The Meaning of Apartheid before 1948: Conflicting Interests and Forces within the Afrikaner Nationalist Alliance¶
Deborah Posel (1987). The Meaning of Apartheid before 1948: Conflicting Interests and Forces within the Afrikaner Nationalist Alliance. Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1. Taylor & Francis (Oxford University Press).
| Type | journal article |
| Scope | Economics and economic history of apartheid |
| Method | archival narrative |
| Period studied | 1940–1952 |
| Regions | South Africa, Witwatersrand, Reserves |
| Themes | origins segregation, politics ideology elections, business and state, bantustans removals influx, mining migrant labour, agriculture land, demography urbanisation |
| Citation key | posel1987 |
Argument¶
Posel disputes the view, associated with O'Meara, Hindson and others, that apartheid before 1948 was a single hegemonic blueprint reflecting Afrikaner capital and implemented as a 'grand plan' after the Nationalist victory. She argues that Afrikaner nationalists shared a commitment to white supremacy and the language of 'separate development', but split between 'total segregation' purists (SABRA, Instituut vir Volkswelstand, Cronje, much of the petty-bourgeoisie and working class) and 'practical' apartheid advocates (AHI, SAAU, Afrikaner capital), who accepted African economic integration under state control. The ambiguity of the term let it unite the alliance. The Sauer Report was an internally contradictory hybrid of the two, so 1950s policy cannot be read as implementation of a ready-made plan. She argues this through critique of O'Meara and close reading of organisational evidence to the Fagan and Tomlinson Commissions and the Sauer Report.
Evidence and method¶
Memoranda and evidence to the Fagan Commission (1946) and Tomlinson Commission (1952-53) in the SAIRR collection (Wits) and the UNISA archive; the Sauer Report (1947); SABRA publications and the Journal of Racial Affairs; Volkshandel; Cronje's books; secondary works by O'Meara, De Klerk, Hindson, Du Toit and Legassick.
Place in the debates¶
- Hegemony of Afrikaner capital in shaping apartheid (O'Meara's class-alliance thesis) (see Origins, coherence and ideology of apartheid and Afrikaner nationalism). Rejects it: Afrikaner capital's 'practical' blueprint was neither hegemonic nor uncontested, and the purist 'total segregation' faction was larger and more powerful than O'Meara allowed.
- Apartheid as a pre-existing 'grand plan' (Sauer Report) implemented after 1948 (see Origins, coherence and ideology of apartheid and Afrikaner nationalism). Rejects it: the Sauer Report was contradictory and could not serve as a simple recipe, and 1950s policy was partly ad hoc reaction to immediate problems.
- Cheap labour thesis and the interests of farming and mining in preventing African urbanisation (Legassick) (see Influx control, pass laws and African urbanisation). Challenges the conventional wisdom: the SAAU accepted continuing, controlled African urbanisation as an economic necessity.
Findings¶
-
Afrikaner nationalists shared an ideology and commitment to white supremacy but held conflicting versions of apartheid, which the ambiguity of the term accommodated. (p. 2)
they had conflicting ideas about how white supremacy was best preserved. Incompatible versions of the apartheid blueprint thus emerged.
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The core division was over the relationship between political segregation and the economic integration of Africans in white areas. (p. 4)
these versions of apartheid differed over a basic question: the relationship between 'political segregation' and the 'economic integration' of Africans in 'white' areas.
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SABRA argued that white economic dependence on African labour would empower African workers and doom white supremacy, so segregation had to be economic as well as political. (p. 6)
The edifice of white supremacy was thus destined to fall as long as it was premised on 'economic integration'.
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The Instituut vir Volkswelstand proposed labour quotas, white immigration and subsidised white employment to reduce dependence on African labour. (p. 8)
a policy of civilised labour and a system of subsidising industries in order to enable them to employ whites'.
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Afrikaner business regarded total segregation as unviable and wished to retain cheap African labour, rejecting the costly alternatives of mechanisation and a larger white workforce. (p. 8)
The alternatives to African labour urged by the 'total segregationists' - such as accelerated mechanisation and a proportionately larger (and more expensive) white workforce - were wholly unpalatable
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Contrary to received wisdom, the farmers' union (SAAU) accepted continued African urbanisation if regulated by economic need, while wanting labour allocation controls to ease farm shortages. (p. 11)
the SAAU accepted continuing African urbanisation as a necessary concomitant of the country's economic development, provided its rate was strictly controlled according to urban economic need.
