Urban Social Movements under Apartheid (Les mouvements sociaux urbains et l'apartheid)¶
Mark Swilling (1985). Urban Social Movements under Apartheid (Les mouvements sociaux urbains et l'apartheid). Cahiers d'Études Africaines, Vol. 25, Cahier 99 (Ségrégation spatiale, ségrégation sociale). EHESS.
| Type | journal article |
| Scope | Wider apartheid literature |
| Method | mixed |
| Period studied | 1976–1985 |
| Regions | Transvaal (Vaal, Soweto, East Rand), Eastern Cape (Port Elizabeth, Uitenhage) |
| Themes | resistance social movements, unions strikes, politics ideology elections, demography urbanisation, business and state, inequality poverty unemployment, bantustans removals influx |
| Citation key | swilling1985 |
Argument¶
Swilling uses Castells's concept of the 'urban social movement' to explain the mass stayaways in the Transvaal (Nov 1984) and the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage area (March 1985). He argues that the post-1976 reform of the urban system, especially the Riekert recommendations and the 1982 Black Local Authorities Act, produced two contradictions. The new councils lacked legitimacy, and they had to fund permanent townships from a non-existent tax base, which pushed up rents and service charges. These grievances fused with student boycotts and a growing independent union movement. In the Transvaal this produced unified worker, student and community action. In the Eastern Cape, divisions between unions and community organisations, between coloured and African workers, and between employed and unemployed workers fragmented the action. He concludes that the state's 'Bonapartist' mix of repression and reform and the movements' own hegemonic project have reached a stalemate.
Evidence and method¶
Labour Monitoring Group surveys of unionised factories (71 in the Transvaal; 50 of 235 firms in Port Elizabeth and 75% of firms in Uitenhage) and of employers, unions and community groups. Also press reports (Rand Daily Mail, Financial Mail, Sunday Express and others), union and civic publications, strike statistics, government casualty figures, a COSAS pamphlet (appendix), interviews with activists, and secondary literature (Castells, Lodge, Webster, Cobbett et al.).
Place in the debates¶
- Workerism versus community/populist politics (union-community alliances) (see Black trade unions: growth, wage effects, Wiehahn and strategy). Sympathetic to the community organisations. He describes the unions' 'workerist' reluctance as shaped by their defensive shop-floor position in the recession and finds that pure working-class politics cannot be organised outside the workplace. He also warns that populism risks dividing employed from unemployed workers.
- Success and genuineness of the Port Elizabeth stayaway (voluntary support versus intimidation) (see Resistance and liberation movements). Treats the question as hard to settle. He notes evidence of substantial factory support for collective action alongside fear of the consequences of not striking, and presents the community and union interpretations side by side.
- Reform from above versus popular challenge (is the apartheid state restructuring or collapsing?) (see Why apartheid ended: reform, transition and elite bargaining). He sees the first outcome as more likely given the state's armed strength, but expects the costs of repression to be very high. He describes the situation as an interregnum in which neither the state's nor the movements' hegemonic project has gained the strategic advantage.
Findings¶
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The Riekert reforms were backed by big capital and conceded permanent urban residence, property rights, union rights and limited local political rights. (p. 3)
Enthusiastically supported by big capital who wanted a stable pool of semi-skilled labour, the Riekert Commission recommended that urban Blacks be given the right to live permanently in the urban areas.
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The new black local authorities lacked legitimacy, as shown by very low turnout. (p. 4)
the polls during the I983 elections for the new bodies were as low as IO-25%
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Resistance largely destroyed the local state within about two years. (p. 4)
34 were introduced in I983 and I04 were due to be established by I984; by April I985, there were only 3 still functioning.
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The self-financing requirement left township councils with no tax base, forcing rent and service charge increases that triggered the movements. (p. 4)
because there are no industries or sizeable middle class in the black townships, these new bodies had no viable tax base from which to draw resources.
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The November 1984 Transvaal stayaway was the largest to date. (p. 5)
The Labour Monitoring Group (I985a: 74) calculated that between 300,000 and 8oo,ooo workers did not go to work, and 400,000 students boycotted classes.
