The Trades Union Congress and Apartheid, 1948-1970¶
John Major (2005). The Trades Union Congress and Apartheid, 1948-1970. Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3. Taylor & Francis (Routledge).
| Type | journal article |
| Scope | Wider apartheid literature |
| Method | archival narrative |
| Period studied | 1948–1970 |
| Regions | South Africa, Britain |
| Themes | unions strikes, sanctions divestment, resistance social movements, politics ideology elections, labour markets wages |
| Citation key | major2005 |
Argument¶
The article examines how the British TUC responded to apartheid in its first two decades and finds the response consistently cautious. On South African unions, the TUC backed the white-led, moderate SATLC/SATUC/TUCSA and tried to build labour unity through parallel African unions. It refused aid to the radical Solly Sachs, to SACTU and (for long periods) to Canon Collins's defence funds. It also resisted an industrial boycott and sanctions, leaving action to the Labour Party, the government or individual affiliates. Major explains this by leadership personalities, a conservative headquarters unchecked by conference majorities, Cold War anti-Communism, a lack of understanding of African workers, and fear of Nationalist hostility to British interference. The result was that African unionists were left largely at the mercy of apartheid policy.
Evidence and method¶
Mainly the TUC Archive at the Modern Records Centre, Warwick (correspondence, memoranda, International Committee and General Council minutes), plus the Collins papers at Lambeth Palace Library, the Gollancz papers, TUC annual congress reports, Keesing's Contemporary Archives, and secondary works (Alexander, Lewis, Southall, Horrell, Luckhardt and Wall).
Place in the debates¶
- Effectiveness and motives of international labour solidarity with African unions (see Sanctions, disinvestment and the anti-apartheid movement). Argues the TUC was cautious and 'led from behind', favouring fraternity with white labour over African unions. This made it largely ineffective and left African unionists to apartheid.
- Boycott and sanctions against South Africa (British labour response) (see Sanctions, disinvestment and the anti-apartheid movement). Shows the TUC doubted that boycotts would work and feared job losses. It favoured a voluntary consumer boycott and treated sanctions as a government responsibility, deferring to the Labour Party.
- Cold War anti-Communism and the anti-apartheid movement (see Sanctions, disinvestment and the anti-apartheid movement). Argues fear of association with Communism (Sachs, SACTU, WFTU) was a persistent brake on TUC initiative, unlike the American CIO.
Findings¶
-
The 1924 Act excluded African workers from registered unions and collective bargaining, leaving African unions legal but handicapped. (p. 3)
Only white, Coloured and Asian workers were allowed to have their unions officially registered and to engage in collective bargaining.
-
The Suppression of Communism Act removed experienced union organisers. (p. 4)
By the close of 1955, more than 50 union officials had been removed, all of them experienced organisers.
-
Minister Schoeman presented the 1953 legislation, with works committees, as a way of removing African incentives to organise. (p. 6)
I am creating alternative machinery which is of such a nature that they won't have any incentive to organise
-
The SATUC exclusion of Africans and the collapse of unity efforts led African unions to form SACTU allied to the ANC. (p. 7)
The African unions dropped by SATUC then formed their own South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), and allied themselves to the African National Congress (ANC)
-
British union support for Sachs's Fund for African Democracy was negligible. (p. 8)
Despite his flood of appeals to the British labour movement, the total he received in the first months of 1955 came to no more than ?66.
-
TUCSA readmitted African unions in 1962 (later dropping them in 1969), but TUC influence on the South African scene waned. (p. 9)
In March 1962, SATUC changed its title to the Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA) and re-admitted African unions to affiliation.
-
British union members' donations to Defence and Aid funds were modest over a decade. (p. 12)
The records indicate that between 1957 and 1967 the members of the TUC donated close on ?10,000 to the South Africa Defence and Aid funds.
-
Britain's heavy trade with South Africa made a boycott potentially damaging, yet unions feared the cost to British workers. (p. 13)
In 1970, Britain took 29 per cent of South Africa's exports, and supplied 22 per cent of its imports
-
Prime Minister Wilson refused a full trade embargo, matching the TUC's preference to leave sanctions to government. (p. 15)
Except in war or near-war conditions, one does not use trade as a means of expressing one's detestation of particular policies.
-
Major judges that the TUC had little effect on early apartheid South Africa. (p. 16)
Yet the British Trades Union Congress made little impact on South Africa in the early years of apartheid.
-
The TUC's caution is explained partly by headquarters autonomy from a conference that lacked a radical majority. (p. 17)
However, until the end of this period there was no conference majority for radical action, and between conferences the conservative TUC command structure could make policy on its own terms.
