The Other Side of Sanctions: Positive Initiatives for Southern Africa¶
Martin Holland (1988). The Other Side of Sanctions: Positive Initiatives for Southern Africa. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 26, 2. Cambridge University Press.
| Type | journal article |
| Scope | Wider apartheid literature |
| Method | policy analysis |
| Period studied | 1977–1988 |
| Regions | Southern Africa, SADCC states, Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, Mozambique, European Community, South Africa |
| Themes | sanctions divestment, mining migrant labour, business and state, resistance social movements, comparative theory |
| Citation key | holland1988 |
Argument¶
The article argues that the European Community's South African policy has a regional, 'positive' side that critics of its post-1985 sanctions have neglected. It documents South Africa's economic dominance over the nine SADCC states and assesses EC support for SADCC, especially transport. It then gives the first examination of the 1986 special programme for victims of apartheid, channelled through churches, the Kagiso Trust and trade unions. Holland concludes that the Community's aid falls short of regional needs, and that these measures grew out of consensus-bound bargaining that avoided sanctions, which several member states opposed. He judges the measures appropriate but insufficient, and notes a more sceptical reading that they deflect criticism of continuing EC ties with South Africa.
Evidence and method¶
Secondary literature, press and yearbook sources (Africa Research Bulletin, Keesings, The Courier), SADCC progress reports, EC Commission and Council documents, OECD aid figures, and Holland's own 1987 research with Commission officials (D-G VIII) and SALDRU at Cape Town. Includes tables of dependence indicators, SADCC project funding and distribution of EC aid.
Place in the debates¶
- Sanctions effectiveness and the choice between punitive and positive measures (see Sanctions, disinvestment and the anti-apartheid movement). Holland treats positive regional measures as a consensus-driven substitute for economic sanctions, which Britain, West Germany and Portugal resisted. He judges them modest but suitable, while acknowledging a sceptical view that they are window-dressing.
- Whether Western donors undermine regional industrialisation (Friedland). Endorses Friedland's argument that OECD donors have funded transport but not industry, using the 70.4 per cent funding gap for industrial projects. He notes that UK, French and West German bilateral aid avoids industry.
- Regional dependence and destabilisation of the SADCC states. Accepts that South African economic and military dominance, and destabilisation, severely limit SADCC. He cites estimates of damage exceeding all aid received.
Findings¶
-
Foreign migrants remained a large share of the black gold-mining workforce in 1983, mostly from the B.L.S. states. (p. 3)
in 1983, migrant workers still comprised 42 per cent (I8I,019) of the black gold-mining force in South Africa
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Lesotho's economy was overwhelmingly dependent on South African employment and migrant remittances. (p. 4)
Lesotho is by far the most dependent on South Africa; 86 per cent of its wage-labour force is employed in the Republic,
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SADCC states carried a heavy joint debt burden, relative to GDP, in 1987. (p. 3)
the joint S.A.D.C.C. debt stands at U.S.$I6,500 million, the equivalent of 6o per cent of G.D.P.
-
Destabilisation costs imposed on SADCC were estimated to exceed all foreign aid received over 1980-84. (p. 8)
in excess of all the foreign aid received by S.A.D.C.C. during that period, and tantamount to one-third of the combined export earnings of the nine member-states.
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Donor funding was skewed toward transport; industrial projects had by far the largest financing gap. (p. 10)
There is a 704 per cent financing gap for industrial projects compared with 54-8 per cent for communications and transport.
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Combined OECD aid from EC member states to SADCC fell over the early to mid-1980s. (p. 11)
has been declining: from U.S.$66I-2 million in I980 to $537-3 million in I985
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The EC special programme for victims of apartheid was financially small: 10 million ECU in its first year, rising to 20 million. (p. 12)
10 million E.C.U. in aid was provided for the special programmes instituted to assist the victims of apartheid, and this was increased to 20 million E.C.U. in the 1987 budget.
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Aid went mainly through the Kagiso Trust and the churches, with trade unions receiving little. (p. 14)
The 34-7 million E.C.U. distributed during the first 21 months went predominantly to the Kagiso Trust and the two church organisations, with the remainder to the trade unions
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South African repression in 1987-88 undermined the programme's viability. (p. 15)
the Government effectively banned 18 opposition groups, including the United Democratic Front and the Confederation of South African Trade Unions
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Positive measures substituted for sanctions because of divisions within the Twelve. (p. 16)
the introduction of positive regional measures, in lieu of economic sanctions which were perceived as detrimental to a number of Community states.
