The Pattern of Diplomatic Sanctions against South Africa 1948-1994¶
Christopher, A. J. (1994). The Pattern of Diplomatic Sanctions against South Africa 1948-1994. GeoJournal 34(4). Kluwer Academic Publishers.
| Type | journal article |
| Scope | Wider apartheid literature |
| Method | descriptive quantitative |
| Period studied | 1948–1994 |
| Regions | South Africa, Western Europe, Latin America, Africa, Asia |
| Themes | sanctions divestment, politics ideology elections, transition post apartheid, resistance social movements |
| Citation key | christopher1994 |
Argument¶
Christopher uses the geography of South African diplomatic representation abroad to chart diplomatic sanctions, the 'symbolically most severe' form of peacetime sanction, against apartheid. South Africa's small foreign service, concentrated in western Europe and North America, shrank in relative terms as African and Asian states refused recognition. Part of the isolation was self-inflicted, and the 1970s outward policy and the 1980s 'total onslaught' era brought only marginal gains, mainly in Latin America and among other pariah states. The end of the Cold War and de Klerk's reforms widened representation into eastern Europe. Normal relations came only with Mandela's inauguration in 1994. The argument is built from a series of maps and tables of missions at 1948, 1965, 1979, 1989, 1993 and 1994.
Evidence and method¶
Official South African sources (Official Yearbook 1948, Department of Foreign Affairs lists 1993 and 1994, Who's Who of Southern Africa for 1966, 1980 and 1990), Hansard, press reports, UN and OAU resolutions, secondary literature on foreign policy and the ANC's diplomacy (Thomas 1989); tabulated and mapped counts of resident missions.
Place in the debates¶
- Sanctions effectiveness and the forms sanctions took (see Sanctions, disinvestment and the anti-apartheid movement). Argues that diplomatic non-recognition was the symbolically most severe sanction and was widely adopted, while noting that even states imposing economic sanctions stopped short of withdrawing recognition. It does not assess economic effects.
- Whether South Africa's isolation was externally imposed or self-inflicted (see Sanctions, disinvestment and the anti-apartheid movement). Holds that isolation was partly self-inflicted, through the rejection of communist states and black African diplomats and the Commonwealth exit, and that the government was not greatly concerned by it.
Findings¶
-
South Africa began the apartheid era with a small diplomatic network that relied on the Commonwealth. (p. 1)
Thus South Africa only maintained 15 resident external high commissions and missions at that date
-
By 1965 no African or Asian state maintained diplomatic relations with South Africa. (p. 2)
Thus none of the 68 states of the extensive African and Asian grouping maintained diplomatic relations with South Africa.
-
The UN and OAU made diplomatic isolation an explicit policy in 1961 and 1963. (p. 2)
In 1961 the General Assembly of the United Nations called upon all states to end diplomatic relations with South Africa.
-
Isolation was in part self-inflicted, and the government rejected relations with a black African ambassador. (p. 3)
the prospect of a black African ambassador in "White" Pretoria was enough to cause its rejection
-
The Vorster-era outward policy found partners mostly among Latin American regimes and other pariah states. (p. 4)
by 1979 South Africa had established full diplomatic relations with some eight states in South and Central America
-
None of the homeland 'independences' gained any external recognition. (p. 4)
Although South Africa established embassies in all four countries, no external country followed suit.
-
By 1989 representation had contracted to a very small base compared with the 166 independent states. (p. 5)
maintained full resident embassies in only 21 capitals, together with two legations
-
Even states pursuing economic sanctions stopped short of withdrawing recognition. (p. 5)
even those pursuing international economic sanctions against the country stopped short of withdrawing diplomatic recognition
-
The reform era increased missions, but the pattern stayed skewed toward Europe. (p. 6)
The number of South African diplomatic missions increased from 23 to 39
-
Normalisation came only after the 1994 inauguration; by late 1994 representation shifted to Africa. (p. 7)
By late 1994 some 69 resident high commissioners and ambassadors represented South Africa abroad
Evidence ledger¶
Sources used¶
| Source | Kind | Period | How used |
|---|---|---|---|
| South Africa: Official Yearbook of the Union of South Africa 1948 | official statistical series | 1948 (published 1949) | Establishes the 1948 baseline of 15 resident South African high commissions and missions, plus non-reciprocal foreign representation. |
| Who's Who in Southern Africa 1966 | newspapers periodicals | 1965-66 | Source for the 19 resident missions abroad in 1965 and their status (embassy or legation), mapped in Fig 2. |
| Who's Who of Southern Africa 1980 | newspapers periodicals | 1979-80 | Documents the 1979 representation, including full relations with eight Latin American states (Fig 3). |
