The Disintegration of the Gold and Maize Alliance in South Africa in the 1920s¶
Robert Morrell (1988). The Disintegration of the Gold and Maize Alliance in South Africa in the 1920s. The International Journal of African Historical Studies, 21(4). Boston University African Studies Center.
| Type | journal article |
| Scope | Economics and economic history of apartheid |
| Method | archival narrative |
| Period studied | 1900–1937 |
| Regions | Transvaal, eastern Transvaal (Bethal and Middelburg districts), Witwatersrand |
| Themes | agriculture land, mining migrant labour, business and state, labour markets wages, politics ideology elections, origins segregation |
| Citation key | morrell1988 |
Argument¶
Morrell documents the economic breakdown of the informal 'gold and maize alliance' (Trapido's term) between Transvaal mine owners and progressive maize farmers. The alliance rested on mines buying cheap maize for compounds and on a shared interest in a disciplined black labour force. As maize farming commercialised after the First World War, the farmers needed year-round wage labour and higher maize prices. Both needs put them in direct conflict with the mines, which had an efficient state-backed recruiting system and wanted cheap food. The state, mainly concerned to protect mining profitability and to keep the cost of living down, failed to satisfy the farmers. Progressive farmers drifted into cooperatives, the National Party and eventually state marketing control. Morrell concludes that the alliance's dissolution helped form a local bourgeoisie of farming, manufacturing and commercial interests.
Evidence and method¶
Mainly archival and press material from Pretoria archives (CAD, TAD, the Pretoria Deeds Office) and local records (Middelburg Town Council, East Middelburg Farmers Association minutes and letter book). It also draws on commission evidence (Transvaal Labour Commission 1903, Natives' Land Commission 1916, Native Economic Commission 1930, Economic and Wages Commission 1925), newspapers (Farmer's Weekly, Middelburg Observer, Die Burger, The Star), recruiting licence counts, and a table of agricultural export values 1914-1927 drawn from Kaplan and official statistics.
Place in the debates¶
- Relations between mining and agriculture: antagonism vs. alliance (see The state and capital: instrumentalism, autonomy and fractions of capital). Rejects the Afrikaner nationalist, liberal and revisionist portrayals of mining and farming as simply antagonistic. Argues that progressive maize farmers were allied with the mines, and that the alliance later dissolved for economic reasons.
- Agriculture and the state/power bloc (hegemony of national capital) (see The state and capital: instrumentalism, autonomy and fractions of capital). Notes the complexity of agriculture's relationship to the state. Cites Bozzoli's view that national capital captured hegemony after the gold standard crisis, and argues that the alliance's end was gradual, not a product of the 1924 election alone.
- Coercion vs. concession in holding farm labour (labour tenants) (see Agrarian transition to capitalism and the fate of the African peasantry). Notes that farmers held tenants by legislation but also by concession (citing Keegan). Argues that for progressive farmers neither route suffices once year-round wage labour is required.
Findings¶
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The alliance was informal and worked through personal and political networks, not formal institutional links between the Chamber of Mines and the agricultural unions. (p. 2)
The alliance did not rest on institutional linkages between, for example, the Chamber of Mines and the South African Agricultural Union.
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A shared interest in controlling black labour underpinned the alliance. (p. 2)
The gold and maize alliance also rested on a shared interest in the creation and preservation of a highly exploitable and disciplined black wage labor force.
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Mines could no longer absorb the growing local maize crop by 1914, creating a marketing crisis that wartime export demand only temporarily deferred. (p. 5)
By 1914 the mines were no longer able to absorb the local maize crop which had increased rapidly.
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Export-oriented commercial maize farming needed full-time wage labour rather than part-year labour tenants, which brought farmers into competition with the mines. (p. 7)
Labor tenants, who worked only three to six months a year were no longer adequate. Full-time labor (and this meant wage labor) was required all the year round.
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Labour districts gave the mines legal control over labour mobility and kept it from farmers. (p. 8)
Labor districts worked to restrict the mobility of labor, tying it to the mines situated within labor districts.
