The Regulation of Working Conditions for Africans, 1918 - 1948¶
David Duncan (1990). The Regulation of Working Conditions for Africans, 1918 - 1948. History Workshop, University of the Witwatersrand: Structure and Experience in the Making of Apartheid (6-10 February 1990). University of the Witwatersrand, History Workshop.
| Type | conference paper |
| Scope | Economics and economic history of apartheid |
| Method | archival narrative |
| Period studied | 1918–1948 |
| Regions | South Africa, Witwatersrand, Natal |
| Themes | mining migrant labour, labour markets wages, business and state, origins segregation, unions strikes |
| Citation key | duncan1990 |
Argument¶
The paper asks how the state regulated working conditions for Africans through three bodies: the Factory Inspectorate, the Mines Division under the Government Mining Engineer (GME), and the Government Native Labour Bureau (GNLB) in the Native Affairs Department. It rejects a simple instrumentalist view of the state as an agent of capital. Officials had their own interests and perceptions: procedure, power, prestige, principles, a residual 'trusteeship', and racism. Each department's behaviour depended on who it saw as its main constituency and on the political weight of its sector. Mines inspectors acted as a 'Trojan Horse' for the gold industry, factory inspectors served white workers, and the GNLB was concerned with control and the supply of African labour. Regulation brought some improvements, but the treatment of African workers stayed very poor, and the migrant system was left intact.
Evidence and method¶
Archival material: Department of Labour and Mines annual reports, Union Year Books, statutes, GNLB, NTS and MNW files, and commission evidence (Low Grade Mines, Mining Regulations, Mills, Holloway/Native Economic, Unemployment). It also draws on the Wits Archives (Kotze, Cooke, Lucas papers) and on secondary literature (Yudelman, Davies, Dubow, van Onselen, Jeeves, Hindson) and bureaucratic and state theory (Weber, Poulantzas, Beetham, Williams).
Place in the debates¶
- Instrumentalist vs 'relative autonomy' views of the state and labour regulation (see The state and capital: instrumentalism, autonomy and fractions of capital). Accepts that the state generally served capital's long-term interests but argues officials had their own interests and perceptions. Civil servants could side with white workers, with a sub-section of the state, or with African workers without 'bringing down the whole edifice'.
- Cheap labour thesis / gold-mining cost structure (see Cheap labour thesis and the function of the reserves). Rejects the mines' claim that costs prevented better treatment of workers. Dividends show 'viable alternatives to the cheap labour policy' existed, and the mines chose bonded, poorly paid migrant labour because they believed it paid more.
- Whether segregation in factories was a deliberate strategy to divide the proletariat (see The job colour bar, white labour and its erosion). Denies a Labour Department conspiracy to split the working class. Racial segregation under the 1941 Act was a concession to Afrikaner Nationalist pressure, not a settled policy of dividing workers.
- State–mining capital relationship (Yudelman, Davies) (see The state and capital: instrumentalism, autonomy and fractions of capital). Endorses Yudelman's account of mine politics and the role of Kotze and Pirow. Criticises his tendency to judge officials by how well they grasped his 'symbiotic' theory, and adds the social background and attitudes of administrators as explanatory factors.
Findings¶
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Regulation brought some gains, but the average treatment of African workers in mines and industry remained very poor. (p. 4)
the average treatment meted out to Africans in mines and industry remained very poor
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The government refused to impose a white-labour policy on secondary industry because of the cost to industrialists. (p. 7)
neither Hertzog nor Smuts would agree to overloading secondary industry at one blow with a more expensive and untrained white labour force
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The 1941 Factories Act was delayed for the war effort, and its protection for African workers was weakened. (p. 9)
the 1941 Factories Act was not applied until September 1945
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The 1941 Act excluded most African factory labourers from its coverage. (p. 9)
the act excluded labourers working within the precincts of a factory (such as packers and handlers), the vast majority of whom were Africans.
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The Kotze-chaired Low Grade Mines Commission served the mineowners: it rejected raising African wages, and recommended lifting the colour bar and widening labour catchment areas. (p. 11)
The idea of raising African wages was roundly condemned
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GME Pirow proposed removing whites from underground to make low-grade ore profitable, putting profitability ahead of white labour. (p. 11)
Pirow argued that the best way to save money and make millions of tons of low grade ore profitable was to remove as many whites from underground as possible.
