Review of A.H. Jeeves (1985), Migrant Labour in South Africa's Mining Economy: the struggle for the gold mines' labour supply¶
Rob Turrell (1986). Review of A.H. Jeeves (1985), Migrant Labour in South Africa's Mining Economy: the struggle for the gold mines' labour supply. Transformation 2.
| Type | journal article |
| Scope | Economics and economic history of apartheid |
| Method | synthesis review |
| Period studied | 1885–1920 |
| Regions | Witwatersrand, Kimberley, Eastern Cape/Transkei, Mozambique |
| Themes | mining migrant labour, origins segregation, labour markets wages, business and state |
| Citation key | turrell1986 |
Argument¶
Turrell reviews Jeeves's account of the thirty-year struggle (c.1890-1920) to build a Chamber of Mines recruiting monopsony. Jeeves argues that this long delay shows the weakness of mining capital and refutes liberal and radical views of Randlord hegemony. Turrell praises the vivid recovery of a neglected period of competitive recruiting, but says competition within and between capital groups does not disprove the power of monopoly capital. He also argues that Jeeves ignores the Kimberley precedent and gives a fudged account of the colour bar's origins. He says Jeeves over-weights recruiter inducements such as cattle advances against the proletarianization of African peasants.
Evidence and method¶
Secondary review of Jeeves's archival study. It draws on Jeeves's quoted claims, an anecdote from a 1915 statement by two Mozambican miners to the Native Labour Bureau, and Turrell's own knowledge of Kimberley labour history.
Place in the debates¶
- Strength of mining capital vs competition in the labour market (liberal/radical vs Jeeves) (see The mine migrant labour system: origins, recruitment, foreign labour and stabilisation). Turrell partly disagrees with Jeeves. He accepts the detail of competitive recruiting but holds that competition does not show capital's weakness. In his view monopoly capital means competition at a different level, not its abolition.
- Origins of the colour bar: white workers (liberal) vs mining capital (radical) (see The job colour bar, white labour and its erosion). Turrell rejects Jeeves's middle path that the colour bar and migrancy 'evolved together'. He sides with Davies: entrenched migrancy led white unionists to defend the colour bar, a pattern already settled at Kimberley.
- Incentives vs impoverishment in creating the Transkei/eastern Cape labour pool (see The mine migrant labour system: origins, recruitment, foreign labour and stabilisation). Turrell finds Jeeves's stress on recruitment policies such as cattle advances a poor balance against Bundy-style proletarianization. He argues that different forms of African incorporation into wage labour need explaining.
Findings¶
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Jeeves's main thesis: mining capital was weak, unable even to police its own labour supply before 1920. (p. 2)
could not even drive from their own backyard the illicit recruiters and labour touts who routinely plundered the mines of their labour supply
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Jeeves poses his challenge to radical historians as a question about the delay in securing a monopsony. (p. 2)
If the mining groups were as powerful as most historians think they were, if they had de facto control of the state as the radicals argue
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Early centralized recruiting failed because it was combined with wage cuts, which led workers to desert to better-paying mines. (p. 2)
was a failure for the simple reason that central control was coupled with wage reductions.
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By 1919 the Chamber of Mines had established an effective recruiting monopsony, helped by growing numbers of voluntary workers and concentration of ownership. (p. 3)
By 1919 the Chanter of Mines had managed to establish an effective recruiting monopsony.
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Turrell argues Jeeves exaggerates the role of independent recruiters, who supplied only a small share of South African labour at their peak. (p. 4)
who at the height of their power in 1911-1912 only supplied 20 per cent of the mines' South African labour supply
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At Kimberley, despite competitive recruiting and contractors, workers' wages fell steadily over the period. (p. 4)
and the wages of workers progressively declined between 1890 and 1914
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Jeeves's account of the colour bar is contested: he says the colour bar and migrant labour evolved together. (p. 5)
the colour bar and the migrant labour system evolved together1
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Turrell dates the statutory colour bar's origins to Kimberley rather than only to Kruger's 1890s measures. (p. 5)
The origins of the statutory colour bar go back to the rules and regulations relating to blasting, promulgated in 1885 1n Kimberley
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Migrancy was settled at Kimberley in the late 1880s through capital concentration, 'old hands' and closed compounds. (p. 5)
But the issue of migrancy on the Diamond Fields was settled in the late 1880s with the concentration of capital, the growth of 'old hands' and the introduction of the closed compound system
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Turrell rejects Jeeves's claim that race relations on the gold mines remained in flux until the monopsony, arguing it was labour-process terms that were in flux, not migrancy. (p. 5)
Jeeves wants us to believe that the pattern of race relations on the gold mines was In flux until a monopsony was created.
