The British War against Apartheid (review of Roger Fieldhouse, Anti-Apartheid. A History of the Movement in Britain; and Denis Herbstein, White Lies: Canon Collins and the Secret War against Apartheid)

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Bob Hepple (2006). The British War against Apartheid (review of Roger Fieldhouse, Anti-Apartheid. A History of the Movement in Britain; and Denis Herbstein, White Lies: Canon Collins and the Secret War against Apartheid). Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Heritage in Southern Africa). Taylor & Francis.

Type	journal article
Scope	Wider apartheid literature
Method	synthesis review
Period studied	1956–1994
Regions	Britain, South Africa, Namibia
Themes	sanctions divestment, resistance social movements, politics ideology elections, business and state
Citation key	hepple2006

Argument

Hepple reviews two histories of British-based anti-apartheid organisations, the Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) and the International Defence and Aid Fund (IDAF), and argues that both made vital contributions to apartheid's downfall. He draws out four themes. First, both organisations responded to events in South Africa rather than instigating them. Second, a 'broad church' single-issue appeal to moral outrage was the source of their success, despite far-left criticism. Third, successive British governments were complicit, putting perceived economic interests and Cold War anti-communism ahead of moral rejection of apartheid. Fourth, the South African security services worked hard to undermine both organisations. He judges Fieldhouse a serious but dull institutional history and Herbstein a gripping account of the 'secret war'.

Evidence and method

The review draws on the two books under review, which are based on archival research, interviews and contemporary sources. It adds Hepple's own recollection of a 1964 union branch meeting in Willesden and a cited memoir by the spy Gordon Winter.

Place in the debates

• Broad single-issue anti-apartheid coalition versus a wider anti-capitalist/anti-imperialist strategy (see Sanctions, disinvestment and the anti-apartheid movement). Hepple defends the single-issue 'broad church' as the source of the AAM's success and compares it to the anti-slave-trade movement. He disagrees with Fieldhouse, who treats it as a weakness, and he criticises the militant far-left groups (CLAAG, RCG).
• Role of British governments and economic interests in sustaining apartheid; sanctions policy (see Sanctions, disinvestment and the anti-apartheid movement). Hepple, following Fieldhouse, holds that British governments of both parties resisted sanctions and a full arms embargo and favoured 'constructive engagement'. He ranks Cold War anti-communism above economic interest as the motive.
• External solidarity movements as instigators versus complements of internal resistance (see Why apartheid ended: reform, transition and elite bargaining). He holds that the AAM and IDAF played a secondary or complementary role, rejecting the apartheid state's claim that they instigated rebellion.

Findings

• The British organisations were reactive to events in South Africa, not instigators of resistance. (p. 3)

  They were not, as the apartheid authorities liked to claim, the instigators or organisers of rebellion in South Africa; they played an entirely secondary or complementary role.

• The AAM originated in the 1959 boycott campaign requested by the ANC. (p. 3)

  The AAM grew out of the campaign to boycott South African goods, launched in 1959 by South African emigres, British sympathisers and the Committee of African Organisations (CAO) in London

• The AAM's main achievement was keeping apartheid on the political agenda. (p. 3)

  Its major achievement was to keep apartheid on the political agenda both internationally and nationally, even during the most severe periods of repression in South Africa.

• IDAF channelled very large sums into South Africa for legal defence and prisoner support, evading the Bureau of State Security. (p. 3)

  to pour tens of millions of pounds into South Africa to provide legal defence in political trials and to support the dependants of political prisoners.

• The AAM mobilised broad support, peaking in 1989. (p. 4)

  At its peak, in 1989, it brought together nearly 20,000 people and 1,300 grassroots organisations of many persuasions.

• British governments of both parties put economic interests ahead of moral opposition to apartheid. (p. 4)

  Fieldhouse shows that both Labour and Conservative governments put Britain's perceived economic interests ahead of their moral rejection of apartheid.

