Capital Restructuring and the Modification of the Racial Division of Labour in South Africa¶
Robert Davies (1979). Capital Restructuring and the Modification of the Racial Division of Labour in South Africa. Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2. Taylor & Francis.
| Type | journal article |
| Scope | Economics and economic history of apartheid |
| Method | mixed |
| Period studied | 1960–1990 |
| Regions | South Africa |
| Themes | labour markets wages, business and state, manufacturing industrial policy, politics ideology elections, unions strikes, sanctions divestment, inequality poverty unemployment, resistance social movements |
| Citation key | davies1979a |
Argument¶
Davies argues from a Marxist, Poulantzian perspective that the mid-1970s moves to scrap job reservation and closed-shop colour bars (ahead of the Wiehahn Commission) reflect imperatives of capital rather than concessions. Shortages of skilled, supervisory and white-collar labour had existed since the mid-1960s. They were tolerable during the boom because of 'floating the colour bar' and abundant foreign capital. After the mid-1970s the profitability crisis, falling foreign inflows and the 1976 uprisings made the racial hierarchy a burden. Raising the organic composition of capital also increases demand for supervisory and mental places, and heightened black working-class organisation ruled out simply raising exploitation by cutting wages or lengthening hours. He argues the reforms will do little for most Africans, will fuel structural unemployment, and may enlarge a black petty bourgeoisie that the bourgeoisie can try to co-opt. He backs this with international occupational comparisons and projections for 1990.
Evidence and method¶
Press reports (Financial Mail, Rand Daily Mail), SAIRR Surveys of Race Relations, statements by business leaders (Oppenheimer, Suzman, Federated Chamber of Industries, South African Foundation), official figures from the Minister of Labour and the Reserve Bank, HSRC and Chamber of Mines manpower studies (Vermaak, Parsons), ILO occupational data for the cross-country comparison in Table 1, Simkins and Clarke on structural unemployment, and the Economic Development Programme 1976-81 for the projections in Table 2.
Place in the debates¶
- Liberal vs revisionist/Marxist views on the relationship between capitalism and racial discrimination (see Liberal vs revisionist: was apartheid functional or dysfunctional for capitalist growth?). Revisionist: the racial division of labour first served capital, then ceased to do so when profitability fell and black militancy rose. Reform is a bourgeois strategy to restructure and secure exploitation, not a victory for liberal rationality.
- Whether reform of the job colour bar reflects economic imperatives or political pressure (see The job colour bar, white labour and its erosion). Both are needed. Skill shortages alone were insufficient, since they were mitigated during the boom. The reform became imperative only with the combined economic crisis and the political crisis after the 1976 uprisings.
- Class position of white wage earners and the white labour–capital alliance (see The job colour bar, white labour and its erosion). Most white wage earners are 'new petty bourgeois' and politically bound to the bourgeoisie. Economic conflict over job reservation is therefore unlikely to change their political polarization, although it may strain political alliances.
- African advancement through upward social mobility (liberal ideology) (see The job colour bar, white labour and its erosion). Rejected as a myth. Even optimistic projections give fewer than one in six economically active Africans any gain.
Findings¶
-
The racial hierarchy of labour no longer serves capital's interests in its existing form. (p. 3)
the continued reproduction of such a racist hierarchical division of labour, at least in its present form, no longer accords with the interests of the bourgeoisie
-
South Africa's share of professional, administrative, clerical and sales workers fell below the norm for middle-level industrialised countries by 1970, indicating skill shortage. (p. 4)
by 1970 it had come to diverge quite markedly (having only 16.5 per cent of its economically active population in ISCO categories 0-3 compared to a norm of about 18-20 per cent)
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Chamber of Mines projections implied a massive unfilled white-collar gap by 1990 unless other races filled it. (p. 5)
this indicates a shortage of 1,448,000 unfilled white collar places unless they are turned over to persons of other races.