Evidence ledger¶
Sources used¶
| Source | Kind | Period | How used |
|---|---|---|---|
| Statement by Mozambican mineworkers 'Fokkies' and 'Forage' to the Union Government Native Labour Bureau (1915) | state archives | 1915 | Used (via Jeeves) as an illustrative anecdote of competitive recruiting and labour touting on the Rand. |
| Native Labour Regulation Act of 1911 | legislation gazette | 1911 | Cited as the law banning recruiting on the Rand, which underlies the WNLA police boy's pursuit of the workers in the anecdote. |
| Chamber of Mines and recruiting organisation records (Native Labour Department, Rand Native Labour Association, WNLA, Native Recruiting Corporation) as used by Jeeves | chamber of mines or recruiting records | 1890-1919 | Underpins Jeeves' periodisation of attempts to create a recruiting monopsony and the role of independent recruiters. |
| Recruitment statistics on independent contractors' share of South African mine labour supply (1911-1912) | secondary literature compilation | 1911-1912 | Cited by the reviewer to argue Jeeves exaggerates the importance of independent contractors. |
| Kimberley diamond mining labour history (De Beers compound system, wage trends 1890-1914, 1885 blasting regulations) | secondary literature compilation | 1870s-1914 | Reviewer uses the Kimberley experience as a comparative case against Jeeves' claims on competition, the colour bar and migrancy. |
| Kimberley blasting rules and regulations of 1885 | legislation gazette | 1885 | Cited by the reviewer as the origin of the statutory colour bar, earlier than the 1890s Kruger measures. |
Inference¶
Quantification: None.
A book review: assesses Jeeves' archival narrative of recruiting competition through logical critique and comparison with the Kimberley diamond fields; no new data analysis.
Key claims¶
| Claim | Basis | Strength |
|---|---|---|
| Jeeves argues that centralising recruiting control took about thirty years, showing the weakness rather than the strength of mining capital before 1920. (p. 80) | Jeeves' archival narrative of recruiting organisations and independent recruiters, as summarised by the reviewer. | Partial data |
| Early centralising attempts failed because central control was coupled with wage reductions, which led to desertion to higher-paying mines and labour shortages. (p. 80) | Jeeves' account of the Chamber of Mines' Native Labour Department, Rand Native Labour Association and WNLA, relayed by the reviewer. | Partial data |
| By 1912 the balance shifted back to capital because of increased voluntary workers and further centralisation of ownership in the super mines, producing an effective monopsony by 1919. (p. 81) | Jeeves' narrative of recruiting trends and mine concentration, as summarised by the reviewer. | Partial data |
| Reviewer argues that Kimberley showed the same pattern of labour competition, with the balance shifting after concentration of capital, old hands and closed compounds, so Rand competition does not prove capital's general weakness. (p. 82) | Reviewer's general knowledge of Kimberley secondary literature; no specific sources cited. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| Independent contractors' importance is exaggerated, since they supplied only 20 per cent of South African mine labour at their peak. (p. 82) | A single recruitment share figure for 1911-1912 attributed to the Jeeves data. | Partial data |
| The statutory colour bar originated in Kimberley's 1885 blasting regulations, not just Kruger's 1890s measures, and migrancy was settled on the Diamond Fields by the late 1880s. (p. 83) | Reviewer's assertion about Kimberley regulations and the closed compound system; no citation. | Asserted |
| Jeeves overstates the role of recruitment inducements (cattle advances, recruiting fees) in explaining the Transkei labour pool, understating impoverishment and proletarianization. (p. 83) | Quotation from Jeeves p 258 versus Bundy's argument; reviewer's assessment without new data. | Asserted |
The author's caveats¶
The reviewer notes that the history of labour contracting in Kimberley has still to be written, so comparative evidence is incomplete.
Gaps in the evidence¶
The review makes comparative claims about Kimberley, the colour bar and Transkei incentives without citing specific archival or statistical sources. Testing the argument would need recruitment returns by recruiter and region, wage series by mine and year, and Kimberley compound and contractor records; much of this exists in Chamber of Mines and Cape archives. Cattle-advance and household income data from the eastern Cape would allow a better test of the inducement-versus-impoverishment debate.
Replicability: Not applicable.