The Truth and Reconciliation Commission on Business and Apartheid: A Critical Evaluation¶
Nicoli Nattrass (1999). The Truth and Reconciliation Commission on Business and Apartheid: A Critical Evaluation. African Affairs. Oxford University Press (Royal African Society).
| Type | journal article |
| Scope | Wider apartheid literature |
| Method | policy analysis |
| Period studied | 1960–1998 |
| Regions | South Africa |
| Themes | business and state, politics ideology elections, transition post apartheid, mining migrant labour, unions strikes, comparative theory, sanctions divestment |
| Citation key | nattrass1999 |
Argument¶
Nattrass argues that the TRC, which was mandated only to examine gross human rights violations by individuals, took a systemic and essentially radical (race-class) view of business, equating any profitable activity under apartheid with culpability. It distinguished first-, second- and third-order involvement but then recommended blanket restitution (wealth taxes, levies) not proportional to involvement. She shows how business submissions drew on the liberal view (apartheid harmed business) while critics drew on the radical view (apartheid structurally benefited capital). She contends the blanket approach is poorly justified, because it assumes net benefit for all firms and that growth contributes nothing to democratization. It also deflects attention from powerful actors who could have acted more decisively. As a drafter of the TRC business chapter, she is both insider and critic.
Evidence and method¶
Written submissions and testimony to the TRC business hearings (ANC, COSATU, SACP, BMF, Terreblanche, Anglo American, Old Mutual, SAB, Tongaat-Hulett, Sanlam, Armscor, AHI, Simkins, Bernstein, Rupert, etc.), the TRC Report vols 4 and 5, the I. G. Farben trial literature (Borkin), and secondary literature on the race-class debate. The author draws on personal involvement in drafting the TRC chapter.
Place in the debates¶
- liberal vs radical (race-class) debate on apartheid and capitalism (see Liberal vs revisionist: was apartheid functional or dysfunctional for capitalist growth?). Notes that the TRC adopted the radical view; she regards the blanket condemnation as highly contestable. She stresses that both liberal and radical writings accept that apartheid affected sections of business differently.
- business culpability and responsibility for apartheid (systemic vs individual) (see Liberal vs revisionist: was apartheid functional or dysfunctional for capitalist growth?). Argues culpability should be graded by power, choices and knowledge, not inferred from benefiting; criticises third-order 'guilt by association' while accepting that powerful firms bore greater responsibility.
- economic growth and democratization (modernization theory) (see Liberal vs revisionist: was apartheid functional or dysfunctional for capitalist growth?). Treats the TRC's implicit denial that growth contributes to democracy as contestable, citing Lipset and Przeworski et al.
Findings¶
-
The TRC's report grouped business involvement into three orders and found most business benefited from apartheid. (p. 3)
Most businesses benefited from operating in a racially structured context.
-
The TRC proposed blanket restitution not scaled to involvement, treating all accumulated wealth alike. (p. 3)
No attempt was made to make the proposed restitutive measures proportional to the different levels of involvement.
-
The TRC treated business differently from individual perpetrators, who received amnesty. (p. 3)
the TRC shifted from a focus on individual perpetrators, to a systematic analysis that equated any profitable activity with prospering under apartheid
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The TRC appears to be the first truth commission to examine business and recommend restitutive taxation. (p. 4)
the South African TRC appears to be the first truth commission anywhere in the world to have both examined the role of business and recommended restitutive taxation.
-
The TRC rejected Sanlam's claim that business was powerless, stressing the responsibility that accompanies financial power. (p. 12)
to say that business was incapable of crossing swords with politicians is to deny the power (and responsibility) that accompanies financial muscle and personal contacts.
-
First-order involvement singled out the mining industry for shaping the migrant labour system with state help. (p. 14)
the mining industry harnessed the services of the state to shape labour conditions to their advantage. Thus, the mining industry bears a great deal of moral responsibility for the migrant labour system
-
Third-order involvement is the weakest category, implying guilt by association. (p. 17)
Third-order involvement is the most problematic of all the levels of involvement because it proceeds beyond the bounds of intention and implies guilt by association.
-
Blanket measures deflected attention from the powerful business players. (p. 18)
The net effect was to take the heat off the powerful players and direct attention away from those whose involvement with the apartheid regime was of graver moral concern.
-
No South African business resembled I. G. Farben in direct involvement in gross human rights abuses, which helps explain the systemic focus. (p. 19)
there were no clear examples of business being involved directly in gross human rights abuses.