Evidence ledger¶
Sources used¶
| Source | Kind | Period | How used |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trades Union Congress Archive, Modern Records Centre, Warwick University (TUC 292/968 and 292B/968 files, International Department and General Council records) | union or movement records | 1945-1970 | Principal evidence for TUC policy toward South African unions, the defence funds, boycott and sanctions, via correspondence, memoranda and minutes. |
| Papers of Canon L. J. Collins, Lambeth Palace Library (LPL 3294-3296) | state archives | 1953-1961 | Collins's correspondence with Sachs, Tewson and Reeves shows relations with the TUC over the Defence and Aid funds. |
| Victor Gollancz Papers, Modern Records Centre, Warwick (157/3.AF/2/6/1.7) | state archives | 1951 | A letter criticising Gordon Walker's neutrality illustrates opposition to Labour's stance in 1951. |
| Reports of the Annual Trades Union Congress (77th 1945, 86th 1954, 95th 1963, 96th 1964) | union or movement records | 1945-1964 | Reports of Bussey and Crawford-Bell, conference debates on the 1954 report and General Council statements and sanctions resolutions. |
| Keesing's Contemporary Archives | newspapers periodicals | 1948-1970 | Source for Nationalist legislation, ministerial speeches, the Sharpeville events and cricket tour developments. |
| Newspapers: The Guardian, Die Transvaler, Rand Daily Mail, The Church of England Newspaper | newspapers periodicals | 1946-1955 | Quoted for Afrikaner and press reactions to Bishop Reeves, Sachs and the SAFTU conference speech. |
| South African legislation: Industrial Conciliation Act 1924, Suppression of Communism Act 1950 (and 1951 amendment), 1953 Native Labour Act, 1956 and 1959 amendments, Sabotage Act 1962 | legislation gazette | 1924-1962 | Statutory framework restricting African unions and Communist-linked officials, explaining TUC caution and constraints on defence funds. |
| Parliamentary speech of Minister of Labour Ben Schoeman on the 1953 bill | parliamentary debates | 1953 | Shows the government's intent that African workers would have no incentive to organise. |
| The United Nations and Apartheid 1948-1994 (New York, United Nations, 1994) | secondary literature compilation | 1959-1963 | Source for the Congress Alliance boycott appeal and UN and US arms-embargo measures. |
| R. First et al, The South African Connection (1973) | secondary literature compilation | 1970 | Trade shares used to show Britain's importance to South African trade. |
| M. Horrell, South African Trade Unionism (SAIRR, 1961) | secondary literature compilation | to 1961 | Used for details of labour legislation and its effects on African unions. |
| B. Castle, The Castle Diaries 1964-70 | other | 1967 | A diary entry shows Cabinet reluctance to curb arms sales because of job losses. |
Inference¶
Quantification: None.
Archival narrative case study based on close reading of TUC correspondence, minutes and memoranda, with chronological tracing of TUC decisions and a concluding interpretive explanation of its caution.
Key claims¶
| Claim | Basis | Strength |
|---|---|---|
| The TUC steered a middle course, favoured the white-led SATLC/SATUC and parallel African unions, and avoided supporting Sachs and SACTU because of anti-Communism. (p. 479) | TUC archive correspondence (Tewson, Sachs, Hartwell), Bussey and Crawford-Bell reports. | Partial data |
| The TUC was slow and hesitant in aiding the Treason Trial and Rivonia defence funds and worked with Collins only reluctantly. (p. 485) | TUC archive files and Collins papers showing delayed donations, vetoes and General Council minutes. | Partial data |
| Members of the TUC donated close to £10,000 to the South African Defence and Aid funds between 1957 and 1967. (p. 487) | TUC records cited in a footnote without a specific file reference. | Partial data |
| The TUC rejected an industrial boycott and sanctions in favour of voluntary consumer boycotts, leaving action to affiliates and the Labour Party. (p. 488) | TUC position papers, International Committee minutes, circulars and affiliate letters 1959-70. | Partial data |
| TUC caution stemmed from leadership personalities, conference majorities, Cold War anti-Communism, reliance on the Labour Party, ignorance of Africans and fear of Nationalist hostility. (p. 492) | Interpretive synthesis of the archival record; no systematic testing against alternatives. | Asserted |
| The 1953 legislation excluded Africans from registered unions and confined them to government-controlled works committees, leaving African unionism very weak by the end of the 1950s. (p. 481) | Keesing's, Horrell, Hansard-style quotation of Schoeman, and the 1956 and 1959 Acts. | Partial data |
The author's caveats¶
Few explicit caveats; the author notes that the TUC had no representative in South Africa and that some documents are undated or unattributed, with no wider discussion of archival limits.
Gaps in the evidence¶
The study relies almost entirely on TUC and Collins papers, so the TUC's view is well documented but South African union and SACTU records and government files are not used to test the claims about impact. The archives of the SATLC/TUCSA, ICFTU, Labour Party and Anti-Apartheid Movement would allow cross-checking and show the real effect of TUC inaction. Many of these records existed then and are now accessible; figures on donations and affiliate opinion are only anecdotal.
Replicability: Data described but not public.