Political Corruption in South Africa¶
Tom Lodge (1998). Political Corruption in South Africa. African Affairs, Vol. 97, No. 387. Oxford University Press on behalf of The Royal African Society.
| Type | journal article |
| Scope | Wider apartheid literature |
| Method | mixed |
| Period studied | 1948–1997 |
| Regions | South Africa, homelands (Transkei, Ciskei, Bophuthatswana, Lebowa, KwaNdebele, KaNgwane), Gauteng, Mpumalanga, Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, Northern Province |
| Themes | business and state, bantustans removals influx, sanctions divestment, transition post apartheid, politics ideology elections, comparative theory |
| Citation key | lodge1998 |
Argument¶
Lodge asks whether post-apartheid corruption is inherited or new. He argues that comparative theory gives no reason to expect the industrialised, coercive apartheid state to have been especially venal. Even so, corruption was routine in particular domains: secret defence and propaganda budgets, oil-sanctions evasion, the Development Aid department and the homeland administrations. Petty extortion fell mainly on the rightless. Post-1994 corruption is concentrated in provincial governments that absorbed homeland civil services, and in welfare, police and justice. New sources have been added: political appointments, preferential tendering, comradeship nepotism, inexperienced managers and party dependence on business donations. Democratization and restructuring together leave the state vulnerable, and the argument rests on press reports, official commissions of inquiry and audits.
Evidence and method¶
Press reports (The Star, Mail and Guardian, Sunday Times and others), commissions of inquiry (Parsons, De Meyer, Skweyiya, Quail, Development Aid, Information Department), Auditor-General reports, the Public Protector, opinion surveys (IDASA, World Values, Transparency International), secondary literature on corruption and the homelands, and memoirs.
Place in the debates¶
- Was the apartheid state especially corrupt, or is current corruption mainly inherited? (see Post-apartheid economic policy, governance and corruption). Mixed: the apartheid state was relatively efficient, with limited corruption in white-facing bureaucracy. It was heavily corrupt in secret security spending, the homelands and Development Aid, and much present corruption inherits those habits. Lodge argues new post-1994 conditions also generate corruption.
- Modernization theory of corruption (Huntington) versus political-structure explanations (see Post-apartheid economic policy, governance and corruption). Lodge finds South Africa not a typical developing country, with a small state role and personal taxation as a revenue base. Corruption is not only a symptom of modernization; it also flourishes under decentralization, one-party dominance, secrecy and importing business practices into administration.
- Corruption as developmentally harmful or functional (see Post-apartheid economic policy, governance and corruption). Cites the functional arguments but treats petty venality as harmful, and stresses that corruption diverts scarce development spending.
Findings¶
-
Public perception holds that corruption is widespread in post-apartheid South Africa. (p. 2)
46 percent of the sample consulted felt that most ofiicials were engaged in corruption and only six percent believed there was clean government.
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The apartheid state is judged structurally less prone to corruption than typical colonial or post-colonial states. (p. 7)
In contrast to colonial administrations the apartheid state was relatively effective and comparatively efficient
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Auditor-General reports show modest financial irregularities in the 1950s and 60s, mostly in the post office. (p. 9)
the number of financial irregularities documented reached a comparatively modest 252 in 1967, and were mainly concentrated in the post office
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Covert military operations in the 1980s created large opportunities for private enrichment through front companies. (p. 10)
between 1985 and 1990, R10 million was paid over to five front companies established by the Eastern Cape Command.
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The Department of Development Aid, successor to Native Affairs, suffered pervasive fraud and nepotism. (p. 12)
over the years several hundreds of millions of rands was lost through various forms of nepotism and fraud in a department which administered about 1 1 percent of the government's budget.
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Pre-1994 petty corruption was concentrated where citizens were least able to resist officials. (p. 14)
Its incidence probably varied in accordance with the degree of rightlessness of the people seeking benefits or services from officials.
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Authoritarian secrecy and powerlessness explain the dishonesty of the homelands and the departments that worked with them. (p. 16)
The more powerless ordinary people were the more officials abused their position; for this reason homeland governments were especially dishonest
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Welfare administration inherited from apartheid leaks substantial funds through fraud and false entitlements. (p. 22)
It is reckoned that about 10 percent of the Department's budget is lost to official fraud and false entitlements.
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Estimates of the overall cost of corruption range widely and are politically contested. (p. 25)
corruption has cost the tax paper between R13-5 billion and R20 billion over the past three years
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New policies create new corruption risks independent of the apartheid legacy. (p. 27)
tendering principles which favour small businesses (and which require much more efficient administration if they are to be handled honestly)
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No office-holder had yet been convicted, which Lodge treats as the test of control measures. (p. 32)
To date, though, no political office-holder has been charged and convicted for corruption; international experience suggests that it is the litmus test of the effectiveness of control measures.
