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Grounds for a Strike: South African Gold Mining in the 1940s

Literature › Works

James, Wilmot G. (1987). Grounds for a Strike: South African Gold Mining in the 1940s. University of the Witwatersrand History Workshop, 'The Making of Class', 9-14 February 1987. University of the Witwatersrand (workshop paper).
Type conference paper
Scope Economics and economic history of apartheid
Method mixed
Period studied 1936–1946
Regions Witwatersrand, Orange Free State, Mozambique, High Commission Territories, central Africa
Themes mining migrant labour, unions strikes, labour markets wages, business and state, origins segregation, manufacturing industrial policy
Citation key james1987

Argument

The paper explains the economic and social origins of the August 1946 African mineworkers' strike, which O'Meara had treated as a watershed but left under-documented at the level of gold mining itself. James argues that wartime shortages of African and white labour, rising working costs against a fixed gold price, and a squeeze on profit margins pushed the Chamber of Mines to resist any African wage rise. The Chamber also tightened labour control instead of mechanizing on a large scale. Managerial responses (written standard practice, closer checking of workers), shrinking maize and meat rations and unmet Lansdowne Commission wage recommendations became grievances. The African Mine Workers' Union turned these into strike demands, notably higher wages and the right for miners to feed themselves.

Evidence and method

Transvaal Chamber of Mines annual reports (1936-1950), Gold Producers' Committee evidence to the Witwatersrand Mine Natives' Wages Commission (1943), papers and discussions of the Association of Mine Managers, Native Affairs Department archive material cited via Dunbar Moodie's unpublished essays, Inkululeko, The Guardian, and secondary works (Wilson, van der Horst, Yudelman and Jeeves, Lang, Green). Table 1 and Figures 1-6 give employment, labour origins, output, working costs, profit and food provision.

Place in the debates

Findings

  • Domestic (South African) recruiting boomed in the late 1930s, then collapsed during the war, creating a labour shortage. (p. 5)

    Betaeen 1936 and 1940, local labour supplies increased froi 235 392 to 390 433 aigrants, a tttnty-three percent increase.

  • The Mozambique Convention capped Mozambican recruitment, so foreign supply could not cover the domestic shortfall. (p. 6)

    The Charter of Nines das not allomd to eiploy tore than 80 000 or less than 45 000 Nozarticans at any one tin.

  • Recruitment from central and south-central Africa grew sharply, but not enough to offset the domestic decline. (p. 7)

    increased frot 3 374 in 1934 to 31 907 by 19*4.

  • The colour bar and closed shops prevented the Chamber from substituting African or non-union white labour for white volunteers away at war, worsening the shortage. (p. 8)

    The colour bar and union dosed shops prevented the Oiaiber frot using African and non-unionizM >hite labour in place of the absentees.

  • Most of the industry favoured outward expansion into new fields over large-scale mechanization. (p. 10)

    Thus, for the industry as a atiolei outnard eipansiorr das preferred to largt-sralt inward techanization.

  • Mechanical scraping in stopes raised labour productivity by roughly ten percent in the late 1930s. (p. 9)

    gf labour—teasured in tern of ore output per person per year—increased by about ten percent.

  • The industry reported a ten percent output-per-worker gain across 1935-1945, which cannot be attributed to any single strategy. (p. 13)

    On the nhole the industry reported a ten percent gain in output per wrker over the period 1935 to 1945

  • Written standard practice and tight supervision at Langlaagte provoked sit-down strikes and confrontations; 500 miners were arrested and the union provided counsel. (p. 14)

    five hundred liners aere arrested during the Langliagte disturbances and had to stand trial.

  • Food, though a minor cost, was highly sensitive, and the maize ration was cut in 1943-44. (p. 16)

    Hhereas the average African liner received about 660 pounds of laize in l?40i in 1943 it Has dom to 550 pounds, 550 in 1944.

  • Compound food riots were organised by miners on their own initiative, and the union then took up food as a union issue. (p. 19)

    Jhe food disturbances w e a direct result of Mize and etat ihortages,

  • Ore output fell sharply in the war years while the gold price was fixed, cutting revenue. (p. 20)

    Betiteen 19*1 and 19*7 ore production fell by fourteen •illion tons Ifroi 67.25 to 53.71 lillion) and gold bullion three tillion fine ounces.

