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From Grassroots Democracy to National Mobilization: COSATU as a Model of Social Movement Unionism

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Philip Hirschsohn (1998). From Grassroots Democracy to National Mobilization: COSATU as a Model of Social Movement Unionism. Economic and Industrial Democracy 19(4). SAGE (for Department of Economic History, Uppsala University).
Type journal article
Scope Wider apartheid literature
Method theoretical or conceptual
Period studied 1973–1994
Regions South Africa
Themes unions strikes, resistance social movements, labour markets wages, politics ideology elections, transition post apartheid, comparative theory
Citation key hirschsohn1998

Argument

The article argues that COSATU exemplifies 'social movement unionism' (SMU), which combines institutionalised collective bargaining with the collective action of social movements, and that conventional economic/political union categories cannot explain it. Using a political process approach, it proposes a four-stage model: independent grassroots unions, institutionalised bargaining, extension of purpose via internal democracy, and alliances with other movements against the state. It claims SMU emerged because a reformist authoritarian state opened the syndical opportunity structure (1979 reforms) while keeping political space closed, and because members' 'cognitive liberation' pressed leaders to act politically. The final section asks whether SMU can survive democratisation and corporatist 'strategic unionism'.

Evidence and method

Secondary literature on South African unions and social movements (Baskin, Friedman, Webster, Lambert, Marx, Kraak), union and labour-law sources, aggregate figures on membership, wages and strike days from Finnemore and Van der Merwe, Moll and Innes, and social movement theory (Tilly, McAdam, Tarrow, Valenzuela, Flanders). No new archival or survey data; a worker survey (Ginsburg et al. 1995) is cited.

Place in the debates

Findings

  • The 1973 strike wave was a turning point, and the state later extended union rights to African workers to control them. (p. 11)

    The Apartheid state accepted the Commission’s strategy to control the emerging unions through formal recognition and registration, and extended full trade union rights to African workers between 1979 and 1981.

  • The Wiehahn reforms backfired, producing rapid union growth and a bargaining explosion. (p. 11)

    the reforms had the opposite effect to what the architects intended

  • Union membership and density grew sharply in the 1980s. (p. 18)

    In the 1980s union membership grew from 900,000 to almost 2.9 million; density increased from 16 percent to over 50 percent of the non-agricultural workforce in formal employment

  • Unionised black workers earned a wage premium and compressed differentials by 1985. (p. 18)

    By 1985, unionized black workers already earned a wage premium of 24 percent compared to non-union workers and unions had significantly compressed skill and gender differentials

  • Real wages rose despite rising unemployment, but unions were less able to prevent retrenchment. (p. 18)

    Although real wages increased, despite persistent and increasing unemployment (up to 33 percent) and declining national per capita income, unions were less successful in protecting their members from retrenchment

  • Industrial action cost an unprecedented number of working days in 1986-90, and political protest cost three times as many again. (p. 19)

    Between 1986 and 1990 the country lost more working days to industrial action than in the preceding 75 years

  • Early employer resistance to recognising black unions was overcome by organising drives and willingness to disrupt production. (p. 17)

    only four firms had concluded recognition agreements with black unions before 1979

  • State repression of union members was heavy during the emergency, which pushed COSATU toward national political struggle. (p. 20)

    about 25 percent of the 38,000 detained without trial during 1984-8 under the state of emergency

  • COSATU's political leadership after 1988 was enabled by its institutionalised bargaining role, which the state could not afford to attack. (p. 27)

    The state could no longer risk the consequences of widespread detention of labor leaders for political activities.

  • Post-1990 the labour movement shifted toward corporatist policy influence after the failed VAT campaign. (p. 28)

    The failure, in 1991, of a COSATU-led campaign against value added tax resulted in a major shift in labor’s strategy.

  • Survey evidence suggests a leadership-rank-and-file rupture, though grassroots democracy persisted. (p. 30)

    this research also finds that worker control over shop stewards and the participative democratic culture remain vibrant at grassroots level