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Consolidation of mine recruiting (a monopsony) coincided with a surge in farmer recruiting licences, shifting competition to among farmers. (p. 10)
a decline in the number of mine labor recruiting licences issued - from 521 in 1919 to 404 in 1921
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The state's own labour official admitted that the recruiting system let the Chamber of Mines starve other industries of labour, yet the state did little. (p. 10)
the hands of the Chamber of Mines the power of practically starving other industries of labor
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The Pact government favoured farmers rhetorically but would not sacrifice mining profitability, limiting help to mine-reject labour. (p. 11)
The Hertzog government was more receptive to farmers' labor demands but did not wish to interfere with the profitability of the mines.
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Mines wanted low maize prices and opposed subsidies, which polarised the alliance and united large and small farmers. (p. 12)
A low internal price suited consumers generally and the mines particularly and the mine owners consequently opposed any move by the state to subsidize the maize crop.
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State grain elevators chiefly benefited consumers, including the mines, because the state prioritised a low cost of living after the 1922 strike. (p. 16)
farmers would benefit little from the elevators because of the tariff structure and that the major beneficiaries would be consumers, including, of course, the mines.
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State marketing control (1931 Maize Control Act, 1937 Marketing Act) effectively ended the alliance. (p. 16)
The first concrete result of collective farmer resolve was the 1931 Maize Control Act, which brought in the state as an active part of the maize marketing process.
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Morrell's overall thesis is that the alliance's breakup was a step towards a local bourgeoisie that combined farming, manufacturing and commerce. (p. 18)
this paper argues that the dissolution of the alliance began in the early 1920s and was a necessary step in the creation of a local bourgeoisie
Evidence ledger¶
Sources used¶
| Source | Kind | Period | How used |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pretoria Deeds Office (PDO) property transfer files 2031/18, 3637/16, 10599/13, 2849/23, 3475/11 | state archives | 1911-1923 | Documents land purchases and farm acquisition by Lazarus and Hudson as progressive farmers. |
| Transvaal Archives Depot (TAD) and Central Archives Depot (CAD), Secretary for Native Affairs / Native Affairs files (SNA, NTS, NA) | state archives | 1907-1922 | Shows labour recruiter activity (Kuhlmann, Harley), police action, labour districts, and NAD/Chamber relations in the farm-mine labour competition. |
| Central Archives Depot, Secretary for Lands (LDE) files, 10 Vol. III and 1520/39 | state archives | 1909-1910s | Evidence of state credit and cattle loans to progressive Middelburg farmers and of Ermelo farmers' attempt to recruit labour. |
| Records of Middelburg Town Council (MMG) 1/1/4, 55th Ordinary Meeting, 17 May 1923 | state archives | 1923 | Shows the town council asking labour recruiters to route recruits through Middelburg. |
| East Middelburg Farmers Association (EMFA) minutes and duplicate letter book; Middelburg District Farmers Union (MDFU) minutes | union or movement records | 1920-1929 | Documents failed attempts by farmers' associations to obtain labour and their requests to government. |
| Evidence to Transvaal Labour Commission (1903) | commission or official report | 1903 | Supplies wage comparisons between mines and farms and Erskine's recruiting figures. |
| Report of the Natives' Land Commission, Vol. 2 (UG22-1916), and Majority Report of the Eastern Transvaal Natives' Land Committee (UG32-1918) | commission or official report | 1916-1918 | Farmer testimony (Schuurman) on labour tenant limits and Farmer's Labour Agency; Kuhlmann's evidence. |
| Native Economic Commission (1930) evidence (Kuhlmann; Bosman and Williams) | commission or official report | 1930 | Kuhlmann's testimony on labour diversion and farmers' complaints about recruiting agents. |
| Select Committee Report SC10-1927 (evidence of J. C. Gilfillain, TAU) | parliamentary debates | 1927 | Evidence on unsatisfactory farmer-organized labour from bushveld reservoirs. |
| Economic and Wages Commission 1925, evidence of J. D. Heyns | commission or official report | 1925 | Cited on cooperative membership and indirect stake of non-members in maize exports. |
| Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on the Labour Resources of the Union (1930) | commission or official report | 1930 | Supports the example of farmers' association labour supply in the Lowveld. |
| Annual Reports for Union Departments (UG21-1926) | official statistical series | 1926 | Source for labour recruiting licence numbers and SAAU positions on state interference. |
| Agricultural exports series (Kaplan, Farming in South Africa, Agricultural Position 1939, Union Statistics for 50 Years) | secondary literature compilation | 1914-1927 | Table 1 shows value of agricultural exports, peaking in 1919. |
| Farmer's Weekly, 1919-1927 | newspapers periodicals | 1919-1927 | Main source for farmers' complaints, recruiting licence counts, cooperative membership, and positions on mine maize imports. |
| Middelburg Observer, 1922-1928 | newspapers periodicals | 1922-1928 | Local reports on labour recruiting, cotton farming and Hudson. |
| Other press: The Star, Die Burger, South African Agricultural Journal | newspapers periodicals | 1921-1923 | Smartt's statements and NP criticism of the agricultural bills. |
| Central Agency for Co-operative Societies records (LEB CD 60; TES F23/11; Barclays Bank Archives Minute Book 28) | company records or reports | 1914-1919 | Gives the Central Agency's maize handling volumes and finances. |
| CAD Secretary to the Prime Minister (PM) 43/2a, Heard to Prime Minister, 18 January 1924 | state archives | 1924 | Quotes TCL lands manager on farmer disillusionment with SAP. |
| General election results (1924 Pact election) | election returns | 1924 | Used as an indicator of political change among farmers. |
| Secondary data: Kaplan and O'Meara theses | secondary literature compilation | 1920s | Source of data on cooperatives and exports. |
Inference¶
Quantification: Illustrative figures.
Qualitative archival case study of the Bethal and Middelburg districts in the eastern Transvaal, tracing change over time through documentary quotation, supported by a short time series of agricultural exports and scattered figures, with an argument by narrative and interpretation.
Key claims¶
| Claim | Basis | Strength |
|---|---|---|
| Mines held superior power in labour competition because of recruiting organisation, labour districts and state backing, leaving progressive farmers short of labour after 1920. (p. 624) | NAD and Middelburg archive files, commission evidence, Farmer's Weekly and EMFA letters, applied by anecdote. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| Mine recruiting monopsony consolidated as agricultural recruiting expanded, shown in licence numbers. (p. 627) | Licence counts for 1919 and 1921 cited from Farmer's Weekly. | Partial data |
| Post-war maize surpluses and low export prices caused price conflict between farmers and mines, with mines resisting subsidies and importing cheaper maize. (p. 631) | Export value series (Table 1), Farmer's Weekly quotes, press accounts of mine imports. | Partial data |
| Export marketing issues drew progressive and small farmers together in cooperatives and pushed them toward the NP. (p. 630) | Cooperative membership figure for 1926, Heyns evidence, SAAU statements. | Partial data |
| The state prioritised mining profitability and low food prices, so it failed to give farmers effective price support in the early 1920s. (p. 632) | Newspaper reports of Smartt's bills and parliamentary debates, grain elevator program, the Central Agency's records. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| The alliance ended with state marketing control in the 1930s (1931 Maize Control Act, 1937 Marketing Act) and farmers' new alliance with manufacturing. (p. 633) | Asserted with reference to legislation and secondary works; no archival evidence cited. | Asserted |
| The alliance began dissolving in the early 1920s and was confirmed by farmers' shift from SAP to NP in the 1924 election. (p. 634) | Resignation of Hunt, Heard letter and general election outcomes, with the author warning that election deductions are hazardous. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
The author's caveats¶
The author notes that election deductions are hazardous, with no one-to-one relationship between type of farming and political allegiance, and that he could not trace Erskine's recruiting figures for the later period.
Gaps in the evidence¶
The argument depends on quotations from a few farmers and district associations and does not measure mine-farm labour competition, wage differentials or maize contract volumes through time. Mine purchasing records, Chamber of Mines maize contracts and district-level census and recruiting data would test the claims better, and many existed in the archives then and now. Voting data by farm size or district would be needed to link economic position to the shift from SAP to NP.
Replicability: Data described but not public.