The 1992 Referendum in South Africa

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Annette Strauss (1993). The 1992 Referendum in South Africa. The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 31, No. 2. Cambridge University Press.

Type	journal article
Scope	Wider apartheid literature
Method	archival narrative
Period studied	1989–1993
Regions	South Africa, Southern Africa
Themes	politics ideology elections, business and state, sanctions divestment, transition post apartheid
Citation key	strauss1993

Argument

Strauss reconstructs the whites-only referendum of 17 March 1992, in which De Klerk asked voters to endorse continued negotiation. She shows how the Yes camp (NP, DP, big business, economists, universities, sportsmen, foreign governments, and the ANC and IFP) made the case. Its central appeal was that a No vote meant sanctions, isolation, lost exports and jobs, and economic ruin. The Conservative Party and its allies argued instead for partition, claimed Codesa meant communist takeover and economic collapse, and later blamed employers and foreign pressure for their defeat. She concludes that the landslide Yes was a propaganda triumph for the NP and a mandate for reform, but that it did not end violence, and that the argument for resuming negotiations, including the Ramaphosa-Meyer 'Channel', rested on fear of economic ruin as well as moral choice. The method is a narrative assembled mostly from press statements.

Evidence and method

Almost entirely contemporary South African newspapers and periodicals (The Citizen, Beeld, Die Burger, The Star, Sunday Times, Business Day, Financial Mail, Rapport and others), plus a few foreign magazines (Time, The Economist, West Africa). It also uses campaign advertisements, party and business statements and press interviews. There are no archives or statistical series beyond the reported referendum turnout and vote.

Place in the debates

• Why did the white electorate and business support negotiated reform (economic pressure/sanctions vs moral choice) (see Why apartheid ended: reform, transition and elite bargaining). Presents both strands. The Yes campaign leaned heavily on sanctions, trade, jobs and investment fears, and Strauss calls sport and economic issues the main pillars of the Yes vote. She also reports Giliomee's view that reform was a choice for survival in justice.
• Role of business in the political transition (see Why apartheid ended: reform, transition and elite bargaining). Documents big business breaking its tradition of keeping out of politics: it funded a Private Sector Referendum Fund and told employees to vote Yes. The CP counter-charge of employer intimidation is reported rather than adjudicated.
• Significance of the referendum for the settlement (see Why apartheid ended: reform, transition and elite bargaining). Cautions that its importance should not be over-estimated. She treats it as a propaganda triumph and mandate that did not stop violence or the later Codesa deadlock.

Findings

• De Klerk made the referendum a test of his mandate by pledging to resign on a No vote, with a right-wing win expected in any ensuing election. (p. 2)

  The President undertook to resign should there be a 'No' majority, and it was widely believed that in any ensuing white parliamentary election the right-wing would almost certainly be victorious.

• Business organised and funded the Yes campaign through a dedicated fund. (p. 5)

  A number of business leaders launched a 'Private Sector Referendum Fund' in order to finance an aggressive advertising campaign.

• Individual firms warned employees that a No vote threatened jobs through sanctions and lost exports (Delta Motor Corporation). (p. 6)

  a 'No' vote could close down the factory and cause 3,500 to lose their jobs

• Economists argued that growth was impossible without political change, because the domestic market was truncated by discrimination. (p. 6)

  A rapidly growing domestic market cannot be brought into being if 85 per cent of the population is shut out by discriminatory restrictions

• Strauss judges that sport and economic arguments were the central props of the Yes campaign and the CP had no answer to them. (p. 8)

  Indeed, sport and economic issues were the main propaganda-erected pillars on which the 'Yes' vote rested, and the C.P. could find no antipode in these fields.

• Foreign governments signalled that sanctions would be eased after a Yes vote. (p. 13)

  On 12 March the European Parliament in Strasbourg declared that a positive vote would open the possibility for the rapid removal of all restrictions on normal relations barring the sale of arms.

• Turnout was exceptionally high and Yes won decisively. (p. 13)

  It was reported that the turnout on 17 March I992 was 86 per cent of the registered voters - the highest for any election or referendum in decades.

• Treurnicht blamed defeat on foreign pressure and employer pressure, which indicates how far economic threats were seen as decisive. (p. 15)

  blatant threats by employers, and the hysterical emphasis on sanctions, a bloodbath

• Despite the landslide, roughly a third of whites remained opposed to reform. (p. 19)

  Yet they still constituted about one-third of the white electorate, even if their leaders had been discredited.

• Talks between the government and the ANC collapsed in mid-1992 but resumed bilaterally. (p. 20)

  although negotiations between the Government and the A.N.C. collapsed in June I992, following the massacre of unprotected A.N.C. supporters

• Strauss judges the referendum a political victory for the NP but of limited lasting effect. (p. 22)

  It was a propaganda triumph for the National Party, and revealed the positive attitudes of the majority of whites towards de Klerk's reform initiatives.

• Expectations of sanctions removal and investment inflows were tempered by recognition of the growth challenge. (p. 22)

  it was always realised that the needed economic growth rate of more than 6 per cent was going to be very difficult to achieve.