Evidence ledger¶
Sources used¶
| Source | Kind | Period | How used |
|---|---|---|---|
| IDASA Public Opinion Service, POS Reports No. 3, February 1996, 'Parliamentary Ethics and Government Corruption: Playing with Public Trust' | household or labour survey microdata | 1996 | Establishes public perception that most officials are corrupt and that corruption is increasing. |
| World Value Survey: South Africa, Summary Report 1996 | household or labour survey microdata | 1996 | Supplies second poll showing perceptions of widespread bribery among public servants. |
| Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, 1997 (press release, 31 July 1997) | international trade or finance data | 1980-1997 | Shows foreign business perception of corruption rising, with South Africa's score slipping 1996-97. |
| Auditor-General's reports 1950s-1960s, incl. Report of the Controller and the Auditor-General for the financial year 1966-1967, RP 60, 1967 | commission or official report | 1950s-1967 | Shows low and modest numbers of financial irregularities before 1967 and a rise in police fraud to 58 incidents in 1966. |
| Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the former Department of Information, RP/113/1978 | commission or official report | 1978 | Documents the Information Department scandal as an instance of grand corruption using secret funds. |
| Minaar, Liebenberg and Schutte, The hidden hand: Covert operations in South Africa (HSRC, 1994) | secondary literature compilation | 1985-1994 | Source for details of military front companies and private enrichment in covert operations. |
| Hengeveld and Rodenburg, Embargo: Apartheid's oil secrets revealed (1995) | secondary literature compilation | 1964-1984 | Supports claim of possible venality in Strategic Fuel Fund oil sanctions evasion. |
| Republic of South Africa, Commission of Inquiry into Development Aid, RP 73/1992 | commission or official report | 1991-1992 | Shows pervasive dishonesty and fraud in the Department of Development Aid. |
| Commission reports on Kwandebele (Parsons) RP 137/1993 and state lands inquiry RP 52/1996 | commission or official report | 1980s-1996 | Documents kickbacks, tender fraud and dishonest land transfers in homeland administration and the SA Development Trust. |
| Republic of the Transkei, Commission of Inquiry into the Conduct of the Department of Commerce, Industry and Tourism, June 1987 | commission or official report | 1976-1987 | Supports the account of cronyism in the sale of property and allocation of licences in Transkei. |
| De Meyer Commission report on Lebowa | commission or official report | 1992-1993 | Establishes misdoings in Lebowa departments and by chief minister Ramodike. |
| Skweyiya Commission summary report, Government of the North West Province, 1997 | commission or official report | 1978-1997 | Shows graft entrenched in Bophuthatswana since 1978 under Mangope. |
| Report of the Ciskei Commission (Quail Commission), Conference Associates, Pretoria, 1980 | commission or official report | 1978-1980 | Evidence of petty extortion over pension payments in Ciskei. |
| Southall, South Africa's Transkei (1982); Mare and Hamilton, An Appetite for Power (1987); Cole, Crossroads (1987); Brandel-Syrier, Reeftown Elite (1971) | secondary literature compilation | 1959-1980s | Supplies fieldwork-based evidence of routine petty bribery and extortion of rightless Africans before 1994. |
| Soweto Crime Survey, Marketing and Media Research, January 1996 (Sowetan questionnaire) | household or labour survey microdata | November 1995 | Shows 67% of respondents believe police accept bribes. |
| Provincial audits 1992-1993 (Cape Province, Transvaal) | official statistical series | 1992-1993 | Quantifies frauds in white provincial administrations. |
| Corruption Barometer, National Party Department of Research and Strategy, 1997 | other | 1994-1997 | Ranks provinces by reported official fraud and theft; used to show corruption concentrated in former-homeland provinces. |
| Public Protector reports (matric exam papers 1996; Sarafina II investigation, 20 May 1996; University of Zululand Special Report No. 5) | commission or official report | 1996 | Documents specific post-1994 irregularities in examinations, health tendering and university degrees. |
| Auditor-General Special Interim Report on the Findings of the White Commission, RP50/1997, and Auditor-General report on the IBA, RP67/1997 | commission or official report | 1994-1997 | Evidence of ghost workers, losses and misuse in Eastern Cape and the IBA. |
| Newspaper and periodical reports (The Star, Mail and Guardian, Sunday Times, Sunday Independent, Business Day, Financial Mail etc.), 1990-1997 | newspapers periodicals | 1990-1997 | Main evidence for the great majority of post-1994 corruption cases in provinces, central departments, police, parastatals and parties. |
| Department of Welfare Annual Report 1996/1997 (RP 80/1997) and 1996 White Paper | commission or official report | 1996-1997 | Used for inherited fragmented pension administration, fraud and removal of dead claimants. |
| Public Service Commission, Report on the Rationalisation of Public Administration, RP/1997 | commission or official report | 1996-1997 | Gives share of African managers in the civil service, showing turnover of senior personnel. |
