Farmers' strategies and their implications for land reform in the Orange Free State¶
William Beinart (1994). Farmers' strategies and their implications for land reform in the Orange Free State. History Workshop conference 'Democracy: Popular Precedents, Practice, Culture', University of the Witwatersrand, 13-15 July 1994. University of the Witwatersrand, History Workshop.
| Type | conference paper |
| Scope | Wider apartheid literature |
| Method | survey fieldwork |
| Period studied | 1950–1994 |
| Regions | Orange Free State, Thaba Nchu, Tweespruit/Excelsior, Dewetsdorp, Wepener, Ladybrand, Bophuthatswana |
| Themes | agriculture land, transition post apartheid, macro fiscal finance debt, labour markets wages, inequality poverty unemployment |
| Citation key | beinart1994 |
Argument¶
Drawing on 1993 interviews in the eastern Orange Free State around Thaba Nchu, Beinart shows that white landowners are a differentiated group. The largest owners (over 5,000 ha) accumulate land and specialise in extensive stock farming, especially cattle, to cut input, capital and labour costs after the lean 1980s. Medium and smaller farmers tend to diversify, and often farm more intensively. Widespread debt, a high turnover of land, falling land prices and a growing rental market suggest that the land market, 'suitably nudged', could supply land for redistribution. He cautions that capital rather than land availability may be the main constraint for new black farmers, and that farmworkers are vulnerable to eviction and extrusion under both consolidation and reform.
Evidence and method¶
Interviews in 1993 with farmers, officials, NGOs (OFS Rural Committee, Rural Foundation), farmworkers and recent migrants in four areas; Land Bank arrears and foreclosure figures; Department of Agriculture statistics (Glen) for 1991; a Coetzee and Heckroodt survey of 46 Excelsior farms; World Bank 1993 reports; Deeds Office print-outs; Murray's historical work.
Place in the debates¶
- Land reform: market-led versus state-led redistribution (see Agricultural policy, productivity, farm size and land reform). Argues that the land market, suitably nudged by Land Bank controls, taxation changes and state support, could provide scope for redistribution. He warns that the costs of reform need careful consideration and that capital for new farmers is the critical constraint.
- Causes of farm labour shedding and farmworker eviction (see Farm labour: mechanisation, labour shedding, wages and labour control). Large farmers shed resident workers to gain economies of scale and to pre-empt labour legislation, minimum wages and unionisation. Protective legislation has itself contributed to a further phase of extrusion.
- Economic logic of large-scale landholding and farm size (see Agricultural policy, productivity, farm size and land reform). Land accumulation is tied to extensive stock farming, and the biggest owners are not the most intensive producers. Medium-sized farms show more diversity and intensity, so taxing large holdings or limiting farm size would be unlikely to harm overall production.
Findings¶
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The number of white-owned farming units fell sharply after the early 1950s. (p. 6)
the number of farming units owned by whites peaked at about 119,000 in the early 1950s and subsequently declined to about 60,000 in the early 1980s.
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Farm land transactions are numerous, though this has not given easy access to new buyers. (p. 6)
around 300,000 in the 28 years up to 1991 or an average of more than 10,000 annually
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Inheritance is central to the making of the white farming class. (p. 7)
it is important to stress the centrality of inheritance in the creation of the modern South African farming class. Every white farming family interviewed had inherited some land.
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Large landowners respond to the 1980s squeeze by minimising costs and concentrating on stock. (p. 10)
The central strategy of the land barons, learnt during the lean agricultural years of the 1980s, has been to minimise input costs and maximise economies of scale by concentrating on stock
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Land barons clear farmworkers when they take over farms, and anticipate labour regulation. (p. 12)
Land barons generally removed farmworkers when they took over a farm and noted that it was simpler to ease farmworkers off newly purchased or rented land.
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Wheat specialisation was reversed on a typical average-sized Tweespruit farm. (p. 21)
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Debt among OFS farmers rose steeply, with Land Bank arrears growing over 1983-92. (p. 23)
18 per cent of long-term Land Bank loan accounts were in arrears in 1983, 28 per cent in 1987 and 33 per cent in 1992.
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Capital rather than land may be the critical constraint for new black farmers. (p. 26)
The most critical issue in bringing black farmers onto the land, at least in the shorter term, may not be land availability but capital
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Land redistribution will matter politically but not greatly for national wealth distribution. (p. 27)
it is unlikely to be a major factor in the redistribution of wealth nationally.