  • Profit per fine ounce collapsed through the 1940s, hardening Chamber resistance to African wage rises. (p. 22)

    2.29 pounds in m & and 1.08 paunds by 19*7, the leanest year of the decade.

Evidence ledger

Sources used

Source Kind Period How used
Transvaal Chamber of Mines (TCM) Annual Reports, 1936-1950, incl. presidents' speeches, labour supply, food, working cost and profit data (basis for Table 1 and Figures 1-6) employer association records 1936-1950 Supplies the time series on labour supplies by origin, ore milled, gold output and grade, working costs, profit per ounce and food rations. Also supplies the Chamber presidents' statements on labour and costs.
Table 1, Gold Production 1936-1948 (tons milled, fine ounces, grade), sourced to TCM Annual Reports official statistical series 1936-1948 Documents the fall in ore milled, gold output and ore grade during the war years.
TCM Gold Producers' Committee, Statements of Evidence, Statistics and Memoranda submitted to the Witwatersrand Mine Natives' Wages Commission, June 1943 employer association records 1943 Provides the evidence on Mozambican labour, central African mortality and health, and the industry's position on wage increases.
Report of the Witwatersrand Mine Natives' Wages Commission (Lansdown Commission), U.G. 21/1944 commission or official report 1943-1944 Source for the Commission's sympathy with African miners' wage grievances and its recommended wage increases, which the government only partly granted.
Papers and Discussion, Association of Mine Managers of the Transvaal (AMMT) / TCM, 1937-1945 (papers by R.B. Start, J.S. Ford, J.B.W. Couperthwaite, Glathaar, Hildick-Smith, Bushell and others) employer association records 1937-1945 Manager papers and discussion record the mechanization, scientific management, labour checking and compound-kitchen responses to the labour shortage.
Chamber of Mines archives, unlisted source: Gold Producers' Committee, 'Native Labour-Native Trade Unions-Strike' (1945) chamber of mines or recruiting records 1945-1946 Records the food disturbances in the compounds in 1945, including the first on 4 February at Marievale and a fatal incident at Modderfontein East.
Correspondence of the Chamber of Mines and the Department of Agriculture, 14 July to 14 December 1945, reprinted in TCM Annual Report 1945 employer association records 1945 Shows the Chamber lobbying against agricultural price supports and the Department's refusal, in the context of food shortages.
Department of Native Affairs file NTS 7475, 102/332 (Transvaal Archives, Pretoria), on the Langlaagte disturbances, Jan 1943, as cited by Dunbar Moodie's unpublished manuscripts state archives 1943 Documents the Langlaagte sit-down strikes, the miners' complaints against written standard practice, and the response of Ford and the police. Taken second-hand through Moodie.
The Guardian (newspaper), 21 January 1943, cited via Moodie newspapers periodicals 1943 Supports the account of the Langlaagte trial and arrests.
Inkululeko (Communist Party newspaper), January and March-April 1946 editions newspapers periodicals 1946 Reports further mine food riots and shows food featuring prominently in the African Mine Workers' Union (AMWU) campaign.
Mozambique Convention of 1928 (recruiting quotas) legislation gazette 1928-1942 Sets the upper and lower limits on Mozambican recruits, which constrained foreign labour as compensation for the domestic shortfall.
Sheila van der Horst, Native Labour in South Africa (data on Mozambican and central African recruiting and mortality) secondary literature compilation 1913-1940s Source for Mozambican quotas and the closure of central African recruiting for health reasons.
David Yudelman and Alan Jeeves, 'The Closing of the Frontier: Labour Migrancy to the Rand Gold Fields 1920-1985' (Yale SARP workshop paper, 1986) secondary literature compilation 1920-1985 Supplies the interpretation of the labour supply system and the observation that most mines did not mechanize because they expected the labour situation to normalize.
H. Wagner (Chamber of Mines), 'The Challenge of Deep-Level Mining in South Africa', Journal of the South African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy, 1954/84 secondary literature compilation 1910s-1940s Establishes the significance of mechanical scrapers and the industry-reported ten percent productivity gain.
John Lang, Bullion Johannesburg: Men, Mines and the Challenge of Conflict (1986) secondary literature compilation 1930s Supports the claim that capital went into new mines and shafts (West Wits, Klerksdorp, Free State) rather than mechanization.
TCM Annual Report 1950 (gold price series) and Timothy Green, The New World of Gold (1981) international trade or finance data 1936-1950 Documents the fixed, stable gold price (about 7 to 8.6 pounds an ounce 1936-46) and the limitless demand, so the industry could not pass on cost increases.