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Mines inspectors sided with management against Creswell and the white unions and did not press for stricter regulation. (p. 13)
They acted, in a sense, as a Trojan Horse for the mining industry within the State.
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In the Simmer and Jack compound case the DNL sided with the mineowners and never used his statutory powers, although the mine was profitable. (p. 17)
At no point did the DNL invoke his powers under regulations issued in 1911.
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Underground violence was part of the labour process, and the Native Labour inspectors could do little to limit it. (p. 18)
Beatings of labourers by 'boss-boys' and white supervisors were everyday occurrences, a part of the labour process
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The apparent decline of the GNLB after the mid-1930s may be an artefact of missing archival records. (p. 20)
A false impression is given by the lack of archival material from after about 1935.
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The mineowners' political weight explains why mining was regulated more weakly than secondary industry. (p. 21)
The mineowners exercised their political influence more concertedly and more effectively than the captains of secondary industry.
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The mines' claim that costs prevented better conditions is not supported by their dividends. (p. 22)
But an analysis of the dividends paid out to shareholders would hardly support this.
Evidence ledger¶
Sources used¶
| Source | Kind | Period | How used |
|---|---|---|---|
| Department of Labour Annual Reports (U.G. 30-38 for 1937; U.G. 45-41 for 1940) | commission or official report | 1937, 1940 | Supplies official statements of departmental policy and the Secretary for Labour's views on factory inspection, union criticism, regulation and the non-discrimination principle. |
| Union Year Book (Nos. 8, 9, 25: 1925, 1926-7, 1946) | official statistical series | 1925-1946 | Used for descriptive facts on the Factories Act, the inspectorate's structure, and the date and application of the 1941 Act. |
| Union Government Gazette (regulations 1919-1924; Govt Notice 1988 of 30/11/11) | legislation gazette | 1911-1924 | Establishes factory regulations issued under the 1918 Act and the 1911 Native Labour Regulation Act regulations the DNL failed to invoke. |
| Statutes of the Union of South Africa (Acts 12/1911, 15/1911, 21/1923, 41/1939, 22/1941) | legislation gazette | 1911-1941 | Provides the legal provisions on working hours, colour bars, segregation (section 51), exclusion of labourers, and contract-breach penalties. |
| Final Report of the Low Grade Mines Commission (Kotze Commission), U.G. 34-20 | commission or official report | 1919-20 | Shows the commission rejecting African wage rises, recommending lifting the colour bar and opening up labour catchment areas. |
| Report of the Mining Regulations Commission (Pittman), U.G. 36-25 | commission or official report | 1924-25 | Source for the argument linking rising accidents to the falling ratio of white supervisors to black workers (1:7.7 in 1911 to 1:10.1 in 1923). |
| Evidence of GME Kotze to the Economic and Wage Commission (2/9/25) and Unemployment Commission (1930); Wits Archives A1882, A1280 | state archives | 1925, 1930 | Documents Kotze's position on accident rates, inspector numbers and African capacities. |
| Lucas Papers, Wits Archives AD1769: Summary of Pirow's evidence to Low Grade Ore Commission, 22/9/30 | state archives | 1930 | Documents Pirow's proposals to remove whites from underground to cut costs and phthisis. |
| Cooke's evidence to the Mills Commission (1925) and the Holloway/Native Economic Commission (1931), Wits AD1438 and A1882 | state archives | 1925, 1931 | Shows the DNL's rosy portrayal of Native Labour services and his defence of migrant labour, compounds and pass laws. |
| Mines Department files MNW MM2489/25 pt.1 and MM2426/22 | state archives | 1922-1926 | Evidence of union deputations, Gray's admission that supervision had fallen, Creswell's demands and inspector responses on staff ratios and accidents. |
| GNLB (Government Native Labour Bureau) files 291/18/78, 64/23/9, 69/23/154 | state archives | 1922-1924 | Documents the PSC report on cutting the sub-department, Pritchard's role, and monthly returns of assaults on labourers. |
| NTS 697/408C file on the Simmer and Jack compound (1932-34) | state archives | 1932-1934 | Case study of DNL siding with mineowners on compound housing; includes company statement refusing non-essential expenditure. |