Evidence ledger¶
Sources used¶
| Source | Kind | Period | How used |
|---|---|---|---|
| Author/Murray fieldwork interviews in 1993 around Thaba Nchu (Excelsior/Tweespruit, Ladybrand, northern Dewetsdorp, Thaba Nchu, Wepener) | interviews oral history | 1993 | Main evidence for farmer strategies, land accumulation, rental, diversification and land turnover across size categories of farm. |
| Discussions with farmers, officials, NGOs (OFS Rural Committee, Rural Foundation), farmworkers and recent migrants | interviews oral history | 1993 | Supplements farmer interviews; with sketchy statistics gives an overview of social change. |
| Deeds Office records (computerised print-outs) | official statistical series | present snapshot (c.1993) | Snapshot of present farm ownership; historical ownership change had to be taken from interviews. |
| World Bank 1993a, 'South Africa Agriculture Sector Memorandum' (unpublished report, May 1993) | secondary literature compilation | to 1991/93 | Source for national numbers of white farming units and Deeds Office transaction volumes. |
| World Bank 1993b, 'Options for Land Reform and Rural Restructuring in South Africa' | secondary literature compilation | to 1991 | Source for around 300,000 registered farmland transactions in 28 years to 1991 and the high turnover of land. |
| Department of Agriculture statistics, Glen College of Agriculture, unpublished statistical print-outs, 1991 | official statistical series | 1991 | Establishes average farming unit size per district and that 80-90% of farming units were owner-occupied. |
| Land Bank figures on long-term loans, arrears and farms bought in (OFS and districts) | official statistical series | 1982-1993 | Shows rising arrears, interest rates, and Bank-held farms as evidence of indebtedness and land potentially available for redistribution. |
| Union of South Africa, 1960, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into European Occupancy of the Rural Areas (Du Toit Commission), evidence at K103, Union Archives | commission or official report | 1960 | Cited for government concern over white rural depopulation until the 1960s. |
| Landbou Weekblad, 27.8.1993 | newspapers periodicals | 1993 | Illustrates farmer caution about switching from sheep to cattle. |
| Murray, C. 1992, Black Mountain: Land, Class and Power in the Eastern Orange Free State | secondary literature compilation | 1860s-1980s | Background on Thaba Nchu's mixed white and black tenure, English-speaking settlement, and history of Tweespruit potato growing. |
| Standard Bank 1988, Finance and Farmers: a financial management guide for farmers | other | 1988 | Cited for an explanation of the taxation regime on land improvements and livestock valuation. |
New data¶
Interview material from a 1993 local research project with many farmers, officials, NGOs and farmworkers in four areas of the eastern OFS around Thaba Nchu; the number of interviews is not stated and no dataset is tabulated, though individual farmer case studies are anonymised by letter.
Inference¶
Quantification: Illustrative figures.
Qualitative case-study comparison of farmer strategies by farm-size category, drawn from interviews and anecdotal farm profiles, supported by district-level Department of Agriculture and Land Bank figures and national estimates cited from World Bank reports; policy implications for land reform are argued from this evidence.
Key claims¶
| Claim | Basis | Strength |
|---|---|---|
| Very large landowners accumulate land mainly through purchases, concentrate on extensive stock farming (cattle), and shed farmworkers, with tax advantages and cheap inputs encouraging this. (p. 10) | Interviews with landowners N and S and others in Wepener and Dewetsdorp; tax regime explanation from Standard Bank guide. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| Medium and smaller farmers pursue varied and diversified strategies, often more intensive than the largest owners, rather than a single specialisation. (p. 18) | Interview-based profiles of farmers G, Q, R, B, K, F plus partial Department of Agriculture farm size data. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| There is high turnover of farmland (especially smaller pieces) yet little access to the market for new black or white farmers, and inheritance is central to the farming class. (p. 6) | World Bank 1993 figures on Deeds Office transactions; interviews with white farming families. | Partial data |
| Farm indebtedness in the OFS rose sharply in the 1980s and early 1990s, worse in grain district Excelsior, driven by drought, interest rates and terms of trade. (p. 23) | Land Bank arrears and interest rate figures; Coetzee and Heckroodt 1991 Excelsior survey. | Systematic data |
| The OFS land market, suitably nudged, could provide land for redistribution given turnover, rental (up to 25-30% in Wepener), low prices and debt, though capital rather than land may be the binding constraint for new black farmers. (p. 25) | Synthesis of interviews, rental price estimates, Land Bank figures and World Bank turnover data. | Partial data |
The author's caveats¶
Author notes statistics for the area are 'sketchy', that analysis of ownership change would need time-consuming Deeds Office work, and that most historical information comes from interviews. Farmers were cautious in responding to researchers interested in land matters in 1993, and cautious generalisation is advised for the Wepener evidence.
Gaps in the evidence¶
The argument rests on a small, unquantified set of interviews, so claims about strategy by farm size and about shifts to cattle cannot be tested against systematic data. Time-series Deeds Office transfer records, Agricultural Census farm-level data and Land Bank account-level data would allow the ownership, concentration and indebtedness claims to be tested; computerised Deeds records existed then but were not exploited for history. The number and selection of interviewees, and rental market data beyond informant estimates, are also missing.
Replicability: Data poorly documented.