| Who's Who of Southern Africa 1990 | newspapers periodicals | 1989-90 | Source for 1989 representation: 21 resident embassies and two legations (Fig 4). |
| South Africa: Department of Foreign Affairs List 1993 | commission or official report | 1993 | Establishes the increase from 23 to 39 South African missions under de Klerk and the 1993 distribution (Fig 6). |
| South Africa: Department of Foreign Affairs List 1994b | commission or official report | late 1994 | Gives the post-election count of 69 resident high commissioners and ambassadors and the new African focus (Fig 7). |
| South Africa: List of guests to President Mandela's inauguration, 10 May 1994 | commission or official report | 10 May 1994 | Shows that over 130 governments were represented at the inauguration. |
| South Africa: Monthly Abstract of Trade Statistics 1993 | official statistical series | 1993 | Supports the claim of imbalance between trade patterns and levels of diplomatic representation. |
| Hansard (House of Assembly Debates) 1961, vol. 107, col. 4173 | parliamentary debates | 1961 | Quoted Verwoerd speech illustrating the government's isolationist attitude to the Afro-Asian bloc and the UN. |
| Hansard 8 August 1994 | parliamentary debates | 1994 | Cited for the possible refocusing of diplomatic attention on neighbouring African countries. |
| Times (London) 24 April 1991 | newspapers periodicals | 1991 | Source for Zambia's 1964 rejection of diplomatic relations because a black African ambassador in Pretoria was unacceptable. |
| Pretoria News 10 May 1994 | newspapers periodicals | 10 May 1994 | Reports that the inauguration was one of the largest gatherings of foreign heads of state since WWII. |
| Thomas, S. (1989) unpublished PhD thesis on ANC diplomacy | secondary literature compilation | 1960-1989 | Basis for the ANC mission network mapped in Fig 5 and the claim it exceeded the government's representation. |
| Muller, M.E. (1976) Suid-Afrikaanse buitelandse verteenwoordiging 1910-1972 | secondary literature compilation | 1910-1972 | Background for the government's push to establish direct links outside the Commonwealth heritage. |
| Cervenka (1968) quoting OAU 1967 resolution | commission or official report | 1963-1967 | Quoted OAU resolution showing the diplomatic isolation policy. |
New data¶
The author compiled a time-series of South African resident diplomatic representation (Table 1) and maps for 1948, 1965, 1979, 1989, 1993 and 1994, plus a map of ANC missions in 1985, from the official lists and Who's Who volumes.
Inference¶
Quantification: Descriptive tables.
Descriptive comparison across snapshot years (1948, 1965, 1979, 1989, 1993, 1994) of the number, status and spatial distribution of South African missions, mapped and tabulated and interpreted against the chronology of apartheid policy, OAU/UN resolutions and Cold War politics.
Key claims¶
| Claim | Basis | Strength |
|---|---|---|
| In 1948 South Africa maintained only 15 resident missions, concentrated in western Europe and the Commonwealth, mirroring trade and migration links. (p. 439) | Official Yearbook 1948 listing of missions; Table 1 and Fig 1. | Systematic data |
| By 1965 no African or Asian state (68 states) maintained diplomatic relations with South Africa, and the Cairo embassy had closed. (p. 440) | Who's Who 1966 mission list and Fig 2. | Partial data |
| Vorster's outward policy expanded relations mainly to Latin America and a few pariah states (Taiwan, Israel, Malawi). (p. 442) | Who's Who 1980 mission list; narrative of individual cases. | Partial data |
| Under Botha the diplomatic network contracted, to only 21 embassies and two legations by 1989 against some 166 independent states. (p. 443) | Who's Who 1990 and Fig 4. | Systematic data |
| Missions rose from 23 to 39 under de Klerk, concentrated in Europe (24 of 39), while most African and Asian states withheld recognition until Mandela took office. (p. 444) | Department of Foreign Affairs list 1993 and Fig 6. | Systematic data |
| After the May 1994 inauguration Africa and Asia became the focus of representation, with 69 resident envoys by late 1994 and many non-resident accreditations. (p. 445) | Department of Foreign Affairs list 1994 and inauguration guest list; Fig 7. | Systematic data |
| The ANC ran a more extensive diplomatic network than the South African government and contributed to the success of sanctions. (p. 443) | Thomas 1989 thesis and Fig 5; no direct measure of impact. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
The author's caveats¶
None stated; the author notes that consular representatives in colonies and dependencies are excluded and that lower-level representation is only treated as a sign of strained relations.
Gaps in the evidence¶
The argument rests on counts of missions and descriptive narrative, with no direct measure of how recognition or non-recognition affected trade, finance or politics. Foreign ministry archives, cabinet records and the UN/OAU voting record (existing then and now) would allow testing of causal claims about the motives and effects of isolation. Fuller tabulation of reciprocal versus non-reciprocal representation, and of staffing and budgets, would strengthen the comparison across years.
Replicability: Data described but not public.