Inequality in South Africa during and since Apartheid (review of Jeremy Seekings and Nicoli Nattrass, Class, Race, and Inequality in South Africa, Yale University Press, 2005)¶
Frederick Cooper (2007). Inequality in South Africa during and since Apartheid (review of Jeremy Seekings and Nicoli Nattrass, Class, Race, and Inequality in South Africa, Yale University Press, 2005). Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 33, No. 2. Taylor & Francis.
| Type | other |
| Scope | Economics and economic history of apartheid |
| Method | synthesis review |
| Period studied | c.1800s (nineteenth century)–early 2000s |
| Regions | South Africa |
| Themes | inequality poverty unemployment, labour markets wages, origins segregation, agriculture land, bantustans removals influx, education human capital, transition post apartheid, politics ideology elections, methods data sources |
| Citation key | cooper2007 |
Argument¶
Cooper reviews Seekings and Nattrass's book, which explains South African inequality as the result of a 'growth path': a trajectory of decisions and institutions, not one legacy or factor. On this account, coercive labour control and land expropriation produced skills bottlenecks, capital-intensive production and a surplus of unskilled African labour. The state hid that surplus in the Bantustans, while a better-skilled African core was increasingly protected by residence rights, schooling and pensions. Inequality was therefore deracialised under apartheid and the main divide became employment, which the post-1994 high-wage, high-productivity strategy reinforced instead of reducing. Cooper praises the book's methodological self-awareness about data and categories, and its critical but non-dismissive use of the Marxist and liberal literatures. He is sceptical about how developed and optimistic its proposed 'social accord' solution is.
Evidence and method¶
This is a review, so it draws on the reviewed book's evidence: census and survey data from before and after 1994, household income comparisons (e.g. 1975 vs 1991), and comparisons with other African countries and with Brazil. Cooper cites only a few specific pages of the book (pp. 155, 371).
Place in the debates¶
- Liberal vs Marxist/revisionist accounts of apartheid and capitalism (see Liberal vs revisionist: was apartheid functional or dysfunctional for capitalist growth?). Cooper says the book takes both traditions seriously, and moves beyond generalised conceptions of the logic of capitalism and its relationship to race towards a systematic study of income and welfare and their relationship to institutions and programmes. He endorses this approach.
- Apartheid's legacy and the persistence of inequality after 1994 (see Long-run legacy and persistence of apartheid). Endorses the view that inequality has been deracialised since before 1994 and that unemployment is now its main expression. He accepts that the post-1994 high-wage strategy encouraged capital-intensive growth and worsened unemployment.
- State knowledge and surveillance (Foucauldian view of the modern state). Cooper notes that the book challenges Foucauldian grid-of-surveillance conceptions, since apartheid's knowledge regime featured 'studied ignorance' about the effects of policy on Africans.
Findings¶
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Segregationist and apartheid growth was built on land expropriation and labour coercion enforced through influx control and policing. (p. 3)
South Africa's growth strategy, going back to the nineteenth century, was rooted in the expropriation of land and coercion of labour, through pass laws, residential restrictions, and intensive policing.
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By the 1960s the economy had an unskilled labour surplus and a skills shortage. (p. 3)
By the 1960s, South Africa had a surplus of unskilled African labour and a shortage of skilled labour.
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The state responded to skill shortages by letting the job colour bar shift upward. (p. 3)
The government allowed the colour bar to 'float' upward
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Farm mechanisation and removals from white farms enlarged the unskilled surplus. (p. 3)
Mechanisation of farming and new waves of forced removals from white-owned farms accentuated the surplus of unskilled labour
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The Bantustans were used to conceal the surplus rather than address it through welfare, training or job allocation. (p. 3)
which the state tried to manage not by welfare measures, job training, or job allocation programmes, but by hiding the problem in the Bantustans.
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Deracialisation of inequality began under apartheid, not in 1994. (p. 3)
The book centres on the deracialisation of inequality, a process that began not in 1994 but under apartheid itself
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Gains in African income between 1975 and 1991 were concentrated at the top, and poor households did not benefit. (p. 3)
most of the increased income of Africans went to the richest 20 per cent of households, while poor households were, if anything, worse off in 1991 than 1975 (p. 155).