| ARB files 1132 and C.F.2/0 (Secretary for Labour, TLC, Parliamentary answer 1939) | state archives | 1939-1944 | Evidence on the TLC complaints, the departmental investigation and factory registration figures (5754 factories, 3597 post-1933), and Walker's statements on the colour bar. |
| Van Eck Commission Papers, Union Archives K302, Box 10 | state archives | WWII | Shows lenient wartime exemptions policy under the 1918 Act. |
| GES 539/13 Public Health Department correspondence (1925) | state archives | 1925 | Shows Pritchard exploiting loopholes in housing regulations as labour recruiter. |
| Rand Daily Mail articles by E.H. Brookes, 27/2/23-1/3/23 | newspapers periodicals | 1923 | Evidence of opposition to the cuts to the NAD. |
| Report of the Public Service Commission Inspectors on the sub-department of Native Labour, 1922 | commission or official report | 1922-23 | Source for recommended staff cuts, reduction of labour districts from eight to four and salary cuts. |
| Yudelman, The Emergence of Modern South Africa (secondary account used for GME biography and mine politics) | secondary literature compilation | 1908-1937 | Source for the political appointments and later careers of GMEs Kotze and Pirow. |
Inference¶
Quantification: Illustrative figures.
Qualitative, comparative institutional case study of three inspectorates (Factory, Mines, Native Labour), built from archival correspondence, commission evidence and official reports, interpreted through theories of the state and bureaucracy (Marx, Poulantzas, Weber).
Key claims¶
| Claim | Basis | Strength |
|---|---|---|
| Factory inspectors saw white workers as their constituency, and the 1941 Factories Act treated black workers differently (segregation under section 51, exclusion of labourers, delayed application) while the department maintained a fiction of non-discrimination. (p. 9) | Statutes (Act 22/1941), Dept of Labour reports, ARB correspondence and Union Year Book. | Partial data |
| Mines inspectorate heads (Kotze, Pirow) acted to promote mining profitability and productivity rather than safety, and the inspectors acted as a 'Trojan Horse' for the industry. (p. 13) | Commission reports and evidence, MNW files on staff ratios, Yudelman. | Partial data |
| The Native Labour Bureau protected little against violence and poor compound conditions, as in the Simmer and Jack case where the DNL sided with mineowners despite evidence of profitability. (p. 17) | NTS 697/408C file, GNLB assault returns, company letter; company profit figures for 1931. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| Mine owners' claim that the cost structure could not support better conditions is not supported by dividend data; the cheap labour policy was chosen for profit. (p. 22) | Asserted from dividends paid out to shareholders without any figures presented, except Simmer and Jack 1931 profits. | Asserted |
| The DNL's rosy portrayal of services to Africans and the absence of strikes was exaggerated and served to defend NAD's standing and the migrant-labour system. (p. 16) | Cooke's evidence to the Mills and Holloway Commissions and the Native Economic Commission memorandum. | Partial data |
| The apparent decline of the GNLB after the 1930s may be illusory, given the lack of archival access to later DNL files and increased activity amid labour militancy. (p. 20) | Author's observation of archival gaps; no direct post-1935 evidence. | Asserted |
| Differences in inspectors' behaviour are explained by the economic and political power of the sectors, the production process, and officials' perception of their constituency and racial attitudes. (p. 22) | Synthesis of the archival and official evidence above; theoretical argument. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
The author's caveats¶
The author notes that archival material for the Native Labour Bureau after about 1935 has not been available to researchers. The paper also draws on a longer thesis chapter and is a summary version.
Gaps in the evidence¶
The argument relies on a small number of correspondence files and commission testimony, with no systematic data on inspection frequency, prosecutions, accident or phthisis rates, or compliance, which would test claims about enforcement. Dividend and cost data for the mines, said to refute the cost-structure argument, are not presented, though Chamber of Mines and company records exist. Post-1935 DNL files and inspectorate records would be needed for the 1940s claims; some may now be accessible in archives.
Replicability: Data described but not public.