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Industrial action rose in 1984 despite the recession. (p. 5)
whereas in I982 and I983 tlhere were 394 and 336 strikes respectively, in I984 there were 469.
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Unionised factories showed very high participation in the Transvaal stayaway. (p. 8)
These factories gave overwhelming support to the stayaway: 70% of the sample had a participation rate of over 8o%.
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After the stayaway, capital and reformist state officials pushed harder for structural reform, and some businessmen even favoured talking to the ANC. (p. 9)
after the stayaway, capital and advanced reforiners in the State became much more vocal about the need to accelerate structural reform
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The recession caused heavy job losses in the Eastern Cape motor industry. (p. 10)
ii,ooo motor workers and a further 20,000 in related industries were laid off during the last three years
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Divisions between community organisations and unions produced opposing ideologies in the Eastern Cape. (p. 10)
the community organizations articulating a radical national democratic ideology that identified 'the community' as the primary vehicle of political mobilization, and the unions practising a hard-line economistic workerism.
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Port Elizabeth township poverty was severe and underlay the militancy of the unemployed youth. (p. 11)
20% of the squatters earn R2o a month or less, while the average earns R24o a month
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African workers in Uitenhage joined the 21-22 March stayaways almost completely. (p. 13)
Of the African workers, 98% did not go to work on Thursday, and 97% on Friday.
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Swilling judges that the state's reform-plus-repression strategy is the more likely outcome. (p. 15)
Although neither outcome is a clear possibility, the first appears more likely, given the armed strength of the State and the material and political resources that ruling-class reformers can mobilize.
Evidence ledger¶
Sources used¶
| Source | Kind | Period | How used |
|---|---|---|---|
| Labour Monitoring Group (1985a), 'Report: The November Stay-away', South African Labour Bulletin X(6): 74-100 – stayaway participation estimates and 71-factory survey | author survey or fieldwork | November 1984 | Provides the estimate of 300,000-800,000 workers and 400,000 students staying away, and the survey of 71 unionized factories on participation, day-two intensity, migrants and employer responses. |
| Labour Monitoring Group survey of 71 unionized factories (Transvaal stayaway) | author survey or fieldwork | November 1984 | Interview results used to claim overwhelming factory support, no weakening on day two, no migrant/township difference and mild employer sanctions. |
| Labour Monitoring Group (1985b), 'Report: The March Stay-aways in Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage', South African Labour Bulletin XI(1): 86-120 – survey of employers, unions and community organisations | author survey or fieldwork | March 1985 | Source for stayaway participation rates among African and coloured workers, short-time work, employer practices and predictions; also for township poverty data and the history of racial separation. |
| Midland Chamber of Industries Directory (sampling frame for Port Elizabeth firms) | employer association records | c. 1985 | Directory listing 235 firms from which the Labour Monitoring Group interviewed 50 firms; Uitenhage coverage was 75% of firms. |
| Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg), 11 March 1985 – strike statistics | newspapers periodicals | 1982-1984 | Source for the number of strikes (394, 336, 469) and working days lost (124,594 to 378,712) for 1982-84. |
| Sunday Express (Johannesburg), 18 Nov. 1984 | newspapers periodicals | November 1984 | Supports the claim that senior officials and cabinet ministers had reservations about hard-line tactics by the Department of Law and Order after the stayaway. |
| Finance Week (Johannesburg), 15 Nov. 1984 and Financial Mail, 15 Nov. 1984 | newspapers periodicals | November 1984 | Document organized commerce and industry's reservations about state overreaction and Tony Bloom's comment on talking to the ANC. |
| Eastern Province Herald (Port Elizabeth), 13 June 1985 | newspapers periodicals | 1985 | Source for the racial composition of Langa (about 3,000 Coloureds of 42,000 residents). |
| 'Eastern Cape Hidden Horror', State of the Nation (Johannesburg), special edition, May 1985 | newspapers periodicals | 1982-1985 | Source for job losses in the motor industry (11,000 motor workers and 20,000 in related industries). |
| Business Day (Johannesburg), 21 Aug. 1985 | newspapers periodicals | 1985 | Source for the 56% township unemployment figure. |