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The two positions mapped onto different class interests within the alliance, which explains the unresolved division. (p. 13)
a fundamental source of the unresolved division over the meaning of apartheid was the divergent class interests accommodated within the Afrikaner nationalist alliance.
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The Sauer Report combined purist and practical proposals and was internally contradictory, including on migrant labour. (p. 17)
It was rather an internally contradictory and ambiguous document - contradictory, because it wove together strands from mutually exclusive conceptions of apartheid
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The state implemented some Sauer proposals but rejected others, so 1950s policy was in part ad hoc; the state also entrenched migrant labour and froze urbanisation against AHI preferences. (p. 18)
the apartheid policies of the 1950s were, in some respects, ad hoc reactions to immediate problems and priorities.
Evidence ledger¶
Sources used¶
| Source | Kind | Period | How used |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sauer Report (Verslag van die Kleurvraagstuk Kommissie van die Herenigde Nasionale Party, 1947) | commission or official report | 1947 | Text analysed to show that its long-term goals and short-term proposals combine incompatible 'total segregation' and 'practical' apartheid blueprints. |
| Fagan Commission (Native Laws Commission) unsorted evidence, SAIRR collection, Wits: Thom, Van Eeden et al., 'Naturelle in Stedelike Gebiede' (1946) | state archives | 1946 | Documents SABRA-linked academics' claims that African labour is of low productivity and costly, and that Reserves must be developed. |
| Fagan Commission Evidence, Malherbe, Van Eeden et al., 'Reply To Mr Justice Fagan's Defence' | state archives | c.1946-48 | Source for the proposal to substitute efficient European and mechanised labour for African labour. |
| Instituut vir Volkswelstand memorandum to the Fagan Commission, 'Naturelle in Stedelike Gebiede: Getuienis Voorgele aan die Kommissie van Ondersoek Insake Wette op Naturelle in Stedelike Gebiede' | state archives | 1946 (undated) | Main evidence for a detailed 'total segregation' blueprint (labour districts, quotas, white immigration, subsidies) within the FAK. |
| Tomlinson Commission Record of Evidence (UNISA archive), various volumes (Vols 1, 2, 4, 10, 87), 1952-53 | state archives | 1952-1953 | Oral evidence from SABRA, the AHI, the SAAU and the SAIRR used to reconstruct organisational positions on urbanisation, migrant labour and Reserves. |
| SAAU, 'List of Recommendations for Discussion with the Minister of Native Affairs', conference of 15 September 1944 | employer association records | 1944 | Establishes the SAAU's 1944 blueprint for 'separate development' as rural/urban labour allocation with influx/efflux controls. |
| Stellenbosch Chamber of Commerce memorandum to the Fagan Commission | employer association records | c.1946 | Shows that some capitalist bodies endorsed SABRA's total segregation blueprint. |
| Pretoria City Council evidence to the Fagan Commission, 'Getuienis Voorgele aan die Kommissie van Ondersoek Insake Wette op Naturelle in Stedelike Gebiede' | state archives | c.1946 | Near-verbatim copy of the Instituut's evidence, offered as an index of the Instituut's political influence. |
| Volkshandel (journal of the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut), 1948 editorial, as cited in O'Meara | newspapers periodicals | 1948 | Quoted to show the AHI's 'practical' conception of apartheid; also the passage O'Meara used as proof of hegemony. |
| Journal of Racial Affairs, 1,1 (September 1949) | newspapers periodicals | 1949 | Gives SABRA's founding purpose and its Broederbond origins. |
| SABRA pamphlet, Integration or Separate Development (Stellenbosch, 1952) | newspapers periodicals | 1952 | Main source for SABRA's critique of economic integration and its programme of gradual withdrawal of African labour. |
| W.W.M. Eiselen, 'The Meaning of Apartheid', Race Relations XV, 3 (1948) | newspapers periodicals | 1948 | Supports SABRA's claim that withdrawing African labour would not ruin the economy. |
| G. Cronje, Voogdyskap en Apartheid (Pretoria, 1948) and 'n Tuiste vir die Nageslag (1945) | newspapers periodicals | 1945-1948 | Contemporary intellectual statements of total segregation, used to show the faction's influence. |
| SAIRR, The Economic Development of the Reserves, Fact Paper No. 3 (1959) | secondary literature compilation | 1959 | Cited for total segregationist support within the Dutch Reformed Church. |
| SAIRR evidence to the Tomlinson Commission on foreign African labour on the Witwatersrand | state archives | 1952 | Supplies the figure that 58 per cent of the Witwatersrand's African workforce was foreign. |
| O'Meara, Volkskapitalisme (Cambridge, 1983), as the foil study | secondary literature compilation | 1940s (analysed) | Its claims and quotations (e.g. the Volkshandel editorial) are the target of the critique. |
Inference¶
Quantification: None.
