South Africa: Reform versus Reaction¶
J. E. Spence (1981). South Africa: Reform versus Reaction. The World Today, Vol. 37, No. 12. Royal Institute of International Affairs.
| Type | journal article |
| Scope | Wider apartheid literature |
| Method | policy analysis |
| Period studied | 1974–1981 |
| Regions | South Africa, Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe |
| Themes | politics ideology elections, bantustans removals influx, resistance social movements, business and state, unions strikes |
| Citation key | spence1981b |
Argument¶
Spence argues that P. W. Botha's April 1981 election result left him less able to carry through significant reform. Right-wing Herstigte gains, the taboo against splitting the Nationalist Party, and weakening Afrikaner ideological unity all constrain him. He also holds that the state's capacity to deter black unrest has eroded, so South Africa risks a 'violent equilibrium' of repression and sporadic violence. Reagan's 'constructive engagement' eased external pressure but encouraged the right and domestic reaction, and the August 1981 Angola incursion and Namibia diplomacy tie foreign and domestic policy together. He concludes that Botha's government will put white survival in traditional terms ahead of fundamental restructuring of the political and economic system.
Evidence and method¶
Election returns (seats and votes for the PFP and the Herstigte Nationale Party), press commentary (Financial Mail, Observer), a recent visit to South Africa, and reports of government and President's Council proposals and of diplomatic events (the Geneva Conference, the Angola incursion, UN Security Council votes). No systematic economic data are used.
Place in the debates¶
- Whether Botha's government can and will deliver substantial reform of apartheid (reformist/verligte vs reactionary/verkrampte constraints) (see Why apartheid ended: reform, transition and elite bargaining). Sceptical. Spence argues the election strengthened constraints on Botha, that verligtheid is not liberalism, and that only modest, controlled changes are likely.
- Whether the military and security establishment favours major reform (the 'generals favour reform' argument) (see Why apartheid ended: reform, transition and elite bargaining). Doubtful. He suggests that military success against SWAPO and FAPLA may encourage faith in a military solution, and that Malan's successors may not share his reformist view.
- Effect of Western pressure versus 'constructive engagement' on South African domestic policy (see Why apartheid ended: reform, transition and elite bargaining). Argues that Reagan's approach eased external pressure but encouraged right-wing resistance to reform; real reform might be the price of US support over Namibia.
Findings¶
-
The Herstigte Nationale Party's vote rose sharply in 1981, and its challenge in the industrial and mining Transvaal made about 50 Nationalist seats marginal. (p. 3)
34,161 in 1977 to 192,214 in 1981 and although the party failed to win a single seat
-
The Herstigte campaign in industrial and mining areas threatened many Nationalist seats despite winning none. (p. 3)
turned some 50 Nationalist seats into marginal ones
-
The PFP gained seats and became a stronger official opposition, but the right-wing gains were more significant. (p. 2)
increasing its share of seats from 17 to 26, capturing nearly a fifth (265,297) of the votes cast
-
Despite Botha's large majority, the taboo on splitting Afrikaner unity limits his ability to pass reformist legislation. (p. 3)
splitting the Nationalist Party is the ultimate heresy and every Nationalist Prime Minister since Hertzog has been aware of the penalties exacted
-
Anticipated reforms were limited to softening influx control and widening the scope of black trade unions, with no African representation in central institutions. (p. 4)
There may, too, be legislation designed to soften the harsher aspects of influx control and increase the scope and effective operation of black trade unions.
-
The government's co-optation strategy aimed to create an urban black 'middle class' from Section 10 rights holders, to moderate political demands. (p. 4)
a substantial number of urban blacks (those having so-called Section 10 rights of residence and employment in the cities) will in time constitute a 'middle class'
-
Refined influx control pushed the burden of unemployment onto the overcrowded Homelands, creating a potential source of disaffection and guerrilla recruitment. (p. 5)
the policy of reducing unemployment in the cities by refining the techniques of influx control has left the Homelands to bear the brunt of the large increase in the numbers of dispossessed blacks
-
The state's capacity to deter black dissatisfaction has weakened compared with the 1960s and early 1970s. (p. 5)
the state no longer has the means to control effectively the propensity of the black majority to express its dissatisfaction with the existing political and economic order
-
Botha's hard line towards neighbouring states is partly a device to reassure white supporters that reform does not abandon white interests. (p. 6)
the Botha government has been compelled to follow a Verkrampte policy towards its neighbours if only to convince supporters at home
-
Business leaders were worried by the slow and uncertain pace of reform. (p. 9)
Note the deep concern expressed by prominent businessmen at a recent conference with the Prime Minister at the slow and uncertain pace of internal reform.
