White Politics in South Africa: Polarization under Pressure¶
Timothy D. Sisk (1989). White Politics in South Africa: Polarization under Pressure. Africa Today, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Apartheid under Siege: Challenges from the Churches, Sanctions and the White Right). Indiana University Press.
| Type | journal article |
| Scope | Wider apartheid literature |
| Method | descriptive quantitative |
| Period studied | 1948–1989 |
| Regions | South Africa, Transvaal |
| Themes | politics ideology elections, business and state, sanctions divestment, resistance social movements, transition post apartheid |
| Citation key | sisk1989 |
Argument¶
Sisk argues that the unified Afrikaner rule exercised through the National Party is ending, and that the main threat to the NP comes from the white right rather than from black revolt. The split began in 1982 when Treurnicht's faction broke over Botha's limited power-sharing with Coloureds and Indians, and the Conservative Party has gained ground in every electoral test since. He ties the 1976-82 shift to Soweto and to economic interdependence: industrialisation needed skilled black labour, and Afrikaners had become middle-class beneficiaries who no longer needed job reservation. He draws on election returns, press reports and the views of South African commentators. He concludes that white polarisation may either halt reform or push whites toward multiracial coalitions, and he treats it as potentially positive for a post-apartheid order.
Evidence and method¶
Official election returns from the Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa 1985, press reports (FBIS-reproduced wire and newspaper items, Washington Post, NYT, Star, Wall Street Journal), opinion polls and statements by South African politicians and academics (Treurnicht, Frankel, Terreblanche, Laurie and Kleynhans), and secondary works by Giliomee, Adam and Baker.
Place in the debates¶
- Sources of National Party reform: black protest versus economic and structural change (see Why apartheid ended: reform, transition and elite bargaining). Credits both Soweto-style 'revolutionary violence' and the economy's need for skilled black labour and the embourgeoisement of Afrikaners (following Giliomee, Adam and Baker) as pushing the NP toward an 'ideology of survival'.
- Can the Conservative Party win power? (see White electoral politics, delimitation and party systems). Reports Laurie and Kleynhans, who think the CP could win up to 50% of the vote, and Frankel's doubts about its narrow base; Sisk judges that the CP could at least end the NP's absolute majority.
- Does white fragmentation help or hinder the end of apartheid? (see Why apartheid ended: reform, transition and elite bargaining). Argues that the NP's decline may open the way for multiracial coalitions and a nonracial democracy, citing Huntington's point that violence works by dividing the dominant group.
Findings¶
-
The NP held overwhelming Afrikaner support from 1948 to 1977, which let it legislate apartheid. (p. 3)
In each of the elections held during 1948-1977, the National Party garnered more than 80% of the Afrikaner vote
-
The 1982 Treurnicht split opened the lasting rift in Afrikaner politics. (p. 2)
Dr. Andries Treurnicht, leader of the party's right wing, and 21 other MPs took the unprecedented step of voting against a motion of confidence in party leader and Prime Minister P. W. Botha.
-
Industrial interdependence undermined orthodox Verwoerdian separate development. (p. 4)
The need for skilled black labor in the urban areas of "white" South Africa struck hard at the segregationist aims of orthodox apartheid.
-
Afrikaner upward mobility made the beneficiaries of job reservation less dependent on it. (p. 5)
The Afrikaners, mostly poor farmers in 1948, had been elevated to middle-class bureaucrats and managers after 30 years of apartheid.
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Afrikaner support for the NP fell sharply between 1977 and 1981. (p. 5)
popular Afrikaner support for the NP dropped from 85% in 1977 to 63% in 1981.
-
The 1984 tricameral constitution provoked a black revolt larger than 1976 and the 1985 Emergency failed to contain it; US sanctions followed in 1986. (p. 6)
Blacks, who had been deliberately excluded from the reform plans, revolted in a fury far outstripping that of the 1976 Soweto riots.
-
In 1987 the NP kept its seat majority but its popular vote fell, while the CP became the official opposition. (p. 6)
The popular vote for the NP dropped to 52% of votes cast, even though the party won a firm majority of parliamentary seats (123 of the available 166 seats
-
The CP's economic base is the lower-income whites squeezed by deregulation, and white unemployment is reviving the 'poor white' problem. (p. 9)
The reemergence of the 'poor white problem," which catapulted the NP into power in the 1940s, could be the fuel which powers the CP in the 1990s.
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Job reservation was gone by 1987, removing the last statutory protection for white workers. (p. 9)
The last legislation protecting white jobs was repealed in August 1987.
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Sisk concludes that exclusive NP rule is finished and that the NP is being undone by the right rather than by black protest. (p. 12)
The NP is not falling to the revolutionary protest of South Africa's black majority, but to those who feel that orthodox apartheid ideology has been betrayed.