• The AAM failed to win economic sanctions or a full arms embargo from British governments. (p. 4)

  The AAM was unable to sway governments on major policy issues such as economic sanctions and a full arms embargo

• British confidence in the South African economy was misplaced, and Cold War alliance logic mattered more than the economy. (p. 4)

  far more important than the economy was the view, shared with the United States of America, that South Africa was a reliable ally against communism.

Evidence ledger

Sources used

Source	Kind	Period	How used
Roger Fieldhouse, Anti-Apartheid: A History of the Movement in Britain (Merlin Press, 2005), archival research and interviews	secondary literature compilation	1959-1994 (AAM's existence)	The reviewer relies on Fieldhouse's archive- and interview-based account for AAM's campaigns, membership, politics and relations with British governments.
Denis Herbstein, White Lies: Canon Collins and the Secret War against Apartheid (James Currey, 2004), interviews and contemporary sources	secondary literature compilation	c. 1956-1990s (Defence and Aid, IDAF)	The reviewer relies on Herbstein's interview-based narrative for IDAF's founding, its covert transfer of funds and its infiltration by South African security services.
Gordon Winter, Inside BOSS: South Africa's Secret Police (Penguin, 1981)	secondary literature compilation	1960s-1970s	Cited as the only, unreliable, available account of BOSS operations against AAM and IDAF, given that BOSS may have covered its tracks.
Reviewer's personal recollection of a Willesden union branch meeting, 1964	interviews oral history	1964	Anecdote illustrating how the AAM linked racial discrimination in South Africa to racism in Britain.
UN Resolution of 1963 inviting Member States to provide for defence of persons charged under apartheid laws	commission or official report	1963	Mentioned as the trigger for the formation of IDAF in 1964 as the recognised channel for contributions.

Inference

Quantification: None.

A book review that summarises and evaluates two monographs, drawing common themes from their narratives, with a single personal anecdote. The claims rest on the authors' archival and interview work, not on independent evidence.

Key claims

Claim	Basis	Strength
AAM and IDAF were responses to events in South Africa and played only a secondary or complementary role, not that of instigators of rebellion. (p. 845)	Fieldhouse's and Herbstein's narratives of the founding of AAM (1959 boycott, ANC requests) and IDAF (1956 Treason Trial, 1963 UN resolution).	Partial data
AAM mobilised a broad cross-section of public opinion on the single issue of apartheid, reaching about 20,000 people and 1,300 organisations by 1989. (p. 846)	Membership and affiliation figures presumably taken from Fieldhouse; the source is not given in the review.	Partial data
Successive Labour and Conservative British governments put perceived economic interests ahead of their moral rejection of apartheid and favoured 'constructive engagement'. (p. 846)	Fieldhouse's archival account of government policy, relayed by the reviewer.	Partial data
Anti-communism and the view of South Africa as a Cold War ally mattered more than the economy in shaping British policy. (p. 846)	Assertion by the reviewer, drawing on both books' accounts of Foreign Office fears.	Asserted
IDAF secretly channelled tens of millions of pounds into South Africa for legal defence and support of political prisoners' dependants, evading BOSS. (p. 845)	Herbstein's interview-based narrative; no financial records are cited in the review.	Illustrative or anecdotal
South African security services made enormous efforts to infiltrate and undermine AAM and IDAF. (p. 846)	Herbstein's account of infiltration (e.g. Craig Williamson), less on AAM in Fieldhouse; Winter's accounts are flagged as unreliable.	Illustrative or anecdotal

The author's caveats

The reviewer notes that BOSS may have covered its tracks, so that only the unreliable accounts of spies such as Gordon Winter survive. He also notes that Fieldhouse says little on the AAM office ransacking and the theft of funds.

Gaps in the evidence

This is a review, so its claims are only as good as the two books it summarises, and it gives no page-level archival references for them. Testing the claims would need AAM and IDAF financial and membership records, Foreign Office and Cabinet files on British policy, and BOSS or Truth and Reconciliation Commission material on infiltration. Much of this was available in archives and in later releases.

Replicability: Not applicable.