Evidence ledger

Sources used

Source	Kind	Period	How used
Oosterlig (Port Elizabeth), 10 March 1992	newspapers periodicals	March 1992	Source for the N.P.'s 1989 election mandate to negotiate a new constitution, which frames the referendum.
The Citizen (Johannesburg), March 1992 issues	newspapers periodicals	March 1992	Reports Treurnicht's open letter, statements by de Klerk, Mandela and business leaders, and the post-result reactions.
Eastern Province Herald (Port Elizabeth), March 1992 issues	newspapers periodicals	March 1992	Reports C.P., N.P. and D.P. campaign statements, including Delport and de Beer, and A.N.C. regional leaders.
Die Burger (Cape Town), editorials and reports, 1990-1992	newspapers periodicals	1990-1992	Supplies editorial argument about sanctions, exports and the cost of a 'No' vote, and the C.P.'s planned ban on mixed marriages.
The Star / The Sunday Star (Johannesburg), March 1992	newspapers periodicals	March 1992	Source for de Klerk's and Hani's statements, N.P. and D.P. positions, the I.F.P. advertisement and foreign reactions.
Business Day (Johannesburg), March 1992	newspapers periodicals	March 1992	Source for business-press forecasts of the economic effects of a 'Yes' or 'No' result and for Japanese business warnings.
Statement by the Economic Policy Study Group, reported in Sunday Times (8 March 1992) and The Natal Witness (10 March 1992)	newspapers periodicals	March 1992	Used as the economists' warning that a 'No' vote would bring stagnation and loss of foreign confidence.
Die Volksblad (Bloemfontein), March 1992	newspapers periodicals	March 1992	Cited for Canberra's sanctions warning, the Private Sector Referendum Fund appeal, and public opinion after the vote.
Rapport (Johannesburg), March 1992 and February 1993	newspapers periodicals	March 1992 - February 1993	Source for the N.P. advertisement, the artists' declaration, Fedhasa's views and the C.P./I.F.P. grouping (Cosag).
Die Transvaler (Pretoria), March 1992	newspapers periodicals	March 1992	Source for de Klerk's remarks on international support and investment interest, and Treurnicht's post-result statement.
Sowetan (Johannesburg), 16 March 1992	newspapers periodicals	March 1992	Source for Rev. Frank Chikane's view of a 'No' vote.
Diamond Fields Advertiser (Kimberley), 3 and 19 March 1992	newspapers periodicals	March 1992	Cited for the C.P. advertisement claims and for the inference that most whites, including some C.P. supporters, supported reform.
The Cape Times (Cape Town), 12 March 1992	newspapers periodicals	March 1992	Source for Giliomee's analysis of the referendum and de Klerk's motives.
Financial Mail (Johannesburg), 19 February 1993 interview and editorial	newspapers periodicals	February 1993	Source for de Klerk's reflections on the referendum principles and the commentary on negotiating strength after the vote.
Scott Macleod report, Time International (Amsterdam), 1 March 1993	newspapers periodicals	March 1993	Quoted for Meyer's account of the secret 'Channel' talks with Ramaphosa after Codesa's breakdown.
The Economist (London), 27 February-5 March 1993	newspapers periodicals	February-March 1993	Source for the proposed constituent assembly and government of national unity.
West Africa (London), 10-16 May 1993, pp. 770-71	newspapers periodicals	May 1993	Source for the postscript on Mandela's London visit and the A.N.C.'s government of national unity position.
Reported referendum result (17 March 1992), via The Citizen 19 March 1992	election returns	17 March 1992	Establishes turnout, the 'Yes' share and regional exceptions (Pietersburg), plus Simpson's estimates of voting by language group.
Campaign advertisements, open letters and public statements (C.P., N.P., D.P., Private Sector Referendum Fund, I.F.P., companies)	other	February-March 1992	Used as primary evidence of the arguments each side deployed (economic collapse, sanctions, jobs, investment).

Inference

Quantification: Illustrative figures.

Narrative synthesis of contemporaneous press reports and quoted statements by party, business, foreign and civil-society leaders; the author reconstructs the campaign arguments and reactions and infers their meaning, with no systematic data analysis.

Key claims

Claim	Basis	Strength
The 'Yes' vote won a landslide with very high white turnout, and carried all regions but one. (p. 13)	Reported referendum results (via The Citizen, 19 March 1992); Simpson's estimates of language-group voting.	Partial data
Sport and economic appeals (sanctions, jobs, investment) were the main pillars of the 'Yes' campaign, which the C.P. could not counter. (p. 8)	Press-reported statements by business leaders, economists, sportspeople and foreign governments; media coverage; the author's judgement.	Illustrative or anecdotal
Major corporations broke with their tradition of political neutrality to urge employees to vote 'Yes'. (p. 6)	Newspaper reports (Sunday Times, Business Day) of company statements and employee communications.	Illustrative or anecdotal
Foreign governments and bodies linked the vote to sanctions and relations, threatening reimposition after a 'No' and promising easing after a 'Yes'. (p. 8)	Press reports of statements by Australia, Japan, Germany, the European Parliament, the U.S., Britain and others.	Illustrative or anecdotal
Most whites, including some Conservative supporters, backed the reform process. (p. 19)	Vote tallies plus one independent analyst's estimates by language group and party; press inference.	Partial data
The referendum was a propaganda triumph for the N.P. but did not end violence and spurred more militant responses. (p. 22)	The author's assessment drawing on press commentary and reported statements.	Asserted
The referendum reopened Codesa, but talks deadlocked and then moved to bilateral 'Channel' talks leading toward power-sharing agreements by early 1993. (p. 20)	Press accounts (Sunday Times, Time International, Financial Mail) of negotiators' statements.	Illustrative or anecdotal

The author's caveats

The author notes that this is not the place for a detailed analysis of why the A.N.C. withdrew from Codesa, and that the referendum's importance should not be over-estimated. No limitations of the press-based evidence itself are acknowledged.

Gaps in the evidence

The argument rests almost entirely on press quotations from partisan actors and gives no systematic evidence on voter motivations, such as exit polls, surveys or constituency-level returns. Official referendum returns by region and constituency, and opinion polls by language and party, existed in 1992 and would test the claims about the 'Yes' coalition and the role of economic fears. Company, Chamber of Commerce or government archives could show how far business campaigning actually shaped the outcome, and these are now partly accessible.

Replicability: Data public and well described.