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Broken Promises: Discontent, Protest, and the Transition to Confrontation in Duduza, 1978-1985

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Jeremy Seekings (1990). Broken Promises: Discontent, Protest, and the Transition to Confrontation in Duduza, 1978-1985. History Workshop, University of the Witwatersrand: Structure and Experience in the Making of Apartheid, 6-10 February 1990. University of the Witwatersrand.

Type conference paper
Scope Wider apartheid literature
Method archival narrative
Period studied 1957–1985
Regions East Rand, Nigel, Duduza, Charterston/Alra Park, PWV townships
Themes resistance social movements, bantustans removals influx, demography urbanisation, unions strikes, macro fiscal finance debt, politics ideology elections, inequality poverty unemployment
Citation key seekings1990

Argument

Using Duduza as a case study, Seekings argues that the shift from township 'quiescence' to confrontation in 1984-85 had general causes (recession, resurgent nationalist and union organisation, state urban, education and political policy). These were mediated by a local factor: residents' belief that promises of township development made at the 1960s-70s removal from Charterston had been broken. Rent increases that financed development under the state's self-financing rule fed a sense of injustice. Civic and council lobbying won concessions in 1982-83 but did not solve the bucket-sewerage grievance. Union strikes, the schools boycott and a funeral then radicalised residents, and the police shooting of February 1985 produced unintended confrontation. 'Quiescence' is read as powerlessness and non-confrontational political action, not contentment, and the emphasis on state promises as a resource of the powerless, not as evidence of belief in a paternalistic state.

Evidence and method

Court transcripts of the Baleka and Montoedi trials (residents' testimony), interviews with Civic Association leaders, councillors, unionists and student activists (1986, 1989-90), Sowetan and Rand Daily Mail reports, Hansard questions and replies, ERAB budgets and estimates, SAIRR Race Relations Surveys, Government Gazette rent notices, and the 1976 Census of Manufacturing.

Place in the debates

  • Township 'quiescence' versus contentment before the 1980s revolt (see Resistance and liberation movements). Rejects reading pre-1984 quiescence as contentment; sees it as powerlessness and the prevalence of non-confrontational political action (drawing on Gaventa).
  • General structural versus local causes of township revolt (see Resistance and liberation movements). Argues that common structural conditions were mediated by locally specific experiences (here, the forced removal and the broken promises), which shaped the timing and form of protest.
  • Moral economy and notions of injustice in popular protest (see Resistance and liberation movements). Applies Thompson and Moore: moral outrage was bound up with material and political factors; the emphasis on state promises reflects powerlessness, not belief in a paternalistic state.

Findings

  • Duduza moved from apparent quiescence to chronic violent confrontation with the security forces in 1984-85, in line with wider township unrest. (p. 2)

    During 1984-85 the East Rand township of Duduza, like many other black townships in South Africa, became the scene of chronic confrontation between township residents and the security forces.

  • The core local grievance was the state's failure to deliver the development promised at the time of removal. (p. 3)

    Underlying the transition to confrontation in Duduza was residents' involvement in new forms of political action, in response to the chronic failure of the state to provide promised township development, on terms acceptable to the residents.

  • Duduza lacked basic services on arrival despite the promised model township. (p. 5)

    There was no electricity, internal water supply, or sewerage system.

  • The 1982 three-stage rent increase, justified as financing development, would have doubled rents and triggered the formation of the Civic Association. (p. 11)

    The three stages would, together, increase rents by R22 or 100%.

  • Rent increases were a central instrument of state urban policy, tied to the requirement that townships finance their own development. (p. 12)

    Rent increases were a central feature of state urban policy during this period, as the pronouncements of state officials made quite clear.

  • Resistance to rents was defensive and not programmatic; residents did not demand state subsidy but development out of rents already paid. (p. 13)

    Opposition to rent increases was not programmatic. There does not seem to have been any explicitly formulated call for state subsidisation.

  • The recession devastated local manufacturing employment, which underpinned household incomes and the rise of independent unions. (p. 15)

    Union Carriage, the largest local employer, was said to have been retrenching about fifty workers a month from 1983; at the beginning of the decade it had employed over 900 workers

  • Strikes and unionisation at Union Carriage radicalised the wider township community and fed into civic revival. (p. 16)

    The experience of unionisation at Union Carriage and other firms, and in particular the experience of strike action, mobilised and radicalised many of Duduza's residents.

  • The perceived failure of earlier lobbying forms of politics drove the transition to active protest. (p. 19)

    It was the perceived bankruptcy or inefficacy of previous forms of political action which constituted the initial dynamic of the transition to more active protest and confrontation.

  • Pre-1984 quiescence reflected powerlessness and the manner of political action, not contentment. (p. 20)

    In so far as Duduza in the period before 1984-85 can be regarded as 'quiescent', this cannot be understood as contentment, but rather needs to be seen in terms of the manner of political action.

  • Emphasis on state promises was a resource of the powerless and did not imply a belief in a paternalistic state. (p. 22)

    An emphasis on state promises reflected neither deference to the state nor (necessarily) a particular view of distributive justice.

