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Consequences for Lesotho of Changing South African Labour Demand

Literature › Works

James Cobbe (1986). Consequences for Lesotho of Changing South African Labour Demand. African Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 338. Oxford University Press on behalf of The Royal African Society.
Type journal article
Scope Wider apartheid literature
Method mixed
Period studied 1966–1985
Regions Lesotho, South Africa, Gold mining industry, Bantustans
Themes mining migrant labour, labour markets wages, inequality poverty unemployment, bantustans removals influx, business and state, comparative theory
Citation key cobbe1986

Argument

Since the early 1970s South Africa has turned Lesotho from a general labour reserve into a reserve for the mining industry alone, as mines stabilised their workforce and recruited domestically. The large mid-1970s rise in real mine wages produced a short-lived 'Golden Seventies' prosperity that Lesotho failed to convert into productive investment. The result is greater dependence and vulnerability. Because South African mines have a large oversupply of potential novices, Basotho miners are replaceable at modest cost, so future demand depends on Chamber of Mines strategy and Pretoria's political choices rather than on economic growth. The article sets out four scenarios (continued employment of about 100,000, gradual decline, sudden cut, total ban) and argues that each leaves Lesotho worse off: youth unemployment, rural differentiation and landlessness, and potential famine under a mass repatriation.

Evidence and method

Lesotho and South African official statistics (Lesotho Department of Labour, Bureau of Statistics, Central Bank of Lesotho Quarterly Review, SAIRR Surveys), TEBA and Chamber of Mines data compiled in Table 1, de Vletter's ILO working paper, agricultural survey data, press reports, and the author's own crude multiplier estimates. It also draws on secondary literature (Murray, Spiegel, Thabane and Guy, Sen).

Place in the debates

Findings

  • South Africa's policy changes shifted Lesotho from a general labour reserve to a reserve for mining alone, with other migration openings almost closed. (p. 29)

    In the new situation, the transition to which is almost complete, Lesotho becomes a labour reserve for the single industry, mining, and new opportunities for migration are almost eliminated.

  • Mine labour oversupply allowed employers to stabilise the workforce, upgrade skills and mechanise. (p. 29)

    Oversupply permits employers to be selective about whom they employ; it therefore facilitates 'stabilization' of the labour force in terms of continuity of employment.

  • Mine employers could readily replace Basotho from within South Africa; a TEBA spokesman claimed ample unemployed blacks for the 1984 strike. (p. 30)

    a TEBA spokesman alleged that there were 300,000 unemployed blacks who could be used to replace strikers, indicating massive oversupply.

  • Basotho form a large share of mine labour, but the economics of mine demand are only permissive; the outcome rests on Chamber strategy and government policy. (p. 32)

    The economics are, in effect, permissive rather than determining of the outcome.

  • Migrant earnings exceed Lesotho's GDP, so any reduction would sharply cut incomes and consumption. (p. 37)

    the most recent provisional balance of payments estimates for 1983 value labour income from abroad in that year at M470 million, well in excess of GDP.

  • A youth employment crisis is already underway, with few formal jobs and very few new mine openings. (p. 38)

    well over 20,000 new entrants to the working age population, most with a full primary education or more, are having to be absorbed into agriculture, the informal sector, or open unemployment each year.

  • Reduced migration is expected to increase rural differentiation and landlessness, including the emergence of a kulak class. (p. 40)

    the result is likely to be an acceleration of a process already in motion, by which the rural population becomes increasingly differentiated, with the emergence of a kulak class

  • Mine wage gains did not reduce poverty, and vulnerability to South African decisions has increased. (p. 48)

    The vulnerability of Lesotho's economy, society, and polity to changes in South Africa over which Lesotho has no control is greater now than it was a decade ago.

