land Act (1937) | commission or official report | 1937 | Documents the official intention of close supervision and restructuring of Trust land. |
| Government Gazette, Proclamations 31 and 264 of 1939 | legislation gazette | 1939 | Establishes the betterment-area powers, culling and the 5 and 2.5 morgen arable allotments. |
| Native Affairs Department (NTS) files in the Transvaal Archives (TA/NTS 3796-3799; 2530-2567/308) | state archives | 1940s | Supplies tenant statements, meeting records and official correspondence on Trust implementation and resistance in the northern Transvaal. |
| NTS files on reserve rehabilitation and erosion surveys (NTS 7516/679/327; 10210/5/423; 10203/1/423; 10244/33/423; 9535/138/400/91) | state archives | post-1944 | Cited for postwar reports confirming erosion as a serious and growing menace. |
| NTS files on Sekhukhuneland/Pietersburg implementation (NTS 10276/59/423/4; 3775/2334/308; 2523/116/293(a); 10248/38/423/3(a)) | state archives | 1948-1954 | Documents official practice in allocating ever-smaller plots, the treatment of widows, and the culling and proclamations in Sekhukhuneland. |
| Ad Hoc Committee Report, Sekhukhuneland Location, 1954 (NTS 10248/38/423(1)A) | commission or official report | 1954 | Shows that officials feared rural villages would undermine the tribal ties needed for Bantu Authorities. |
| Minutes of the Chief Native Commissioners Conference, 29-30/11/1955 (NTS1813/138/276/(4)) | state archives | 1955 | Supports the argument that officials saw Bantu Authorities as a way round popular consent for conservation. |
| Oral testimony: Claus Sebola statement (1943) and Mangope Phala interview (1987), plus other oral evidence | interviews oral history | 1943; 1987 | Conveys African experiences of and responses to Trust control. |
| J. Bekker, 'We will plough where we like', unpublished Honours thesis, Wits (1989) | secondary literature compilation | 1989 (covers late 1930s-1940s) | Source for the detailed account of the Pietersburg land purchases, tenant circumstances and resistance. |
| Native Representative Council, Verbatim Record of Proceedings, 7th Session, August 1944 | parliamentary debates | 1944 | Supplies the statements of Reineke, Z.K. Matthews and Selope Thema on rehabilitation and African elite criticism. |
| D.L. Smit, A New Era of Reclamation (1945) | commission or official report | 1945 | Evidences the 1945 policy turn to planning committees, rural villages and a permanent peasantry. |
| Report No. 9 of the Social and Economic Planning Council (1946), on the African Reserves | commission or official report | 1946 | Shows the Council's critique of narrow technical approaches and its proposals for urban centres in the reserves. |
| Tomlinson Commission report, Social-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas | commission or official report | c.1955 | Used to show the commission endorsed technicians' view that part-time farming could not succeed, and recommended a full-time farmer class. |
| Report of the Reconstruction Committee of the Department of Agriculture and Forestry (Reconstruction of Agriculture, 1944) | commission or official report | 1944 (report 1943) | Provides figures on subsidies and bull inspections, and shows the Viljoen report's populist, pro-assistance stance. |
| Industrial and Agricultural Requirements Commission, Third Interim Report (1941) | commission or official report | 1941 | Source for the wartime reconstruction blueprint, yield comparisons and recommendations on prices and farm plans. |
| Report No. 4 of the Social and Economic Planning Council: The Future of Farming in South Africa (1945) | commission or official report | 1945 | Supports the claim that the agricultural sector was uncompetitive and absorbed state revenue without a productivity return. |
| Forest and Veld Conservation Act 1941; Soil Conservation Act No. 45 of 1946; Amended Soil Conservation Act 1969 | legislation gazette | 1941-1969 | Establishes the powers and flexibility of the conservation legislation and its later centralisation. |
| Soil Conservation Board Annual Reports (Fifth 1950-51, Seventh 1953-54, Eleventh 1960, Thirteenth 1959-60, 1965-66, 1968-69) | official statistical series | 1950-1969 | Main data source for subsidies, works applications, number of farm plans and Board assessments of farmer behaviour. |
| Parliamentary Assembly Debates 1945, 1946 and 1960 | parliamentary debates | 1945-1946; 1960 | Used to show widespread parliamentary support for conservation, racial arguments about black tenants, and the 1960 shift toward large farms. |
| Agricultural Statistics for 1955 | official statistical series | 1955 | Source for the comparison of farm size and the share of farms selling under £100 of produce by province. |
| Cape Archives Depot, Department of Agriculture/Lands correspondence (CAD LDB R4250 vols 3232-3263; CAD MLD 14/20 vol. 19) | state archives | 1949-1959 | Farmers' letters of complaint and ministerial replies supply evidence on white farmers' attitudes to the conservation programme. |
| Die Huisgenoot article, D.G. Steyn, 'Waarom Boere Uitraak', 2 March 1945 | newspapers periodicals | 1945 | Cited to show soil erosion being framed as a threat to the 'Afrikaner Nation'. |
| Sunday Times article of 13 December 1953 (cited via CAD memo) | newspapers periodicals | 1953 | A departmental memo on the article records farmers' complaints about the distribution of conservation resources. |
| Du Plessis / Commission of Enquiry into European Occupation of Rural Areas report (1960), cited via Soil Conservation Board report | commission or official report | 1960 | Shows the government's aim of keeping as many white farmers as possible on the land. |
Inference¶
Quantification: Illustrative figures.
