Recent changes in regional policy in South Africa¶
John Pickles (1988). Recent changes in regional policy in South Africa. Geography, Vol. 73, No. 3. Geographical Association.
| Type | journal article |
| Scope | Economics and economic history of apartheid |
| Method | policy analysis |
| Period studied | 1948–1987 |
| Regions | South Africa, homelands, Ciskei, Transkei, Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vaal (PWV) area |
| Themes | bantustans removals influx, manufacturing industrial policy, labour markets wages, business and state, demography urbanisation, politics ideology elections |
| Citation key | pickles1988a |
Argument¶
Pickles argues that since the Riekert Commission (1979) South African regional policy has shifted from the formal political regions of Verwoerdian apartheid to functionally integrated regions that join urban/industrial nodes with rural homeland labour-market areas. The aim of Riekert was to raise the geographic mobility of labour and the efficiency of the labour market, while keeping control over urbanisation. The 1981 Good Hope strategy and the 1982 incentive scheme created development regions with four types of industrial area, designed to ease pressure on the metropolitan centres, exploit regional labour-cost differences and legitimise the homelands. The abolition of the pass laws in 1986 replaced influx control with economic restraints on urbanisation. He concludes that these new spatial units aim to restructure political relations while preserving the basic structures of apartheid social relations. The argument is descriptive and interpretive, drawing on official reports and policy documents.
Evidence and method¶
Official documents: Riekert Report (1979) and the government White Paper, the Good Hope Plan (1981), SECOSAF incentive manual (1982/1985), the 1985 President's Council White Paper on Urbanization, and press and digest reports on the 1986 reforms. Secondary literature: Wellings and Black (1986) for decentralisation statistics, Hindson (1985), Hirsch (1986), Lemon, Smith. The only quantitative evidence is a table of incentive ranges and a decentralisation share.
Place in the debates¶
- Apartheid reform as restructuring vs dismantling (the post-1979 'reform' debate) (see Why apartheid ended: reform, transition and elite bargaining). Treats reform as restructuring: a 'facelift' that changes the visibility of apartheid and the spatial basis of control while safeguarding the basic structures of apartheid social relations.
- Functional role of the homelands and reserves for capital and the labour market (revisionist/political economy) (see Homelands, separate development, decentralisation and removals). Describes homelands as a 'surplus reserve army' and sees recent policy as integrating them into functional labour-market regions.
- Success of industrial decentralisation (see Homelands, separate development, decentralisation and removals). Notes earlier failure even by government accounts, but points to some changes in location decisions and rising decentralised manufacturing share, while remaining cautious about the evidence.
Findings¶
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The key intent of Riekert was to improve labour-market efficiency through greater mobility of labour, in both supplying and removing labour. (p. 4)
the fundamental intent behind Riekert was to enhance the geographic mobility of labour and hence the effectiveness of the labour market.
-
Riekert and the government retained influx control, which they regarded as a social security necessity, even at an acknowledged cost in growth. (p. 3)
Even though, as some witnesses contend, the abolition of such control would lead to faster economic growth, the price to be paid for it in terms of direct and indirect social costs would be too high
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Riekert extended security to urban 'insiders' while tightening control over rural movement, leaving rural blacks worse off. (p. 4)
as greater security was to be extended to this group, control on labour movement from the rural areas was to be tightened and rural blacks in the homelands or on white farms were to be further disadvantaged.
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Decentralisation incentives aimed to shift production and employment, exploit regional labour-cost variation and legitimise the homelands. (p. 4)
to restructure production in order to permit industry to take advantage of the regional variation in labour costs and skills
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The share of manufacturing industry in decentralised areas rose between 1978 and 1984. (p. 5)
In 1978 the proportion of manufacturing industry located in decentralised areas was 12.9 per cent. By 1984 this had increased to 19.3 per cent
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Eight (later nine) development regions were ranked by employment need, income and its distribution, and future economic potential, with the PWV given lowest priority. (p. 4)
Eight development regions (A-H) were established, and their "actual development needs" were determined on the basis of three criteria
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Regional policy shifted from formal political regions to functional labour-market regions that cut across political boundaries. (p. 6)
from formal political regions as the basis for Verwoerdian apartheid to the recent incorporation of functionally interrelated regions, integrating rural labour market areas with their urban or industrial nodes
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The 1986 abolition of the pass laws replaced influx control with economic constraints, so that housing and jobs governed mobility. (p. 7)
blacks would no longer need permits to leave their birthplace, their mobility would depend on the availability of housing and employment.
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Development regions are intended to serve as a spatial basis for political restructuring that preserves the apartheid social order. (p. 7)
as a means of moving away from the province/homeland form of territorial organisation while safeguarding the basic structures of apartheid social relations.