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Apartheid-era data are weak because the state was ignorant by design about African welfare. (p. 3)
the knowledge regime of apartheid South Africa featured studied ignorance, not least about the effects of state policy on Africans.
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The post-1994 wage and productivity strategy favoured capital intensity and worsened unemployment. (p. 4)
The result was to encourage a capital-intensive form of growth that provided a boost to the fortunes of the best trained and best-off African workers, but if anything made unemployment worse.
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The overall pattern is a split between a favoured core and a marginalised poor. (p. 4)
Their overall picture is that of a virtuous circle for the better-off and a vicious circle for the disadvantaged.
Evidence ledger¶
Sources used¶
| Source | Kind | Period | How used |
|---|---|---|---|
| Census and survey data (1990s South African censuses and household surveys) as used by Seekings and Nattrass | population census | 1990s, with earlier apartheid-era data | The reviewed book draws on census and survey data to document the distribution of income and the class structure, and its authors flag the limits of these data. |
| Household income distribution data, 1975 and 1991 (as cited in Seekings and Nattrass, p. 155) | secondary literature compilation | 1975-1991 | Supports the claim that most of the increase in African income went to the richest 20 per cent of households while poor households were no better off. |
| Data on class structure, households, wages, welfare, education and employment on both sides of 1994 | official statistical series | Apartheid era and post-1994 | The reviewer says much of the book analyses data to document and explain the trajectory of inequality, class structure and unemployment. |
| Comparative data on other African countries and middle-income unequal societies such as Brazil | international trade or finance data | Not specified | Frequent comparisons establish the distinctiveness of South Africa's trajectory, such as its capitalist economy, welfare system and apartheid-era controls on the rural poor. |
Inference¶
Quantification: Descriptive tables.
This is a book review, so it describes inference rather than performing it. The reviewed book combines historical and institutional analysis of the apartheid and post-apartheid 'growth path' with quantitative analysis of census and survey data on income, class and employment, plus comparison with Brazil and other African countries.
Key claims¶
| Claim | Basis | Strength |
|---|---|---|
| Inequality is explained by a distinctive growth path, a sequence of decisions and practices that shaped later options, rather than a single factor or legacy. Evidence is historical-institutional narrative. (p. 2-3) | Historical narrative of policy and institutions as summarised by the reviewer; no specific source named. | Asserted |
| Most of the increased African income between 1975 and 1991 went to the richest 20 per cent of households, and poor households were worse off. (p. 3) | Household income distribution evidence cited at p. 155 of the book; underlying source not named in the review. | Partial data |
| Apartheid rested on land expropriation, labour coercion and policing; it generated skills bottlenecks and capital-intensive production, a surplus of unskilled African labour by the 1960s, and the colour bar was allowed to float upward. (p. 3) | Historical and institutional analysis, not tied to specific sources in the review. | Asserted |
| The post-1994 high-wage, high-productivity strategy encouraged capital-intensive growth that benefited better-off African workers and worsened unemployment. (p. 4) | Analysis of wage, employment and income data after 1994, as summarised by the reviewer. | Partial data |
| Inequality has been deracialised, beginning under apartheid, and now lies chiefly in unemployment and limited access by the poor to resources, with policies favouring intermediate groups. (p. 3) | Quantitative class and income analysis on both sides of 1994, as reported by the reviewer. | Partial data |
| The ANC's strategy framed redistribution in terms of racial redress rather than building a constituency among the poor. (p. 4) | Book p. 371 quoted by the reviewer; the evidence behind it is not specified. | Asserted |
The author's caveats¶
The reviewer notes that apartheid-era knowledge regimes featured 'studied ignorance', especially about the effects of policy on Africans. Census and survey data improved in the 1990s but still have limits, and the categories used to organise information are ambiguous and politically volatile. The reviewed authors are described as self-aware about these methodological limitations.
Gaps in the evidence¶
As a review, the text names almost no specific primary sources, such as particular censuses, October Household Surveys, commission reports or archives, so the evidentiary basis of the book cannot be audited from it. Apartheid-era African income and household data were weak, and the 1975-1991 comparison depends on reconstructed series; household-level panel or linked microdata would test the claims better. Such microdata exist only for the post-1993 period, so the earlier trajectory remains hard to test.
Replicability: Data poorly documented.