Evidence ledger

Sources used

Source Kind Period How used
Finnemore and Van der Merwe (1992), Introduction to Industrial Relations in South Africa, 3rd edn: union membership, density, recognition agreement and unemployment figures secondary literature compilation 1980s Supplies the aggregate figures on union membership growth, density, COSATU membership, recognition agreements and unemployment used to show institutionalization of bargaining.
Moll (1993), 'Black South African Unions: Relative Wage Effects in International Perspective', ILR Review 46(2) secondary literature compilation to 1985 Provides the estimate of a 24 percent union wage premium for black workers and compression of skill and gender differentials.
Ginsburg et al. (1995), Taking Democracy Seriously: Worker Expectations and Parliamentary Democracy in South Africa (extensive worker survey) household or labour survey microdata early 1990s (mid-1990s publication) Used as evidence of a 'democratic rupture' between rank-and-file and leaders, yet vibrant worker control over shop stewards at grassroots level.
Wiehahn Commission (state-appointed) and the 1979–81 labour law reforms commission or official report 1979–1981 Establishes the opening of the syndical opportunity structure; the Commission's strategy of formal recognition and registration is cited via Maree (1985), not from the report itself.
Labour Relations Amendment Act 1988 and Laboria Minute 1990 legislation gazette 1988–1990 Used as evidence that the state tried to roll back labour rights, that unions made the Act unworkable, and that the Laboria Minute reversed the state's position.
COSATU (1987), 'COSATU 1987: From the Executive Committee', Review of African Political Economy 39 union or movement records 1987 Documents the COSATU Executive Committee's encouragement of affiliates to strengthen community ties and to form street committees.
COSATU/FOSATU statements, congress resolutions and leaders' speeches (FOSATU 1982 Congress policy statement; Jay Naidoo; Ramaphosa 1985; COSATU May 1988 special congress) union or movement records 1982–1988 Quoted to show the evolving political stance of the unions and the adoption of the Freedom Charter; all are secondhand citations.
Figures on detentions under the 1984–88 state of emergency and working days lost to industrial action and political protest (Innes 1992, uncited source for detentions) official statistical series 1984–1990 Used to show the scale of labour militancy and state repression of union members.
Author's doctoral research: clothing and auto industry case studies (MIT PhD) author survey or fieldwork unclear The article does not draw explicitly on this fieldwork; it is mentioned only in the author biography as the basis of his dissertation.
Ethnographic/historical studies of migrant workers and hostels (Sitas 1985; Moodie 1994; Adler 1994 PhD dissertation) secondary literature compilation 1970s–1980s Used as illustrative evidence of how hostel life, mine compound decision-making and rugby teams fostered union democracy and mobilization.

Inference

Quantification: Illustrative figures.

Theory-driven analytic narrative: a four-stage political process model of social movement unionism, built from secondary literature on the FOSATU/COSATU case and illustrated with a few aggregate statistics. No systematic empirical test and no comparative cases.

Key claims

Claim Basis Strength
The 1979 labour law reforms opened the syndical opportunity structure and, contrary to the state's intentions, produced rapid union growth and an explosion of bargaining in the 1980s. (p. 642) Wiehahn reforms as described in Maree (1985) and Friedman via Sampson (1987); no direct use of the Commission report or legislation. Illustrative or anecdotal
Union membership and density grew massively in the 1980s, and bargaining institutions were consolidated through recognition agreements and mergers into 14 industrial unions. (p. 649) Aggregate figures from Finnemore and Van der Merwe (1992), a textbook; no primary union records cited. Partial data
Unions delivered material gains: a wage premium for unionized black workers and real wage increases despite recession and rising unemployment, though they were less successful in protecting against retrenchment. (p. 649) Moll (1993) for the 24 percent wage premium; Finnemore and Van der Merwe (1992) for real wage and retrenchment claims. Partial data
Worker control and democratic practice persisted in COSATU's governance structures after mergers, and grassroots pressure (e.g., detentions of members) drove COSATU's turn to national political struggle. (p. 651) Secondary accounts (Baskin 1991, Friedman 1987) and an uncited figure on detentions; interpretive inference from structure. Illustrative or anecdotal
Hostel life, mine compound consensus practices and rugby teams fostered 'cognitive liberation' and a virtuous cycle of participation and mobilization among migrant workers. (p. 652) Secondary ethnographic literature (Sitas 1985, Moodie 1994, Adler 1994). Illustrative or anecdotal
COSATU withstood a three-pronged state assault in the late 1980s (bombing, the LRAA, bans on the UDF) and became the leading force of the Mass Democratic Movement because its institutionalized bargaining role gave it relative protection. (p. 657) Narrative from Benjamin (1989), Marx (1989), Fine and Webster (1989), Baskin (1991); events reported without primary documents. Illustrative or anecdotal
The four-stage political process model derived from COSATU is generalizable to the emergence of social movement unionism under reformist authoritarian regimes. (p. 634) Single-case theoretical argument; no comparative case evidence presented. Asserted
After the transition to democracy, corporatist policy-making has produced a 'democratic rupture' between leaders and rank-and-file, although grassroots worker control over shop stewards remains vibrant. (p. 661) Ginsburg et al. (1995) worker survey, cited secondhand, plus Marie (1992) and Keet (1992). Partial data

The author's caveats

The author acknowledges that the four-stage model explains the emergence but not the full life-cycle of SMU. He also notes it is 'premature to assess' whether COSATU still exemplifies SMU after 1990. There are no explicit caveats about data quality.

Gaps in the evidence

The argument rests almost entirely on secondary literature and a handful of aggregate statistics; it uses no archival union records, shop steward or member surveys, strike statistics series or interviews to test the claims about internal democracy and member 'cognitive liberation'. Union minutes, congress resolutions, membership and strike data (for example the Department of Manpower or Andrew Levy and Associates strike series), and worker survey data existed at the time and could test the causal links between bargaining success, democratic practice and political mobilization. Comparison with unions that did not become SMU (CUSA/NACTU, or other countries) would be needed to support the generalizable model.

Replicability: Data poorly documented.