Negotiating a Democratic Order in South Africa: Learning from Mediation and Industrial Relations¶
Philip Hirschsohn (1996). Negotiating a Democratic Order in South Africa: Learning from Mediation and Industrial Relations. Negotiation Journal (April 1996). Plenum Publishing Corporation.
| Type | journal article |
| Scope | Economics and economic history of apartheid |
| Method | archival narrative |
| Period studied | 1973–1995 |
| Regions | South Africa |
| Themes | unions strikes, transition post apartheid, labour markets wages, business and state, politics ideology elections, resistance social movements |
| Citation key | hirschsohn1996 |
Argument¶
Hirschsohn argues that the negotiated transition to democracy had roots in the unintended consequences of the state's 1979 labour law reforms, which produced a powerful black union movement and made collective bargaining the dominant mode of conflict resolution. He traces how the Independent Mediation Service of South Africa (IMSSA) carried this culture of negotiation from industrial relations into community peace-making and public policy. The Laboria Minute, the National Economic Forum, NEDLAC and the 1995 Labour Relations Act are presented as the institutional legacy. He rejects the notion that policymakers deliberately designed the reforms as a trial run for political change. The case is built as an institutional narrative of IMSSA and labour law, not a quantitative study.
Evidence and method¶
Secondary literature (Finnemore and Van der Merwe, Innes, Maree, Moll, Sisk), IMSSA's own ten-year review (1994), speeches by IMSSA director Charles Nupen and Labour Minister Mboweni (1995), conference papers, and the author's description of the drafting of the 1995 LRA.
Place in the debates¶
- Origins of the negotiated transition (leadership vs. structural/institutional account) (see Why apartheid ended: reform, transition and elite bargaining). Rejects a story centred only on Mandela and De Klerk; locates the origins in the unintended consequences of the 1979 labour reforms and the negotiation culture of industrial relations, while granting that leadership mattered.
- Intentional design vs. unintended consequences of 1979 labour reform (see Black trade unions: growth, wage effects, Wiehahn and strategy). Holds that the reforms backfired on their architects; any view that policymakers deliberately used them as a trial run is an ex-post rationalization.
- Corporatism and union strategy: protest vs. participation (see Black trade unions: growth, wage effects, Wiehahn and strategy). Treats COSATU's move to corporatist policy-making (NEF, NEDLAC) as a natural outgrowth of its founding mission, noting that it was hotly debated within the movement.
Findings¶
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The 1979 reforms aimed at control but produced explosive union growth. (p. 3)
The reforms proved to be far more radical and resulted in the opposite of what the architects intended
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Union membership grew rapidly between 1979 and 1991. (p. 3)
Union membership grew from 700,000 in 1979 to 2.7 million by 1991, representing 53 percent of the workforce covered by the Labour Relations Act
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Industrial action in the late 1980s was unprecedented. (p. 3)
more days lost to industrial action between 1986 and 1990 than over the preceding 75 years
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Collective bargaining spread via plant-level recognition agreements despite adversarial relations. (p. 3)
Within a decade, 2,000 recognition agreements had been concluded
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The Industrial Court, applying universal fairness standards, helped entrench negotiation and procedure. (p. 3)
the court helped to secure support for negotiation and respect for procedure as the industrial relations norm
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The 1988 LRAA, intended to restore managerial power, was undone by union non-compliance and then negotiation. (p. 5)
unions made the legislation unworkable by refusing to follow its procedures
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The Laboria Minute institutionalized consensus-based policy-making. (p. 5)
a document that committed the state to submit all future labor laws to employer and union federations before tabling the legislation in Parliament
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IMSSA's caseload grew substantially in its first years. (p. 4)
From 15 media- tions in the first year, by 1990 the annual rate had increased to 580 mediations and 344 arbitrations.
