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State Bureaucracy and Black Labour in South Africa: The Milling Workers' Strike of 1944

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David Duncan (1989). State Bureaucracy and Black Labour in South Africa: The Milling Workers' Strike of 1944. African Studies Seminar Paper No. 257, African Studies Institute, University of the Witwatersrand (seminar 31 July 1989). University of the Witwatersrand, African Studies Institute.

Type conference paper
Scope Economics and economic history of apartheid
Method archival narrative
Period studied 1941–1945
Regions Witwatersrand (Rand), Pretoria, Transvaal, Natal (Durban)
Themes unions strikes, labour markets wages, business and state, resistance social movements, politics ideology elections
Citation key duncan1989

Argument

Duncan argues that South African historiography treats the state as too unified, and neglects the bureaucracy. Through the 1944 coal distributors' and milling workers' strikes he shows that the Department of Labour and the Native Affairs Department (NAD) had distinct institutional interests, procedures and 'constituencies'. The Labour Department's preoccupation with white unions and elaborate arbitration procedures left African workers desperate enough to strike. NAD and Labour then fell back on arrests and replacement labour, and were angered when employers made an unofficial compromise that bypassed their machinery. He concludes that the state still combined fairly effectively, with Smuts approving most steps, to keep workers in check and serve capital's long-term interests.

Evidence and method

Archival files from Central Archives Depot (Department of Labour LC1052 series; NAD NTS 199/332 and 138/332), Transvaal Archives (GNLB), plus contemporary newspapers (Star, Rand Daily Mail, Guardian, Forum, Die Vaderland, Die Transvaler), police spy reports, and secondary works (Simons & Simons, Yudelman, Davies, Johnstone, Greenberg, Moodie, Lewis).

Place in the debates

Findings

  • Over 1,200 African milling workers struck in September 1944, more than half were arrested, and a few shillings' wage gain followed within four months. (p. 3)

    The stoppage lasted only a few days, but it involved over 1200 hundred labourers) mare than half of whom mere arrested.

  • Historiography has treated the state as too unified and neglected the bureaucracy. (p. 3)

    South African historiography has neglected the State and its internal divisions and contradictions, especially in the context of its relations with labour.

  • The Labour Department's preference for white unions and its paternalism or hostility to African unions shaped its handling of the dispute. (p. 9)

    their treatment of the nascent African unions was at best off-hand and on occasion openly hostile.

  • The 1942 Conciliation Board settlement favoured the white skilled workers represented there over Africans, feeding African impatience in 1944. (p. 11)

    Predictably, though, the final settlement was much more favourable to those directly represented at the meeting than to Africans.

  • Pass-bearing Africans could not present their own case before the Conciliation Board, forcing reliance on the white union. (p. 11)

    as pass-bearing Africans were prevented under the Industrial Conciliation Act from putting their own case.

  • The Labour Department's procedural preoccupation caused it to lose sight of the strike threat despite repeated warnings. (p. 13)

    the Department of Labour completely lost sight of the prospect of a strike. Instead, its officials busied themselves with the intricate procedures involved in administering a Board

  • TAMWU's initial wage demand was modest, and the strike was initially averted only at the last minute by announcing a Conciliation Board. (p. 14)

    its Secretary asked for a minimum wage of L.2 p&r week plus cost of living allowance.

  • Had the Minister appointed an arbitrator under War Measure 145, the strike could have been prevented. (p. 15)

    If the Minister of Labour had then heeded TAMWU's request for an arbitrator under War Measure 145, the strike could still have been prevented.

  • NAD prioritised its authority among Africans over restarting the mills. (p. 10)

    In the course of the strike, it became more important for the NAD to avoid loss of face before the black- proletariat than to put the mills back to work.

  • Employers broke ranks and negotiated an unofficial compromise with the CRJ, undermining the departments' strategy. (p. 17)

    The mill-owners further bound themselves to take back 70"/. of the workers immediately, and to negotiate with TAMWU for a wage increase.

  • The arbitrator's award raised wages by 4s.10d on the Rand and 2s.4d in Pretoria, and charges were dropped. (p. 20)

    a rise of 4s.l0d on the Rand, and 2s.4d in Pretoria.

