The Regulation of Working Conditions for Africans, 1918-1948¶
David Duncan (1990). The Regulation of Working Conditions for Africans, 1918-1948. History Workshop, 'Structure and Experience in the Making of Apartheid', University of the Witwatersrand, 6-10 February 1990. University of the Witwatersrand, History Workshop.
| Type | conference paper |
| Scope | Economics and economic history of apartheid |
| Method | archival narrative |
| Period studied | 1918–1948 |
| Regions | Witwatersrand, Transvaal, Natal, South Africa (Union) |
| Themes | origins segregation, mining migrant labour, labour markets wages, business and state, manufacturing industrial policy, unions strikes |
| Citation key | duncan1990a |
Argument¶
Duncan examines how three state bodies regulated working conditions: the Factory Inspectorate (Department of Labour), the Mines Division under the Government Mining Engineer (GME), and the Native Labour Bureau (GNLB) in the Native Affairs Department. He argues that the state was not just a simple instrument of capital. Bureaucrats had 'relative autonomy', and their own procedures, careers, social backgrounds and perceptions of their 'constituency' shaped enforcement. Factory inspectors saw white workers as their constituency and applied British-style reformism. Mines inspectors acted as a 'Trojan Horse' for the gold industry and did little for safety or compounds. Native Labour officials protected the migrant labour and compound system under a weak paternalist 'trusteeship'. Inspection improved some standards, but conditions for Africans stayed harsh and the migrant system survived intact to 1948.
Evidence and method¶
Archival material: Native Affairs, Mines and Labour department files (GNLB, NTS, MNW, ARB series), annual Department of Labour reports (U.G.), Union Year Books, statutes and government gazettes. Commission evidence held at Wits Archives (Mills 1925, Holloway/Native Economic Commission 1931, Kotze and Pirow evidence, Low Grade Mines Commission). Secondary works: Yudelman, Davies, Dubow, van Onselen, Hindson. Theory from Marx, Weber, Poulantzas and Williams.
Place in the debates¶
- Instrumentalist vs relative-autonomy views of the state (Marxist state theory) (see The state and capital: instrumentalism, autonomy and fractions of capital). Accepts that the state served capital's long-term interests but argues bureaucrats had relative autonomy. Their own institutional interests, professional backgrounds and racial attitudes shaped policy, so branches of the state could respond to other interests without the state 'bringing down the whole edifice'.
- State-mining capital symbiosis (Yudelman) and fractions of capital (Davies) (see The state and capital: instrumentalism, autonomy and fractions of capital). Agrees with Yudelman's account of Kotze and Pirow's role in mine politics, but says Yudelman judges them by how well they fit his symbiosis theory. Duncan adds social background and perceptions of constituency to explain why mines and factory inspectors behaved differently.
- Cheap labour thesis: could the gold mines afford better wages and conditions? (see Cheap labour thesis and the function of the reserves). Rejects the mines' claim that their cost structure could not bear better treatment. Dividends show viable alternatives existed, and the mines chose bonded, cheap migrant labour because it paid more. Their propaganda convinced many that there was no alternative.
- Was workplace segregation a conspiracy to divide the working class? (see The job colour bar, white labour and its erosion). Denies a conspiracy by the Labour Department. Section 51 segregation in the 1941 Factories Act is attributed to Afrikaner Nationalist pressure and prevailing social values, while the department preferred non-discrimination and incorporation of Africans into the industrial conciliation framework.
Findings¶
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Despite some safety gains from inspection, treatment of African workers stayed poor on average. (p. 4)
the average treatment meted out to Africans in mines and industry remained very poor
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The 1941 Factories Act applied to Africans only belatedly (not until 1945). (p. 9)
In the first place, the 1941 Factories Act was not applied until September 1945.
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The 1941 Act excluded the labourers who were mostly African. (p. 9)
the act excluded labourers working within the precincts of a factory (such as packers and handlers), the vast majority of whom were Africans.
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The Labour Department would not impose a white-only labour force on secondary industry because of industrial and political costs. (p. 7)
neither Hertzog nor Smuts would agree to overloading secondary industry at one blow with a more expensive and untrained white labour force.
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Factory growth was rapid after 1933, which strained the inspectorate. (p. 8)
Of 5754 factories registered under the act in 1939, 3597 had been established since 1933.
