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The State and Policy-Making in Apartheid's Second Phase

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Deborah Posel (1990). The State and Policy-Making in Apartheid's Second Phase. University of the Witwatersrand History Workshop, 'Structure and Experience in the Making of Apartheid', 6-10 February 1990. University of the Witwatersrand, History Workshop.
Type conference paper
Scope Economics and economic history of apartheid
Method archival narrative
Period studied 1950–1972
Regions South Africa, Witwatersrand/PWV, Durban, Johannesburg
Themes origins segregation, bantustans removals influx, business and state, politics ideology elections, labour markets wages, resistance social movements, demography urbanisation
Citation key posel1990a

Argument

Posel challenges the view that apartheid was the linear enactment of a 'grand plan', arguing that by the early 1960s it entered a discrete second phase driven by realignments within Afrikanerdom after urban African protest and Sharpeville. The Bantu Affairs Department (BAD) sought to cap white dependence on African urban labour through labour quotas and to abolish section 10 'residential rights', reversing the 'practical' premises of the 1950s. Using the BAD's bureaucracy, its Broederbond/SABRA networks and the contests with business and municipalities, she shows that policy was the outcome of ceaseless conflict and compromise. Business power was uneven: it defeated the attack on section 10 but failed to stop the limits on 'economic integration'.

Evidence and method

Parliamentary debates (Hansard), Broederbond and SABRA material, newspapers, business body records (ASSOCOM, FCI, AHI), municipal records (Johannesburg, Brakpan), IANA proceedings, SAAU reports, SAIRR surveys, secondary literature (Lazar, Innes), and interviews (Carr, Bourquin, Olivier, Strydom). State archives for the period were closed.

Place in the debates

Findings

  • The 'grand plan' view of apartheid is rejected; the 1960s brought a discrete second phase. (p. 2)

    by the early 1960s, Apartheid had shifted gear into a discrete, second phase, distinguished by certain new premises and objectives

  • 1950s NAD policy let urban employers' demand set the size of the African urban workforce, and granted section 10 rights to 'urbanised' Africans. (p. 3)

    The size, and rate of growth, of the urban African proletariat would thus be determined by the size of the urban labour demand.

  • Sharpeville triggered an economic as well as a political crisis, with capital outflow and a balance of payments crisis. (p. 4)

    during 1960, the country suffered a net outflow of R180 million" and a 'balance of payments crisis more severe than any experienced since 1932

  • English- and Afrikaans-speaking business jointly urged differentiating settled urbanised Africans from migrants as the response to unrest. (p. 5)

    these organisations published a joint memorandum in July 1960, of 'proposals to ease race tension'.

  • The BAD concluded that urban unrest came from too little state control, and the 1960 Bill proposed state-set labour quotas, a reversal of earlier policy. (p. 10)

    the explosion of urban resistance was caused by too little statn control, rather than too much.

  • The 1960 Bill and later drafts were abandoned in the face of business and municipal opposition, which foreshadowed the pattern of conflict and compromise. (p. 12)

    The BAD hastily backed down, abandoning the Bill in toto without even having it gazetted.

  • The BAD pressed for curbs on urban labour at the very time the economy boomed, raising the costs of restricting labour supply and strengthening business's bargaining power. (p. 14)

    Between 1963 and 1968 the GDP at current prices rose by an annual average of 9.3% (compared with an average of 5.2% from 1957-1962.)

  • Labour quotas finally entered policy: the 1970 White Paper fixed maximum white-to-African industrial worker ratios on the Witwatersrand, with decentralisation as the sanction. (p. 17)

    The maximum permissible ratio of White to African industrial workers in the region was to be pegged at 1:2.5 (until 1973) and thereafter, at 1:2.

  • Employers defended section 10 rights because they stabilised a semi-skilled workforce during capital-intensification. (p. 18)

    The industrial boom of the 1960s, accompanied by the accelerating capital-intensification of manufacturing, boosted the urban demand for semi-skilled labour.

