Skip to content

Industrial Democracy In South African Industries

Literature › Works

Mandisa Poswa (1994). Industrial Democracy In South African Industries. Paper presented at History Workshop, University of the Witwatersrand, July 1994. Centre for Industrial and Labour Studies, University of Natal, Durban.
Type conference paper
Scope Wider apartheid literature
Method survey fieldwork
Period studied 1974–1994
Regions South Africa, Durban (Khangela Brewery)
Themes unions strikes, labour markets wages, business and state, transition post apartheid
Citation key poswa1994

Argument

The paper argues that worker participation schemes in South Africa have been driven by management to raise productivity and to bypass unions, so they extend rather than challenge managerial control. Drawing on a 1991-92 case study at Khangela Brewery, it shows that workers distrust these schemes, understand them poorly and are reluctant to take part. It contends that real industrial democracy, meaning a redistribution of power and worker input into macro-level policy, is needed. The case rests on the political transition, the economic crisis and the ANC's Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). The paper closes with conditions for building it, namely literacy and training, clear objectives, information disclosure and a role for the state.

Evidence and method

A single case study at Khangela Brewery (a subsidiary of National Sorghum Breweries, Durban), taken from the author's unpublished 1993 dissertation. It draws on worker and management perceptions, including an interview with the Human Resource Manager. The paper also relies on secondary literature on participation (Torres, Nel, Cohen, Anstey, Maree, Greenberg) and on the RDP. No quantitative data are presented.

Place in the debates

Findings

  • Participation in South Africa has been management-led and aimed at productivity and consent rather than coercion. (p. 6)

    Worker participation in South Africa so far has been driven by the need to increase productivity and efficiency.

  • Participation schemes left decision-making power with employers. (p. 7)

    while decision-making remained intact in the hands of the employer.

  • In contrast to Europe, the initiative on participation was ceded to employers, and workers rejected it as co-optation except for collective bargaining. (p. 8)

    Workers and their representatives have until recently rejected any form of participation, regarding it as co-optation, with the exception of collective bargaining.

  • At Khangela, workers distrusted management's motives and saw the schemes as a way to undermine unions. (p. 8)

    They were seen as a way of undermining trade unions and increasing productivity at the expense of workers.

  • Workers at Khangela largely accepted managerial prerogative and felt they lacked the skills to take decisions. (p. 8)

    There was general agreement that they did not have the skills and expertise to make significant decisions.

  • Workers understood collective bargaining best, while ESOPs and briefing groups were poorly understood. (p. 9)

    Workers clearly did not understand what was to be gained by buying shares in the company.

  • Existing programmes extend management control instead of challenging it, and support dwindles when productivity does not rise. (p. 13)

  • Political democracy is a precondition for industrial democracy, and the lack of it explains the failure of participation. (p. 10)

    One can attribute part of the failure to at least partially democratise industry, even with the introduction of worker participation, to the absence of political democracy in the country.

  • The RDP commits to redressing power imbalances between workers and employers through legislation. (p. 12)

    Legislation is to be created which will enable worker-participation and decision-making in the workplace.

Evidence ledger

Sources used

Source Kind Period How used
Khangela Brewery case study (author's 1991-1992 study of worker participation initiatives; Poswa 1993 unpublished dissertation, University of Natal Durban) author survey or fieldwork 1991-1992 Supplies the paper's only primary evidence on workers' perceptions of participation schemes and their propensity to participate, and supports the claim that participation extends managerial control.
Statement by the Human Resource Manager at Khangela Brewery (interview or testimony) interviews oral history 1991-1992 Used to show that worker suspicion made the introduction of participatory schemes a 'tell and sell' exercise.
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) of the African National Congress other 1994 Cited as a policy document showing that workers' rights and worker participation are to be legislated, supporting the case for industrial democracy.
Ewert (1992/1993), study on restructuring of technology and work organisation, cited for evidence of change in technology, work organisation and industrial relations secondary literature compilation early 1990s Cited as evidence that technology, work organisation and industrial relations are changing in response to reconstruction.
Unspecified South African company case studies of worker participation (e.g. Anstey 1990; Mailer 1992; Horwitz & James 1992) secondary literature compilation 1980s-early 1990s Referred to generally to support the claim that managers show little commitment to full participation or power redistribution.

New data

Case study data at Khangela Brewery, Durban (1991-1992) on workers' and management's views of participation schemes, held in the author's unpublished 1993 dissertation; sample size and method are not described in this paper.

Inference

Quantification: None.

Largely theoretical and normative argument, illustrated by a single case study (Khangela Brewery) and by reference to other scholars' case studies. No quantitative evidence, comparison or statistical test is presented.

Key claims

Claim Basis Strength
Worker participation in South Africa has been driven by management for productivity and legitimacy ends, not by unions or workers. (p. 6) Secondary literature (Torres, Cohen, Anstey) and unspecified case studies; no primary data presented. Asserted
Khangela workers were suspicious of management's motives, seeing participation schemes as a way of undermining unions and raising productivity at their expense. (p. 8) Khangela Brewery case study, including the Human Resource Manager's remarks. Illustrative or anecdotal
Workers' propensity to participate was reduced by acceptance of managerial prerogative, low literacy and skills, and poor understanding of the available schemes. (p. 9) Khangela Brewery case study alone; no sample or method details given. Illustrative or anecdotal
Existing participation programmes do not challenge managerial control and in fact extend it. (p. 13) Khangela case study plus general assertion about managers' motives. Illustrative or anecdotal
South Africa faces an over-accumulation crisis dating from 1974, with structural problems across industry, agriculture, mining and the labour and financial markets, which makes industrial democracy necessary. (p. 11) Cited as 'one of the explanations advanced' (apparently Gelb 1991 in the references); no data presented. Asserted

The author's caveats

The author notes that the Khangela study is only part of a broader study. The paper does not discuss the case's representativeness, sample size or methods.

Gaps in the evidence

The paper rests on one unnamed-sample brewery case study, so its generalisations about South African industry are untested. It would need survey data on participation schemes across firms and sectors, union records, and company or industrial council records. Surveys such as Horwitz & James-type studies existed by the early 1990s and could have been used, as could comparative case studies of several firms, and the evidence on the 1974 crisis and its link to management strategy is entirely absent.

Replicability: Data poorly documented.