The Moral Economy of the Black Miners' Strike of 1946¶
T. Dunbar Moodie (1986). The Moral Economy of the Black Miners' Strike of 1946. Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1. Taylor & Francis / Oxford University Press.
| Type | journal article |
| Scope | Economics and economic history of apartheid |
| Method | mixed |
| Period studied | 1939–1948 |
| Regions | Witwatersrand (East, Central and West Rand), Pondoland (Eastern Cape), Lesotho |
| Themes | mining migrant labour, unions strikes, resistance social movements, labour markets wages, business and state |
| Citation key | moodie1986 |
Argument¶
Moodie challenges O'Meara's reading of the 1946 African mineworkers' strike as evidence of proletarianisation. He argues that compound life in the 1940s was governed by a hegemonic 'moral economy' (after E.P. Thompson), an implicit and unequal contract that set limits on management and defined what workers would contest with moral outrage. Workers' own room-based networks, organised by the elected isibondas, ran the compound protests of the 1940s. The African Mine Workers' Union (AMWU) grafted wage demands (10s. a day) onto this moral economy and triggered the August 1946 strike. On the East Rand the strike was nonetheless organised through the isibonda/room networks and was disciplined and non-violent. Only on the West and Central Rand did union-minded, urbanised 'tshipa' workers organise it and use violence. The strike was therefore more plebeian than proletarian.
Evidence and method¶
Native Affairs Department (NTS) files in the National Archives, including police and labour-inspector reports on 101 disturbances, 1939-48; AMWU speeches recorded in police and Chamber of Mines spy reports; Carter-Karis Collection interviews (J.B. Marks); Lansdown and Botha commission evidence; Inkululeko, Guardian and Rand Daily Mail; and about 30 oral-history interviews the author conducted in 1984 with Mpondo ex-miners, indunas, clerks and retired compound managers.
Place in the debates¶
- Proletarianisation vs moral economy as the explanation of 1940s African mine worker resistance and the 1946 strike (see Worker consciousness, strikes and conflict on the mines and shop floor). Rejects O'Meara's reductionist proletarianisation account as inadequate. Argues that resistance was rooted in a localised, defensive moral economy and in informal compound networks, and that migrant workers with rural stakes were the most effective strikers.
- Spontaneity vs union organisation in the 1946 strike (see Worker consciousness, strikes and conflict on the mines and shop floor). The AMWU initiated and gave a common focus to wage demands (leaflets, mass meetings). The East Rand strike itself was carried out through indigenous room networks, with little union involvement or unionist ideology.
Findings¶
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Moodie proposes moral economy rather than proletarianisation as the concept for understanding 1940s miner resistance. (p. 2)
The notion of a 'moral economy' amongst the mine workers, and more broadly within the mines as a whole, seems more appropriate as a means of capturing the essential features of resistance and accommodation
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Collective disturbances on the mines were frequent during the war decade, even if local in focus. (p. 4)
In the ten years between 1939 and 1948, there were 101 gold and coal mine disturbances
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The isibonda was a worker-chosen representative and was not co-opted by management, unlike the induna. (p. 9)
The induna was selected by management and presented to the workers; the isibonda was selected by the room and presented to the induna.
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The AMWU was small before its 1944 open recruitment drive. (p. 17)
the union had not grown spectacularly when application was made for affiliation to the Trades and Labour Council in May 1943. At that time, they reported about 1800 members.
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The state, at the Chamber of Mines' behest, closed off the union's open organising on mine property in August 1944. (p. 23)
By proclamation 1425 of August 1944, the union was forbidden to hold meetings on mining ground and the South African police enforced the regulation.
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The April 1946 ten-shilling strikes on the West Rand broke the union's hold there because leaders were victimised. (p. 28)
the hold of the AMWU on the West Rand, where it had been strongest, was effectively broken after these April strikes.
