The Effect of Sanctions on Constitutional Change in SA¶
Steward, Dave (on behalf of F.W. de Klerk) (2004). The Effect of Sanctions on Constitutional Change in SA. Speech delivered to the Institut Choiseul, Paris, 14 June 2004. The FW de Klerk Foundation.
| Type | primary source |
| Scope | Economics and economic history of apartheid |
| Method | primary document |
| Period studied | 1945–1994 |
| Regions | South Africa, Namibia, Angola, southern Africa |
| Themes | sanctions divestment, politics ideology elections, transition post apartheid, macro fiscal finance debt, business and state, bantustans removals influx, inequality poverty unemployment, demography urbanisation |
| Citation key | steward2004 |
Argument¶
Speaking for F.W. de Klerk, Steward argues that sanctions were not the main reason the National Party government embarked on fundamental reform in 1989-90. Sanctions harmed and distorted the economy but also produced unintended effects: they rallied white voters, spurred import substitution (SASOL, armaments) and hurt black workers. The government resisted concessions because of fears over Afrikaner self-determination, communist influence in the ANC and chaos. The shift came from the failure of the homeland partition model, the collapse of communism, the 1988 Namibia/Angola settlement, and above all long-run socio-economic change, including black urbanisation, rising black incomes and the embourgeoisement of Afrikaners. The text is a retrospective, partisan speech with no footnotes. It makes its case by assertion and anecdote, with a few statistics.
Evidence and method¶
No formal sources. It relies on the speaker's recollection of government perceptions, a 1986 opinion survey of whites, unnamed 'authoritative opinion surveys' of blacks, a study by M D McGrath on income shares, Small Business Development Corporation figures, university enrolment figures, and anecdotes such as General Motors/Delta Motors.
Place in the debates¶
- Sanctions effectiveness as a cause of the political transition (see Sanctions, disinvestment and the anti-apartheid movement). Argues from the perpetrator-regime side that sanctions were one factor to be weighed but not the main driver; economic and social change and the end of the Cold War mattered more. Sanctions were effective only where core interests were not threatened.
- Liberal vs revisionist on apartheid and growth / modernisation as the solvent of segregation (see Liberal vs revisionist: was apartheid functional or dysfunctional for capitalist growth?). Takes a modernisation-liberal line: market-driven urbanisation and rising incomes eroded pass laws and the Group Areas Act, and sanctions slowed these forces. It makes no reference to the revisionist view of apartheid as functional to capital.
- Economic costs of sanctions (see Sanctions, disinvestment and the anti-apartheid movement). Concedes they cut growth by roughly 1.5% a year and forced costly strategic investment, but stresses unintended benefits such as SASOL, armaments and oil reserves, and the 1985 banking crisis as market-driven rather than a sanction.
Findings¶
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The speaker estimates the growth cost of sanctions at about 1.5% a year, while saying South Africa could still obtain what it needed at a premium. (p. 4)
sanctions seriously harmed and distorted the South African economy – and probably reduced its economic growth rate by about 1.5% per annum.
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The oil embargo spurred SASOL, and the arms embargo spurred a domestic armaments industry, both import-substitution gains. (p. 3)
OPEC’s 1970 oil sanctions spurred South Africa to expand and develop SASOL, its advanced oil from coal process, which soon provided a significant part of its fuel requirements
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Sanctions are said to have strengthened NP electoral support by providing a rallying cause. (p. 3)
The National Party used the threat of sanctions and international pressure to rally voters to its cause in election after election.
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The 1985-86 bank credit refusal is described as the most serious economic threat, caused by confidence collapse rather than formal sanctions. (p. 6)
refused to roll over about $ 14 billion of short-term loans.
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The economy is said to have grown despite sanctions and the state of emergency, implying the regime could have held on. (p. 6)
the economy actually grew at an annual rate of 2.7% between April 1986 and February 1989.
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The homeland partition model is described as having failed on inequity of land allocation and economic integration of the cities. (p. 7)
the 78% black majority being allocated only 13 % of the land
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Black share of personal income is said to have risen sharply after 1970, citing McGrath. (p. 8)
between 1970 and 1991 there was a marked shift in the relationship: the Black share climbed to 37% and the White share had fallen below 50%
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Urbanisation is said to have made the pass laws and Group Areas Act unenforceable before their formal repeal. (p. 8)
the “pass laws” were abolished by the reality of millions of people migrating to the cities, long before 1986 when they were officially scrapped
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Black workers bore the brunt of sanctions and the speaker claims that most blacks opposed them. (p. 4)
The main victims of sanctions – predictably – were black workers who were usually the first to be retrenched as a result of the negative effects of sanctions.
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The general lesson drawn is that sanctions work only when core interests are not threatened, and that they slowed underlying forces for change. (p. 10)
sanctions can be quite effective in encouraging action and reforms that do not threaten the core interests or the continued existence of targeted governments and communities.