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IMSSA's community mediation in Thokoza reduced political violence. (p. 6)
led to a total cessation of politically related deaths for six months in a community in which 300 people had died in political violence in only 18 months
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COSATU's shift from outside pressure to corporatist participation produced the NEF and then NEDLAC. (p. 7)
acceptance of COSATU's demand for an inclusive policy formulation process during the extended political transition led to the establishment of the National Economic Forum in 1992
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The author disclaims a deliberate-design interpretation of the labour reforms. (p. 9)
the ex-post rationalization outlined here suggests that omniscient policy- makers intentionally used the labor law reforms to get important sectors of South African society accustomed to the negotiation process
Evidence ledger¶
Sources used¶
| Source | Kind | Period | How used |
|---|---|---|---|
| IMSSA 1994, On the frontline: Ten years of the Independent Mediation Service of South Africa 1984-1994, IMSSA Review No. 16 | company records or reports | 1984-1994 | Supplies the account of IMSSA's founding, caseload growth, neutrality, community mediation and ADR innovations. |
| Finnemore and Van der Merwe 1992, Introduction to industrial relations in South Africa (3rd ed.), union membership and recognition agreement figures | secondary literature compilation | 1979-1991 | Provides figures for union membership growth and number of recognition agreements. |
| Innes 1992, Labour relations in the De Klerk era (strike days data) | secondary literature compilation | 1910s-1990 | Supports the claim that days lost to industrial action in 1986-90 exceeded the preceding 75 years. |
| Moll 1993, Black South African unions: relative wage effects (1985 data) | secondary literature compilation | 1985 | Used in a note for the union wage premium among black workers. |
| Sisk 1995, Democratization in South Africa: arrest and death figures under the state of emergency | secondary literature compilation | 1985-1988 | Supplies arrest and fatality counts for the political repression context. |
| Nupen 1995, address to International Industrial Relations Association 10th World Congress, Washington, June 1995 | interviews oral history | 1995 | Provides a participant's recollections of shopfloor conflict, evolving mediator roles and the design of the new CCMA. |
| Mboweni 1995, Minister of Labour address (IIRA World Congress) on NEDLAC and the LRA drafting | parliamentary debates | 1995 | Official statements describing NEDLAC consensus processes and the instructions given to the LRA drafters. |
| Labour Relations Amendment Act 1988 and 1979 labour law amendments (Industrial Conciliation Act, Industrial Court) | legislation gazette | 1979-1988 | The legal reforms whose unintended consequences are the core of the argument, described rather than directly cited. |
| Laboria Minute (1990) and 1995 Labour Relations Act, plus the Draft Negotiating Document in Bill Form and Explanatory Memorandum (January 1995) | legislation gazette | 1990-1995 | Documents the shift to consensus-based policy formulation and the CCMA dispute resolution design. |
| National Peace Accord (September 1991) and King 1995 conference paper on ADR in South Africa | commission or official report | 1991-1995 | Establishes the codes of conduct and ADR use in peace committees and the repositioning of ADR under the 1995 LRA. |
| Maree 1985, quoting the Minister of Labour on union participation in politics | secondary literature compilation | 1979 | Quotation of the Minister of Labour's motives for the 1979 reforms. |
| ROAPE 1986, Congress of South African Trade Unions (founding mission quotation) | union or movement records | 1986 | Quoted to show COSATU's founding mission as a basis for corporatist engagement. |
Inference¶
Quantification: Illustrative figures.
Interpretive case study of IMSSA and industrial relations institutions, supported by a narrative chronology, secondary statistics, and participant statements; the argument uses analogy and institutional continuity rather than systematic testing.
Key claims¶
| Claim | Basis | Strength |
|---|---|---|
| The 1979 labour law reforms unintentionally spawned a powerful union movement and institutionalised collective bargaining. (p. 3) | Union membership and recognition agreement figures drawn from Finnemore and Van der Merwe 1992; narrative of the 1979 amendments. | Partial data |
| The Industrial Court helped institutionalise conflict and win respect for negotiation and procedure. (p. 3) | Haysom 1984 and Benjamin 1989 (secondary), employer nicknames for the court; no case data. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| IMSSA became established as a neutral service and its mediation caseload grew rapidly. (p. 4) | IMSSA 1994 internal publication figures and an anecdote of a conservative white union requesting a black arbitrator. | Partial data |
| IMSSA's community mediation (e.g. Thokoza) contributed to reducing political violence and spread a culture of negotiation to national politics. (p. 6) | IMSSA 1994 and King 1995; a single case of Thokoza deaths falling to zero for six months. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| Labour's 1988-90 resistance to the LRAA led to the Laboria Minute, which began consensus-based policy formulation now typical of the new order. (p. 5) | Narrative of the LRAA, strikes, employer-union agreement and the Laboria Minute, with Fine and Webster 1989 cited. | Asserted |
| The 1995 Labour Relations Act and its CCMA were built on IMSSA's ADR experience and a consultative NEDLAC process. (p. 8) | Statements by Nupen, Mboweni and King 1995 describing the drafting process and the LRA design. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| Industrial relations experience provided a template for the negotiated political transition and the consensus-based new order (NEDLAC, RDP). (p. 2) | Argument by analogy and institutional continuity; Patel 1993, Adler and Webster 1995; no causal evidence. | Asserted |
The author's caveats¶
The author concedes that the argument is an ex-post rationalisation: policymakers did not intentionally plan the labour reforms as a trial run, and the transition was shaped by contingency and leadership. He also notes criticism of the limited fact-finding and public debate in drafting the LRA.
Gaps in the evidence¶
The causal link from industrial relations negotiation to the political transition is not tested against alternative explanations, and no archival evidence or interviews with political negotiators are used. Evidence such as IMSSA case files, Industrial Court judgments, Laboria and NEDLAC records, and negotiator testimony would allow better tests; much of this existed then and is archived or accessible by interview now. The union growth and wage figures rely on secondary compilations rather than primary registrar or survey data.
Replicability: Data poorly documented.