South Africa: Reform versus Reaction¶
J. E. Spence (1981). South Africa: Reform versus Reaction. The World Today, Vol. 37, No. 12. Royal Institute of International Affairs.
| Type | journal article |
| Scope | Wider apartheid literature |
| Method | policy analysis |
| Period studied | 1974–1981 |
| Regions | South Africa, Namibia, Angola, Zimbabwe, Mozambique |
| Themes | politics ideology elections, resistance social movements, bantustans removals influx, business and state, unions strikes |
| Citation key | spence1981a |
Argument¶
Spence argues that the April 1981 election strengthened rather than weakened the constraints on P.W. Botha's room for reform, because the right-wing Herstigte Nasionale Party made gains and the Nationalist Party's fear of splitting Afrikaner unity limits reform. The state's deterrence capability is eroding, since ideological unity is weakening and black discontent is rising, though its capacity to restore order remains. Reagan's 'constructive engagement' gave Pretoria external breathing space but also encouraged right-wing resistance to reform. The Namibia/Angola episode shows how domestic and foreign policy are fused. He concludes that leaders will prioritise white survival in traditional terms over major restructuring of the political and economic system. The piece is an analytical commentary based on a visit to South Africa, not a systematic study.
Evidence and method¶
Election returns (seats and votes for the PFP and HNP), press sources (Financial Mail, The Observer), observations from a recent visit to South Africa, and reported events on Namibia and the Angola incursion. No systematic economic data.
Place in the debates¶
- Reform vs. reaction under Botha (is the government's reform programme genuine?) (see Why apartheid ended: reform, transition and elite bargaining). Sceptical: the election outcome and the constraints of Afrikaner unity make major reform unlikely; expected change is modest (urban Section 10 'middle class', softened influx control, wider union scope).
- Whether the military/security establishment favours reform as a precondition for counter-insurgency (see Why apartheid ended: reform, transition and elite bargaining). Doubts it; argues that military success against SWAPO and FAPLA may encourage belief in a military solution.
- Foreign pressure and domestic reform (see Why apartheid ended: reform, transition and elite bargaining). Argues that US 'constructive engagement' gave Pretoria flexibility and emboldened the right, while future US pressure over Namibia/Cubans might eventually force reform.
Findings¶
-
The PFP gained seats and became the official Opposition, but the right-wing gains were more significant. (p. 2)
increasing its share of seats from 17 to 26, capturing nearly a fifth (265,297) of the votes cast and confirming its status as the official Opposition.
-
Splitting the Nationalist Party is treated as the ultimate political taboo, restraining reformist legislation. (p. 3)
splitting the Nationalist Party is the ultimate heresy and every Nationalist Prime Minister since Hertzog has been aware of the penalties exacted
-
Expected reforms were limited to softening influx control and widening trade union scope, in the hope of creating an urban black middle class. (p. 4)
There may, too, be legislation designed to soften the harsher aspects of influx control and increase the scope and effective operation of black trade unions.
