South Africa: Reform versus Reaction¶
J. E. Spence (1981). South Africa: Reform versus Reaction. The World Today, Vol. 37, No. 12 (Dec. 1981). Royal Institute of International Affairs.
| Type | journal article |
| Scope | Wider apartheid literature |
| Method | policy analysis |
| Period studied | 1974–1981 |
| Regions | South Africa, Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe |
| Themes | politics ideology elections, bantustans removals influx, resistance social movements, business and state, unions strikes |
| Citation key | spence1981 |
Argument¶
Spence reads the April 1981 white general election as tightening, not loosening, the constraints on P. W. Botha's reform programme. The rise of the right-wing Herstigte Nationale Party, and the taboo against splitting Afrikanerdom, limit how far reform can go, and the planned changes (President's Council proposals, community councils, influx control and trade union tweaks) are modest. The state's capacity to deter black unrest is eroding, and domestic and regional policy are fused. Reagan's 'constructive engagement' and the August 1981 Angola incursion gave Pretoria breathing space and encouraged the right. He concludes that leaders will prioritise white survival in traditional terms over major restructuring of the political and economic system. The argument is an interpretive political essay based on a recent visit, with no systematic data.
Evidence and method¶
Election returns (seats and votes for the PFP and Herstigte Nationale Party), press commentary (Financial Mail, The Observer), reports of President's Council proposals, the August 1981 Angola incursion and UN diplomacy, and the author's impressions from a recent visit to South Africa. No archival or statistical economic data.
Place in the debates¶
- Whether Botha's government could and would deliver significant reform of apartheid (see Why apartheid ended: reform, transition and elite bargaining). Sceptical: Spence argues that Afrikaner unity, Verkrampte/Herstigte pressure and external support for Pretoria limit reform to piecemeal measures.
- Role of the military and security establishment (generals as reformers) (see Why apartheid ended: reform, transition and elite bargaining). Doubts the 'generals favour reform' argument, since military success against SWAPO and FAPLA may encourage faith in a military solution.
- Co-optation of an urban black 'middle class' as a strategy of reform (see Why apartheid ended: reform, transition and elite bargaining). Describes the government's expectation that Section 10 urban blacks would form a moderating middle class, and treats this as a modest alteration of the status quo that black opinion rejects as grossly insufficient.
- Effect of external pressure versus external support on internal reform (see Why apartheid ended: reform, transition and elite bargaining). Argues that Reagan-era support eased external pressure but encouraged right-wing resistance to reform, although future US pressure over Namibia and Cuban troops might force evidence of reform.
Findings¶
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The Herstigte Nationale Party's gains, though it won no seats, made many Nationalist seats marginal, especially in the industrial and mining Transvaal. (p. 3)
especially in the industrial and mining areas of the Transvaal - turned some 50 Nationalist seats into marginal ones.
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Despite Botha's large majority, splitting the National Party is treated as ultimate heresy, which constrains reform. (p. 3)
splitting the Nationalist Party is the ultimate heresy and every Nationalist Prime Minister since Hertzog has been aware of the penalties exacted
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Government theory offered urban blacks only limited municipal-level concessions, while homelands remained the vehicle for African political expression. (p. 4)
the most the urban black can hope for is that the black community councils will be given municipal status and access to adequate sources of revenue.
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Reform was expected to create a settled urban black 'middle class' among those with Section 10 rights to moderate political demands. (p. 4)
(those having so-called Section 10 rights of residence and employment in the cities) will in time constitute a 'middle class' willing to accept economic and social gains
-
Refined influx control displaced the burden of unemployment onto the overcrowded homelands. (p. 5)
the policy of reducing unemployment in the cities by refining the techniques of influx control has left the Homelands to bear the brunt of the large increase in the numbers of dispossessed blacks
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The state's deterrent capacity over black dissatisfaction had declined compared with the 1960s and early 1970s. (p. 5)
the state no longer has the means to control effectively the propensity of the black majority to express its dissatisfaction with the existing political and economic order
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US support under Reagan relieved external pressure but emboldened the domestic right wing against reform. (p. 5)
Thus, this respite from external pressure won from the most powerful member of the Western Alliance had a domestic corollary, namely, the encouragement of right-wing aspirations
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Domestic politics pushes Botha towards a hard line on regional policy to reassure white supporters. (p. 6)
the Botha government has been compelled to follow a Verkrampte policy towards its neighbours
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Business leaders were already expressing concern at the slow pace of reform in 1981. (p. 9)
Note the deep concern expressed by prominent businessmen at a recent conference with the Prime Minister at the slow and uncertain pace of internal reform.
