Political Corruption: Before and after Apartheid¶
Jonathan Hyslop (2005). Political Corruption: Before and after Apartheid. Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4. Taylor & Francis.
| Type | journal article |
| Scope | Wider apartheid literature |
| Method | synthesis review |
| Period studied | 1870–2005 |
| Regions | South Africa, Transvaal, Bantustans/homelands (Transkei, Eastern Cape, Mpumalanga, Limpopo), Pretoria |
| Themes | business and state, politics ideology elections, bantustans removals influx, sanctions divestment, transition post apartheid, comparative theory, origins segregation |
| Citation key | hyslop2005 |
Argument¶
Hyslop argues that South African debate about corruption is polarised and unilluminating because it fails to separate rent-seeking, patron-client relations and corruption proper. He draws on comparative work (Chabal and Daloz's 'empty shell' state, the East Asian growth-with-corruption cases) and a historical sketch from Kruger to the 2005 Zuma/Shaik affair. He finds that rent-seeking and patronage varied widely under white rule. Overt corruption was contained in the senior bureaucracy under Milner and the high-apartheid state, and only 'took off' from the 1970s as apartheid disintegrated, in the homelands, in sanctions-busting and covert operations, and in the final decade of NP rule. The post-1994 state inherited and combined three legacies: the Pretoria bureaucracy, the homeland administrations and the liberation movement's loyalty-based political culture. Corruption is worst where provincial administrations grew out of the homelands, while the arms deal shows a narrower, East Asian-style elite enrichment.
Evidence and method¶
Secondary literature (Lodge, O'Meara, Posel, Marks and Trapido, Southall, Bauer, Chabal and Daloz, Khan and Jomo), commission findings (Pickard on the DDA, an inquiry into the DET), newspaper reports (Mail & Guardian, Sunday Times, Rapport, Noseweek), Human Rights Commission reports, and one anonymous investigator interview. No original archival or quantitative data.
Place in the debates¶
- Whether the apartheid or the post-1994 state is more corrupt (liberal/conservative critics vs ANC) (see Post-apartheid economic policy, governance and corruption). Rejects the polarisation as ideological and unilluminating; the two orders produce different types of corruption, and new forms are layered on old ones, following Lodge.
- Chabal and Daloz's 'Africa Works' model of corruption as instrumentalised disorder and vertical networks (see Post-apartheid economic policy, governance and corruption). Partly adopts it. The homelands and the Eastern Cape, Mpumalanga and Limpopo provincial administrations approximate the 'empty shell' state. He warns of its drift toward cultural essentialism, and says the arms scandal looks more East Asian.
- Corruption and growth (East Asian vs African experience) (see Post-apartheid economic policy, governance and corruption). Uses a low/high corruption by high/low growth typology. He argues that South Africa shifted from low-corruption high-growth to high-corruption low-growth as the economy stagnated in the 1970s and 1980s, and that the 1960s boom was compatible with extensive patronage-driven rent-seeking.
- Cultural-determinist and Marxist readings of African corruption (see Post-apartheid economic policy, governance and corruption). Rejects conservative cultural determinism as racialising and homogenising. Argues that Marxist elite-versus-masses accounts cannot explain vertical patronage networks that cut across class lines.
Findings¶
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Corruption should be defined in legal-positivist terms as illegal or unprocedural activity, unlike rent-seeking and patronage, which may be legal. (p. 5)
corruption necessarily involves illegal or unprocedural activity, whereas rent-seeking and patronage do not always do so.
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Milner's bureaucratic reorganisation after 1902 reduced Kruger-era corruption, and senior-level corruption stayed low for decades. (p. 9)
There was a clear reduction in the levels of corruption in the Transvaal and there is little evidence of corruption in the senior levels of the South African bureaucracy in the immediately succeeding decades.
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After 1948 the NP systematically promoted Afrikaner rent-seeking, but largely within the law. (p. 10)
Malan and his successors pursued blatant strategies of promoting Afrikaner rent-seeking, although generally within the bounds of legality.