| HSRC 1992 survey of 5,320 members of the Public Service Association (via Schwella, DSA in Depth, 1993) | household or labour survey microdata | 1992 | Shows civil servant anxiety and demoralization that may erode professional ethics. |
| Government Gazette: Draft White Paper on Transformation of the Public Service (1995); Gazette No. 16943 (1996); Gazette No. 17928 (1997) | legislation gazette | 1995-1997 | Documents new management policy and tendering reform context. |
| Attorney General Witwatersrand Division Annual Reports 1993 (RP104/1994) and 1994 (RP100/1995) | commission or official report | 1993-1994 | Suggests demoralization among white prosecutors. |
| Housing Amendment Act of 1996 | legislation gazette | 1996 | Illustrates delegation of authority to local government and possible weakened controls. |
| SAP Anti-Corruption Unit figures and police investigation counts, 1993-1996 | official statistical series | 1993-1996 | Quantifies growth in police corruption investigations and allegations. |
| Deloitte and Touche and National Party estimates of public sector fraud cost, 1997 | other | 1997 | Estimates the overall cost of public sector corruption. |
| Posel, The Making of Apartheid (1997); Cloete in de Crespigny and Schrire (1978) | secondary literature compilation | 1950s-1970s | Shows political patronage in the early apartheid bureaucracy and contemporary claims of tight controls. |
Inference¶
Quantification: Illustrative figures.
Comparative theoretical reasoning on corruption literature combined with a catalogue of case examples drawn from official commissions, audit reports and press accounts; no systematic measurement, so claims rest on accumulated instances and perception surveys.
Key claims¶
| Claim | Basis | Strength |
|---|---|---|
| Apartheid-era corruption was concentrated in security, information and homeland-related departments and in homeland administrations, while the white civil service was relatively clean. (p. 167) | Auditor-General reports to 1967, commissions of inquiry (Information 1978, Development Aid 1992, Parsons, De Meyer, Skweyiya, Transkei), press reports and secondary studies. | Partial data |
| Petty extortion before 1994 was concentrated among the rightless, such as Africans dealing with pensions, permits, housing and pass offences, and was exceptional for whites. (p. 171) | Commission testimony (Ciskei), Transkei official statements, scholarly fieldwork (Southall, Cole, Brandel-Syrier, Zulu), trial evidence and press. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| Post-1994 corruption is concentrated in regional administrations that absorbed homelands, though Gauteng shows that some corruption is not explained by the apartheid inheritance. (p. 172) | Press reports of provincial scandals, Auditor-General findings, National Party Corruption Barometer. | Partial data |
| Roughly ten percent of MECs have been implicated in corrupt practices and corruption is systemic in some provincial departments and police stations but not among national cabinet members or MPs. (p. 175) | Press identification of 10 MECs; case lists; absence of evidence regarding MPs. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| Welfare, police and justice are the main central-government sites of corruption, with welfare losses largely inherited from fragmented pre-1994 bureaucracies. (p. 177) | Welfare white paper and annual report, press estimates of 10% leakage, 46,000 dead claimants removed, SAP investigation counts and Anti-Corruption Unit figures. | Partial data |
| Aggregate cost of public corruption is large but uncertain, with estimates ranging from seven percent of expenditure to R13.5-20 billion over three years. (p. 181) | Deloitte and Touche statements and National Party estimates. | Asserted |
| New sources of corruption exist after 1994, including discriminatory tendering, political solidarity nepotism, party finance dependence on business donors and rapid expansion of entitlements. (p. 182) | Press reports of specific cases (Motheo, Dyambu Trust, Siyakha, Kerzner donation), Tender Board criteria and workshop reports. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| Apparent rise in corruption may partly reflect greater openness, press willingness and audits rather than a real increase. (p. 163) | Argued from institutional changes (Public Protector, inquiries) and press behaviour; no counterfactual measures. | Asserted |
The author's caveats¶
Notes that perception surveys are 'unreliable indicators of the scope or seriousness of administrative venality'; acknowledges that increased reporting reflects greater openness; notes cases may be aberrations or may not imply epidemics; acknowledges difficulty of estimating pre-1994 police corruption since dismissal lists include other misconduct.
Gaps in the evidence¶
The argument rests on a catalogue of press and commission cases without any systematic or comparable measure of corruption incidence before and after 1994, so claims about increase, concentration and inheritance cannot be tested. Comprehensive Auditor-General series, disciplinary and prosecution records, and household victimisation surveys would permit consistent comparisons across departments and provinces; many Auditor-General and provincial audit data existed then and are now accessible in archives. Sampling bias from press-reported scandals and from politically interested sources (National Party barometer) is not addressed.
Replicability: Data poorly documented.