Inference

Quantification: Descriptive tables.

Historical political-economy narrative. It reads the strike's origins from TCM time series (Table 1 and Figures 1-6) on labour supply, output, costs, profits and food rations. It adds mine-manager papers and one archive-based case study (Langlaagte), plus the Chamber's correspondence with the state. Causal links from labour shortage to managerial strategy to grievances to strike are argued by sequence and plausibility, with no formal test.

Key claims

Claim Basis Strength
Domestic African labour supplies boomed in the late 1930s and then fell by about 36-39 percent by 1946/47, creating a wartime labour shortage on the mines. (p. 5) TCM Annual Reports, labour supply series (Figures 1-2). Systematic data
Foreign recruiting (Mozambique, central Africa) expanded only partially and could not compensate for the domestic shortfall. (p. 7) TCM Annual Reports; Gold Producers' Committee 1943 evidence; Mozambique Convention quotas; van der Horst. Partial data
Most mines did not respond to the labour shortage with large-scale mechanization. Capital went into outward expansion (new mines and shafts), and only limited stope-cleaning mechanization occurred. (p. 10) AMMT Papers and Discussion (Start, Van Dyk); Lang; Yudelman and Jeeves. Partial data
Managers responded with scientific management (written standard practice) and tighter labour checking, and the industry reported about a ten percent output-per-worker gain 1935-45, but the gains cannot be attributed to any one measure. (p. 13) Manager papers in AMMT Papers and Discussion; Wagner; TCM reports. Partial data
Managerial control strategies turned into grievances: at Langlaagte in 1942-43 miners staged sit-down protests, about 500 were arrested and only eight were dismissed after the African Mine Workers' Union (AMWU) provided counsel. (p. 14) Department of Native Affairs file NTS 7475 and The Guardian, both cited via Moodie's unpublished papers. Illustrative or anecdotal
Wartime maize and meat shortages cut rations (maize from about 660 to 550 lb) and caused compound food riots in 1945-46, which the AMWU turned into a union demand. (p. 19) TCM reports (Figure 6 ration series), Chamber of Mines archive file, Inkululeko, the Chamber-Department of Agriculture correspondence. Partial data
With the gold price fixed, falling output and a sharp rise in working costs (a 69 percent increase during the war) squeezed profit per ounce from about 3.5 pounds to about 1.1 pounds by 1947. (p. 22) TCM Annual Reports (Table 1, Figures 3-5) and the gold price series. Systematic data
The Chamber resisted African wage increases and persuaded government to pay part of the Lansdown Commission's recommended rise. The AMWU exploited the gap between recommended and actual awards, feeding the 1946 strike. (p. 22) Lansdown Commission report, Gold Producers' Committee evidence, Chamber archive file. Partial data

The author's caveats

The author notes that causation is hard to establish and that the productivity gains cannot be attributed to any one measure. He also notes uncertainty about when the food rioting started, and that the Chamber's claimed gains are industry-reported.

Gaps in the evidence

The argument leans on Chamber of Mines series and manager papers, with little direct evidence from African miners (testimony, union records, AMWU documents). Mine-by-mine data on ration levels, wages, mortality and food disturbances would better test the food and wage grievance claims. The link between the wartime squeeze and the August 1946 strike is argued from sequence, and the Langlaagte case rests on archive material read only second-hand through Moodie. The relevant archives (Native Affairs, Chamber of Mines, AMWU papers) existed then and are accessible now.

Replicability: Data described but not public.