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Official strike figures are unreliable; the police summary gives daily numbers out and a total of man-days lost. (p. 29)
According to the police summary, 45,924 workers were out on Monday, August 12; 65,585 on Tuesday; 50,212 on Wednesday, 21,296 on Thursday and 450 on Friday
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The Native Affairs Department count shows roughly a quarter of the Witwatersrand workforce involved. (p. 29)
The Native Affairs Department reported 21 out of 47 mines on the Witwatersrand affected, 11 wholly, 10 partially, with 73,557 out of 287,376 workers actually involved
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East Rand workers largely did not know of the union; leaflets precipitated the strike but compound networks carried it out. (p. 33)
This remembered ignorance on the East Rand of the very existence of the union was so general and widespread that one cannot but believe it was genuine.
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The East Rand strike was an indigenous action grounded in the moral economy. (p. 34)
The East Rand strike was thus an indigenous affair, rooted in the moral economy of the mine, with all the strengths and weaknesses of that type of collective action.
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On the Central and West Rand, union-oriented tshipa organised the strike but split the workforce and used intimidation and violence. (p. 35)
The 'tshipa', imbued with a union ideology of workers' rights, had lost touch with the moral economy of the mine and the local and communal sense of outrage that it could evoke.
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The strike was plebeian rather than proletarian, and wage grievances were driven by real-wage erosion. (p. 36)
The raises granted under Lansdown had not raised their real wages to the 1936 level.
Evidence ledger¶
Sources used¶
| Source | Kind | Period | How used |
|---|---|---|---|
| Native Affairs Department files, NTS collection, Series 332 ('disturbances' reports by police and native affairs inspectors), National Archives, Pretoria | state archives | 1939-1948 | Basis for the count of 101 mine disturbances and for case narratives of compound riots, underground stoppages and the 1946 strike. |
| Native Affairs files on specific mine disturbances (NTS 7689, 7675, 7685, 7687, 7683, 7681, 7686, 7674 etc.), including Modderfontein East deposition of Ngonqela | state archives | 1939-1949 | Detailed case evidence, including a deposition by a ringleader, used to reconstruct how compound protests were organised via rooms and isibondas. |
| Police, mine spy and Chamber spy reports of AMWU speeches, NTS 7248, 224/326 | state archives | 1944-1946 | Source for the content and frequency of themes in AMWU speeches and for reports on mine worker actions in 1946. |
| Author's 1984 interviews with Mpondo ex-miners, black officials (indunas, clerks), retired compound managers, and Sotho clerks (Tapes 3-30) | interviews oral history | Interviews Spring 1984 on 1940s | Establishes the moral economy, role of isibondas, home-boy and room networks, and worker accounts of how the 1946 strike was organised. |
| Carter-Karis Collection, J.B. Marks interviews (2:XM42:94, 96) | interviews oral history | Recollections of 1942-1946 | Marks's own account of union growth, the 1944 move onto mine property, and the strike-date planning. |
| Lansdown Commission (Witwatersrand Mine Native Wages Commission) evidence, Cory Library, Rhodes University | commission or official report | 1943 | Testimony of A.G.T. Chaplin on underground union organisation and unrest in compounds in 1942. |
| Lansdown Commission report and resulting wage raises (1944) | commission or official report | 1943-1944 | Provided the union a yardstick for wage demands and gave rise to wage and allowance recommendations referred to in AMWU speeches. |
| Industrial Legislation Commission (Botha Commission) Evidence, Transvaal Archives (K18) | commission or official report | 1949 | Marks's and Majoro's testimony on trade unionism, tribal organisations and the isibonda. |
| Proclamation 1425 of August 1944 | legislation gazette | August 1944 | Documents the ban on union meetings on mining ground that crippled AMWU recruitment. |
| Xuma Papers (ABX 410609b) | union or movement records | 1941 | Source for Guar Radebe's 1941 conference calling for a committee to organise African mineworkers. |
| Tusca (Trades and Labour Council) Papers, University of the Witwatersrand Special Collections, Dc 18 | union or movement records | 1943 | Gives AMWU membership of about 1800 at its May 1943 affiliation application. |
| Garment Workers Union Papers, Wits Special Collections, Dbc 2.1: transcript of evidence at trial of J.B. Marks and others, 2/9/46 | union or movement records | 1946 | Evidence on Marks's report-back procedures before the strike. |
| Newspapers and periodicals: Inkululeko, Guardian, Rand Daily Mail | newspapers periodicals | 1940-1946 | Corroborate disturbances, press counts, Marks's statements and eyewitness reports of the August 1946 strike. |
| Police summary and Native Affairs Department figures on the 1946 strike (numbers of strikers, man-days, mines affected, arrests, injuries) | state archives | August 1946 | Provides strike size estimates, which the author treats as unreliable. |
| Chamber of Mines presidential addresses 1944, 1945, 1946 | employer association records | 1944-1946 | Cited for the nation-wide food shortage as a major problem for mine managements. |
| F. Wilson, Labour on the South African Gold Mines 1911-1969 | secondary literature compilation | 1911-1969 | Cited for the claim that Lansdown raises did not restore real wages to the 1936 level. |
New data¶
Oral-history interview set (Spring 1984) with Mpondo ex-miners, indunas, clerks, retired compound managers and Sotho clerks, tape-recorded and deposited at Wits African Studies Institute; plus author's counts of mine disturbances from NTS files (101 events 1939-48).