Evidence ledger

Sources used

Source Kind Period How used
Baleka trial court transcript (State vs Baleka and 21 others), Supreme Court, Transvaal Provincial Division, evidence of Thobela, Tsagane, Mazibuko, Mhlambi state archives 1978-1985 events (testimony) Residents' testimony establishes the promises made at removal, conditions in Duduza, rent increases, Civic Association actions and the events of February 1985.
Author interviews with Duduza Civic Association leaders, residents, councillors (Moloi), Kleinveld, students, unionists (April 1986; Sept 1989; Dec 1989; Jan 1990) interviews oral history 1986-1990 Establish residents' memories of promises at removal, rents, grievances, union and student mobilisation, and the sequence of 1984-85 events.
Hansard, Questions and Replies (Q&R), 1983-1985 parliamentary debates 1983-1985 Gives the Deputy-Minister's denial of promises, numbers of new houses built, township population and rented-house proportion, and ERAB capital allocation.
Sowetan newspaper, 1982-1983 (e.g. 7 June 1983; 28 Jan 1983; 15 Oct 1982) newspapers periodicals 1982-1983 Reports of rent increases, council meetings, Civic quotes and ERAB budget decisions.
Rand Daily Mail, 1979-1982 newspapers periodicals 1979-1982 Dates the 1979 rent increase and reports bus-fare opposition and shack issues.
SAIRR Race Relations Survey 1959-60 and 1980 official statistical series 1959-60; 1980 Cited for Charterston housing stock and the poll in Community Council elections.
East Rand Administration Board (ERAB) 1975-76 Budget Speech by SJ van der Merwe, 12 March 1975 commission or official report 1975 Documents the completion of Charterston removals in 1975 and official commendation.
ERAB budget estimates for financial years 1979-80 to 1982-83 company records or reports 1979-1983 Provide the deficit figures (R2.1m combined) and the 1979 Council resolution on economic administration, underlying the rent-increase argument.
Government Gazette rent notices (GN 1,701, GG 6,613, 10 Aug 1979; GN 1,408, GG 7,118, 11 Jul 1980; GN 605-19, GG 7,501, 27 Mar 1981) legislation gazette 1979-1981 Supports the claim that rents were broadly the same across East Rand townships despite uneven services.
1976 Census of Manufacturing (Nigel) industrial mining census 1976 Shows about 4,500 black manufacturing jobs in Nigel, the material base of Duduza household incomes.
State vs Montoedi and others (court record, evidence of Councillor Namane) state archives 1984-85 Evidence on councillors' resignations after the November 1984 funeral.
Statements by union organisers and Union Carriage workers (Godongwana; shop stewards; Joseph Thobela statement) interviews oral history 1986-1989 Document retrenchments at Union Carriage and Powerlines and the union organising and strikes of 1982-84.
Secondary data compilations: Humphries 'Life after Death'; Bekker and Humphries on Administration Boards; Chaskalson and Seekings, Political Conflict in South Africa (Indicator Project) secondary literature compilation 1973-1988 Supply the general pattern of Community Council and Administration Board finance and township conflict against which Duduza is compared.

New data

Author-collected oral testimony (interviews 1986-1990 with civic leaders, residents, unionists, students and councillors) combined with court transcript evidence and newspaper/Hansard compilation on Duduza; no systematic dataset.

Inference

Quantification: Illustrative figures.

Single-township case study using qualitative reconstruction from interviews, court testimony, press and Hansard, interpreted through concepts of moral economy, powerlessness and quiescence, with comparison to other PWV townships from the secondary literature.

Key claims

Claim Basis Strength
Duduza residents' discontent rested on promises of township development made at the removal from Charterston, which were broken while Charterston was developed. (p. 4) Baleka trial testimony of residents, interviews with Moloi and Kleinveld, ERAB budget speech. Partial data
Rent increases under the Community Council were driven by state fiscal policy requiring townships to self-finance, with ERAB deficits and overruling of council. (p. 9) ERAB budget estimates 1979-83, Sowetan reports, Hansard on council finances. Partial data
Resistance to rent increases in 1982-83 was not programmatic opposition to state urban policy but based on locally rooted perceptions of promise and justice. (p. 13) Residents' testimony in Baleka trial, Civic leaders' interviews, Sowetan statements by council chair Mokoto. Illustrative or anecdotal
The Civic's lobbying succeeded in suspending rent increases in 1982-83 and ERAB responded by cutting Duduza from its capital budget and building no new houses in 1984. (p. 13) Sowetan reports of suspensions, Hansard on ERAB allocation and housing. Partial data
Recession-driven retrenchments and independent union organisation, then school boycotts, mobilised and radicalised residents and revived the Civic in late 1984. (p. 15) Interviews with unionists, Union Carriage workers and student activists, Godongwana statement, 1976 manufacturing census. Illustrative or anecdotal
The transition to confrontation was unintended, triggered by the 17-18 February 1985 bucket meeting, police shooting and detentions, and occurred in three stages. (p. 21) Baleka trial testimony of Thobela and Mazibuko, interviews 1986 and 1989. Illustrative or anecdotal
Township 'quiescence' reflected powerlessness and non-confrontational forms of action, not contentment, and emphasis on state promises was a resource of the powerless rather than a belief in a paternalistic state. (p. 22) Author's interpretation of interviews, informed by Gaventa and Thompson/Moore; acknowledged no conclusive explanation. Asserted

The author's caveats

Author notes uncertainty about dates of events (court testimony gives 1978 for the first rent increase, press 1979), possible overlap in housing figures (235 and 156 houses), little other evidence of councillor corruption, official versus unofficial population figures, and that despite extensive interviewing no conclusive explanation of the promise beliefs was reached.

Gaps in the evidence

The argument relies mainly on retrospective testimony from civic leaders and trial witnesses, who had incentives to frame events in particular ways. Systematic evidence such as ERAB and Nigel council minutes, township rent and service-charge records, household income or survey data, and contemporaneous documents showing whether promises were actually made would test the claims better; some of these archives likely existed and may be accessible today. Comparison with other townships' budgets and rents is asserted rather than tabulated.

Replicability: Data poorly documented.