Evidence ledger¶
Sources used¶
| Source | Kind | Period | How used |
|---|---|---|---|
| TRC Report, Vol. 4 (institutional hearing on business chapter) and Vol. 5 Ch. 8 Recommendations | commission or official report | 1960-1994 (report 1998) | The object of analysis: its findings on three orders of business involvement and recommendations for wealth taxes and restitution are quoted and critiqued. |
| Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act no. 34 of 1995 | legislation gazette | 1995 | Defines gross human rights violation and so the TRC's narrow mandate, against which its business inquiry is contrasted. |
| Business organisation submissions to the TRC (AHI, COSAB, Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce and Industry, SACOB, SEIFSA, Textile Federation) | employer association records | October 1997 | Show the business/liberal line that apartheid constrained growth and that business protested against it. |
| Corporate submissions to the TRC (Anglo American, Old Mutual, SAB, Tongaat-Hulett, SANLAM, Armscor) | company records or reports | 1997 | Quoted to show how firms denied culpability, apologised, or defended their role (e.g. Anglo married accommodation, Armscor, Tongaat-Hulett ill-treatment). |
| Submissions by corporate executives and business commentators (A. Rosholt, A. Rupert, A. Bernstein, C. Simkins) | interviews oral history | 1997 | Rupert's Verwoerd correspondence and Bernstein's and Simkins' arguments illustrate business self-defence positions. |
| Left/critical submissions to the TRC (ANC, SACP, COSATU, Black Management Forum, Anti-Apartheid Movement Archives Committee, Apartheid Debt Co-ordinating Committee) | union or movement records | October-November 1997 | Document the radical case that business benefited from and was complicit in apartheid. |
| S. Terreblanche, Testimony before the TRC special hearing on business, 11 November 1997, and fax to Dr Fazel Randera, 8 July 1998 | interviews oral history | 1997-1998 | Keynote testimony as the strongest statement of the symbiotic state-capital thesis and the wealth tax proposal. |
| Testimony of Major Craig Williamson to the TRC on covert bank credit cards | interviews oral history | 1997 | The basis for the TRC's second-order finding on banks providing covert cards to the Civil Co-operation Bureau. |
| Borkin, The Crime and Punishment of I. G. Farben, and I. G. Farben trial judgment | secondary literature compilation | 1978 (trial 1940s) | Source for the court's evidential standard in the I. G. Farben trial, used as a comparator to the TRC's systemic approach. |
| Przeworski et al., 'What makes democracy endure?' (1996) data on income and democratic survival | secondary literature compilation | cross-national | Cited as evidence that growth supports democracy, undermining the TRC's implied claim that growth contributed nothing to democratisation. |
Inference¶
Quantification: None.
Qualitative critical reading of the TRC business chapter set against the submissions it drew on, with comparative reference to the I. G. Farben trial and the liberal-radical debate; the author draws on her own participation in drafting the chapter.
Key claims¶
| Claim | Basis | Strength |
|---|---|---|
| The TRC adopted a systemic notion of business culpability that equated profitability with prospering under apartheid and recommended blanket restitution, unlike its treatment of individual perpetrators. (p. 3) | Quotations from TRC Report vols. 4 and 5 (findings and recommendations), compared with the amnesty regime under the Act. | Partial data |
| The business submissions largely followed a liberal view (business was harmed by apartheid and protested) while the left submissions followed a radical view, and the TRC sided with the radical one. (p. 6) | Submissions from business bodies, firms and executives versus ANC, SACP, COSATU, BMF and Terreblanche, plus TRC quotations. | Partial data |
| The TRC's third-order involvement implies guilt by association and holds a firm that treated workers well equally culpable with a racist firm. (p. 17) | Close reading of TRC Report vol. 4 paragraphs 32-33 and the recommendations. | Asserted |
| The TRC's finding on arms manufacturers and banks (second-order involvement) was moral rather than judicial and shifted the burden of proof onto business. (p. 15) | Armscor submission, Williamson testimony, TRC paragraphs 31 and 78, and the I. G. Farben court's standard of evidence. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| The blanket approach deflected attention from powerful business actors (Anglo American, Brenthurst group, South Africa Foundation) who might have done more to hasten change. (p. 18) | Argument based on the TRC's own acknowledgement of power and responsibility (para 143) and its blanket recommendations. | Asserted |
| The TRC lacked evidence for strong findings on first- and second-order involvement because there were no clear cases of business directly involved in gross human rights abuses and because the hearings relied on business cooperation. (p. 19) | The author's account of the hearings' lack of legal power, a TRC press release and the comparison with I. G. Farben. | Asserted |
The author's caveats¶
The author discloses that she helped draft the TRC business chapter and so is closer to the material than usual. She notes that the final chapter was altered by editing, with inaccuracies and quotations inserted.
Gaps in the evidence¶
The argument rests on a selective reading of submissions and the final report without systematic coding of all submissions or hearing transcripts. Estimates of how apartheid affected profits across sectors (firm-level profitability or sectoral data) would better test the claim that benefits were uneven, and such data existed. Evidence on how commissioners deliberated, and drafting records, is cited only from the author's memory and is not independently documented.
Replicability: Data described but not public.