Apartheid Under Siege, 1984-1988: Actions and Reactions¶
Stemmet, Jan-Adriaan (2002). Apartheid Under Siege, 1984-1988: Actions and Reactions. PhD thesis, Department of History, University of the Free State (Promoter: Prof. S.L. Barnard). University of the Free State, Bloemfontein.
| Type | thesis |
| Scope | Wider apartheid literature |
| Method | archival narrative |
| Period studied | 1984–1988 |
| Regions | South Africa, United States, Britain / Commonwealth, Western Europe, Japan, Southern Africa (frontline states) |
| Themes | sanctions divestment, politics ideology elections, resistance social movements, macro fiscal finance debt, business and state, transition post apartheid |
| Citation key | stemmet2002 |
Argument¶
The thesis argues that the Botha government could have crushed internal dissent militarily and held minority rule far longer, through the Total National Strategy and National Security Management System. What it could not contain was the international reaction to its security campaigns, which took the form of disinvestment, sanctions and a financial squeeze. The spiral of unrest and repression, with economic disaster looming, produced a stalemate in which neither the ANC (People's Power, 'Render the Country Ungovernable') nor the government could win unilaterally. Both were pushed toward accepting negotiations. Section 3 (the part most relevant here) narrates the 1985 Rubicon speech, the banking crisis and debt standstill, US/Commonwealth/European/Japanese sanctions, and the shift of big business toward demanding reform.
Evidence and method¶
Archives of the ANC (Fort Hare), PW Botha, Louis le Grange and Chris Heunis (Institute for Contemporary History, Bloemfontein), Rupert International papers, interviews (Botha, Malan, de Lange, Naudé, Sunter, Coetsee), newspapers and magazines (Financial Mail, Leadership SA, Newsweek, Time), SAIRR Surveys, Hansard, government gazettes and secondary literature.
Place in the debates¶
- Sanctions effectiveness and who bears their costs (see Sanctions, disinvestment and the anti-apartheid movement). Treats sanctions and the 1985 bank withdrawals as the decisive external pressure that made the status quo unaffordable. Notes they did not collapse the economy in the short run; their weight lay in lost investment and future growth. Reports the opposing anti-sanctions arguments (Suzman, Reagan, Thatcher, Walters) at length and sympathetically.
- Security-versus-economic/political causes of apartheid's end (see Why apartheid ended: reform, transition and elite bargaining). Argues the regime held the military upper hand, so the economy and isolation, not violence or defeat, forced the shift to negotiation. Cites de Lange, De Klerk, Ackerman and Sunter that economic change and 'conscience' eroded apartheid.
- Was Botha's reform genuine or co-option (Huntington, Slabbert, Webster & Erwin) (see Why apartheid ended: reform, transition and elite bargaining). Sees reform as carrot and stick, a tactic to buy time that left white power intact and gave no clear intent or timetable.
- Were banks driven by politics or profit (Chase Manhattan 1985) (see Sanctions, disinvestment and the anti-apartheid movement). Following Sampson, concludes that political pressure and 'hassle' outweighed commercial calculation in the banks' withdrawal.
Findings¶
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Central thesis: the government could have held on militarily, but international economic reaction became insurmountable. (p. 5)
in a military sense, the Botha Government, could have crushed any internal dissent and maintained minority rule for much longer than it did
-
The Rubicon speech and the Chase Manhattan decision triggered a collapse in confidence and a bank exodus. (p. 480)
When Chase ditched Pretoria other overseas banks fell over each in a slapdash stampede of withdrawals. In one single month alone, August 1985, foreign banks extracted $400 million out ofthe country.
-
Short-term foreign debt and rand depreciation underlay the 1985 crisis. (p. 477)
Since 1984, the rand had depreciated by some 40% against the US dollar. The bottom line was that by 1985, Pretoria sat with a short-term debt of $14 000, 000, 000 which accounted for 60% ofthe country's total foreign debt.
-
The rand's fall around the Rubicon speech and 'Black Tuesday'. (p. 499)
By the time Botha's speech was over the rand had dropped from 44,5 cents, to the US dollar, to 38,5 cents.
-
Markets were closed and a debt standstill declared in late August 1985. (p. 500)
After closing the markets for five days, the Finance Minister, Barend du Plessis, announced what many a concemed economist expected and feared, the Government was suspending repayment of all foreign debt until the end of 1985.