-
Refining influx control displaced unemployment onto the homelands, creating a potential source of disaffection. (p. 5)
the policy of reducing unemployment in the cities by refining the techniques of influx control has left the Homelands to bear the brunt of the large increase in the numbers of dispossessed blacks
-
The state's deterrence capacity, not its capacity to restore order, has declined compared with the 1960s and early 1970s. (p. 5)
now (and increasingly in the future) it is clear that the state no longer has the means to control effectively the propensity of the black majority to express its dissatisfaction
-
Reagan's election was double-edged: relief from external pressure, but encouragement to the right against reform. (p. 5)
this respite from external pressure won from the most powerful member of the Western Alliance had a domestic corollary, namely, the encouragement of right-wing aspirations
-
Spence concludes that white survival will be prioritised over major restructuring of the political and economic system. (p. 9)
it seems likely that the present generation of South Africa's leaders will give priority to the claim of white survival defined in traditional terms
Evidence ledger¶
Sources used¶
| Source | Kind | Period | How used |
|---|---|---|---|
| Colin Legum report in The Observer, 28 December 1980 | newspapers periodicals | December 1980 | Cited for the observation of a change in white attitudes towards blacks that has not been translated into reforms. |
| 'Who calls the tune now?', The Financial Mail, 8 May 1981 | newspapers periodicals | May 1981 | Supports the point that verligte Afrikaner opinion should not be confused with liberalism. |
| Press publicity on the South African Political Science Association Annual Conference, Johannesburg, September 1981 | newspapers periodicals | September 1981 | Illustrates the role Afrikaner academics play in constitutional reform debates. |
| President's Council recommendations (September 1981) on District Six and Pageview and the government's rejection | commission or official report | September 1981 | Shows that even modest proposed Group Areas reversals were rejected by government, evidencing the limits of reform. |
| Group Areas Act, Immorality Act (Section 16), Mixed Marriages Act, influx control and Section 10 residence rights | legislation gazette | to 1981 | Statutes whose possible reform defines the scope of the expected modest changes; discussed but not analysed in text. |
| Nationalist Party provincial congresses 1976-7 proposal for a three-parliament system | union or movement records | 1976-1977 | Cited as the baseline constitutional proposal that the author expects reform to revert to. |
| Author's visit to South Africa (informal fieldwork/observation) | author survey or fieldwork | 1981 | Background observation underlying the article's assessments; no interviews or notes are specified. |
| Reports on the Geneva Conference on Namibia (January 1981), the August 1981 incursion into Angola, the UN Security Council veto and the Zurich US-South Africa meetings | newspapers periodicals | January-September 1981 | Event narrative supporting claims about American backing and South African flexibility over Namibia. |
| Christopher Hooker (?), 'The South African elections and neo-apartheid', The World Today, June 1981 | secondary literature compilation | June 1981 | Cited for the interpretation of the election outcome as strengthening constraints on Botha. |
Inference¶
Quantification: Illustrative figures.
Qualitative political analysis based on election results, press reports, the author's impressions from a visit, and inference about incentives and constraints facing the Botha government; no systematic data.
Key claims¶
| Claim | Basis | Strength |
|---|---|---|
| The April 1981 election strengthened rather than weakened the constraints on Botha's reform freedom because of the right-wing Herstigte gains, which turned some 50 Nationalist seats marginal. (p. 461-462) | Election vote and seat totals for PFP, HNP and NP from 1977 and 1981. | Partial data |
| Reform will be modest (three-parliament system, black community councils, softened influx control, wider union scope) and aimed at creating an urban black middle class. (p. 463) | Speculation about the President's Council and government theory; no documents cited. | Asserted |
| The state's deterrence capability has eroded since the 1960s and early 1970s, so violent outbursts will increase even though order can be restored. (p. 463-464) | Analytical argument from Soweto-style disturbances and guerrilla threats; no data on incidents. | Asserted |
| Influx control has pushed dispossessed blacks into overcrowded Homelands, creating a potential source of disaffection and guerrilla recruitment. (p. 464) | No data on Homeland population or unemployment cited. | Asserted |
| Reagan's election gave Pretoria legitimacy and flexibility on Namibia while encouraging right-wing resistance to internal reform. (p. 464-466) | Press accounts of constructive engagement, Geneva walkout, Angola incursion, and the US veto. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| South Africa is unlikely to accept a Namibia settlement that risks a SWAPO-dominated state, and the struggle will continue indefinitely. (p. 467) | Inference from domestic political constraints and reports of a US initiative; terms are acknowledged as unknown. | Asserted |
| Leaders will prioritise white survival in traditional terms over major restructuring of the political and economic system, despite business pressure for faster reform. (p. 468) | Overall argument; a footnote refers to a business conference with the Prime Minister. | Asserted |
The author's caveats¶
The author notes that the precise terms of the US-South African Namibia initiative are not known and that reports are allegations; otherwise no data caveats are given.
Gaps in the evidence¶
The argument about economic and political reform rests on no systematic economic data (e.g., unemployment, Homeland population, union membership, business surveys). It would need Hansard debates, National Party caucus and congress records, President's Council reports, and opinion polls on white voters, much of which existed in 1981 or is now in archives. Incident counts for unrest and guerrilla activity and constituency-level election returns would better test claims about eroding deterrence and marginal seats.
Replicability: Data poorly documented.