Worker agency in colonial, apartheid and post-apartheid gold mining workplace regimes¶

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Timothy Sizwe Phakathi (2012). Worker agency in colonial, apartheid and post-apartheid gold mining workplace regimes. Review of African Political Economy 39(132). Routledge (ROAPE Publications).


Type	journal article
Scope	Economics and economic history of apartheid
Method	synthesis review
Period studied	1886–c.2000s
Regions	Witwatersrand, South Africa, Mozambique, Lesotho, Southern Africa
Themes	mining migrant labour, unions strikes, labour markets wages, origins segregation, resistance social movements, transition post apartheid, business and state
Citation key	`phakathi2012`

Argument¶

Phakathi reviews the historical and theoretical literature to argue that racial and coercive labour control on the gold mines (contract, pass and compound systems, recruiting monopoly, wage and job colour bars) enriched the mining houses but was ultimately unsustainable. Mineworkers were never passive: covert resistance, underground solidarity ('brotherhood') and overt strikes (1920, 1946, 1970s, 1987) fed the rise of the NUM. Following Burawoy, he casts the old order as 'colonial despotism'. In the 1990s gold slump the industry moved towards consent-based, productivity-oriented work reorganisation, though this may bring 'soft-touch' coercion and NUM shaft-level weakness. The piece is a synthesis from secondary sources rather than new research.

Evidence and method¶

Secondary literature only: Johnstone, Wilson, First, Webster, Moodie, Allen's three-volume history, Crush et al., O'Meara, Burawoy, Cohen, Gordon, Hemson and Morris, plus Phakathi's own DPhil (2011) which is cited but not used here. No new primary data in this article.

Place in the debates¶

Cheap labour thesis and the functionality of racial labour control for mining capital (see Cheap labour thesis and the function of the reserves). Accepts that racial coercion produced cheap labour for the mines, but stresses its contradictions (the 1922 white strike, wage-bill threats, worker resistance) and argues it became dysfunctional and unsustainable.
Worker agency vs structural/coercive accounts of the compound system (see Worker consciousness, strikes and conflict on the mines and shop floor). Sides with agency-centred accounts (Moodie, Allen, Cohen, Sitas): control 'could never be total' and covert and cultural resistance underpinned unionism.
Post-apartheid workplace transformation: consent vs new coercion (see Post-apartheid economic policy, governance and corruption). Sees a shift from coercion to consent but notes that consent can carry intensification and 'soft-touch' coercion, and that empowerment has benefited elites (Williams).

Findings¶

Gold's cost structure (fixed price, low ore grade) created persistent demand for cheap labour. (p. 7)

the combination of the ﬁxed price of gold, heavy production costs and the low average grade of ore have meant that proﬁts could . . . be secured [only] through low levels of costs and high output
Mine owners chose to cut black rather than white wages, using an interlocking system of extra-economic controls. (p. 5)

the state and mining companies designed and put into practice an interlocking system of racial and coercive methods of labour control: the contract system, the pass system and the compound system
The compound system limited desertion, which was sizeable in 1910. (p. 6)

It is estimated that in 1910, gold mines had an annual desertion rate of about 15% – about 30,000 out of about 180,000 black mineworkers
Foreign labour dominated the mine workforce in two long phases, with Mozambique the largest supplier. (p. 6)

the majority of mineworkers were from outside South Africa, and Mozambique was the largest supplier of labour
Under the maximum average system, wages were capped to stop competition among mines for labour. (p. 6)

preventing any mining company paying wages exceeding the stipulated average. Fixed wages prevented mining companies from competing over the supply and demand of cheap labour.
The 1946 African mineworkers' strike cut output though it won no gains. (p. 9)

between 74,000 and 76,000 black mineworkers participated in the strike for four days
1970s unrest in the compounds hurt production and profits at Western Deep Levels, and prompted the Wiehahn inquiry. (p. 10)

This dramatic disturbance of mine discipline and labour supplies affected the mine's proﬁtability which fell by about R35 million between 1975 and 1976.
NUM grew rapidly after recognition and by 1987 organised over half the labour force. (p. 10)

by late 1985, the NUM had a membership of 200,000 (100,000 paid up); one year later, the ﬁgures were 320,000 (and 180,000 paid up)
The 1987 strike was the biggest in the industry's history. (p. 10)

This was the largest, longest and costliest strike in the history of the South African gold mining industry.
The 1990s gold slump made coercive cheap-labour practices untenable and drove a tripartite restructuring. (p. 11)

The crisis and challenges of mining gold at a proﬁt could no longer be offset by means of coercive, racial and cheap labour practices.
New work systems may embody subtle coercion rather than genuine consent. (p. 12)

worker consent to new working practices may embody new or ‘soft-touch’ forms of worker coercion due to the malign effects of new production systems