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Civil-service expansion was itself a vehicle of Afrikaner rent-seeking and upward mobility. (p. 10)
by 1967 the number of people directly employed by civil service departments stood at four times the 1939 level.
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Under high apartheid, patronage was extensive but overt senior-level corruption was rare. (p. 10)
But although the role of patronage in these changes was so great, there is relatively little evidence of overt corruption in the top ranks of the bureaucracy.
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The 1960s boom coexisted with heavy patronage-driven rent-seeking without senior corruption. (p. 11)
It is clear that this was entirely compatible with a high degree of patronage-driven rent-seeking, although it was not accompanied by a high level of overt corruption in the senior bureaucracy.
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Economic stagnation coincided with a shift to a high-corruption, low-growth regime from the 1970s, linked to the disintegration of apartheid ideology (Muldergate). (p. 11)
As the economy stagnated the country seems to have shifted dramatically from a low-corruption high-growth to a high-corruption low-growth scenario.
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The homeland system created large black bureaucracies and patronage networks, with extortion, casino rents and an 'empty shell' character. (p. 12)
Homeland government became a by-word for corruption and incompetence.
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Sanctions-busting and propaganda operations were shielded from scrutiny and drew officials into criminal networks, which fostered corruption. (p. 12)
The importance to the state of sanctions-busting and the countering of hostile opinion abroad meant that those involved in activities directed to these ends were shielded from normal public service or parliamentary scrutiny.
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In the transition years (1984-94) senior departments were looted, and the Department of Development Affairs was closed after the Pickard inquiry. (p. 13)
De Klerk shut down the Department of Development Affairs (DDA) in 1991, after a commission under Judge Pickard found that it was a swamp of corruption.
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Post-1994 provincial corruption tracks administrative continuity with the former homeland bureaucracies. (p. 14)
Here there was a clear correlation between the level of systematic corruption and the degree of administrative continuity with the old homeland administrations.
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Black economic preference policies blurred the line between legal rent-seeking and corruption or cronyism after 1994. (p. 15)
government policy encouraged rent-seeking activity by black entrepreneurs through the economic preferences they were given through a whole gamut of policies
Evidence ledger¶
Sources used¶
| Source | Kind | Period | How used |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pickard commission of inquiry into the Department of Development Affairs (as quoted via Bauer) | commission or official report | c. 1991 | Shows that corruption in a central department was severe in the final apartheid years, leading De Klerk to close it. |
| Inquiry into the Department of Education and Training (DET), as quoted in Bauer | commission or official report | c. 1990-91 | Supports the claim of late-apartheid departmental corruption, including the Director-General's contracts to his son's company. |
| Human Rights Commission, 4th Annual Economic and Social Rights Report, 2000-2002 | commission or official report | 2000-2002 | Evidence of civil service fraud in pensions and social benefits in the Eastern Cape. |
| Interim management team report on the Eastern Cape provincial administration, April 2003 | commission or official report | April 2003 | Documents major deficiencies in the provincial Health, Education, Social Development and Public Works departments. |
| Auditor-General report to parliament on arms deal tendering, 15 September 2000 | commission or official report | 2000 | Establishes that irregularities in the arms procurement were officially identified early. |
| Hefer judicial commission and the Schabir Shaik trial judgment (2005) | commission or official report | 2003-2005 | Used to show the spy allegations against Ngcuka collapsed and that the court found a 'corrupt relationship' between Zuma and Shaik. |
| Newspaper reports on the arms deal (Mail & Guardian, Rapport, Sunday Times, Noseweek) | newspapers periodicals | 2002-2003 | Source for the detailed narrative of the Shaik-Thomson-Maharaj-Modise links and alleged payments. |
| Sunday Times, 27 April 2003 (interview with Premier Stofile) | newspapers periodicals | 2003 | Quoted to illustrate the Eastern Cape leadership's disregard for administrative responsibility. |
| Guardian (UK) online report on Sun hotel group bribery of George Matanzima | newspapers periodicals | c. 1980s events reported 2002 | Supports the alleged Sun hotel bribery for homeland gambling rights. |
| Political party and ANC statements (Delport for DA, 23 March 2005; Mbeki, 5 June 2003) | other | 2003-2005 | Documents the polarised public debate about corruption that the article seeks to move beyond. |
| Interview with an investigator (anonymous) | interviews oral history | not stated | Anecdotal illustration of intelligence operatives' offshore enrichment. |
| Lodge's survey of corruption evidence (Political Corruption in South Africa, 1998; Politics in South Africa, 2002) | secondary literature compilation | 1994-2002 | Relies on Lodge's survey of post-1994 evidence for provincial and arms-deal narrative and as the starting point for the argument. |
| Posel on the growth of the apartheid civil service | secondary literature compilation | 1939-1967 | Supplies the figure that civil service employment in 1967 was four times the 1939 level. |
| Secondary accounts of Kruger-era concessions and Milner's administration (Blackburn and Caddell; Marks and Trapido) | secondary literature compilation | 1886-1910 | Basis for the claims on concession rent-seeking and the Milner bureaucratic reforms. |
Inference¶
Quantification: None.