Evidence ledger

Sources used

Source Kind Period How used
TEBA/Chamber of Mines recruitment data for Basotho miners (via Central Bank of Lesotho Quarterly Review 111:4, Dec 1984, p. 56 and others), Table 1 chamber of mines or recruiting records 1966-1983 Establishes numbers of Lesotho miners on Chamber mines and trend (plateau near 100-110,000) in Table 1.
Average annual cash wage for all black gold-mine workers (current and 1970 Rand), from SAIRR Survey of Race Relations and Lipton, 'Men of Two Worlds' official statistical series 1966-1982 Documents rapid real wage rises in the 1970s used to explain the Golden Seventies and migrant supply.
Lesotho Department of Labour data on total mine workers and recruitment, and Bureau of Statistics, Kingdom of Lesotho, Annual Statistical Bulletin 1982 official statistical series 1967-1984 Provides total mine workers and derived average completed contract length in Table 1.
South African official data on registered legal non-mine foreign African workers (SAIRR Survey of Race Relations 1983, p. 137) official statistical series 1977-1983 Shows decline in legal non-mine Basotho workers, with construction etc. rising 1982-83 and agriculture falling.
Fion de Vletter, 'Recent Trends and Prospects of Black Migration to South Africa', ILO Working Paper No. 20 (1985) secondary literature compilation 1980s Supplies novice recruitment share, illegal apprehension statistics, TEBA statements and 1984 South African threat data.
Lesotho census of 1976 (female temporary migrants) and village-level studies population census 1976 Indicates illegal female migration of 3 to 10 per cent absentee rates.
Thabane and Guy oral history interviews with unemployed ex-miners in Maseru (ISAS, NUL, 1983) interviews oral history 1983 Used to show miners' own perceptions of migrant labour as a necessity rather than a career.
Basic Agricultural Services Programme surveys 1979/80 (Winch, Agri-Economic Farm Situation in the Lowlands and Foothills of Lesotho, 1981; via Cobbe 1982) author survey or fieldwork 1979/80 Shows average crop output of M85-130 per year, so agriculture cannot sustain households.
Kingdom of Lesotho, Third Five-Year Development Plan 1980-1985 commission or official report 1980-1985 Source of the government's poverty datum line estimate (over M1000 per household in 1980).
Central Bank of Lesotho Quarterly Review 3 (4th quarter 1984): GNP, balance of payments, labour income from abroad national accounts macro 1983 Gives GDP of about M340 million and migrant labour income of M470 million, showing earnings exceed GDP.
Financial Mail, 20 May 1983 (January 1983 average cash wages for blacks in gold mines) newspapers periodicals 1983 Wage levels underlie the M350 million earnings estimate for 100,000 miners.
Cobbe, 'Modeling a Labour-Reserve Economy: Lesotho' (ASA 1984) multiplier estimates author survey or fieldwork 1984 Provides a crude 1.25-1.85 multiplier on migrant earnings used to estimate income loss from migrant reductions.
Lesotho census data on age structure and education statistics (1979 examination figures) population census c.1980 Indicates about 30,000 persons a year reaching age 15 and thousands of school leavers, implying youth employment crisis.
Molapo, 'Implementation of the Third Five Year Development Plan', Central Bank of Lesotho Quarterly Review 3 (1984), plus retail price index tables official statistical series 1975/76-1984/85 Used for real government expenditure trends, expenditure composition (Tables 2, 3) and customs revenue share.
Catholic Relief Services nutrition data and Food and Nutrition Information Bulletin 1 (1984) official statistical series 1979-1984 Shows persistent child malnutrition (16.0-32.7 per cent underweight) and rising food aid as indicators of vulnerability.
Press reports: Lesotho Weekly, Financial Mail, Africa News, Boston Globe, The Economist, The Comet (1983-85) newspapers periodicals 1983-1985 Document the chronology of South African pressure on Lesotho (border restrictions, Maseru raid, ANC refugee issue, Vaal Reefs dismissals).
Parliamentary/official reports: LCU employment (Lesotho Weekly 30 December 1983) newspapers periodicals 1983 Shows the Labour Construction Unit employed only 863 labourers, indicating limited contingency capacity.

Inference

Quantification: Illustrative figures.

Policy-oriented scenario analysis combining descriptive tables of migrant numbers and wages with rough macro arithmetic (earnings vs GDP, multiplier), qualitative reading of South African political chronology from press reports, and theoretical reasoning about Chamber and state strategy.

Key claims

Claim Basis Strength
Lesotho has shifted from a general labour reserve to a reserve for the mining industry alone, a change driven by South African policy, with non-mine opportunities nearly eliminated and novice recruitment collapsed. (p. 8) Table 1 series (TEBA, Department of Labour, SAIRR), de Vletter on novice shares, and press and personal communication. Partial data
Each rand of migrant earnings generates 25-85 cents of additional value added within Lesotho (multiplier 1.25-1.85). (p. 17) Author's own crude model estimates, derivation not shown in this article. Asserted
The most likely future scenarios are continued employment of about 100,000 on Chamber mines, gradual decline, sudden cut, or total ban, with the Chamber likely to keep a sizeable Basotho contingent but not to expand it. (p. 14) Inference from mine management statements (de Vletter), Chamber behaviour, press chronology of 1983-84 South African threats. Illustrative or anecdotal
There is a youth employment crisis: over 20,000 new entrants a year to the working-age population against minimal formal job creation and 500-3000 mine opportunities. (p. 17) Census-derived age structure, school examination figures, and rough job creation figures. Partial data
Reduced migration will increase rural differentiation, landlessness, urban growth and illegal migration. (p. 20) Reasoned projection drawing on Murray, Spiegel, Winch studies and the 1979 Land Act; no new data. Asserted
Lesotho's government and population have become more vulnerable in the 1980s, shown by falling real government spending, rising interest burden, defence share, malnutrition and food aid, and dependence on customs revenue. (p. 27) Molapo/Central Bank fiscal data (Tables 2, 3), Catholic Relief Services nutrition data and food aid figures. Partial data

The author's caveats

The author notes that precise quantification of Lesotho-South Africa labour flows is impossible for conceptual and empirical reasons, that illegal and long-settled permanent migrants cannot be counted, that data from different sources are inconsistent, that Basotho wages are not separately known, that Lesotho migrant earnings estimates vary and their methodologies are unrevealed, and that the discussion of future scenarios is speculative.

Gaps in the evidence

The argument would benefit from household survey data on remittance dependence and distribution among Basotho households, and a documented, tested multiplier model rather than a cited conference paper. Chamber of Mines internal recruitment-policy records and South African government labour-policy files would better test claims about Chamber quotas and strategy, though these were likely inaccessible at the time. Since the article is a forward-looking scenario piece, later outcomes (post-1986 actual recruitment and retrenchment data) now exist to test its predictions.

Replicability: Data poorly documented.