-
The 1985 banking crisis made apartheid's economic price exceed what South Africa offered; politics and economy became inseparable. (p. 521)
the price ofSouth African apartheid had now finally overtaken the price ofSouth African gold, and anything else it had to offer for that matter.
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The debt standstill was renegotiated in 1986-88, but fresh foreign lending dried up. (p. 521)
although Pretoria scraped by in obtaining trade credits overseas, after mid-1985, actual loan funding had become scarce.
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The 1985 Reagan sanctions and the 1986 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, passed over a presidential veto, banned loans, krugerrand imports and new investment. (p. 579)
Reagan activated his Presidential vetoing powers to try and smother the proposed legislation, but the Senate backed the House and overrode Reagan's veto.
-
By 1989 the finance minister attributed economic problems to apartheid's costs, debt servicing and lack of foreign capital; growth in the decade was only 1.5%. (p. 626)
Asa whole, during the decade the country had an economic growth rate of only 1,5%.
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Final assessment: the Total Strategy was a security strategy, not an economic plan, and the economy was its Achilles' heel. (p. 636)
The Total Strategy was a security strategy, not an economic plan. The Government's Achilles' tendon was the economy.
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Sanctions' real impact lay in lost foreign capital rather than immediate collapse (Bloom, 1988). (p. 610)
It is not that fragile that all you've got to do is impose a few sanctions and the whole system will collapse
Evidence ledger¶
Sources used¶
| Source | Kind | Period | How used |
|---|---|---|---|
| ANC Archives, Howard Pim Library, Fort Hare (Oliver Tambo Private Collection; ANC-Lusaka Mission boxes, e.g. Box 5, 75, 90, 101) | union or movement records | 1980s (1983-1986 documents) | Establishes ANC structures, four-pillar strategy, People's Power and 'ungovernability' campaign, and ANC views of the UDF. |
| PW Botha Private Collection, Institute for Contemporary History (INCH), Bloemfontein, PV 203 (speeches, 1985-1988 files) | state archives | 1980-1988 | Source for Botha's speeches (Rubicon, state of emergency announcements, Reagan/Nickle correspondence) and security/reform thinking. |
| Louis le Grange Private Collection, INCH, PV 778 (PLEG files) | state archives | 1983-1986 | Used for Le Grange's statements on unrest, army deployment and emergency powers, and unrest incident statistics. |
| Chris Heunis and Hennie van Deventer private collections, INCH | state archives | 1980s | Listed archival collections consulted for constitutional reform and government context. |
| Author interviews with PW Botha, JP de Lange, Kobie Coetsee, Magnus Malan, Beyers Naudé, Clem Sunter (2000) | interviews oral history | June-November 2000 | Supplies elite perspectives on Total Strategy, reform, emergencies, securocrats, business and violence; quoted widely. |
| Correspondence from Gen. Magnus Malan (8 August 2000) and Rupert International / Office of Dr Anton Rupert documents | other | 1985-2000 | Provides Malan's written views on JMCs and revolutionary warfare and Rupert's 1986 letter to Botha and other business viewpoints. |
| Government Gazette: Internal Security Act 1982 (No. 74, vol. 204, no. 8232) and 1986/1987 emergency proclamations | legislation gazette | 1982-1987 | Used to describe powers of the security forces under the ISA and the state of emergency regulations. |
| Hansard, 8th Parliament of South Africa (1985-1987 debates) | parliamentary debates | 1985-1987 | Listed as primary source for parliamentary statements on security and emergencies. |
| Newspapers (Die Volksblad, Rand Daily Mail, Sowetan, Sunday Times, Star, Business Day, Burger etc.) | newspapers periodicals | 1982-1989 | Used for events, statistics and reactions, though author doubts their value due to censorship. |
| South African Institute of Race Relations Race Relations Survey 1984-1988/89 | secondary literature compilation | 1984-1989 | Source for unrest deaths, detentions, army deployments and sanctions measures. |
| Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, vols 1-4 | commission or official report | 1998 | Used for UDF findings on violence, CBW program and legal basis of army deployment. |
| Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group report, 'Mission to South Africa' (1986) | commission or official report | 1986 | Establishes assessment of emergency, violence and failed negotiation concept. |