Evidence ledger¶

Sources used¶

Source	Kind	Period	How used
Leon Commission Report 1995: Commission of inquiry into safety and health in the mining industry	commission or official report	1995	Establishes that the commission was set up under NUM pressure and that its recommendations led to the Mine Health and Safety Act of 1996, including the right to refuse dangerous work.
Wiehahn Commission of Inquiry reports (1977-1981), incl. 'Industrial relations in the mining industry'	commission or official report	1977-1981	Cited, via Crush et al., as the state's response to 1970s mine unrest and its recommendation that black unions be recognised.
Mines and Works Acts of 1911 and 1926 (job reservation/colour bar)	legislation gazette	1911, 1926	Described as the legal basis of the job colour bar reserving skilled work for whites.
Mine Health and Safety Act (MHSA) of 1996	legislation gazette	1996	Presented as the legislative outcome of the Leon Commission that entrenched workers' rights in the post-apartheid mining regime.
Hemson and Morris, 'Black working class resistance on South African mines' (unpublished monograph)	secondary literature compilation	1973-1976 data	Supplies mine-level production, gold output, labour and profit figures to show disruption of production by violent resistance in the 1970s.
Johnstone (1976) desertion estimate for 1910 gold mines	secondary literature compilation	1910	Provides the desertion rate figure used to show the compound system's purpose and limits.
O'Meara (1975) data on the 1946 African mineworkers' strike (participation and production)	secondary literature compilation	1946	Supplies strike participation figures and the production fall across mines used to show the strike's impact.
Phakathi (2011) DPhil thesis, University of Oxford: ethnographic study of worker responses to work reorganisation	author survey or fieldwork	c. 2011	Cited, not used directly, for the finding that post-apartheid consent to new work practices can embody soft-touch coercion.
Webster, Moodie, Stewart and Psoulis 1999: The impact of ultra-deep mining on the occupational culture of miners (SWOP), quoting Bobby Godsell	secondary literature compilation	1999	Source of an AngloGold Ashanti CEO statement on the shift from Fordist work structures.
Malherbe and Segal (2000) report for the Chamber of Mines; Leger and Nicol (1991, 1992); Standing et al. (1996) on the 1990s gold slump	secondary literature compilation	1990s	Cited for the claims of falling gold prices, rising costs, declining output and shrinking employment in the 1990s.

Inference¶

Quantification: Illustrative figures.

Literature-based historical and theoretical synthesis. It reviews secondary studies (Burawoy's labour regime framework, Allen, Moodie, Crush et al., Johnstone) to build a narrative of coercion, resistance and restructuring across three regimes. Evidence comes from selectively cited figures and quotations, with no original data analysis and no ethnographic material in this paper.

Key claims¶

Claim	Basis	Strength
Racial and coercive labour controls (contracts, passes, compounds, recruiting monopoly, wage and job colour bars) were designed to secure cheap labour for gold mines with a fixed gold price and low-grade ore. (p. 282)	Secondary literature (First, Johnstone, Wilson, Webster, Ncube), plus legislation cited via Davenport; no primary data.	Illustrative or anecdotal
The compound and contract system was imperfect: desertion was substantial, so control was never total. (p. 283)	Single desertion estimate for 1910 from Johnstone (1976).	Illustrative or anecdotal
Major strikes (1920, 1946, 1970s, 1987) demonstrated worker power and disrupted production, at Western Deep Levels among other mines. (p. 286)	Participation and production figures from O'Meara, Crush et al., Hemson and Morris and Allen, taken from secondary sources.	Partial data
Unrest and union pressure led to the Wiehahn reforms, NUM recognition and rapid NUM growth, with over half the workforce organised by 1987. (p. 287)	Crush et al. (1991) membership figures and the Wiehahn Commission as described in secondary accounts.	Partial data
Post-apartheid consent to new work practices may involve soft-touch coercion through work intensification, and the NUM struggles at shaft level because of weak shop-steward leadership. (p. 289)	The author's own earlier DPhil ethnography (2011) and Buhlungu and Bezuidenhout (2008), cited but not presented.	Asserted

The author's caveats¶

The author states that the paper reviews historical and theoretical literature and that space constraints prevented the inclusion of ethnographic material, which appears in Phakathi (2011).

Gaps in the evidence¶

The argument rests on secondary literature and a few quoted figures. It lacks systematic data on strike incidence, desertion, wages, productivity and output, which could come from Chamber of Mines and WNLA records, Department of Mines statistics, and company archives, all of which exist. The claim that covert resistance drove union formation, and the claim of a shift from coercion to consent, would need worker testimony or the author's own ethnography, plus mine-level productivity and accident data.

Replicability: Not applicable.