Emergent Democracy and 'Resurgent' Tradition: Institutions, Chieftaincy and Transition in KwaZulu-Natal¶
Jo Beall; Sibongiseni Mkhize; Shahid Vawda (2005). Emergent Democracy and 'Resurgent' Tradition: Institutions, Chieftaincy and Transition in KwaZulu-Natal. Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4. Taylor & Francis.
| Type | journal article |
| Scope | Wider apartheid literature |
| Method | mixed |
| Period studied | 1845–2004 |
| Regions | KwaZulu-Natal, Natal, KwaZulu bantustan, eThekwini (Durban) Metropolitan Municipality, South Africa |
| Themes | origins segregation, bantustans removals influx, politics ideology elections, transition post apartheid, resistance social movements, agriculture land, comparative theory |
| Citation key | beall2005 |
Argument¶
The article argues that chieftaincy (ubukhosi) in KwaZulu-Natal is better understood as persistent than 'resurgent', part of a long institutional history running from Shepstone's indirect rule through segregation and apartheid to the post-1994 order. It uses institutional theory (North, Giddens, Douglas, Bates) to treat institutions as inert but mutable, and it reads the ANC's post-1997 accommodation of chiefs, culminating in the TLGFA and CLRA of 2004, as largely electoral expediency that echoes indirect rule. It also shows that the analogy has limits, since eThekwini's engagement with amakhosi shows hybrid forms of governance emerging. The authors conclude that chieftaincy may offer stability but remains a faultline for democracy, particularly for women's rights.
Evidence and method¶
Secondary historiography (Marks, Cope, Mamdani, Mare and Hamilton, Beinart and Bundy), legislation and White Papers (Black Administration Act 1927, Municipal Structures Act 1998, TLGFA and CLRA 2004), newspaper reports, a City Manager newsletter, and the authors' own research in eThekwini (interviews with amakhosi, officials and councillors, resident survey evidence reported in related papers). Election results and census figures are used for context.
Place in the debates¶
- Resurgence vs persistence of traditional leadership in post-apartheid South Africa (see Post-apartheid economic policy, governance and corruption). Argues against Oomen's 'resurgence' framing and for persistence and adaptation of an evolving institution with both continuities and discontinuities.
- Citizen and subject / indirect rule legacy (Mamdani) (see Post-apartheid economic policy, governance and corruption). Accepts parallels with indirect rule but finds Mamdani's dichotomy and 'total control' overstated, and says the analogy is limited by the new institutional context.
- Do traditional authorities threaten democratic consolidation or provide stability? (see Post-apartheid economic policy, governance and corruption). Ambivalent: chiefs could be a site of stability if they stay out of electoral politics, but concessions so far come at citizens' expense, especially women's, so chieftaincy remains a faultline.
- Invention of tradition / creation of ethnic identity (see Post-apartheid economic policy, governance and corruption). Treats chiefly authority and Zulu ethnic politics as historically shaped by colonial and apartheid manipulation as well as by pre-colonial roots.
Findings¶
-
Central thesis: tradition is persistent rather than resurgent and must be seen within a longer history. (p. 2)
we argue that tradition is more persistent than 'resurgent' and that the relationship between ubukhosi (chieftaincy) and wider governance structures in the province and South Africa must be seen as part of a much longer history
-
KwaZulu-Natal's transition involved civil-war-scale violence. (p. 4)
The price paid in the province for the transition to a non-racial national democracy was the loss of 20,000 lives since 1984.
-
Shepstone's system made chiefs dependent agents of the colonial state. (p. 7)
His approach to native administration saw both appointed and hereditary chiefs become agents of the colonial government and totally dependent on it for resources.
-
Shepstone's 'total control' is judged an exaggeration, as the colonial state lacked capacity. (p. 8)
To describe Shepstone's system as one of 'total control' is an exaggeration. He may have had such ambitions but he was never able to gain even partial control because he lacked both the resources and manpower.
-
Segregation-era legislation further curtailed chiefly autonomy and made chiefs subordinate to the central state. (p. 8)
The Black Administration Act (No. 38 of 1927) stripped traditional leaders of more of their autonomy
-
The ANC long viewed traditional leadership as incompatible with its modernist vision, until it softened in 1997. (p. 9)
As late as 1988, the ANC declared in its constitutional principles that traditional leadership was anachronistic to their modernist vision and that the organisation would abolish it with the advent of democracy.