  • Business power was uneven: it blocked removal of section 10 rights but not limits on economic integration. (p. 21)

    Strong enough to subvert the BAD's schemes to eradicate section 10 'rights', the urban business lobby failed to deter the BAD in its quest for limits on the scale of 'economic integration' in the cities.

Evidence ledger

Sources used

Source Kind Period How used
Joint memorandum 'proposals to ease race tension' (AHI, FCI, ASSOCOM, SEIFSA, Chambers of Mines), reported in Commercial Opinion, July 1960 employer association records July 1960 Shows organised business (including the AHI) called for differentiating settled urbanised Africans from migrants after Sharpeville.
Commercial Opinion, June 1967, Feb 1968 (business journal reports on Physical Planning Bill and Section 10) employer association records 1967-1968 Documents organised business reaction to the Physical Planning Bill and the BAD's Section 10 proposals.
ASSOCOM Unsorted Non-European Affairs Files (NEAF), including Pretoria Chamber of Commerce memorandum on 1960 Bantu in European Areas Bill and 1963-68 circulars employer association records 1960-1968 Evidences business opposition to labour quotas, Bantu Laws Amendment Bills and Bantu Labour Amendment Bill.
FCI Non-European Affairs Files (NEAF), Minutes of Meeting of Non-European Affairs Committee, 24 January 1968 employer association records 1968 Records Du Randt's meeting with FCI and FCI's opposition to tampering with Section 10 rights.
Brakpan Municipal Records (BMR) 14/1/92 and 14/1/89, Brakpan City Council minutes and BAD circulars state archives 1960-1968 Source for the text and provisions of the 1960 Bantu in European Areas Bill and BAD circulars on the Physical Planning Act.
West Rand Administration Board Archives (WRAB), Johannesburg Municipal Records (JMR) A14/5, A78/2, A14/2, A78/6/2 state archives 1963-1969 Provides BAD officials' addresses (Van Rensburg, Coetzee), IANA minutes and the Secretary for BAD's removals memorandum.
Institute of Administrators of Non-European Affairs (IANA) Proceedings, annual conferences 1959, 1962, 1972 and Biennial Meetings of Officials 1966, 1968 employer association records 1959-1972 Shows municipal administrators' views (Carr) and Du Randt's statements on Section 10 and removals.
Killie Campbell Library, Bourquin papers KCM 55218, Durban NEAD notes for meeting with Minister of BAD, 3 August 1959 state archives 1959 Establishes the Durban NEAD's declaration of defeat at Cato Manor.
Hansard (HAD 1952, 1956, 1976) and Senate Debates 1967 parliamentary debates 1952-1976 Used for NAD policy statements, Verwoerd's refusal on Tomlinson funding, M.C. Botha's statements on homeland citizenship.
Memorandum Explaining Background and Objects of Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Bill 1959, N.P. 3-1959 commission or official report 1959 Shows official government opposition to Section 10 rights as policy from 1959.
Natives (Urban Areas) Act s.10 (as amended 1952); Bantu in European Areas Bill 1960; Bantu Laws Amendment Bills 1963/64; Physical Planning and Utilisation of Resources Act 1967; Bantu Labour Amendment Bill 1968; Homeland Citizenship Act 1970 legislation gazette 1952-1970 The bills and Acts are the objects whose drafting and fate trace BAD policy and its limits.
White Paper on Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on the Decentralisation of Industries, 1970 commission or official report 1970 Establishes authorisation of labour quotas with White:African ratio of 1:2.5 then 1:2.
SAAU Reports of the General Council to Annual Congresses, 1960, 1961, 1962 employer association records 1960-1962 Used for Land Bank loans to farmers and SAAU's shift on African urbanisation.
South African Institute of Race Relations, Survey of Race Relations 1967 secondary literature compilation 1967 Source for Physical Planning Bill reactions (ASSOCOM, Economic Advisory Council, Minister of Planning).
Newspapers: The Star, Sunday Times, The World, Rand Daily Mail, Sunday Express, The Friend (1953-1979) newspapers periodicals 1953-1979 Source for Sauer's statements, Broederbond membership and activities, SABRA conference conflicts, 1963 De Wet Nel remarks.
Interviews with N.J. Olivier (1985), W.J.P. Carr (1984), S.B. Bourquin (1985), Hans Strydom (1989) interviews oral history 1984-1989 Supports claims about SABRA origins of the Tomlinson Commission, Broederbond control of BAD posts, and BAD bureaucrats' autonomy.
Lazar, Conformity and Conflict: Afrikaner Nationalist Politics 1948-1961 (D.Phil. Oxford 1987) and SABRA paper secondary literature compilation 1948-1961 Supplies evidence on Broederbond membership growth, Verwoerd's use of the Bond and SABRA divisions.
Innes, Anglo American and the Rise of Modern South Africa (economic data on capital outflow, GDP growth, sector shares) secondary literature compilation 1960-1970 Source for net capital outflow in 1960 and GDP/sectoral growth figures in the 1960s.
Griffiths and Jones, South African Labour Economics (strike/dispute figures 1955-58) secondary literature compilation 1950s Supports claim that industrial disputes and strikers nearly doubled 1955-58.
Hobart Houghton, The South African Economy (1964) (balance of payments crisis) secondary literature compilation 1960 Source for the 1960 balance of payments crisis quotation.