Evidence ledger¶
Sources used¶
| Source | Kind | Period | How used |
|---|---|---|---|
| M D McGrath study of racial distribution of personal income, 1917-1970 (and extension to 1991) | secondary literature compilation | 1917-1991 | Supplies the racial shares of personal income used to argue that underlying socio-economic change, not sanctions, drove reform. |
| Small Business Development Corporation figures on black small businesses | official statistical series | early 1990s | Cited to show a large black small-business sector by the early 1990s. |
| University and technikon enrolment statistics by race, 1993 (unnamed source) | official statistical series | 1993 | Shows black university enrolment overtaking white enrolment as evidence of social change. |
| 1986 survey of white South African opinion on sanctions and negotiations with the ANC (unnamed) | author survey or fieldwork | 1986 | Used to show that sanctions hardened white resistance to concessions. |
| Unnamed opinion surveys of black South Africans on sanctions | household or labour survey microdata | 1970s-1980s | Used to claim a majority of black South Africans opposed sanctions. |
| 1992 white referendum result on continuing reform | election returns | March 1992 | Cited as evidence that a new generation of Afrikaners supported reform. |
| UN Security Council Resolutions 432 and 435 and the Secretary-General's implementation plan | legislation gazette | 1976-1989 | Narrates the Namibia negotiations and South Africa's loss of confidence in the UN process. |
| US Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (1986) and EU sanctions | legislation gazette | 1986 | Documents the intensification of sanctions after the 1984-85 unrest. |
| Macroeconomic growth and sanctions-cost estimates (unattributed) | national accounts macro | 1986-1989 | Used to claim sanctions reduced growth by about 1.5% per annum, yet the economy grew 2.7% in 1986-89. |
| Foreign bank short-term debt figures and 1985-86 debt standstill/repayment agreement | international trade or finance data | 1985-1986 | Used to argue that the banking crisis was market-driven rather than a result of government-imposed sanctions. |
| Land allocation and population shares under the homeland partition policy | official statistical series | early 1980s | Illustrates the inequity of the partition model, with 78% of the population allocated 13% of the land. |
| General Motors / Delta Motors disinvestment case (company history) | company records or reports | 1926-1987 | Anecdotal case showing disinvestment benefited white management. |
| Author's personal recollection and government insider knowledge (de Klerk's perspective) | interviews oral history | 1970s-1990 | Insider testimony on the motives and perceptions of the National Party government. |
Inference¶
Quantification: Illustrative figures.
Argument by narrative and insider testimony, supported by a few unsourced or lightly sourced statistics (income shares, enrolments, growth rates) and anecdotal cases. It counterfactually ranks the causes of the 1990 reforms, with domestic socio-economic forces placed above sanctions. There is no formal test.
Key claims¶
| Claim | Basis | Strength |
|---|---|---|
| Sanctions harmed the economy, reducing growth by roughly 1.5% a year, but did not decisively drive the 1990 reforms. (p. 4) | Unsourced growth estimate and the 2.7% growth figure for 1986-89; no cited source. | Asserted |
| Sanctions had unintended consequences that strengthened the NP and South African industry, including SASOL, armaments, and the Delta Motors buyout. (p. 3) | Anecdotal examples (SASOL, oil reserves, armaments industry, GM/Delta Motors) without cited sources. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| The 1985-86 banking crisis was caused by a market collapse of confidence rather than government-imposed sanctions. (p. 6) | Narrative reference to Chase Manhattan and the refusal to roll over $14bn in loans; no source cited. | Asserted |
| The racial distribution of personal income shifted markedly between 1970 and 1991, with the black share rising to 37% and the white share falling below 50%, indicating underlying forces of change. (p. 8) | McGrath's study of income shares (secondary compilation), cited without detail. | Partial data |
| The government's decision for fundamental change in 1989-90 resulted from policy failure, the collapse of communism, the Namibia/Angola settlement, and above all long-run socio-economic dynamics. (p. 8) | Insider reasoning and illustrative statistics (enrolments, small businesses); no systematic data. | Asserted |
| Sanctions hardened white resistance and the government was not under existential pressure by 1988, since it could probably have kept control for 10-20 years. (p. 6) | 1986 white opinion survey (unnamed) and the assertion that the state of emergency restored order. | Partial data |
| Black South Africans were the main victims of sanctions and majority black opinion opposed them. (p. 4) | Unnamed 'authoritative opinion surveys'; no citation. | Asserted |
The author's caveats¶
No caveats on the data are given, apart from describing the income-share statistics as 'dry statistics' and attributing them to a study carried out 'some years ago'.
Gaps in the evidence¶
The argument needs systematic data on sanctions' economic effects (capital flows, trade, growth counterfactuals) and on timing against policy decisions, none of which are cited. Archival records of cabinet and State Security Council deliberations and contemporary polling data on both white and black opinion would test the causal ranking of sanctions against domestic forces. Published national accounts, Reserve Bank and census data, together with the surveys, existed then and are available now, but the speech uses none of them directly.
Replicability: Data poorly documented.