Inference¶
Quantification: Illustrative figures.
Qualitative case-study reconstruction combining archival disturbance reports, union speech reports and oral testimony, interpreted through the concepts of moral economy and hegemony; arguments proceed by pattern across cases and contrast of East Rand with West/Central Rand, with only minor counts of events and speech themes.
Key claims¶
| Claim | Basis | Strength |
|---|---|---|
| A tacit 'moral economy' on the mines set limits on management and indunas, and its breach (food, assault, interference with customs) triggered collective protest that constrained managers. (p. 3) | NTS Series 332 disturbance reports plus interviews with Mpondo ex-miners, indunas and compound managers. | Partial data |
| Collective resistance on compounds was organised through rooms and elected isibondas rather than home-boy networks or management-appointed indunas. (p. 8) | Mpondo interviews (Tapes 5-8) and the detailed Ngonqela deposition from Modderfontein East in NTS 7685. | Partial data |
| The AMWU grew rapidly in 1944 through open mass meetings but its speeches stressed wages, food and conditions and did not grasp the informal underpinnings of the moral economy; Proclamation 1425 then crippled it. (p. 19) | Police/Chamber spy reports of speeches (NTS 7248), Marks interviews, Proclamation 1425, Botha Commission evidence. | Partial data |
| Strike statistics for August 1946 are unreliable; official counts range around 73,000-75,000 workers out, with 21 of 47 mines affected. (p. 28) | Police summary versus Native Affairs Department figures and press reports, compared by author. | Partial data |
| The East Rand strike was an indigenous, room-based coordinated protest in which workers barely knew the union, whereas West/Central Rand strikes were union-organised by militant 'tshipa' workers. (p. 34) | Oral testimony (Tapes 4, 10, 11, 14, 30) and NTS reports and press accounts. | Partial data |
| Pamphlets circulated by the union and party the week before the strike triggered the walkout by giving workers something written to cross the threshold to action. (p. 31) | Interviews with old miners (Tapes 30, 16) and Marks's account. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| O'Meara's proletarianisation thesis does not explain the strike, since the best-organised, most successful strikers were migrants with rural ties and drew on plebeian moral outrage. (p. 35) | Synthesis of interview and archival evidence; no direct data on proletarianisation presented. | Asserted |
The author's caveats¶
Notes that statistics on wildcat strikes are almost certainly unreliable and underreport events, that Native Affairs files never record whether participants were isibondas, that strike figures conflict across police, NAD and press, and that informants are ambiguous or disagree on who initiated resistance. Admits interpretations of isibonda status in cases are surmise from context.
Gaps in the evidence¶
The argument rests on a small, non-random set of 1984 interviews dominated by Mpondo men recalling events four decades earlier, and on police and spy reports that omit participants' roles. Systematic data on worker origins, tenure and urban ties per mine (e.g. from Chamber/NRC or mine compound records) would better test the proletarianised-versus-migrant contrast, and mine-level disturbance and wage records could test the moral economy claims quantitatively. Some such records existed in company and Chamber archives then; wider interview sets (more ethnic groups, East Rand and West Rand) could still be gathered only partially today.
Replicability: Data described but not public.