-
During the boom, shortages in production were managed by floating the colour bar, buying off white workers with promotion and concessions. (p. 6)
it involved 'buying out' the acceptance of white wage earners for the 'fragmentation', 'dilution' or 'reclassification' of artisanal tasks previously performed by whites.
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Foreign investment returns in South Africa fell relative to other states, undermining the earlier cushion of abundant foreign capital. (p. 9)
in 1976, for example, the return on US capital invested in countries like Nigeria and Libya exceeded that on US capital invested in South Africa
-
Foreign capital flows reversed sharply between 1974/5 and 1976/7. (p. 10)
million compared to a net inflow of R1,635 million in 1974/5
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Black working-class militancy closed off absolute-wage or working-day strategies for raising profitability, pushing capital towards a higher organic composition. (p. 10)
the greater degree of organization and militancy displayed by the black working class in recent years has made any strategy relying predominantly on such direct assaults too risky for the dominant classes.
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Raising the organic composition of capital necessarily raises demand for supervisory and mental labour, making racial restructuring an imperative. (p. 10)
the only solution available to its profitability problems must necessarily involve an increased demand for these categories of labour power.
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After 1976 the bourgeoisie shared an aim of creating a black middle class committed to free enterprise. (p. 11)
some form of restructuring which would allow the emergence of a significant 'black middle class' committed to 'free enterprise values'
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Major business bodies had organised in favour of ending job reservation after Soweto. (p. 13)
have been committed to a policy of actively seeking to end job reservation
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Repeal of job reservation leaves the fundamental exploitation of the African working class untouched. (p. 15)
What clearly will not be affected, at least directly, however, are the fundamental relations of capitalist exploitation to which the mass of the African working class is subjected.
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Under optimistic projections, few Africans would benefit from reclassification of jobs. (p. 17)
the potential gains from any such process of restructuring would be limited even on the most optimistic assumptions to less than one-sixth of the total 'economically active' African population of 1990.
Evidence ledger¶
Sources used¶
| Source | Kind | Period | How used |
|---|---|---|---|
| Financial Mail (various issues 1976-1978) | newspapers periodicals | 1976-1978 | Reports of job reservation repeal, closed shop agreements, Wiehahn expectations, bourgeois statements and union reactions. |
| Rand Daily Mail (various issues 1970-1978) | newspapers periodicals | 1970-1978 | Source for ministerial figures, employer/business-leader statements, and state/union positions on job reservation. |
| Official vacancy statistics (April 1977) as cited by the Minister of Labour | official statistical series | April 1977 | Shows continuing shortages of 99,000 in professional, semi-professional and technical grades despite the recession. |
| Official estimate of employer numbers (Minister of Labour) | official statistical series | recession, c. 1977-78 | Shows that employers declined from 41,000 to 39,000 yet skill shortages persisted. |
| Vermaak et al., 'The Demand and Supply of Manpower, Part 1', HSRC Report No. 70 | commission or official report | 1977 | Documents shortages of technicians, supervisors and artisans in production. |
| ILO, 'The Occupational Structure of Employment 1960-1980' and ILO Yearbooks of Labour Statistics | international trade or finance data | 1956-1975 | Table 1 compares share of economically active population in ISCO categories 0-3 across countries to show South Africa diverging by 1970. |
| J. A. Parsons, 'Manpower Needs for the Future' (unpublished paper, Chamber of Mines), quoted in SAIRR Survey 1977 | company records or reports | projection to 1990 | Projected demand for 2,796,000 white colour employees by 1990 against 1,348,000 whites available; also supplies 780,000 skilled/semi-skilled African production jobs for Table 2. |
| SAIRR, Survey of Race Relations in South Africa (1976, 1977) | secondary literature compilation | 1976-1977 | Source for business memoranda, Leistner quotation, organisational demands to end job reservation, and 1976 African wage figures. |
| Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Export Trade of the Republic of South Africa (Reynders Commission), Vol II, RP 69/72 | commission or official report | 1972 | Evidence of state measures in 1972 to accelerate floating of the colour bar and retrain whites. |
| South African Reserve Bank, Annual Economic Report 1977 | international trade or finance data | 1974/5-1976/7 | Documents decline in long-term foreign investment inflow and net capital outflow in 1976/7. |
| US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Report on US Corporate Interests in Africa (Senator Dick Clark, 1978) | commission or official report | 1976 | Shows return on US capital in Nigeria and Libya exceeded that in South Africa in 1976. |
| Simkins and Clarke, Structural Unemployment in Southern Africa, Table 20 | secondary literature compilation | c. 1978 | Supplies the estimate of structural unemployment at 22.4 per cent. |
| Economic Development Programme of the Republic of South Africa 1976-1981 | commission or official report | 1976-1981 | Supplies projected growth of the economically active population by race underlying the Table 2 projections to 1990. |
| Evidence of Secretary of Labour to the Cillie Commission, via Rand Daily Mail | commission or official report | 1977 | Shows departmental officials' earlier opposition to abolishing job reservation. |
| Statements by business leaders and organisations (Oppenheimer, Suzman, FCI, Leistner, Hersov, Rupert, etc.) | secondary literature compilation | 1970-1977 | Quoted as evidence of bourgeois positions on floating the colour bar and later demands for repeal of job reservation. |
New data¶
Author constructs illustrative projections (Tables 1 and 2) of African occupancy of ISCO 0-3 posts by 1990 under two assumptions, and a cross-country table compiled from ILO data; no new primary dataset.
Inference¶
Quantification: Illustrative figures.
Theoretical Marxist structural argument (circuit of capital, organic composition, class struggle) illustrated with press quotations, official statistics and a simple scenario projection for 1990; no statistical testing.
Key claims¶
| Claim | Basis | Strength |
|---|---|---|
| South Africa experienced a shortage of skilled, supervisory and white-collar labour from the mid-1960s, as shown by vacancy figures, international comparison and projections. (p. 184) | Official vacancy figures, ILO cross-country ISCO shares (Table 1), Parsons' Chamber of Mines projection. | Partial data |
| During the 1960s and early 1970s boom the shortages were mitigated by floating the colour bar and by abundant foreign investment, so there was no imperative to confront the colour bar. (p. 184) | Secondary studies, Reynders Commission, press and business quotations; the foreign capital link is explicitly tentative. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| Business organisations and the state moved to end job reservation only after the 1976 uprising and after securing white union acquiescence. (p. 192) | Press reports (Financial Mail, Rand Daily Mail) and SAIRR Survey on organisational demands and ministerial statements. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| Even on optimistic assumptions, reforms would raise only a small minority of Africans into new petty bourgeois posts (under one-sixth of the economically active by 1990), so 'upward mobility' is a myth. (p. 196) | Scenario calculation (Tables 2A-C) from EDP growth projections, 1974 occupational shares and Parsons' estimate, with arbitrarily chosen parameters. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| By 1970 South Africa's share of economically active in ISCO categories 0-3 (16.5%) fell below the norm of about 18-20% for middle-level industrialised countries, having been on par in 1960. (p. 183) | ILO occupational structure data and Yearbooks of Labour Statistics compiled in Table 1. | Systematic data |
The author's caveats¶
Acknowledges that all the shortage calculations 'do have defects'; describes the 30% Coloured/Asian share as 'selected arbitrarily'; calls the foreign-capital mitigation argument tentative and presents 1990 figures as assumption-based projections.
Gaps in the evidence¶
The argument about falling profitability and foreign capital as the driver is not backed by profit-rate or investment series, nor by firm-level evidence (company records, employer association minutes, Chamber of Mines files) on how employers actually responded. Occupational census data by race and industry (1960, 1970) and Department of Labour manpower surveys could test shortages and colour-bar floating directly; these existed then. Archival records of the Wiehahn Commission and union/employer negotiations became available later.
Replicability: Data poorly documented.