The United Democratic Front and Township Revolt¶
Mark Swilling (1987). The United Democratic Front and Township Revolt.
| Type | working paper |
| Scope | Wider apartheid literature |
| Method | mixed |
| Period studied | 1979–1987 |
| Regions | Eastern Cape, Transvaal/PWV, Natal, Western Cape, Orange Free State |
| Themes | resistance social movements, politics ideology elections, unions strikes, demography urbanisation, inequality poverty unemployment, macro fiscal finance debt |
| Citation key | swilling1987 |
Argument¶
Swilling argues that black resistance since 1983 became more effective because the UDF supplied a national political and ideological centre. The township revolt itself was driven from below by local organisations responding to abysmal urban living conditions, not by UDF national strategy. The 1984 election boycott is the main exception. He periodises UDF politics into four phases: reactive anti-constitutional campaigns, the 1984-85 uprising, the State of Emergency and ungovernability, and the building of 'people's power' street and area committees. The UDF is a multi-class front whose leaders are largely of working-class origin, and he rebuts Callinicos's 'populist, petty bourgeois' critique. He uses evidence on campaigns, affiliates, leader biographies and opinion surveys.
Evidence and method¶
UDF affiliate lists (court exhibit in State vs Ramgobin and 15 others), leader biographies, Labour Monitoring Group stayaway reports, South African Labour Bulletin and South African Review articles, HSRC and Schlemmer attitude surveys (1984), UDF pamphlets and documents, and the author's own earlier research.
Place in the debates¶
- Origin of the township revolt: UDF national direction versus local grassroots initiative (see Resistance and liberation movements). Argues the revolt came from below, from local organisations. The UDF gave it a national identity and articulated common demands, apart from the 1984 election boycott.
- Class character of the UDF (Callinicos, Alexander and Friedman's 'populist/petty bourgeois' critique) (see Resistance and liberation movements). Rejects the critique. Leaders are mostly working class or of working-class origin, local affiliates are entrenched in poor communities, and the organisation links community and workplace issues.
- Charterist multi-class strategy versus Black Consciousness/AZAPO and some trade unionists (see Resistance and liberation movements). Defends the Charterist national-democratic, multi-class front. He treats AZAPO as largely middle class and not a mass movement, and says the nationalist-socialist split cannot be reduced to the internal colonialism versus racial capitalism debate.
- Economic versus political causes of urban protest (see Resistance and liberation movements). Holds that recession and the illegitimacy of Black Local Authorities fused economic (collective consumption) and political demands.
Findings¶
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Central thesis: the UDF made black resistance more effective by providing a national political and ideological centre. (p. 1)
black resistance in South Africa has become increasingly effective because of the UDF's capacity to provide a national political and ideological centre
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The revolt originated in local communities reacting to urban living conditions. (p. 1)
emanated from below as communities responded to their absymal urban living conditions
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Recession and discredited reforms are identified as the underlying causes of the 1984-85 uprising. (p. 11)
The deepening recession and the illegitimacy of state reforms were the underlying causes of this urban uprising.
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The Vaal Uprising was triggered by a local rent increase, linking fiscal strain in black local government to revolt. (p. 11)
It was sparked off by a rent increase announced by the Lekoa Town Council.
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The November 1984 Transvaal stayaway showed large-scale union-community-student cooperation. (p. 11)
The stayaway was suppported by 800 000 workers and 400 000 students
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The State of Emergency failed because the security forces' presence in the townships fuelled resistance. (p. 13)
the State of Emergency failed to restore civil government largely because the permanent prescence of the security forces in the townships fueled rather than quelled resistance
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Consumer boycotts were most effective where local organisation was strongest, as in the Eastern Cape. (p. 14)
The consumer boycott worked best where organisation was most highly developed.
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The rent boycott reached 54 townships and imposed a large monthly cost on the state in 1986. (p. 15)
the spread of the rent boycott to 54 townships countrywide involving about 500 000 households and costing the state at least R40 million per month
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The author puts the urban unemployment rate at over 40% as one economic grievance behind the rent boycotts. (p. 15)
a growing number of unemployed people as the unemployment rate moves beyond the 40% mark
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Rent boycotts directly attack the fiscal base of township administration, unlike consumer boycotts. (p. 16)
It undermines the fiscal foundations of township administration and has recieved the full support of both trade union and community organisations.