Evidence ledger

Sources used

Source Kind Period How used
Native Affairs Department files NTS 199/332 (milling strike), Central Archives Depot Pretoria state archives 1944 Principal source for NAD, DNL and police handling of the milling strike, including minutes of the employers' deputation, police spy reports and DNL-SNA correspondence.
Native Affairs Department file NTS 138/332 (coal distributors' strike), CAD Pretoria state archives 1941-1944 Establishes the course of the June 1944 coal distributors' strike, the arrests, and the DNL's rough notes.
Department of Labour files ARB LC1052/409 (milling dispute 1944), CAD Pretoria state archives 1944-1945 Documents Labour Department delays, Conciliation Board minutes, union and employer correspondence, the arbitrator's award and the department's reaction to the unofficial settlement.
Department of Labour file ARB LC1052/282 (1942 milling Conciliation Board) state archives 1941-1942 Shows the 1942 Conciliation Board's composition, wage settlement and Natal African union protests that preceded the 1944 strike.
Minutes of Conciliation Board, 14 August 1944, and arbitrator Charles Fraser's memorandum on the award, 23/12/44 commission or official report 1944 Supplies wage rates, compound and ration deductions, and the arbitrator's condemnation of compounds.
Government Native Labour Bureau file GNLB 291/18/78, Transvaal Archives Depot state archives 1923 Supports the account of labour area reorganisation by the Public Services Commission in 1923.
Other CAD files: NTS 449/280 'Efficiency of Native Labour'; NTS 585/313 pt.2P; Dept. of Agriculture R3699; ARB CF2/0, F2/0 state archives 1919-1944 Supports background on departmental development, scientific management, Labour Department duties and Smuts's view of wage increases and inflation.
Police spy and detective reports on TAMWU meetings (e.g. Det/Bgnt Boy report 29/7/44) state archives 1944 Shows that the police were the best-informed branch of the State in the early stages, from union meeting surveillance.
Government Notice No.1222, 21/7/44 (Wage Board settlement, coal distributors) legislation gazette 1944 Gives the final wage settlement for coal distributors' labourers after arbitration.
Industrial Conciliation Act 1924, Wage Act 1925, Native Labour Regulation Act 1911, and War Measures 9 and 145 of 1942 legislation gazette 1911-1942 Describes the legal machinery of conciliation, arbitration and control under which the departments operated and the strike was declared illegal.
The Star, Rand Daily Mail, The Guardian, Forum, Sunday Times, Die Vaderland, Die Transvaler, Natal Witness, Daily Mail (1944) newspapers periodicals June-September 1944 Provides strike numbers, arrests, political reaction, the CRJ-employers' agreement and press positions.
Yudelman, Davies, Johnstone; Dubow D.Phil.; Greenberg; Phillips Ph.D.; Moodie 1988; Simons & Simons; Lewis secondary literature compilation 1900-1960 Historiographic framing and context on the Labour Department, Wage Act operation, and the 1946 mineworkers' strike; not data sources.

Inference

Quantification: Illustrative figures.

Single archive-based case study of one strike, with comparison to the earlier coal distributors' strike. Narrative reconstruction from departmental correspondence, minutes and press reports, interpreted through bureaucratic-politics and social-theory frameworks (Weber, Giddens, scientific management).

Key claims

Claim Basis Strength
The strike was precipitated partly by the Labour Department's preoccupation with its own procedures and with white unions, which led it to neglect warnings and delay an arbitrator for African workers. (p. 9) Labour Department file LC1052/409 correspondence and Conciliation Board minutes; NTS 199/332 DNL reports. Partial data
Native Affairs and Labour Departments learned from the coal strike to coordinate more closely and to rely on police coercion, but repeated the failed tactic of mass arrests and over-estimated employer cooperation. (p. 8) NTS 138/332 and 199/332 files; police and DNL minutes; press reports of arrests. Partial data
The state bureaucracy was internally divided, with departmental interests such as NAD prestige and Labour procedural integrity diverging from each other and from employers' short-term interests. (p. 18) Minutes of milling employers' deputation to the Minister of Native Affairs 26/9/44; Chief Clerk memos in LC1052/409. Partial data
The 1942 Conciliation Board settlement favoured skilled white workers over Africans and fuelled African discontent in 1944. (p. 11) Conciliation Board minutes and Chief Clerk memo (LC1052/282); letters from the Natal African union. Partial data
Roughly 1200-1500 Africans struck, 646 were arrested, and employers broke ranks to negotiate an unofficial compromise with the CRJ. (p. 17) The Star and Rand Daily Mail reports; Rand Daily Mail 18/9/44 and 20/9/44. Illustrative or anecdotal
The strike produced modest gains: arbitrator's award of 4s.10d on the Rand and 2s.4d in Pretoria, and charges against strikers were dropped. (p. 20) LC1052/409 Chief Clerk to Secretary for Labour 2/1/45; NTS 199/332 DNL to SNA 25/10/44. Partial data
Overall the State combined fairly effectively under Smuts's approval to keep workers in check despite internal divisions. (p. 21) Interpretive synthesis of the archival narrative. Asserted

The author's caveats

The author notes some uncertainties of motive, e.g. that it is unclear whether milling companies deliberately avoided forming a single employer body, and that the NMWIU may have confused the Natal and Transvaal African unions.

Gaps in the evidence

The account rests almost entirely on official departmental files and press, so the strikers' and African unions' own perspectives, such as TAMWU and CNETU records or worker testimony, are largely absent. There are no systematic data on milling wages, employment, firm finances or the arrested workers' fates that would test the claims on grievances and outcomes. Employer association records and Wage Board materials existed and could be used to test the claim about employers' short-term versus long-term interests.

Replicability: Data described but not public.