| FOSATU Worker News, 37, May 1985 | union or movement records | May 1985 | Source for the FOSATU vice-president's criticism that the stayaway benefited non-workers while workers lost pay. |
| Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), 13 Sept. 1985 – Minister of Law and Order figures | newspapers periodicals | June 1984-October 1985 | Official figures on deaths, injuries, arrests and detentions during the unrest and state of emergency. |
| Commission of Inquiry into Legislation Affecting the Utilisation of Manpower (Riekert Commission) | commission or official report | late 1970s | Characterised as the reformist policy that recommended permanent urban rights for urban Blacks; cited from memory of its contents, not from the report itself. |
| Black Local Authority Act of 1982 | legislation gazette | 1982 | Legislation introducing new black local government bodies, which are the focus of the legitimacy and fiscal contradictions. |
| Interview with PEYCO president | interviews oral history | 1985 | Quoted to illustrate community organisers' view of the stayaway's success. |
| COSAS appeal for worker support (pamphlet, Transvaal Region) | union or movement records | October 1984 | Reproduced in an appendix as evidence of student demands and the origin of the stayaway initiative. |
| Pillay (1985), 'The Port Elizabeth Stayaway', Work in Progress 37 | secondary literature compilation | 1985 | Cited for the claims and counter-claims about whether workers participated willingly or out of intimidation. |
New data¶
Surveys by the Labour Monitoring Group (including the author): interviews with 71 unionized factories in the Transvaal (Nov 1984); and in Port Elizabeth (50 of 235 firms) and Uitenhage (75% of firms) plus commercial sector employers, unions and community organisations (March 1985).
Inference¶
Quantification: Descriptive tables.
Comparative case study of two regional stayaways (Transvaal 1984, Eastern Cape 1985) using the Castells framework of urban social movements, combining survey percentages of stayaway participation, press reports and organisational accounts with interpretive argument about class and community divisions.
Key claims¶
| Claim | Basis | Strength |
|---|---|---|
| The November 1984 Transvaal stayaway was the largest to date, with 300,000-800,000 workers and some 400,000 students absent, reflecting united action of labour, students and community groups. (p. 366) | Labour Monitoring Group (1985a) estimates and press reports; organisations' own claims of over one million. | Partial data |
| Factory participation in the Transvaal stayaway was overwhelming and did not weaken on day two; migrants participated as much as township dwellers. (p. 369) | Labour Monitoring Group survey of 71 unionized factories (only 9 with significant migrant workforce); sample not random and covers unionized firms only. | Partial data |
| Strike activity was rising in 1984 despite recession, supporting growing worker militancy. (p. 366) | Press-reported strike and working-days-lost figures (Rand Daily Mail). | Partial data |
| The new black local authorities lost legitimacy and collapsed, because of low polls and the fiscal burden pushing rent and service charge increases. (p. 365) | Election poll figures and counts of functioning councils and resignations given without source; the fiscal argument is asserted. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| In Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage, African workers heeded the stayaway massively (90% in PE industry on 18 March; 98% and 97% in Uitenhage on 21-22 March), while coloured participation was very low, reflecting racial divisions. (p. 374) | Labour Monitoring Group employer survey (Tables I and II). | Partial data |
| The apartheid state responded to urban movements with repression combined with reform, producing a stalemate between the ruling-class Bonapartist project and the movements' hegemonic project. (p. 377) | Press reports, official casualty figures and theoretical argument following Castells; speculative. | Asserted |
The author's caveats¶
The author notes that it is extremely difficult to ascertain whether Eastern Cape workers participated voluntarily or out of intimidation; he also notes that evidence of later dismissals is in smaller, unorganized factories and that the situation in Uitenhage was less clear due to short-time.
Gaps in the evidence¶
The argument relies on a non-random employer survey of unionized firms and on newspaper figures, with little direct evidence from workers themselves about motives, so claims about solidarity versus intimidation cannot be tested. Official statistics on strikes, township rents, council elections and unemployment (e.g. Department of Manpower, Department of Co-operation and Development, municipal records) and household or worker surveys would test the fiscal and class-composition claims; some existed then and archival police and municipal records are available now. Union, civic and state archives, and oral histories of participants, would better establish decision-making.
Replicability: Data poorly documented.