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Leadership profiles contradict the 'petty bourgeois leadership' claim. (p. 7)
a high proportion of the UDF's leadership either are or have come from poor working class backgrounds
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The UDF's own leaders admitted they could not control the spontaneous militancy. (p. 12)
that we have been unable to respond effectively to the spontaneous waves of militancy around the country
Evidence ledger¶
Sources used¶
| Source | Kind | Period | How used |
|---|---|---|---|
| UDF list of affiliates, State v. Mawalal Ramgobin and 15 others, exhibit D7 | other | early 1984 | Tabulated the UDF's affiliates by region and type to show organisational composition, which the author then argues is misleading. |
| Transcript of UDF meeting proceedings, Natal, 18 July 1984 (exhibit M44, State v. Ramgobin and 15 others) | state archives | July 1984 | Source for a trade-union leader's class-struggle rhetoric within the UDF. |
| Labour Monitoring Group reports on stayaways (Transvaal Regional Stayaway Nov 1984; March 1985 Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage; May Day 1986; June 16th 1986), South African Labour Bulletin | newspapers periodicals | 1984-1986 | Supports stayaway participation figures, the account of union-community cooperation, and the sequence of events. |
| HSRC survey of black attitudes (de Kock, Rhoodie & Couper, 'Black Views on Socio-Political Change in South Africa') | secondary literature compilation | 1984 | Provides percentage support for the ANC, UDF, AZAPO and Inkatha, and reasons for supporting the UDF. |
| Schlemmer, Black Workers' Attitudes (University of Natal, 1984) survey | household or labour survey microdata | 1984 | Second survey of support for political groups, used to corroborate the UDF/ANC support base. |
| UDF information pamphlet, August 1986, on the rent boycott | union or movement records | August 1986 | Quoted to show the link between economic and political grievances in the rent boycott. |
| UDF Transvaal Education Forum internal discussion document, May 1985, 'From Protest to Challenge. Mobilisation to Organisation' | union or movement records | 1985 | Quoted as an internal admission that the UDF could not respond to spontaneous militancy. |
| Movement and press publications: Isizwe, Inqaba, Socialist Worker Review, New Era, Weekly Mail, community newspapers | newspapers periodicals | 1984-1986 | Used for activists' statements, leadership biographies and the ideological positions of socialists within the UDF. |
| Internal discussion paper, Transvaal Anti-President's Council movement | union or movement records | c. 1983-84 | Source for the Charterist rationale on multi-class strategy. |
| South African Labour Bulletin and South African Review articles on local struggles (PEBCO, 1980 Cape schools boycott, East London bus boycott, Transvaal townships, consumer boycotts) | secondary literature compilation | 1979-1986 | Supplies the narrative of local campaigns and boycotts on which the 'from below' argument rests. |
| Author's own unpublished research and fieldwork (MA dissertation on the Eastern Cape, 1979-1986; research papers) | author survey or fieldwork | 1979-1986 | Forthcoming dissertation cited as the place where the Eastern Cape claims will be substantiated. |
Inference¶
Quantification: Illustrative figures.
Qualitative, interpretive political analysis: a periodisation of UDF politics into four phases, regional comparison across the Eastern Cape, Western Cape, Natal and Transvaal, and use of movement documents, leadership biographies and two attitude surveys to rebut a rival (Callinicos) interpretation.
Key claims¶
| Claim | Basis | Strength |
|---|---|---|
| The township revolt was driven from below by local community organisations responding to urban conditions, not by UDF national strategy, except for the 1984 election boycotts. (p. 11) | Chronology of local struggles from secondary articles and Labour Bulletin reports, and the UDF Transvaal Education Forum document admitting inability to respond. | Partial data |
| The UDF's official affiliate list gives a misleading picture of its organisational strength, which is greatest in the Eastern Cape. (p. 4) | Tabulation from exhibit D7 plus the author's own regional knowledge, with no systematic counts of unlisted organisations. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| The UDF leadership is predominantly working class in origin, not petty bourgeois. (p. 8) | Biographical sketches of the Eastern Cape and Western Cape executives, drawn from a New Era article and the author's own knowledge. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| The 1984 attitude surveys show the ANC/UDF movement had far more support among urban Africans than AZAPO or Inkatha. (p. 17) | HSRC and Schlemmer survey percentages, which the author himself calls less reliable and which predate the UDF's expansion. | Partial data |
| The 1986 rent boycott spread to 54 townships, involved about 500,000 households and cost the state at least R40 million per month. (p. 15) | Asserted without a cited source; no footnote or dataset is given. | Asserted |
| The November 1984 Transvaal stayaway and the March 1985 Eastern Cape stayaway were mass actions that marked a turning point and brought unions and community organisations together. (p. 11) | Labour Monitoring Group reports and the author's Labour Bulletin and South African Review articles. | Partial data |
| Consumer boycotts worked best where local organisation, such as street and area committees, was most developed, as in the Eastern Cape. (p. 14) | Secondary Labour Bulletin accounts of boycotts and the author's regional knowledge; no systematic comparison. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| Economic conditions were deteriorating: a recession from early 1982, unemployment beyond 40%, a 600,000-unit housing shortage and average household size of 12. (p. 15) | Stated as general background without any cited statistical source. | Asserted |
The author's caveats¶
The author notes that the UDF's own affiliate list is misleading, that the 1984 surveys predate the UDF's expansion and are 'less reliable' attitudinal data, and that the Transvaal is too large and complex for generalisation.
Gaps in the evidence¶
The argument that resistance came from below is carried largely by secondary and movement accounts, with no systematic dataset of local protest events, organisations or membership. Event-level data (rent boycott, stayaway and unrest incidents by township), township-level fiscal data on Black Local Authorities, and post-1984 surveys would test the claims better. Police and Detainees' Parents' Support Committee records and UDF regional archives existed then, and many are accessible now. The statistics on rent boycotts, unemployment and housing are given without sources.
Replicability: Data poorly documented.