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An alternative reading sees the positive measures as deflection of criticism. (p. 17)
they may be an attempt, just as in the earlier policy of the Code of Conduct, to deflect criticism from the E.C.'s continuing ties with South Africa
Evidence ledger¶
Sources used¶
| Source | Kind | Period | How used |
|---|---|---|---|
| Africa Research Bulletin, September 1985 and February 1987 (Table 1: Indicators of Economic Dependence on South Africa) | official statistical series | c. 1985-1987 | Supplies trade, migrant labour, remittance, supply-dependence and GDP indicators in Table 1 showing regional dependence on South Africa. |
| Africa Research Bulletin, August 1986, p. 8,311 (SACU revenue shares) | newspapers periodicals | 1982-3 to 1985-6 | Estimates the share of B.L.S. government revenue derived from the Southern African Customs Union. |
| SADCC 1985-86 Annual Progress Report (Luanda, 1987) and Progress Report (Luanda, 1986), including Table 2 on SADCC projects and funding | commission or official report | 1985-1986 | Source of SADCC debt, currency effects, transport project counts and the sectoral project cost/funding gap data in Table 2. |
| Association of Western European Parliamentarians Against Apartheid, 'Southern Africa's Future: Europe's role' (The Hague, 1987) | commission or official report | 1987 | Supplies figures on SADCC population, GDP, intra-regional trade, transport project costs, transport dependence and donor statements. |
| European Parliament, Scott-Hopkins Report of the Political Affairs Committee on Southern Africa, Working Document 1-657, 1982 | commission or official report | 1982 | Evidence on the commodity concentration of SADCC states' exports (copper, tobacco, tea, sugar). |
| Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 32, 1986 | newspapers periodicals | 1986 | Used for Lesotho's labour-force dependence on South Africa and regional transport/petroleum trade routes. |
| The Courier (Brussels), nos. 95 and 96, 1986 | commission or official report | 1986 | Provides the estimated cost of South African destabilisation (US$10,000m 1980-84) with itemised components, and E.C. aid figures under Lomé and the Memorandum of Understanding. |
| Commission of the European Communities, 'The European Community and South Africa', Brussels, 1981 | commission or official report | 1981 | Source for the SADCC Lusaka declaration and its four objectives. |
| OECD aid figures as cited via Paul Goodison, CEPS, Brussels, November 1987 | international trade or finance data | 1980-1985 | Shows that Community members' combined ODA to SADCC declined from US$661.2m (1980) to $537.3m (1985) with shifting national shares. |
| Africa News (Durham, N.C.), 8 December 1986; South (London), May 1987; Africa Research Bulletin, March and November 1986/87 | newspapers periodicals | 1986-1987 | Evidence on the decline in Beira corridor traffic, Zimbabwe's export routing, transport cost savings, Zambia's copper rerouting and donor contributions to Beira. |
| Foreign Ministers of the European Community, 'Statement on South Africa', Brussels, 15 September 1986 | commission or official report | 1986 | Documents the Community's positive measures and the lack of new programmes in the September 1986 statement. |
| European Community, Directorate-General VIII, 'Guidelines for the Implementation of the Community's Special Programme for Victims of Apartheid (Budget Article 953)', Brussels, 1986 | commission or official report | 1986 | Source for the positive and negative guidelines governing aid disbursement through the four channels. |
| European Community, 'Meeting Between Representatives of South African Organisations and the Commission on the Implementation of the Special Programme', Brussels, 18 April 1988 (Table 3) | commission or official report | 1986-1988 | Provides the distribution of E.C. aid to victims of apartheid by channel and type of assistance (Table 3) and scheme counts. |
| Secondary data compilations: Yudelman and Jeeves (1986), de Vletter (1987), Kibble and Bush (1986), Green and Thompson (1986), Becker (1987), Thompson (1986) | secondary literature compilation | 1980s | Provide figures on migrant mine labour (42% of black gold-mining force in 1983), South African industrial share and SADCC output decline. |
| South African Institute of Race Relations, Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1982; South Africa Foundation, Information Digest 1987; Innes in Work in Progress 44, 1986 | official statistical series | 1982-1987 | Supports claims on regional trade balance (R828m vs R279m), Lesotho's import dependence and South Africa's GNP and economic superiority. |
Inference¶
Quantification: Descriptive tables.
Descriptive policy analysis of European Community policy: assembles secondary and official statistics on regional dependence and aid flows, and describes the institutional design of the aid programme, to support an interpretive argument that the E.C.'s positive measures are a consensus-driven substitute for sanctions. No formal causal testing.
Key claims¶
| Claim | Basis | Strength |
|---|---|---|
| International donors, including the E.C., have underfunded SADCC industrial and energy projects compared with transport and communications. (p. 310) | Table 2 (SADCC Progress Report) funding-gap percentages, supported by Friedland's argument. | Systematic data |
| The E.C. special programme for victims of apartheid channelled 34.7m ECU over 21 months through four South African channels, mostly churches and the Kagiso Trust. (p. 315) | Table 3 and E.C. Commission April 1988 meeting document; DG VIII guidelines. | Systematic data |
| The positive measures reflect consensus-based Community decision-making and a shift to regional objectives in lieu of sanctions, and are appropriate if not sufficient. (p. 317) | Author's interpretation of E.C. policy documents and his own earlier work; no impact data. | Asserted |
| The programme's early success exceeded expectations, reducing mutual suspicion, though it is too early to assess its impact and South African repression threatens its viability. (p. 316) | Unreferenced assessments from Commission contacts; reports of Kagiso Trust raids and bans. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
The author's caveats¶
The author notes that it is too early to assess the actual impact of the positive measures, that confidentiality limits information on recipients, and that funding is small relative to the scale of the problem.
Gaps in the evidence¶
The argument relies on secondary compilations and press digests rather than original national statistics, so figures on dependence and destabilisation costs are hard to verify. It lacks project-level evaluation data or recipient interviews to test whether the aid reached the disadvantaged or changed perceptions; E.C. archives and later evaluations now exist. Official trade, labour and aid-flow series (OECD DAC, SACU, TEBA) could substantiate the dependency and aid-decline claims directly.
Replicability: Data poorly documented.