Conceptual and comparative essay with a historical narrative sketch across periods. Claims rest on secondary literature, a few official inquiry findings, press reports of scandals and the author's judgement, applying the Chabal-Daloz and Khan-Jomo frameworks. There is no systematic or quantitative measurement of corruption.
Key claims¶
| Claim | Basis | Strength |
|---|---|---|
| Corruption levels and forms varied greatly across white-rule history. It was contained after Milner and in the high apartheid era at senior levels, and expanded sharply from the 1970s. (p. 789) | Secondary literature (Marks and Trapido, O'Meara, Posel) plus absence of evidence and the author's judgement. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| Bureaucratic corruption in the Transvaal fell markedly after Milner's reorganisation, with little evidence of senior-level corruption in the following decades. (p. 780) | Marks and Trapido and Blackburn and Caddell; the claim also rests on the lack of evidence. | Asserted |
| Under National Party rule, patronage and rent-seeking for Afrikaners, via civil service expansion, contracts and parastatals, coexisted with little overt senior corruption. (p. 781) | O'Meara and Posel for the figure on civil service growth; the rest is interpretive. | Partial data |
| Corruption took off in the 1970s-1980s as apartheid unravelled, in the Muldergate scandal, the homelands, and sanctions-busting and intelligence networks. (p. 782) | O'Meara and Southall, a Guardian report, and general assertion; there is no quantitative series. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| Corruption reached new heights in 1984-94, shown by the DDA and DET inquiries and military and intelligence enrichment. (p. 784) | Pickard and DET inquiry findings via Bauer, plus an anonymous investigator interview. | Partial data |
| In post-1994 provincial administrations, corruption correlates with administrative continuity with the old homeland administrations (Eastern Cape, Mpumalanga, Limpopo). (p. 785) | Lodge, the HRC report, the Eastern Cape interim team report, Habib, and press reports; this is an observed correlation, not a statistical test. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| The Arms Scandal shows a convergence of old military-industrial and new ANC elites, with the ANC prioritising organisational loyalty over probity. (p. 787) | Newspaper reports (Mail & Guardian, Sunday Times, Noseweek), the Auditor-General report, and the Shaik trial outcome. | Partial data |
The author's caveats¶
The author notes that even if corruption could be measured in the old and new orders, the figures would not be comparable. He acknowledges that evidence on Kruger-era corruption is largely anecdotal, and that allegations in the arms deal case are 'alleged'. The article is presented as an 'outline sketch', not a systematic study.
Gaps in the evidence¶
The argument needs systematic evidence on corruption across periods, such as Auditor-General reports, prosecution and disciplinary records, commission archives and Hansard debates. The relationship between homeland administrative continuity and provincial corruption could be tested by comparing provinces using audit findings and civil service personnel data. Many of these records exist in state archives and, for the post-1994 years, in audit and parliamentary records. The claims about low senior corruption in 1910-72 rest largely on absence of evidence.
Replicability: Data poorly documented.