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Spence's conclusion is that white survival, defined traditionally, will trump major restructuring. (p. 9)
it seems likely that the present generation of South Africa's leaders will give priority to the claim of white survival defined in traditional terms
Evidence ledger¶
Sources used¶
| Source | Kind | Period | How used |
|---|---|---|---|
| April 1981 South African general election results (seat and vote totals for PFP, Herstigte Nasionale Party, Nationalist Party, New Republic Party) | election returns | 1977 and April 1981 | Provides vote and seat figures to argue that the right-wing HNP gains constrained Botha's room for reform. |
| Christopher Coker, 'The South African elections and neo-apartheid', The World Today, June 1981 | newspapers periodicals | June 1981 | Cited in support of the interpretation that the election strengthened constraints on Botha's freedom of manoeuvre. |
| The Observer, 28 December 1980 (Colin Legum report on white attitudes toward blacks) | newspapers periodicals | 28 December 1980 | Supports the claim that a shift in white attitudes has not been translated into political and economic reform. |
| The Financial Mail, 'Who calls the tune now?', 8 May 1981 | newspapers periodicals | 8 May 1981 | Source of the Afrikaner journalist's remark that verligtheid should not be confused with liberalism. |
| Proposals of the President's Council (District Six and Pageview recommendation, September 1981) and government rejection | commission or official report | September 1981 | Illustrates the limits of reform: the Council's modest recommendation was rejected by the government. |
| Apartheid statutes: Immorality Act s.16, Mixed Marriages Act, Group Areas Act, Section 10 influx-control rights | legislation gazette | to 1981 | Referred to as the framework of possible reform and of the urban black 'middle class' strategy, without citation of texts. |
| Reports of South African military incursions and the August 1981 invasion of Angola (captured Soviet officer, arsenal, SAM missiles) | newspapers periodicals | January and August 1981 | Used to argue that South African military success and US backing reduce pressure for reform. |
| Michael Spicer, 'Namibia - elusive independence', The World Today, October 1980 | newspapers periodicals | October 1980 | Background to Namibia negotiations (a secondary-article reference). |
| Author's visit to South Africa (informal observations and conversations; businessmen's conference with the Prime Minister) | author survey or fieldwork | 1981 | Underlies the general assessment of the political climate and business concern about slow reform. |
Inference¶
Quantification: Illustrative figures.
Qualitative political commentary and argument from election results, press reports and the author's informed judgement about political incentives; no systematic data analysis. Conclusions are speculative projections.
Key claims¶
| Claim | Basis | Strength |
|---|---|---|
| The April 1981 election strengthened constraints on Botha's reform because of HNP gains that made about 50 Nationalist seats marginal. (p. 461-462) | Election vote and seat totals (HNP 34,161 in 1977 vs 192,214 in 1981; PFP seats 17 to 26). | Partial data |
| Splitting the Nationalist Party is politically unthinkable, so Botha cannot rely on PFP support to pass major reform despite his large majority. (p. 462) | Seat counts plus historical-political argument about Afrikaner unity; no further sources. | Asserted |
| Little has been done since the election to translate changed white attitudes into political and economic reform; expected reforms are modest and exclude Africans. (p. 462) | Press commentary (Observer, Financial Mail), the President's Council's early recommendations and their rejection. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| The state's deterrence capability against black unrest has weakened; influx control has pushed dispossessed blacks into the overcrowded Homelands, a potential source of disaffection. (p. 464) | Assertion without cited statistics on unemployment or homeland population. | Asserted |
| US backing under Reagan gave Pretoria latitude for regional military action and reduced external pressure for internal reform, encouraging the right wing. (p. 466) | Press and diplomatic events (Geneva Conference failure, US UN veto, August 1981 Angola incursion). | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| The Namibia struggle will continue indefinitely and South African leaders will prioritise white survival over major restructuring. (p. 468) | Reasoned projection from political incentives and reported secret US initiative; terms unknown. | Asserted |
The author's caveats¶
Author notes that the terms of the reported US-South Africa Namibia initiative are not known and rests on 'allegedly' and 'apparently' reported information.
Gaps in the evidence¶
The argument about reform constraints would be better tested with disaggregated constituency-level election returns and survey data on white attitudes, which existed in 1981. Claims about homeland unemployment and dispossession need census and Bantustan population or labour statistics. Claims about business concern and military views need cited documents or interviews rather than anecdote.
Replicability: Data poorly documented.