Qualitative textual and documentary analysis: reads the policy statements and submissions of Afrikaner organisations (SABRA, Instituut vir Volkswelstand, AHI, SAAU) and the Sauer Report side by side, and attributes the differences to class interests. The analysis is framed as a critique of O'Meara's hegemony thesis.
Key claims¶
| Claim | Basis | Strength |
|---|---|---|
| Afrikaner nationalists shared a rudimentary apartheid discourse but held incompatible blueprints, 'total segregation' versus 'practical' apartheid, over the economic integration of Africans. (p. 124) | Comparison of Fagan and Tomlinson Commission submissions and publications by SABRA, the Instituut, the AHI and the SAAU. | Partial data |
| The AHI and SAAU favoured regulated continued African urbanisation and state allocation of labour, rejecting fixed quotas and freezes on urban African employment. (p. 130) | Volkshandel quotation, AHI and SAAU evidence to the Tomlinson Commission, and the 1944 SAAU memorandum. | Partial data |
| The Sauer Report was an internally contradictory hybrid of the two blueprints, not a coherent 'grand plan' for post-1948 policy. (p. 138) | Close reading of the Sauer Report's stated goals, quota, labour bureaux, urbanisation and migrant labour provisions. | Systematic data |
| The total segregation faction was larger and more influential than O'Meara allowed, reaching the Broederbond, FAK, press, DRC and later the state apparatus. (p. 135) | De Klerk's account, Cronje's books, the SABRA-Broederbond overlap, the Pretoria City Council copying of Instituut evidence, and later appointments of SABRA members. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| The divergence in conceptions of apartheid arose largely from divergent class interests within the alliance (petty-bourgeoisie and workers versus capital and farmers). (p. 133) | Inference from the organisations' stated positions, with the Stellenbosch Chamber of Commerce noted as an exception. | Asserted |
| O'Meara asserts rather than demonstrates the hegemony of Afrikaner capital; his key evidence, the Volkshandel editorial, begs the question. (p. 134) | Reading of O'Meara's use of the Volkshandel editorial against the AHI's own interest. | Partial data |
| 1950s apartheid policy was not simple implementation of a ready-made blueprint: the state adopted some Sauer proposals and rejected others, including a freeze on urbanisation and entrenchment of migrant labour. (p. 139) | Comparison of the Sauer Report and the AHI position with later state policy, with reference to the author's unpublished work. | Asserted |
The author's caveats¶
The author notes that the Instituut vir Volkswelstand cannot be taken as a mouthpiece for the whole FAK. She also notes that the SAAU was not wholly representative and that farming interests varied by type, scale and area. She states the paper offers only a 'brief survey' of 'selected' Afrikaner organisations.
Gaps in the evidence¶
The argument rests on a few organisational memoranda, several of them from 1952-53 Tomlinson evidence used to infer pre-1948 positions. It lacks Broederbond, National Party caucus and Cabinet records, internal HNP correspondence and Afrikaans press content analysis that could test how widely each blueprint was held. Little data on membership composition by class (e.g. occupational profiles of SABRA or the FAK) is given to support the class-interest explanation. Such archives and press holdings existed then and are more accessible now.
Replicability: Data described but not public.