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The Low Grade Mines Commission, chaired by GME Kotze, opposed higher African wages, citing the effect on other sectors. (p. 11)
The idea of raising African wages was roundly condemned- the report showed uncharacteristic concern for secondary industry here
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The GME prioritised mine profitability over underground conditions, and Pirow's 1930 proposals followed the same line. (p. 11)
He also did little to improve underground working conditions, and instead, lent his considerable experience towards promoting the profitability of the big mining companies.
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Pirow proposed cutting costs by removing whites from underground. (p. 11)
Pirow argued that the best way to save money and make millions of tons of low grade ore profitable was to remove as many whites from underground as possible.
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The Director of Native Labour sided with mine owners against improving compound housing on the profitable Simmer and Jack mine. (p. 17)
The DNL ignored the evidence that the mine was easily profitable, and took the part of the mineowners.
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Underground violence by supervisors was part of the labour process and was beyond the Native Labour inspectors' reach. (p. 18)
Beatings of labourers by 'boss-boys' and white supervisors were everyday occurrences, a part of the labour process
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The mines' claim that they could not afford better treatment is rejected: they chose cheap migrant labour for profit. (p. 22)
there were viable alternatives to the cheap labour policy. The fact that the mines did not attempt these was because they believed they could make more money with a bonded, poorly paid, migrant work force.
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Source gaps after c.1935 may exaggerate the decline of the Native Labour Bureau's importance in the 1940s. (p. 20)
A false impression is given by the lack of archival material from after about 1935.
Evidence ledger¶
Sources used¶
| Source | Kind | Period | How used |
|---|---|---|---|
| Department of Labour Annual Reports, U.G. 30-38 (for 1937) and U.G. 45-41 (for 1940) | commission or official report | 1937, 1940 | Supplies the Secretary for Labour's statements about inspectors, regulation by delegated powers, and non-discrimination under the Factories Act. |
| Union Year Book (nos. 8, 9, 25: 1925, 1926-7, 1946) | official statistical series | 1925-1946 | Source for the content of the Factory Act, inspectorate personnel, application date of the 1941 Act and its segregation regulations. |
| Union Government Gazette notices on Factory Act regulations (1919-1924) and Govt. Notice 1988 (30/11/11) | legislation gazette | 1911-1924 | Documents the voluminous regulations published under the 1918 Factory Act and the 1911 regulations the DNL did not invoke. |
| Statutes of the Union of South Africa: Acts 12/1911, 15/1911, 21/1923, 41/1939, 22/1941 | legislation gazette | 1911-1941 | Establishes the legal framework: Mines and Works Act, Native Labour Regulation Act, Urban Areas Act, Shops and Offices Act, Factories Machinery and Building Work Act. |
| Low Grade Mines Commission Final Report (Kotze Commission), U.G. 34-20 | commission or official report | 1919-20 | Shows Kotze's commission rejecting higher African wages, recommending lifting the colour bar and wider labour recruiting. |
| Report of the Mining Regulations Commission (Pittman), U.G. 36-25 | commission or official report | 1924-25 | Links rising accident rate to falling ratio of whites to blacks (1:7.7 in 1911 to 1:10.1 in 1923). |
| Evidence of Kotze to the Economic and Wage Commission (2/9/25) and the Unemployment Commission (1930), Wits Archives A1882, A1280 | state archives | 1925-1930 | Documents Kotze's admissions on supervision and accidents, and his racial stereotypes about African ability. |
| Lucas Papers: Summary of Pirow's Evidence to Low Grade Ore Commission, Wits AD1769 | state archives | 1930 | Shows GME Pirow proposing removal of whites from underground to make low-grade ore payable. |
| Cooke's evidence to the Mills Commission (1925, Wits A1882) and the Native Economic (Holloway) Commission (4/5/31, Wits AD1438) | state archives | 1925, 1931 | Shows the DNL's rosy picture of NAD services, support for migrancy and compounds, and the 'four points of view'. |
| Evidence of the Director of the Industries Division to the Mills Commission, 24/8/25, Wits A1882 | state archives | 1925 | Epigraph used in the conclusion for lack of inter-departmental coordination. |