Evidence ledger¶
Sources used¶
| Source | Kind | Period | How used |
|---|---|---|---|
| Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Legislation Affecting the Utilization of Manpower (Riekert Report), 1979 | commission or official report | 1979 | Source for the Commission's findings on labour market failures and its recommendations on influx control, which anchor the argument about restructured regional policy. |
| White Paper on the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Legislation Affecting the Utilization of Manpower, 1979 | commission or official report | 1979 | Shows the government accepted the Riekert conclusions and that the issue was the mechanism of influx control, not whether to have it. |
| SECOSAF, The Promotion of Industrial Development as an Element of a Coordinated Regional Development Strategy for Southern Africa: Manual on the Implementation of the Regional Development Incentives Introduced on 1st April 1982 (rev. 1985) | commission or official report | 1982, revised 1985 | Source for the development regions, the criteria for ranking them, the four types of industrial area, and the incentive table (Table 1). |
| A Regional Development Strategy for Southern Africa (Good Hope Plan), 1981 | commission or official report | 1981 | Quoted to show that the development regions are conceived as functional regions crossing political boundaries. |
| White Paper on Urbanization: Report of the President's Council, 1985 | commission or official report | 1985 | Shows official recognition of the functional link between urban areas and homelands, and the call to replace influx control with orderly urbanisation. |
| Government White Paper of 23 April 1986 and Botha's 18 April 1986 announcement on the Pass Laws (reported via Facts on File, 25 April and 11 July 1986) | newspapers periodicals | April-July 1986 | Documents the announced repeal of the Pass Laws and 34 laws, and the passage of reform measures replacing them with uniform identity documents. |
| Statutes: Section 10 amendments to the Native (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act (1952, 1955, 1957); Physical Planning Act, 1967; Immorality Act, Mixed Marriages Act, Citizenship Act | legislation gazette | 1952-1987 | Legislation supplying the legal framework of influx control, urban residency rights and metropolitan industrial controls. |
| Wellings and Black (1986), data on the share of manufacturing industry in decentralised areas | secondary literature compilation | 1978-1984 | Supplies the only quantitative evidence that incentives are shifting industrial location (12.9% to 19.3%). |
| South African Digest, 18 September 1987, 'National Council Bill: Black South Africans to get vote' | newspapers periodicals | 1987 | Documents the new National Statutory Council with councillors elected from nine development regions. |
| Van der Merwe (undated), analysis of the Riekert Report; Hirsch (1986) on Ciskei decentralisation | secondary literature compilation | undated; 1986 | Van der Merwe is used as an insider statement of the Riekert Commission's intent; Hirsch as evidence of foreign capital attraction. |
Inference¶
Quantification: Illustrative figures.
Interpretive analysis of official policy documents (commission reports, White Papers, incentive manuals, legislation), supplemented by one secondary statistic on industrial decentralisation and a table of incentives. Claims about intent and restructuring rest on reading texts, not on testing outcomes.
Key claims¶
| Claim | Basis | Strength |
|---|---|---|
| The Riekert Commission's core aim was to raise geographic mobility of labour and labour-market effectiveness while keeping influx control. (p. 235) | Riekert Report paragraphs 4.204 and 6.4, the 1979 White Paper, and the Van der Merwe commentary. | Partial data |
| Regional policy has shifted from formal political regions (homelands) to functional regions integrating rural labour areas with urban/industrial nodes. (p. 237) | Good Hope Plan, SECOSAF manual and the 1985 President's Council report, read interpretively. | Partial data |
| New decentralisation incentives are shifting industrial location, with the decentralised share of manufacturing rising from 12.9% in 1978 to 19.3% in 1984. (p. 236) | Single statistic taken from Wellings and Black (1986); incentive ranges from the SECOSAF manual (Table 1). | Partial data |
| Eight (later nine) development regions were prioritised by employment need, income and economic potential, with the PWV area given lowest priority. (p. 235) | SECOSAF manual and 1982 strategy document description. | Systematic data |
| Influx control is being replaced by economic restraints on urbanisation (orderly urbanisation), not abolished. (p. 238) | 1986 announcements, the White Paper, the 1985 President's Council report, and Hindson (1985). | Partial data |
| Foreign capital and labour-intensive industries may be being drawn to the development regions by the incentives. (p. 236) | Hirsch (1986) and unspecified 'evidence' about IBM and Pepsi-Cola disinvestment through local affiliates; the author concedes the extent is undetermined. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
The author's caveats¶
The author says government claims about the homelands 'should be treated circumspectly', and that the extent to which local affiliates of disinvesting firms use the decentralisation incentives 'has yet to be determined'. The evidence is described as tentative ('seem', 'possibility', 'some evidence').
Gaps in the evidence¶
The paper lacks firm-level or regional data on employment, investment and incentive take-up in the development regions, so it cannot test whether the new policy changed location or labour flows. Evidence on actual influx control enforcement, migration flows and the labour-market effects of the Riekert reforms (pass arrests, Section 10 rights, labour bureau data) would be needed. Census and Board for the Decentralization of Industry incentive records existed in the 1980s and could have been used. The claims about political intent rest on reading official texts and need cabinet or archival evidence.
Replicability: Data poorly documented.