Inference

Quantification: Illustrative figures.

Archival process-tracing case study of BAD policy-making in the 1960s, tracing drafts of bills and their fates through business, municipal and Afrikaner-organisation responses; supported by interviews and press, with few statistics.

Key claims

Claim Basis Strength
Apartheid was not the linear implementation of a grand plan; it shifted into a distinct second phase in the early 1960s with new premises, shaped by contest and compromise. (p. 2) Legislative drafts and their fates, business and municipal records, interviews, press; framed against secondary literature. Partial data
After Sharpeville, realignments within Afrikanerdom, especially the Broederbond's ascent under Verwoerd, defeated reformist lobbies and pushed the BAD toward tighter control. (p. 8) Lazar's thesis, newspaper reports, Broederbond membership figures, interviews with Olivier and Strydom. Partial data
The 1960 Bantu in European Areas Bill reversed the 1950s premises by introducing state-fixed labour quotas and removal of Section 10 rights, but was abandoned after protest from local authorities and business. (p. 12) Brakpan municipal minutes (text of Bill), Pretoria Chamber of Commerce memorandum, ASSOCOM files. Partial data
The BAD succeeded in limiting 'economic integration' (Physical Planning Act 1967, 1970 White Paper quotas) over business opposition, though with concessions. (p. 16) Commercial Opinion, SAIRR Survey, ASSOCOM/FCI files, 1970 White Paper. Partial data
Organised business and municipalities blocked every attempt to repeal Section 10 rights in the 1960s, but the BAD eroded them indirectly via call-in cards and urban removals. (p. 19) FCI/ASSOCOM files, IANA proceedings, WRAB records, Commercial Opinion. Partial data
Business power was uneven: strong enough to defeat the Section 10 repeal but not to stop limits on economic integration. (p. 21) Comparative reading of the outcomes of the quota and Section 10 struggles across archival business sources. Partial data

The author's caveats

The author notes that the state archives covering the period are still closed and the SAAU claims to have no archival material from that time, limiting analysis of Broederbond and agricultural influence. She also says the paper is not a comprehensive analysis of the state, focuses on the BAD, and omits business structural determinants and African resistance.

Gaps in the evidence

The argument depends on business, municipal and press records rather than the BAD's and Cabinet's own files, so internal decision-making is inferred; closed state archives (now opened) would test it. Broederbond influence claims rest on allegations and press reports, so Broederbond membership records or leaked circulars would help. Quantified evidence on labour demand, urban unemployment, removals and employment ratios, available from official statistics, is largely absent, so effects of the policies are not measured.

Replicability: Data described but not public.