| Mines Department files MNW MM2426/22 and MM2489/25 pt.1 (staff ratio disputes 1925-26) | state archives | 1922-1926 | Documents union deputations, Creswell's demands, and inspector Gray's admissions about supervision and misfires. |
| Archive files ARB 1132 and ARB C.F.2/0 (Labour Dept, TLC protest, parliamentary reply 1939) | state archives | 1939-1944 | Used for Walker's colour-bar denial, the TLC's 1939 complaint and the figure of 5754 registered factories. |
| Van Eck Commission Papers, Union Archives K302, Box 10 | state archives | WWII | Supports the wartime lenient exemptions policy under the 1918 act. |
| GNLB files (291/18/78 PSC report 1922 and DNL-SNA correspondence; 64/23/9 assault returns; 69/23/154) | state archives | 1922-1924 | Documents the 1923 PSC restructuring, Pritchard's retirement, and monthly returns of assaults on labourers. |
| NTS 697/408C Simmer and Jack compound file (1932-34) | state archives | 1932-1934 | Case study of the DNL siding with mineowners against improving compound housing. |
| GES 539/13 Public Health Department correspondence on Pritchard in Natal (1925) | state archives | 1925 | Evidence of Pritchard exploiting housing-regulation loopholes as a labour recruiter. |
| Rand Daily Mail articles by E.H. Brookes, 27/2/23-1/3/23 | newspapers periodicals | 1923 | Shows opposition to cuts in the NAD. |
| Yudelman, The Emergence of Modern South Africa, and Davies, Capital, State and White Labour | secondary literature compilation | 1900-1960 | Source of biographical information on GMEs Kotze and Pirow and their political appointments, and of the framework for mining state relations. |
Inference¶
Quantification: Illustrative figures.
Qualitative bureaucratic case study comparing three inspectorates (Factory, Mines, Native Labour) in 1918-1948 through close reading of departmental reports, commission evidence, and archival files, set within neo-Marxist and Weberian theories of the state.
Key claims¶
| Claim | Basis | Strength |
|---|---|---|
| The Factory Inspectorate saw white workers as its primary constituency and the 1941 Act's impact on African workers was limited by delayed application, segregation regulations and exclusion of labourers within factory precincts. (p. 9) | Department of Labour reports, Year Books, the 1941 statute, ARB files. | Partial data |
| Government Mining Engineers Kotze and Pirow served the interests of mining capital rather than underground safety, e.g. accepting rising accidents and proposing to remove whites to cut costs. (p. 11) | Kotze Commission report, commission evidence in Wits Archives, Lucas Papers, Yudelman. | Partial data |
| Mines inspectors found their task hard because of shifting points of production, lacked objective standards, and in general backed management against white labour. (p. 13) | Inspector Gray's 1926 report and deputations recorded in MNW MM2489/25. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| The DNL, Cooke, defended the compound and migrant system and acted on compound conditions only under pressure, as at Simmer and Jack where profits were substantial. (p. 17) | Cooke's commission evidence; NTS 697/408C Simmer and Jack file. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| Inspectors of Native Labour sought to limit assaults on compound workers but had minimal capacity to curb violence underground. (p. 18) | Monthly GNLB assault returns and INL correspondence; assertion on underground practice. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| The mining industry's cost structure did not require the cheap-labour policy; viable alternatives existed and mine propaganda convinced people otherwise. (p. 22) | Asserted by reference to dividends paid, with no dividend data presented beyond one mine. | Asserted |
| The apparent decline of the GNLB after 1935 may be illusory, because archival records are lacking and handling of African labour militancy moved to the political level. (p. 20) | Absence of DNL files after c.1935; inference from wartime context. | Asserted |
The author's caveats¶
Notes that archival material on the GNLB after about 1935 is unavailable to researchers because the DNL's separate files have not been accessible. Also acknowledges the paper is condensed from a longer PhD chapter.
Gaps in the evidence¶
The argument rests on departmental reports and selected files, with no systematic series on inspections, prosecutions, accident rates or compound conditions to test how far inspectorates actually enforced standards. Mine accident and phthisis statistics, company dividend and cost data, and the post-1935 DNL files (if now opened) would allow testing of the claims about inspector attitudes and the cost justifications. The Chamber of Mines records and African workers' own testimony would also be needed to check the officials' self-presentations.
Replicability: Data described but not public.