Evidence ledger¶
Sources used¶
| Source | Kind | Period | How used |
|---|---|---|---|
| Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa, 1985 (election results 1948-1977 and 1981) | official statistical series | 1948-1981 | Supplies NP seat counts and share of House of Assembly seats 1948-1977 and the Afrikaner vote share for the 1981 comparison. |
| Official Yearbook, 1985, pp. 180-181 (Afrikaner NP vote 85% in 1977 to 63% in 1981) | official statistical series | 1977-1981 | Documents the decline in Afrikaner support for the NP between the 1977 and 1981 elections. |
| Dr. Andries Treurnicht, 'Right Wing Growth Inexorable', South African Foundation Review, February 1988 (1983 referendum turnout claims) | newspapers periodicals | 1983 | Source for the CP leader's claim about turnout in the 1983 constitutional referendum (50.1% of registered voters, 37% of eligible voters). |
| Pauline Baker, 'South Africa: The Afrikaner Angst', Foreign Policy 69 (1987-88) (1987 election results) | secondary literature compilation | 1987 | Supplies the 1987 general election vote shares and seat counts for the NP (52%, 123 seats) and CP (26%, 27 seats). |
| Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) reprints of The Sunday Star and SAPA reports, February-March 1988 | newspapers periodicals | February-March 1988 | Documents the 1988 no-confidence debate, Botha's Standerton speech, and Laurie/Kleynhans estimates of a 50% CP vote. |
| The Washington Post, 3 March 1988, p. 22 (by-election results) | newspapers periodicals | March 1988 | Evidence that the CP quadrupled its margin of victory in the Standerton by-election. |
| The New York Times, 28 October 1988, p. 1 (municipal election results) | newspapers periodicals | October 1988 | Supports the claim that the CP won 67 of 110 contested white Transvaal town councils. |
| The Washington Post, 5 February 1989, p. A36 (de Klerk and NP leadership) | newspapers periodicals | February 1989 | Supports characterization of de Klerk's preferred strategy and of him as a cautious mover. |
| The Wall Street Journal, 15 January 1988 (white unemployment estimate) | newspapers periodicals | 1988 | Provides the estimate of white unemployment near 30,000, or 7% of the white work force. |
| SAPA report of 27 February 1988 via FBIS (Engelbrecht claims on AWB membership in police) | newspapers periodicals | February 1988 | Source for the dismissed police reservist's claim that 40% of Transvaal police are AWB members. |
| Phillip Frankel, 'The Right: Can Culture be Translated into Power?', South Africa Foundation Review, February 1988 | newspapers periodicals | 1988 | Cited as counter-argument that the CP's geographic and economic base may be too limited. |
| Rapport, 11 December 1988, p. 13 via FBIS (poll of party support) | newspapers periodicals | December 1988 | Poll result that the left parties had about 22.5% support, similar to the CP. |
| Time, 4 May 1987, p. 30 (Terreblanche estimate of NP factions) | newspapers periodicals | 1987 | Source for the estimate that the NP is 30% verligte, 30% verkrampte and 40% in between. |
| SAPA, 2 February 1989 via FBIS (NP caucus vote for de Klerk) | newspapers periodicals | February 1989 | Gives the 69-61 caucus vote that elected F. W. de Klerk NP leader. |
Inference¶
Quantification: Illustrative figures.
Narrative political analysis of white electoral politics, built on a chronology of elections (1981, 1983 referendum, 1987, 1988 by-elections and municipal) with scenario reasoning about future outcomes, supported by newspaper-reported figures and secondary scholarship; no systematic dataset or statistical testing.
Key claims¶
| Claim | Basis | Strength |
|---|---|---|
| The NP won over 80% of the Afrikaner vote in every election 1948-1977 and held rising majorities in the House of Assembly. (p. 30) | Official Yearbook 1985 table of NP seats by election year. | Systematic data |
| Afrikaner support for the NP fell from 85% in 1977 to 63% in 1981, masked by winner-take-all seat outcomes. (p. 32) | Official Yearbook 1985, pp. 180-181. | Partial data |
| In the 1987 election the NP vote fell to 52% while the CP took 26% and 27 seats, displacing the PFP as official opposition. (p. 33) | Baker (1987-88) as a secondary compilation of election results. | Partial data |
| The CP strengthened its position in 1988 by-elections and municipal elections in the Transvaal. (p. 34) | Press reports (Washington Post, New York Times) of by-election margins and council counts. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| Economic change, with the Afrikaner shift from poor farmers to middle-class managers and the need for skilled black labour, pushed NP leaders to abandon orthodox apartheid. (p. 32) | Giliomee, Adam and Baker as secondary scholarship; no primary economic data presented. | Asserted |
| The CP could plausibly win up to 50% of the popular vote and a Transvaal majority, ending the NP's absolute majority. (p. 35) | Laurie and Kleynhans estimates via press plus the author's seat arithmetic on 18 Transvaal seats decided by 2,000 votes or less. | Partial data |
| Downward mobility of lower-income whites, including rising white unemployment, is a key driver of CP growth. (p. 36) | WSJ unemployment estimate of about 30,000 (7%); otherwise assertion. | Asserted |
The author's caveats¶
The author notes that the CP disputes the 1983 referendum result and that pundits and analysts disagree (Frankel) about the CP's ceiling; he does not otherwise discuss data limitations.
Gaps in the evidence¶
The argument that economic pressure on whites drives the right's rise needs constituency-level election returns matched to occupation, income and farm-debt data, plus survey data on white voters. These existed in the 1980s (official election returns, the 1985 census, opinion polls) but are not used. Reliance on press reports and FBIS reprints for figures such as polls, police AWB membership and unemployment leaves the quantitative claims weakly sourced.
Replicability: Data poorly documented.