-
Spence concludes that white survival in traditional terms will take priority over restructuring the political and economic system. (p. 9)
it seems likely that the present generation of South Africa's leaders will give priority to the claim of white survival defined in traditional terms
Evidence ledger¶
Sources used¶
| Source | Kind | Period | How used |
|---|---|---|---|
| The Financial Mail, 'Who calls the tune now?', 8 May 1981 | newspapers periodicals | May 1981 | Cited for an Afrikaner journalist's remark that verligtheid should not be confused with liberalism. |
| The Observer, 28 December 1980 (Colin Legum's report on white attitudes towards blacks) | newspapers periodicals | December 1980 | Supports the claim that white attitudes have changed but that this is not yet being translated into reform of political and economic structures. |
| Recommendations of the President's Council (District Six and Pageview proposals, September 1981) and government rejection | commission or official report | September 1981 | Used as evidence that even modest Group Areas reform proposals were rejected by the government. |
| Group Areas Act, Immorality Act (Section 16), Mixed Marriages Act, and Section 10 influx control rights (legislation discussed) | legislation gazette | to 1981 | Statutes are the object of speculated reform and are used to describe the limits of the government's reform agenda; they are not analysed in text. |
| Prime Minister Botha's statements on the Group Areas Act as 'non-negotiable' | other | April 1981 election campaign | Quoted to show the limits Botha places on reform. |
| Christopher Hocker (?), 'The South African elections and neo-apartheid', The World Today, June 1981 | newspapers periodicals | June 1981 | Cited as background supporting the claim that election outcome strengthened constraints on Botha. |
| Author's recent visit to South Africa (informal observation) | author survey or fieldwork | 1981 | Unspecified visit forms the experiential basis of the article, including the press coverage of the Political Science Association conference and a businessmen's meeting. |
| Press coverage of the Annual Conference of the South African Political Science Association, September 1981 | newspapers periodicals | September 1981 | Used as an illustration of Afrikaner academics' engagement with constitutional reform. |
| Reports on the August 1981 incursion into Angola, UN Security Council veto, and Geneva Conference on Namibia (January 1981) | newspapers periodicals | January-September 1981 | Narrative evidence for the argument that US support gives Pretoria flexibility and strengthens the military approach. |
| Michael Spicer, 'Namibia - elusive independence', The World Today, October 1980 | newspapers periodicals | October 1980 | Referenced as background for the Namibia negotiations. |
| Prominent businessmen's conference with the Prime Minister (reported concern about slow reform) | other | 1981 | Footnote evidence of business pressure for reform. |
Inference¶
Quantification: Illustrative figures.
Qualitative political analysis and argument by interpretation of recent events (April 1981 election, Namibia diplomacy, Angola incursion), supplemented by a few election figures, press reports, and the author's visit. There is no systematic data analysis; the claims are projections and judgments.
Key claims¶
| Claim | Basis | Strength |
|---|---|---|
| The April 1981 election strengthened constraints on Botha's reform because the right-wing Herstigte vote rose sharply and made many Nationalist seats marginal. (p. 461-462) | Election vote and seat totals for 1977 and 1981 as reported by the author, without a named source. | Partial data |
| The state's deterrence capability has eroded relative to the 1960s and early 1970s, though it can still restore order. (p. 463-464) | Interpretive argument based on Soweto-style disturbances and guerrilla activity; no data on incidents or security capacity. | Asserted |
| Refining influx control has pushed large numbers of dispossessed blacks into overcrowded Homelands, creating a potential source of disaffection and guerrilla recruitment. (p. 464) | Assertion with no cited statistics on unemployment, removals, or Homeland populations. | Asserted |
| The government's expected reforms (community councils, softening of influx control, trade unions) aim to create an urban black middle class among Section 10 residents, and are insufficient to black opinion. (p. 463) | Interpretation of government theory and speculation about President's Council proposals; the Council's September recommendations on District Six and Pageview and their rejection are cited. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| Reagan's election gave Pretoria latitude in Namibia and Angola and encouraged right-wing resistance to reform, linking foreign and domestic policy. (p. 464-466) | Press-reported events: the Geneva Conference failure, the August 1981 Angola incursion, the US Security Council veto, captured Soviet equipment. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| South Africa is unlikely to concede Namibia to a SWAPO-dominated government soon, and the leadership will prioritise white survival over major restructuring. (p. 467-468) | Political reasoning from domestic constraints and past negotiation patterns; no polling or documentary sources. | Asserted |
The author's caveats¶
The author acknowledges that the precise terms of the secret American Namibia initiative are not known and rests on 'allegedly' and 'apparently' reported information. No other data caveats are stated.
Gaps in the evidence¶
The argument about reform, security capacity, and Homeland dispossession would be better tested with systematic data: election returns by constituency, official influx control and pass-law prosecution statistics, Homeland population and employment figures, and data on strikes and political violence. Cabinet and National Party records, interviews with officials, and business association statements would also help; most of this was published or obtainable then, and more archival material is available now. As written, the piece relies on press reports and the author's impressions.
Replicability: Data poorly documented.