-
The 2004 TLGFA entrenches old tribal authorities as traditional councils, perpetuating indirect rule. (p. 10)
This significantly entrenches the authority of traditional leaders, and means, in effect, that legislation introduced in the 21st century will give perpetual life to a system of 'indirect rule' dating back to the colonial era and ossified under apartheid.
-
ANC concessions to chiefs are explained by electoral calculation. (p. 10)
The answer lies in the recognition by the ANC of the electoral influence of chieftaincy.
-
eThekwini's 2000 boundaries absorbed large peri-urban traditional areas, so the city is only partly urban. (p. 13)
eThekwini now includes vast peri-urban areas so that within the Metro's boundaries only 35 per cent of people live in areas that are characteristically urban.
-
The city uses development investment to win over amakhosi. (p. 15)
the City is seeking to deliver to traditional authority with capital investment to the tune of R200 million in the next planning phase.
-
Chieftaincy is likely to remain a democratic faultline, especially for women's rights. (p. 17)
chieftaincy seems set to remain a faultline running through South African democracy for some time to come.
Evidence ledger¶
Sources used¶
| Source | Kind | Period | How used |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors' contemporary research interviews with traditional leaders, municipal officials, councillors and residents of traditional authority areas (eThekwini) | interviews oral history | c. 2001-2004 | Supports the claim that amakhosi opposition is turning to grudging or enthusiastic acceptance of metropolitan engagement. |
| Survey evidence from eThekwini (Beall, 'Exit, Voice and Tradition', Crisis States Working Paper No. 59) | author survey or fieldwork | c. 2003-2005 | Shows that ordinary people value some customary functions and the participation of traditional leaders in community structures. |
| Mkhize, Sithole and Vawda, 'Governance, Democracy and the Subject of the Traditional Authorities in the eThekweni (Durban) Metropolitan Region' (unpublished mimeo, 2001) | author survey or fieldwork | 2001 | Documents amakhosi grievances over demarcation, perceived lack of consultation and the threat to ubukhosi. |
| Beall with Mkhize and Vawda, 'Navigating Tradition' (International Development Planning Review 26, 4, 2004) | author survey or fieldwork | 2004 | Supplies the evidence that investment is leading some amakhosi to reconsider loyalties and that cooperation pays off. |
| Newsletter of the City Manager, eThekwini, 18 March 2003 | company records or reports | March 2003 | Shows the Metro's decision to include traditional leaders in municipal governance. |
| Personal communication, Michael Sutcliffe (eThekwini City Manager), April 2003 | interviews oral history | April 2003 | Source for the R200 million capital investment plan and for the City Manager's view that amakhosi must engage democratically. |
| Goodenough, Traditional Leaders, A KwaZulu-Natal Study, 1999 to 2001 (Independent Projects Trust, 2002) | secondary literature compilation | 1999-2001 | Used for the doubling of the national salary bill for chiefs, KwaZulu legislation, the draft Provincial Constitution and municipality demarcation figures. |
| Stats South Africa, Republic of South Africa Census 2001 | population census | 2001 | Provides the provincial population of 9,426,017 against which the Metro's share is given. |
| South African Cities Network, The State of South African Cities 2004 | commission or official report | 2004 | Supports the claim that 60,000 households in eThekwini still live in traditional rural-style dwellings. |
| White Paper on Local Government (March 1998), Ministry for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development | commission or official report | 1998 | Shows that traditional leaders were given a consultative developmental role under municipal authority. |
| Municipal Structures Act (Act No. 117 of 1998) | legislation gazette | 1998 | Shows the limited consultative, observer role of traditional authorities on municipal councils. |
| Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act (2004) and Communal Land Rights Act No. 11 of 2004 | legislation gazette | 2004 | Shows that traditional councils were entrenched and given land allocation powers. |
| Historical statutes: Black Administration Act No. 38 of 1927; Bantu Authorities Act 1951; Natives Land Act 1913; KwaZulu Amakhosi and Iziphakanyiswa Act No. 9 of 1990 and amendments; Municipal Demarcation Act No. 27 of 1998 | legislation gazette | 1913-1998 | Traces the continuity of indirect rule and the legal powers of chiefs from colonial to post-apartheid periods. |