| Kannemeyer Commission report (Uitenhage, 21 March 1985), RP 74-1985; Economist Intelligence Unit Special Report 1130; Schlemmer 1991 township survey | commission or official report | 1985-1991 | Listed reports; cited generally. |
| Government security statistics on unrest incidents, deaths, detentions (1984-1987) via Le Grange papers, Indicator SA, Race Relations Survey | official statistical series | Sept 1984-1987 | Illustrates escalation and later decline of unrest through monthly incident counts, deaths and arrests. |
| Bureau for Information booklets 'Die Nasionale Noodtoestand' (1988), 'Talking With The ANC' (1986) | commission or official report | 1986-1988 | Official justification of the states of emergency. |
| Financial and economic magazines (Financial Mail, Leadership SA, Finance Week, Newsweek, Time, Fortune) | newspapers periodicals | 1984-1989 | Main sources for the 1985 debt crisis, Chase Manhattan withdrawal, rand fall, sanctions and business views. |
| Rubicon speech and Botha's private correspondence with Reagan, Thatcher, Kohl (INCH PV 203) | state archives | 1985-1988 | Documents diplomatic breakdown with the West. |
| Secondary data compilations: Hanlon, Venter (sanctions), Seekings (UDF), Sampson, Bethlehem, Kenney | secondary literature compilation | 1980s | Used for sanctions measures, debt figures, UDF membership and organisation. |
Inference¶
Quantification: Illustrative figures.
Narrative political-history case study built on elite interviews, private-collection archives and ANC archive documents, supplemented by newspapers, official reports and secondary literature. Claims about action-reaction dynamics and the economic role of sanctions rest on chronological reconstruction and quoted statements, not statistical analysis.
Key claims¶
| Claim | Basis | Strength |
|---|---|---|
| The Botha government could have militarily crushed internal dissent but was constrained by economic repercussions of international pressure. (p. 5) | Chronological narrative of 1985 banking crisis, rand collapse and sanctions, plus interviews (De Lange, Naudé) and Gen. Thirion's quote; no economic data analysis. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| Chase Manhattan's July 1985 decision not to roll over loans triggered a withdrawal of foreign bank credit and the 1985 debt standstill. (p. 457) | Secondary accounts (Kenney, Sampson, Bethlehem) and periodicals; cited sums such as $400 million withdrawn in August 1985. | Partial data |
| Political violence escalated sharply between Sept 1984 and mid-1985, then declined after the states of emergency. (p. 120) | Government security statistics on incidents, deaths and arrests (via SAIRR, Indicator SA, Le Grange papers) and press reports. | Partial data |
| The UDF did not instigate the 1984 township violence but helped create the climate for it. (p. 160) | Seekings's history of the UDF, TRC findings and UDF/ANC archive documents. | Partial data |
| The ANC strategy after 1976 centred on mass mobilisation and the four pillars, culminating in People's Power and 'ungovernability' from 1984. (p. 68) | ANC archive documents (Tambo 1984 New Year statement, Lusaka Mission organisational report) and De Beer and Du Preez theses. | Systematic data |
| The Rubicon speech of August 1985 was a watershed that damaged international confidence and sent the rand falling. (p. 473) | Press reports, De Klerk's memoir, Reserve Bank governor De Kock's later estimate, rand exchange figures. | Partial data |
| Business leaders pressed for reform and negotiation but their influence on Botha was limited and relations deteriorated. (p. 441) | Memoranda (FCI/Wilson, Rupert letter, Relly proposal in INCH files), press reports, interviews with Sunter and De Lange. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
The author's caveats¶
The author notes that interviewees were reluctant and spoke only in broad terms, interviewees' private document collections were unavailable, and ANC members refused interviews so liberation perspectives are missing. He also says newspapers were heavily censored and not an effective source, and that information on NIS covert contacts is scarce.
Gaps in the evidence¶
The economic argument (sanctions and disinvestment forcing negotiation) lacks systematic economic data such as capital flows, balance-of-payments, investment, growth and trade series, which existed in Reserve Bank and SARB publications and could test the causal claim. Unrest statistics are patchy and drawn from secondary compilations rather than police or Detainees' Parents Support Committee records. Interview evidence is dominated by regime and establishment figures; declassified state archives, TRC amnesty records and ANC/UDF participant interviews would balance this.
Replicability: Data described but not public.