Archival case study and comparison across race and region (African reserves/Trust land versus white farming areas, with a Transvaal focus) over 1930-1970. Policy documents, commission reports, Soil Conservation Board annual reports, parliamentary debates and farmer or tenant correspondence are read qualitatively and supplemented by a few aggregate subsidy and farm-plan figures.
Key claims¶
| Claim | Basis | Strength |
|---|---|---|
| The Native Economic Commission's predictions of imminent desertification in the reserves rested on thin, impressionistic evidence, especially for the northern Transvaal. (p. 4) | Authors' reading of the NEC report and its evidence, with comparison to what officials said before 1930. | Partial data |
| Trust conservation policy in the northern Transvaal was coercive, was imposed without consultation, and provoked sustained resistance that the state eventually suppressed. (p. 8) | Transvaal Archives NTS files, Bekker's thesis, oral testimony and Native Representative Council proceedings. | Partial data |
| The state abandoned the substance of its conservationist agenda in the reserves after the 1958 Sekhukhuneland Revolt, prioritising Bantu Authorities over rehabilitation. (p. 14) | Official files and conference minutes, the Tomlinson Commission report, and secondary work by Delius and Hendricks. | Partial data |
| White farmers received generous financial assistance and few coercive controls, in contrast to the coercion applied to Africans. (p. 14) | Department of Agriculture reports giving figures of £2.25 million in transfers and bull-subsidy payments, and Soil Conservation Board reports. | Partial data |
| The Soil Conservation Act's implementation mostly delivered subsidised productive works rather than conservation, and farm-plan adoption lagged far behind subsidy uptake. (p. 21) | Soil Conservation Board annual reports (1951, 1958, 1961, 1965-66) with figures on works, subsidies, plans and the Highveld region. | Systematic data |
| Wartime reconstruction proposals for conservation-linked reform of white farming were diluted by Department of Agriculture populism and farmers' representatives, and soil conservation was captured by farmers' interests. (p. 17) | Comparison of the IARC and SEPC reports with the Viljoen report, and the 1945-46 Assembly debates. | Partial data |
| The extent of soil erosion in white areas was never systematically studied; claims of imminent destruction rested on assertion and racial framing rather than research. (p. 18) | Commission reports calling for further research, and the Bennett tour, read against the debates. | Asserted |
| In the 1960s policy shifted to favour larger white farmers and centralised enforcement, culminating in the Amended Soil Conservation Act of 1969. (p. 23) | Soil Conservation Board reports of 1968-69, the 1960 Assembly debates, the Lipton and O'Meara secondary literature, and the 1969 Act. | Partial data |
The author's caveats¶
The authors say the environmental consequences of rising numbers of people and livestock in the early twentieth century are difficult to establish from the existing evidence. They note that Pietersburg is better documented than the Soutpansberg events, and that the extent of erosion in white areas was never systematically studied. The Transvaal is the primary focus, with other provinces used only illustratively.
Gaps in the evidence¶
The argument has no independent measures of erosion, such as soil surveys, aerial photography or gully mapping, to test whether policy was warranted or effective on either side of the racial divide. Quantitative comparisons of conservation expenditure per farmer or per hectare between reserves and white farms are not systematically assembled. Archival complaint letters and tenant statements are selective and may not represent all farmers, and the oral evidence is not described in detail. Provincial farm-census data, Soil Conservation Board district records and farm-level subsidy records existed and could be analysed.
Replicability: Data described but not public.