| Hansard of the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Legislature (Zulu/Nkonyeni exchange, 2003) | parliamentary debates | April 2003 | Illustrative anecdote of competing institutional norms between traditional culture and constitutional values. |
| Newspapers: Sunday Times 13 April 2003; Mail and Guardian 11-16 April 2003; Natal Witness 25 February 2004; Natal Mercury 18 March 2002 | newspapers periodicals | 2002-2004 | Documents the floor-crossing row, Sparks's explanation for the TLGFA timing, and Buthelezi's secessionist threats. |
| 2004 provincial election results (iafrica.com election focus) | election returns | 2004 | Gives ANC 46.98 per cent and IFP 36.82 per cent in the 2004 provincial vote. |
| Karis and Gerhart, From Protest to Challenge Vol. 3: Luthuli Nobel Peace Prize Address, Document 65 (1961) | secondary literature compilation | 1961 | Quotes Luthuli on chiefs' resistance to show historical links between chieftaincy and the liberation struggle. |
| Taylor, 'Justice Denied' (African Affairs 2002); Jeffrey, The Natal Story (SAIRR 1997); Marino 1994 observer statement | secondary literature compilation | 1984-1994 | Source for the 20,000 deaths and 200,000-500,000 displaced during the political violence. |
Inference¶
Quantification: Illustrative figures.
Historical-institutional narrative combined with a qualitative case study of eThekwini Metro; claims are established by periodisation across colonial, apartheid and post-apartheid eras, legislative and policy analysis, press anecdote and interviews, interpreted through new institutionalist theory.
Key claims¶
| Claim | Basis | Strength |
|---|---|---|
| Chieftaincy in KwaZulu-Natal is persistent rather than 'resurgent', shaped by a long history of indirect rule from Shepstone through apartheid to the present. (p. 761) | Secondary historiography (Marks, Mamdani, Beinart/Bundy, Mare/Hamilton) plus statutes from 1927, 1951 and 2004; no archival work. | Partial data |
| The ANC entrenched traditional leaders' powers through the TLGFA and CLRA out of electoral calculation before the 2004 elections. (p. 764) | Press commentary (Sparks, Natal Witness), the timing of the legislation and the stipend increases, and Jacobs and Goodenough; no direct evidence of ANC deliberations. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| Amakhosi fuelled the political violence of the transition by mobilising rural followers, in exchange for land and licences, against urban militants. (p. 764) | Kentridge's account and Taylor's work; no systematic data on the amakhosi's roles. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| The ANC and IFP drew votes from urban and rural constituencies respectively, making chieftaincy a political faultline. (p. 758) | 2004 election percentages and general assertions about the rural IFP base; no disaggregated returns presented. | Asserted |
| In eThekwini, incorporating amakhosi through allowances, resources and development investment is producing accommodation, and some are shifting loyalties from the IFP. (p. 768) | City Manager newsletter, personal communication with Sutcliffe, the authors' interviews and earlier published work; figures of R3,500 allowance and R200 million. | Partial data |
| Ordinary eThekwini residents value some customary functions of traditional leaders, so the amakhosi remain relevant even in urban areas. (p. 769) | Survey evidence cited from Beall's Crisis States working paper; no sample size or results reported here. | Partial data |
| Concessions to chiefs have come at the expense of citizens, especially women, who have curtailed rights under the traditional system. (p. 764) | Statutory provisions (one-third women quota, no sanctions) and Beall's prior work; no empirical data on women's outcomes. | Asserted |
The author's caveats¶
The authors acknowledge that it is too soon to tell whether the eThekwini trajectory is sustainable or will resonate across rural KwaZulu-Natal, and that the accommodation cases remain fairly limited. They also note the Metro's resource channelling may be aimed at winning political favour in IFP areas.
Gaps in the evidence¶
The argument relies on a single metropolitan case and secondary literature, with no systematic interview sample, survey statistics or archival record presented. Disaggregated election returns by ward or traditional authority area, chiefs' payroll and budget data, and Hansard or ANC internal records would test the electoral-calculation claim and the urban-rural vote split better. Much of this existed then and could be gathered now, together with rural comparisons beyond eThekwini.
Replicability: Data poorly documented.